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Abstract
Multi-agency collaboration is often advocated as a means of tackling cross-cutting areas of 
public services and viewed as a solution to service fragmentation, with local agencies on the 
receiving end of government exhortations to collaborate.  Yet there is relatively little research 
examining the  effectiveness of  policy  tools  and  mechanisms aiming to  stimulate  local 
collaboration. This thesis examines the influence and dynamics of vertical and horizontal 
coordination  tools,  investigating  their  potential  to  enhance collaboration  in  local  public 
service delivery networks and to reduce negative externalities.  A theoretical framework is 
employed which synthesises models of policy implementation and bureaucratic decision-
making. The empirical research is conducted in relation to organisations working with the 
homeless in England, and the research methods include a survey of Local Authorities and 
interviews with civil servants and frontline professionals.  While governmental attempts to 
foster collaboration are partially effective, there are weaknesses with some of the policy tools 
employed, and  limits  to  State  control.   Local  actors’ collaborative  decision-making is 
influenced more by ‘bottom-up’ than by  ‘top-down’ factors.  Moreover,  the competitive 
context in which service providers operate leads them to pursue strategies to promote their 
own organisational interests rather than working towards a dominant common interest.  The 
strategies employed are broadly in line with a bureaucratic politics perspective, and include 
failure to share information, possessiveness over client outcomes and projecting an image of 
success rather than sharing problems.  Nevertheless, formal collaborative mechanisms do 
have the potential to alleviate externalities associated with fragmented systems. With strong 
local management and appropriate central facilitation, they can help to meet client needs and 
to counter fragmentation, ultimately leading to better services.  
2
Acknowledgements
The project was funded by the Economic and Social Research Council/ Office of the Deputy 
Prime Minister/ Price Waterhouse Coopers postgraduate research programme, and I am very 
grateful for this financial assistance (Award No. PTA-039-2004-00006). There are a number 
of people I wish to thank for their advice and assistance with the project. I would first like to 
express my gratitude to Prof Chris Skelcher and Prof Andrew Massey for examining this 
thesis.  I am very grateful also to Prof Oliver James for supervising the research, and for his 
time,  advice  and  encouragement  throughout  the  project.  He  was  also  responsible  for 
encouraging me to undertake a PhD thesis in the first place and helped me obtain funding to 
support this. Dr Claire Dunlop, Prof Bruce Doern, Gabriela Meier and Eva Beuselinck all 
commented on drafts, and Annie Hawton and Dr Stewart Barr provided statistical advice. 
Others who provided support along the way included Barry Dale, Colin Farlow, Bill Tupman, 
Prof  Ade  Kearns, Prof  Koen Verhoest and  Dr  Stephanie Tierney.   My  mentors in  the 
Department for Communities and Local Government were Helen Smith, Penny Withers and 
Kate Hudson, who provided advice and facilitated access to information and interviewees. 
Kay Caldwell kindly proof read the thesis. Prof Brian Sheldon also proof read and has been 
something  of  a  mentor,  helping me  to  see  the  contribution  that  research  can  make to 
improving services for those who depend on them.  I wish to thank my parents Kay and 
Martin and other family members and good friends for their support and encouragement. 
Most of all, thanks to Ben for his steadfast support, patience and faith in me.  Finally, special 
thanks are extended to all the research participants who generously gave up their time to take 
part in the study.
Dedication
This  thesis  is  dedicated  to  all  those  who  have  experienced homelessness,  and  to  the 
committed staff in local services who work tirelessly to help improve the lives of those 
affected.
3
Table of Contents
List of Figures......................................................................................................................................................9
           ....................................................................................................................................................................9
List of Tables........................................................................................................................................................9
List of Abbreviations.........................................................................................................................................11
Introduction.......................................................................................................................................................12
I   Research context........................................................................................................................................12
II   Theoretical perspectives...........................................................................................................................15
III   Research questions..................................................................................................................................18
IV   The empirical setting...............................................................................................................................19
V   Overview of data sources and research methods.......................................................................................19
VI   Thesis structure........................................................................................................................................20
Chapter 1: The rationale for and factors affecting collaboration..................................................................22
Chapter Overview..........................................................................................................................................22
1.1 The search for coordination in a fragmented landscape...........................................................................23
1.1.1 Coordination: a recurrent theme in public administration....................................................................23
1.1.2 Coordination in the ‘differentiated polity’: multi-level and multi-agency..............................................25
1.1.3 Service delivery networks as a mode of governance..............................................................................28
1.1.4 Service delivery networks as self-organising.........................................................................................29
1.1.5 The implications for accountability, democracy, power and control......................................................30
1.2 Collaboration as ‘meta-governance’ ..........................................................................................................33
1.2.1 Definitions of collaboration...................................................................................................................34
1.2.2 Drivers of collaboration: mandated versus voluntary...........................................................................35
1.2.3 The rationale for collaboration in public service delivery networks......................................................36
1.2.4 The rationale for collaboration in central government..........................................................................38
1.2.5 Central exhortations for local collaboration in the contemporary policy context.................................39
1.3 Key factors affecting collaboration............................................................................................................42
1.3.1 Interpretive Factors...............................................................................................................................43
1.3.2 Contextual Factors................................................................................................................................47
Chapter 2: Horizontal Collaboration and Vertical Meta-Governance..........................................................51
Chapter Overview..........................................................................................................................................51
2.1 The Horizontal Dimension: Conceptualising Collaboration.....................................................................52
2.1.1 Levels and varieties of collaboration.....................................................................................................52
4
2.2 Formal tools of collaboration......................................................................................................................55
2.2.1 Classifying formal horizontal coordination tools at local level.............................................................56
2.2.2 Formal horizontal tools for joining up central government...................................................................59
2.2.3 Issues governing horizontal tool choice.................................................................................................62
2.3 Informal collaboration and the role of the individual...............................................................................64
2.4 The Vertical Dimension: Meta-governance of Collaboration...................................................................66
2.5 Vertical tools for joining up local public services......................................................................................68
2.5.1 The tools of government: authority, incentives and information............................................................68
2.5.2 Issues governing vertical tool choice.....................................................................................................70
2.5.3 Tools for steering collaboration.............................................................................................................74
2.6 Can governments mandate collaboration?................................................................................................76
Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework ................................................................................................................78
Chapter overview...........................................................................................................................................78
3.1 Justification for the theoretical framework...............................................................................................79
3.2 Collaboration as rational administration ..................................................................................................81
3.2.1 Introducing the rational-administrative perspective..............................................................................81
3.2.2 Applying rational-administration to the implementation of collaboration.............................................85
3.3 The bureaucratic politics of collaboration.................................................................................................88
3.3.1 Introducing the bureaucratic politics perspective..................................................................................88
3.3.2 Applying bureaucratic politics to the implementation of collaboration.................................................94
3.4 Implementation theory and collaboration.................................................................................................98
3.4.1 Top-down perspectives..........................................................................................................................98
3.4.2 Bottom-Up Perspectives......................................................................................................................100
3.4.3 Application of top-down and bottom-up perspectives to the implementation of collaboration.............103
3.5 Potential explanatory models and hypotheses.........................................................................................108
Chapter summary.........................................................................................................................................113
Chapter 4: Empirical Context and Research methods..................................................................................114
Chapter overview..........................................................................................................................................114
4.1 Empirical Context......................................................................................................................................115
4.1.1 The cross-cutting nature of homelessness............................................................................................115
4.1.2 Defining the homelessness service delivery network............................................................................116
4.1.3 Funding, governance and accountability arrangements......................................................................120
4.1.4 Policy and legislative context..............................................................................................................124
4.1.5 The nature of the task environment......................................................................................................126
4.2 Application of the theoretical framework to homelessness.....................................................................128
5
4.2.1 Collaboration in homelessness as rational administration?................................................................128
4.2.2 Collaboration in homelessness as bureaucratic politics?....................................................................129
4.2.3 Collaboration in homelessness as top-down?......................................................................................130
4.2.4 Collaboration in homelessness as bottom-up?.....................................................................................131
4.3 Research methods......................................................................................................................................133
4.3.1 Overview of research methods and procedure.....................................................................................133
4.3.2 Phase One: Postal Survey...................................................................................................................135
4.3.3 Phase Two: Interviews.........................................................................................................................139
Chapter 5: Local Views of the Rationale for and Factors Affecting Collaboration....................................146
Chapter overview.........................................................................................................................................146
5.1 Externalities in the Homelessness System................................................................................................147
5.1.1 Client level externalities......................................................................................................................147
5.1.2 Externalities relating to service provision/ planning...........................................................................153
5.2 Local Support for Collaboration..............................................................................................................156
5.3 The Factors Affecting Collaboration........................................................................................................158
5.3.1  Interpretive Factors ...........................................................................................................................159
5.3.2    Contextual Factors ..........................................................................................................................168
Chapter summary and discussion.................................................................................................................179
Chapter 6: The Meta-Governance of Collaboration: ...................................................................................182
Steering from the top-down?..........................................................................................................................182
Chapter Overview........................................................................................................................................182
6.1 Local collaboration as a government priority.........................................................................................183
6.2 Classification of vertical meta-governance tools to stimulate local collaboration.................................187
6.2.1 Authority-based tools...........................................................................................................................189
6.2.2 Information-based tools.......................................................................................................................194
6.2.3 Incentive-based tools...........................................................................................................................197
6.2.4 Additional national actors and local governance structures................................................................199
6.3 Collaboration in central government as a form of vertical steering......................................................201
6.3.1 Forms of collaboration in central government....................................................................................201
6.3.2 The challenges of collaboration in central government.......................................................................208
6.3.3 Local perceptions of collaboration in government..............................................................................210
Chapter summary and discussion.................................................................................................................213
Chapter 7: Collaboration and its relationship to Government Steering and Other Key Factors..............216
Chapter overview.........................................................................................................................................216
7.1 The level and nature of homelessness collaboration in English local authorities..................................217
6
7.1.1 Formal collaboration: introduction ....................................................................................................217
7.1.2 The level of adoption of formal collaboration tools.............................................................................218
7.1.3 The nature of collaboration tools employed........................................................................................220
7.1.4 Informal collaboration: introduction...................................................................................................225
7.1.5 The level of informal collaboration and its relationship with formal collaboration............................226
7.1.6 Informal collaboration: breakdown by sector and organisation..........................................................229
7.1.7 Time spent interacting with other bodies.............................................................................................231
7.2 Explaining variation in local authorities..................................................................................................232
7.2.1 The influence of government steering..................................................................................................233
7.2.2 Additional factors affecting collaboration: Introduction.....................................................................239
7.2.3 Intra-organisational factors................................................................................................................241
7.2.4 Inter-organisational factors.................................................................................................................242
7.2.5 Interpretive factors: trust and mutual understanding .........................................................................243
Chapter summary and discussion.................................................................................................................246
Chapter 8: The contribution of horizontal tools to collaboration................................................................250
Chapter overview.........................................................................................................................................250
8.1 Do horizontal coordination tools attenuate externalities?......................................................................251
8.2 Motivations for adopting horizontal tools................................................................................................255
8.3 The development and management of horizontal coordination tools....................................................259
8.3.1 Horizontal tool development: an incremental process.........................................................................259
8.3.2 The challenges of developing and managing horizontal tools.............................................................261
8.4 Do horizontal coordination tools alleviate the obstacles to collaboration?............................................266
Chapter Summary and Discussion................................................................................................................269
Chapter 9: The contribution of vertical meta-governance tools to collaboration.......................................271
Chapter overview.........................................................................................................................................271
9.1 Perceptions of authority-based tools........................................................................................................272
9.1.1 Legislation requiring cooperation ......................................................................................................272
9.1.2 Monitoring and Regulation..................................................................................................................275
9.1.3 Network constitution............................................................................................................................278
9.2 Perceptions of information-based tools ...................................................................................................281
9.2.1 Government guidance..........................................................................................................................281
9.2.2 Information provision and collection through central-local contact ...................................................284
9.3 Perceptions of incentive-based tools ........................................................................................................287
9.3.1 Funding streams and status awards: incentives for collaboration?.....................................................287
9.3.2 Capacity Building Tools......................................................................................................................290
7
9.4 Perceptions of Broader Local Meta-Governance Structures..................................................................292
Chapter Summary and Discussion................................................................................................................295
Chapter 10: Conclusion...................................................................................................................................299
Chapter introduction and overview..............................................................................................................299
10.1 The Pattern of Local Collaboration and Central Steering....................................................................301
10.2 Explaining Collaboration........................................................................................................................303
10.2.1 Assessment of the rational administrative perspective.......................................................................305
10.2.2 Assessment of the bureaucratic politics perspective..........................................................................307
10.2.3 Assessment of the top-down perspective............................................................................................310
10.2.4 Assessment of the bottom-up perspective...........................................................................................314
10.2.5 The rival models assessed..................................................................................................................316
10.3 The Effectiveness of Horizontal and Vertical Coordination Tools........................................................321
10.4 Positioning the Research.........................................................................................................................323
10.4.1 The Contribution of the Research......................................................................................................323
10.4.2 Limitations and Avenues for Future Enquiry.....................................................................................325
10.5 Concluding remarks................................................................................................................................326
Appendices.......................................................................................................................................................328
Bibliography....................................................................................................................................................351
Official Publications........................................................................................................................................351
8
List of Figures
Fig I Framework for the empirical analysis…………………………………. .       15
Fig 1.1 Antecedents of collaboration……………………………………………   46
Fig 2.1 Spectrum of collaboration………………………………………………   55
Fig 2.2 Modes of horizontal collaboration in central and local government…....   64
Fig 2.3 Modes of vertical coordination for stimulating local collaboration……         79
Fig 3.1 Overview of the rival explanatory models……………………………… 113
Fig 3.2 Key aspects of the rival explanatory models……………………………. 113
Fig 4.1 The homelessness service delivery network…………………………….. 124
Fig 4.2 Governance structure of the English homelessness sector……………….. 128
Fig 4.3 Sequential explanatory-complementary design ………………………        140
Fig 4.4 Sampling frame for interviews…………………………………………      145
Fig 5.1 Main factors affecting collaboration: thematic analysis………………….   164
Fig 6.1 Government departments involved in homelessness……………………     212
Fig 6.2 Wider network of national bodies involved in homelessness…………….  213
Fig 7.1 Number of horizontal coordination tools employed in local authorities…   224
Fig 7.2 Histogram of informal collaboration in local authorities………………      233
Fig 7.3 Scattergram of formal and informal collaboration……………………….   235
Fig 10.1 Preponderance of evidence to support each of the rival models ……..      326
List of Tables
Table 4.1 Key characteristics of the case study areas…………………………… 148
Table 5.1 Client level externalities……………………………………………… 153
Table 5.2 Externalities relating to service provision/ planning………………… 158 
Table 5.3 Local support for collaboration……………………………………… 162
Table 5.4 Trust and mutual understanding………… ………………………… 167
Table 5.5 Lack of domain consensus …………………………………………… 169
Table 5.6 Lack of goal congruence; contrasting agendas and priorities………… 172
Table 5.7 Contextual intra-organisational factors affecting collaboration……… 175
Table 5.8 Contextual inter-organisational factors affecting collaboration: 
    The broader policy & funding environment…………………………… 177
Table 5.9 Contextual inter-organisational factors affecting collaboration:
      The level of interdependence…………………………………………… 181
Table 5.10 Boundary spanners and other individual level factors………………. 183
Table 6.1 Local views of central prioritisation of collaboration………………… 189
Table 6.2 Central views of prioritisation of collaboration…………………………. 191
Table 6.3 Governance strategies and tools for promoting collaboration …………. 193 
Table 6.4 Legislation with collaborative implications…………………………… 196
Table 6.5 Horizontal coordination tools suggested in central guidance…………… 200
Table 6.6 Official guidance on collaboration……………………………………… 201
Table 6.7 Formal central collaboration tools in Homelessness Sector …………… 211
Table 6.8 Local views of collaboration in central government …………………… 218
List of tables continued
9
Table 7.1 Forms of horizontal coordination tools adopted …………………………229
Table 7.2 Levels of formal and informal collaboration …………………………….234
Table 7.3 Mean contact scores with local bodies…………………………………...236
Table 7.4 Implementation of formal horizontal coordination tools…………………241
Table 7.5 Relationship between vertical contact and local collaboration…………. 242
Table 7.6 Relationship between incentives and local collaboration……………… 243
Table 7.7 Mean contact scores for individually mandated agencies …………… 244
Table 7.8 Mean contact scores for mandated versus non-mandated bodies……… 244
Table 7.9 Summary of additional factors associated with collaboration ………… 251
Table 8.1 Contribution of horizontal tools to the reduction of externalities………. 260
Table 8.2 Motivations for adopting/ participating in horizontal tools…………… 264
Table 8.3 Process of tool development …………………………………………… 267
Table 8.4 Challenges of tool development …………………………………………269
Table 8.5 Challenges of tool management ……………………………………… 271
Table 8.6 Horizontal tools as tools to address obstacles to collaboration ………… 274
Table 9.1 Perceptions of the statutory duty to cooperate …………………………. 280
Table 9.2 Perceptions of government monitoring of collaboration ……………… 283
Table 9.3 Perceptions of authoritative network constitution ………………………286
Table 9.4 Information-based tools: written guidance …………………………… 289
Table 9.5 Information-based tools: inter-personal forms………………………… 292
Table 9.6 Incentive-based tools: funding streams …………………………………. 295
Table 9.7 Incentive-based tools: capacity building support……………………… 297
Table 9.8 Broader meta-governance structures: LAAs and LSPs ………………… 299
Table 10.1 Rival models and hypotheses ………………………………………… 310
Table 10.2 Rational-administrative elements of collaborative decision-making… 313
Table 10.3 The bureaucratic politics of collaborative decision-making ………… 316
Table 10.4 Top-down influences on collaboration …………………………… 320
Table 10.5 Bottom-up influences on collaboration …………………….……… 322
10
List of Abbreviations
ACPO Association of Chief Policy Officers
CAB Citizens Advice Bureau
CFOA Chief Fire Officers’ Association
CLG (Department of) Communities and Local Government
DAT Drug Action Team
DH Department of Health
DIP Drugs Intervention Programme
DWP Department for Work and Pensions
EMIF Ethnic Minorities Innovation Fund
GORs Government Offices in the Regions
KLOE Key Line of Enquiry
LA Local Authority
LAA Local Area Agreement
LGA Local Government Association
LHA Local Housing Authority 
LSP Local Strategic Partnership
LSVTO Large Scale Voluntary Transfer Organisation
MOD Ministry of Defence
MP Member of Parliament
NACRO Crime Reduction Charity (formerly National Association 
for the Care and Resettlement of Offenders)
NASS National Asylum Support Service
NHS National Health Service
NOMS National Offenders Management Service
NPM New Public Management
ODPM (The former) Office of the Deputy Prime Minister
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PCT Primary Care Trust
PIU Performance and Innovation Unit
PSA Public Services Agreement
QUANGO Quasi Autonomous Non-Governmental Organisation
RSL Registered Social Landlord
SP Supporting People
11
Introduction
I   Research context
Public  policy  issues  which  cut  across  the  boundaries  of  government  departments are 
commonly  referred  to  as  ‘cross-cutting’  or  ‘wicked’ issues  .  These  issues  transcend 
departmental boundaries  by  virtue  of  their  multi-dimensional nature,  requiring  holistic 
solutions which cannot easily be provided by single departments.  Such matters span several 
government departments at the level of policy making and this is reflected at local level in the 
involvement of multiple local service providers. Because of the numerous actors involved, 
cross-cutting issues are increasingly recognised as requiring special coordination efforts at 
different levels of government.  
This coordination ‘imperative’ is also influenced by the increasing fragmentation of 
the  polity,  affected  by  New  Public  Management reforms,  where  public  services  and 
government functions have been contracted out to private and voluntary sector organisations, 
now commonly characterised as the era of ‘governance’ or ‘networks’.  In this context, some 
scholars have suggested that it has become increasingly difficult for government to control 
local  actors,  many  of  which  fall  outside  of  their  line  of  authority  and  accountability 
structures. This has led scholars to characterise the current era as one of the ‘Hollow State’  or 
‘Governing without Government’ .
In cross-cutting areas of public policy, and in policy fields affected by processes of 
fragmentation, governments in several OECD countries have pursued initiatives to enhance 
coordination .  Such efforts are instituted in a variety of ways from the introduction of formal 
coordination structures such as partnerships, to  laws governing interactions between key 
delivery  agents,  incentives  and  exhortations  for  agencies to  work  together,  and  cross-
governmental policy programmes.  In the UK such initiatives have been developed under the 
banner of ‘joined-up government’. These initiatives -  or ‘tools’ of government -  can be 
construed as examples of ‘meta-governance’, involving top-down, central state steering of 
multi-agency networks (Moseley and James 2008).  However,  policy actors involved in 
cross-cutting issues at ‘street level’ can also be said to pursue voluntary forms of coordination 
through informal interactions, mutual adjustments and information sharing, or through more 
formalised collaborative or contractual working arrangements developed from the ‘bottom-
up’.  
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 While the prevalence of cross-cutting issues in contemporary public policy and the 
corresponding need for coordination have been well-documented in research ,  there is  a 
paucity of empirical evidence on the effectiveness of government tools  and strategies to 
enhance coordination  at  the local level.  The promotion of  multi-agency ‘collaboration’ 
amongst local service providers can be understood as one particular type of coordination 
initiative or meta-governance strategy pursued by governments, where collaboration itself 
refers to agencies working purposefully together on an issue of mutual interest or concern . 
Encouraging, incentivising or commanding agencies to collaborate is one possible method for 
governments wishing to enhance policy coherence for cross-cutting issues and to reduce 
‘externalities’1 or problems associated with fragmented delivery systems such as duplication 
of activities and gaps in service provision .  Existing evidence presents a variable picture of 
government’s ability to mandate collaboration amongst local public service organisations, yet 
this is a strategy which is commonly used by governments both in the UK and elsewhere.
This thesis examines the influence of government steering of local collaboration in 
the English homelessness sector.  A broad ‘tools of government’ framework  is used to help 
delineate the particular mechanisms or ‘tools' of vertical coordination used by government to 
stimulate local collaboration.  The research also considers tools of coordination used at the 
level of central government. The influence of vertical steering is assessed using quantitative 
and qualitative evidence collected from local service providers.  The evidence will contribute 
to the broader debate on ‘governing without government’.  In particular, are local networks 
‘self-organising’ or  do  central policy mandates to  collaborate have influence over  local 
actors? Does the network mode of service provision in this sector offer evidence of a loss of 
control and accountability? Does the stimulation of local collaboration by central government 
constitute an effective strategy for enhancing coordination in the fragmented polity? 
Assessing  the  effectiveness  of  government  coordination  efforts  requires  an 
understanding of the wider factors contributing to local agencies’ decisions to collaborate in 
particular  ways.   Government  steering  is  only  one  factor  influencing  inter-agency 
collaboration,  and  previous  research has  highlighted  a  range of  other  ‘contextual’ and 
‘interpretive’ factors  (discussed  further  in  chapter  one),  including  the  wider  policy 
environment, resources, the degree of interdependence, the possession of relevant skills and 
managerial  competencies,  and  issues  relating  to  organisational  structure,  culture  and 
professional values.  Moreover, the underlying context in which collaboration is promoted is 
1 A full definition is offered in chapter one; briefly, negative externalities refer to adverse consequences when 
one part of a system fails to consider the effects of its actions on another.
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a terrain of differing and sometimes conflicting priorities, and uneven power and influence. 
Assessing the influence of government steering strategies to promote collaboration requires 
consideration of  such factors which also  influence organisational  collaboration.  In  this 
analysis vertical governmental steering is considered an independent variable, which amongst 
other variables, may affect the degree of collaboration amongst local service providers, the 
dependent variable.  The diagram below (figure I) outlines the framework for analysis within 
the present research. 
Detecting variation in collaboration is a challenging task, and there are no existing 
validated  measures  of  collaboration  on  which  to  base  such  an  analysis.   One  of  the 
contributions of the thesis is therefore to offer ways forward for assessing collaboration and 
investigating the influence of different factors.  Two measures of collaboration are used, one 
assessing ‘formal’ dimensions of collaboration and another assessing ‘informal’ dimensions. 
Formal aspects of coordination refer to horizontal coordination tools or mechanisms which 
are developed to synchronise the work of different agencies, while informal aspects refer to 
the contact, interactions and communications between agencies in the course of daily work.
Although much has been written on forms of collaboration, very few studies have 
taken the approach of collecting systematic data across a single policy sector at a national 
level.  The methods employed build on American studies which have utilised quantitative 
measures in an attempt to compare coordination efforts in different States, in fields such as 
economic  development   and  mental  health  ,  as  discussed  further  below.   These 
methodological approaches provide promising avenues for mapping coordination across 
policy sectors and, to the author’s best knowledge, have not yet been applied to the study of 
public services in the UK context. 
Fig I Framework for the empirical analysis
     Independent variables        
   Dependent variable
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II   Theoretical perspectives
In common with the subject of public administration itself,  the study of collaboration is 
characterised by theoretical and disciplinary pluralism.  The disciplines of political science, 
organisation theory, psychology, management, sociology and economics and their subfields 
have all made important contributions to the subject. Within these disciplines and subfields, 
theoretical perspectives such as exchange theory, inter-organisational theory, network theory, 
and rational choice theory have been employed as a basis for examining collaboration and 
cooperation more generally. 
Since the focus of the thesis is the contribution of government to local collaboration, 
the  theoretical  framework  employs  perspectives  predominantly  from  political  science. 
However,  reference is made to theories from other disciplines when they help illuminate 
particular aspects of the research questions.  Two branches of political science theory are 
employed, notably theories of bureaucratic decision-making and theories of implementation, 
the selection of which is justified in chapter three. These theories have been influential within 
the fields of public policy and public administration generally, but have not explicitly been 
applied to the issue of inter-organisational collaboration in the context of public services. 
The research therefore makes a new application of these theoretical perspectives to the issue 
of collaboration and takes a novel look at the theoretical and empirical implications of these 
perspectives in this context. 
Theories of bureaucratic decision-making
Two particular theories of bureaucratic decision-making are considered, namely rational-
administrative and bureaucratic politics  perspectives.   Rational-administrative  models of 
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decision-making suggest that policy is made and enacted through a rational process in which 
actors  choose  between alternatives  in  order  to  reach organisational  goals,  pursuing the 
strategies, or means, most likely and most efficiently to achieve these goals, or ends.  In 
terms of explaining collaboration, the rational-administrative perspective would suggest that 
actors collaborate because they view this as the most appropriate and efficient way to meet 
client needs.  Decisions are taken largely on technical grounds, with forms of collaboration 
selected according to the task environment and nature of problems addressed. 
Models of bureaucratic politics, however, view decisions as occurring within a realm 
of struggles, compromises and negotiations. Following in the tradition of authors such as 
Alison and Halperin  and more recently Peters , the bureaucratic politics perspective assumes 
that decisions are a product of a bargaining game between different sections or units within 
the polity, where the outcomes of the game favour the most powerful of these actors.  This 
model is  therefore more concerned with the distribution of power than with the rational 
application of rules.  Where rules are followed, these are ‘rules of the game’ rather than rules 
of rational administrative decision-making. This perspective would suggest that collaboration 
decisions are motivated by agencies’ desire to protect their turf, their resources and their 
position within the multi-agency network.  From this perspective collaborative processes are 
likely to be characterised by negotiation, bargaining and compromise.  
Theories of implementation
This research is also concerned with implementation issues, with collaboration conceived of 
as a policy which governments may seek to implement in relation to cross-cutting issues and 
in  the  context  of  fragmented service  delivery systems.  Two  rival  views of  the  policy 
implementation process are considered.  In one view, the policy process proceeds in a top-
down manner in which lower level policy actors neutrally implement the will  of elected 
policy-makers.  Writers from this perspective are concerned with the ‘traditional’ themes of 
public administration such as  control, coordination and accountability.   This perspective, 
which is most readily associated with Woodrow Wilson , affirms the politics-administration 
dichotomy and suggests that it is both possible and normatively desirable for governments to 
control bureaucrats.  
In another view, the policy process proceeds in a more ‘bottom-up’ fashion, in which 
‘street level’ actors shape and  reformulate laws  and policies.  This  view follows  in  the 
16
tradition of Lipsky , Elmore , Goodsell  and others.  Writers from this perspective emphasise 
the discretion of lower level policy actors and many view the interpretation of laws and 
policies undertaken by ‘street level bureaucrats’ as essential to serving the public interest. 
Decision-making theories and implementation theories are not viewed as opposing or 
mutually exclusive explanations, but rather examine different aspects of the policy process. 
This thesis examines the main factors affecting local actors’ collaborative decisions, with 
particular  emphasis  on the  role  of  government steering, using  a  synthesis of  these two 
branches of political science theory. 
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III   Research questions
The research addresses the following key questions. The first is primarily descriptive while 
the second is explanatory, and third is more evaluative. 
1. What is the nature of government steering of local collaboration? 
(a) What vertical steering tools are employed by government to encourage local 
collaboration? How can these be classified?
(b) What is  the extent and nature of collaboration in  the multi-agency homelessness 
network? In particular, what is the relative strength of links between the different 
local agencies involved?  What forms of collaboration, both formal and informal, can 
be observed?
2. What explains local collaborative patterns? 
(a) What  guides  collaboration  decisions?  Are  decisions  amongst  local  actors  to 
collaborate driven more by rational considerations or more by ‘bureaucratic politics’?
(b) How influential are ‘top-down’ as compared to ‘bottom-up’ factors?
3.  How  effective are  vertical  and  horizontal  coordination  tools  in  terms  of  enhancing 
collaboration and alleviating externalities associated with fragmented networks?
In order to address the explanatory and evaluative questions, it is necessary to examine a 
series of secondary issues.  In relation to questions 2(a), actors’ motivations for collaborating 
are  investigated,  including  their  motivations  for  developing  particular  coordination 
mechanisms.  On  question  2(b),  the  research  considers  the  impact  of  vertical  steering 
strategies in comparison to other more ‘bottom-up’ factors, including the relative influence of 
different vertical coordination tools.   It  is  asked whether vertical steering tools result in 
greater collaboration and which tools  are  most effective.  Addressing this  question also 
includes assessing the extent to which local collaboration patterns and tools accord with those 
recommended in central policy guidance, or whether these are generated from the bottom-up. 
Question 3 which addresses the effectiveness of coordination tools in terms of alleviating 
externalities, involves examining the particular externalities affecting the homelessness sector 
from the perspective of those involved in the system.  
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IV   The empirical setting
As already noted, this research examines these issues within the context of homelessness 
services. The English system is chosen as the particular locus for empirical investigation. 
Homelessness is a major facet of social policy within England and the United Kingdom more 
broadly, and is likely, given current economic turbulence, to become more important.  It is a 
field where government in recent years has actively encouraged local agencies to collaborate. 
It is a domain where inter-organisational networks are pre-eminent, both because of the cross-
cutting nature of the issue and because of the fragmentation of the housing and welfare 
system which provide services to homeless people, a fragmentation which has largely been 
created by New Public Management reforms.  This thesis examines collaboration across the 
boundaries of the public, private and voluntary sectors, from which the main actors in the 
homelessness service delivery network are drawn.  The research examines the impact of 
government steering approaches to collaboration used since New Labour came to power in 
1997.   Arguably,  a  multi-agency,  collaborative approach to  homelessness  has  been the 
cornerstone of Labour’s approach to tackling homelessness in this period.  The research is 
conducted principally at the level of ‘street level bureaucracy’ in order to investigate its 
motivations for collaborating, including local responsiveness to central policy mandates.  
V   Overview of data sources and research methods
The literature search strategy combines systematic searching of electronic databases using 
key search terms which operationalise the research topic, 2 and manual searching of relevant 
public administration and public policy journals and publications3.   Relevant articles and 
publications  were  retrieved and  citations  contained in  these  sources were  subsequently 
followed up.  Searches were updated periodically throughout the course of the research.  A 
search of the UK Index of PhD Theses has also been conducted to ensure the thesis did not 
replicate previous work.  For practical reasons the literature review is confined to English 
language publications, although the scope of the literature consulted comprises contributions 
2 Databases included ASSIA, International Bibliography of Social Sciences (IBSS), First Search and Web of 
Knowledge. Key search terms included collaboration, coordination, cooperation, multi-agency, inter-agency, 
network, homelessness, governance, meta-governance, using appropriate Boolean operators and search 
strings.  
3 Journals hand-searched included Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Public 
Administration, Policy and Politics, and Public Policy and Administration.
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from a variety of OECD4 countries including the UK, the USA, Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand, Germany and the Netherlands.
The degree and nature of collaboration between agencies in the local homelessness 
network (both formal and informal) are assessed by conducting a survey of English local 
housing authorities (N=193)5.  Surveys were completed by local authority officers with lead 
responsibility for homelessness.  Local authority homelessness officers were asked to rank 
the degree of informal contact they had with other agencies in  their local homelessness 
network and to  indicate the  range of  formal coordination  mechanisms in  place in  their 
authority with respect to homelessness services.
The nature of vertical steering is investigated using a combination of interview and 
documentary evidence.  Interviewees included civil servants working in relevant government 
departments and street level bureaucrats working in local homelessness services (N=43). 
Documentary evidence included official  publications  such as  the  national  homelessness 
strategy, the official ‘code of guidance’ for local authorities, local authority circulars, and 
select committee reports. 
The  relative  influence of  top-down and  bottom-up  factors  is  addressed through 
interviews with  staff  in  relevant local agencies, as  well  as  the survey and documentary 
evidence.   Interviewees were  principally  managers  and  practitioners  in  local  services 
involved in  tackling  homelessness  including  public,  quasi-public,  voluntary,  and private 
sector agencies6. In order to evaluate the effectiveness of vertical coordination tools, the local 
picture, assessed through the postal survey, is compared to the official picture contained in 
government publications.  Comparisons between local authorities undergoing different forms 
of vertical steering are also made in order to assess the relative influence of different steering 
strategies.  
VI   Thesis structure
Chapters  1-4  outline  the  research  context,  theoretical  perspectives,  hypotheses  and 
methodology.  Chapter one sets  out  the context of the research, discussing contemporary 
debates on governance and coordination, and then outlines the rationale for,  and the key 
4 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
5 193 responses were received from 354 English authorities. The sampling frame is discussed in chapter four.
6 Public sector bodies included the local housing authority, and statutory health, social and criminal justice 
services. Voluntary sector agencies included frontline homelessness agencies, housing advice and support 
services, and other relevant agencies such as drug and alcohol projects.  Quasi public and private bodies 
included housing associations and independent landlords.
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factors affecting  collaboration.   Chapter two provides  a  conceptual  review of  forms of 
collaboration pursued both at the level of central and local government, including both formal 
and informal methods, and vertical tools or strategies used by governments to stimulate local 
collaboration.  It also reviews existing empirical evidence and debates around the ability of 
governments to mandate collaboration between local agencies. Chapter three discusses the 
two  branches of  theory  which  provide  the  framework for  analysis,  and  presents  rival 
hypotheses  on  the  antecedents of  collaboration  flowing from these  theoretical  models. 
Chapter four sets out the empirical context of the research and provides a detailed research 
methodology for addressing the study hypotheses.  
Chapters 5-9 present the empirical findings.  Chapter Five examines ‘externalities’ in 
the homelessness system from the perspective of local actors. Such externalities may provide 
a  rationale for collaboration from a rational-administrative perspective. The chapter then 
outlines the main factors affecting collaboration, drawing on qualitative interview evidence, 
and using the framework set out in chapter one to structure the analysis. It also examines the 
level of local support for collaboration, a factor which is likely to affect central government’s 
steering strategy.   Chapter Six discusses the steering attempts of the UK Government to 
stimulate collaboration in service delivery networks in English local authorities, discusses the 
strength of this policy agenda from the perspective of street level bureaucrats, and examines 
the degree of collaboration at the level of central government, which itself is considered a 
form of vertical steering.  Chapter Seven presents quantitative data to assess the nature and 
extent of  collaboration  in  the  service delivery network and uses  this  to  investigate  the 
influence of government steering and other relevant factors on local collaboration.  Chapters 
Eight  and  Nine complement this  quantitative evidence, by examining the dynamics and 
perceived effectiveness  of  horizontal  and vertical  tools  through a  qualitative analysis  of 
interview data.  
While references to the theoretical framework are made throughout, Chapter Ten 
draws together the evidence on local collaboration and discusses this in detail in relation to 
the  framework.   It  revisits  the  core  questions  of  the  research,  namely,  do  rational-
administrative or bureaucratic politics perspectives provide a more convincing explanation of 
why actors collaborate?  Are top-down or bottom-up perspectives of the policy process more 
persuasive in explaining collaboration?  This chapter considers the implications for the wider 
debates around government’s steering capacity in the era of governance, and implications for 
policy and practice.
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Chapter 1: The rationale for and factors affecting 
collaboration
Chapter Overview
This  chapter  sets  the  context  for  the  research  questions  which  were  outlined  in  the 
introduction to this thesis.  The first section (1.1) begins by discussing the enduring interest 
with the issue of coordination in public administration, both within scholarship and within 
practice.  The next part of this section considers why interest in the notion of coordination has 
been revived in the contemporary context.  It then outlines the concept of service delivery 
networks, and discusses reasons why they are sometimes characterised as ‘self-organising’. 
The first part ends by highlighting the implications of recent developments in public services 
in terms of four key issues, namely,  accountability,  democracy,  power and control.  The 
second section (1.2) suggests that collaboration and joined up government may be considered 
forms of ‘meta-governance’ used by governments to counter perceived negative effects of 
fragmentation  in  the  current context  of  public services.   It  then presents  definitions  of 
collaboration and outlines  the  key  ‘drivers’ of  this,  including  top-down and bottom-up 
factors.  It subsequently discusses the rationale for collaborating both at the level of local 
public services and central government. This section ends by suggesting that governments 
increasingly  are  exhorting  local  agencies  to  collaborate and  provides an  outline  of  the 
approach used recently in the United Kingdom.   The last part (1.3) outlines key factors 
affecting collaboration which are characterised as interpretive and contextual.  Government 
steering is one of the factors included within this framework. 
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1.1 The search for coordination in a fragmented landscape
1.1.1 Coordination: a recurrent theme in public administration
Effective coordination of bodies involved in the work of government is a recurrent theme in 
the public administration literature and an enduring challenge in practice. Various definitions 
of coordination have been put forward in the literature, with some emphasizing coordination 
as a process and others seeing it  as a desirable end-state .   Fundamentally,  coordination 
involves attempting to synchronise the parts of a system, so that they work in an integrated 
rather than a  fragmented manner.   At  its  most  basic level,  coordination involves active 
consideration of the effect that the activities of organisational units have upon each other, 
with  the  aim of  attaining ‘whole system effectiveness’ .  Coordination  issues arise  both 
between and within organisational units, although this thesis is concerned with the former 
case.  
Coordination  in  the  context  of  public administration  includes both  ‘vertical’ and 
‘horizontal’ coordination.   The vertical dimension  focuses on  relations  between tiers  of 
government, and between governments and other global institutions, while the horizontal 
dimension is concerned with relationships between agencies, departments or units operating 
within a single tier or level. 
Coordination challenges within government, either at central or local level, stem from 
the functional differentiation of government’s work into departments. The necessarily wide-
ranging scope of governmental action requires a division of labour between departments, yet 
this  sometimes  gives  rise  to  negative  externalities  or  systemic  performance  effects  . 
Externalities, as understood by economists, are a form of market failure. Mueller   states that 
externalities occur when “the consumption or production activity of one individual or firm 
has an unintended impact on the utility or production function of another individual or firm”. 
Applying this idea to the public sector, externalities can be understood as the unintended 
consequences of  the  actions  of  one  part  of  the  public  sector  on  another.   Common 
externalities  are  contradictory policies and practices, duplication of activities and gaps in 
public  services.   These problems have been referred to  respectively as  the problems of 
incoherence, redundancy and lacunae .  Coordination of government, at whichever level, is 
arguably about attempting to minimize such externalities.  
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Similar  arguments  have  been  made  for  collaboration in  the  context  of  public 
management7.   Huxham and Macdonald  ,  for instance, argue that  collaboration is  often 
promoted to address problems arising when organisations act without reference to one other. 
Such problems, they suggest, include repetition (duplicating activity), omission (leaving gaps 
in activities), divergence (diluting activity across a range of activities) and counter production 
(pursuing conflicting activities).  
Governmental attempts to counter coordination problems have appeared in various 
guises in the context of British public administration, both at the level of central and local 
government.  For instance, Chadwick’s local government reforms of the 1830s and Victorian 
public health policies can be viewed as an attempt to improve horizontal integration between 
local  public  services  .   The  Haldane  Inquiry’s  report  of  1918  made  influential 
recommendations on the organisation of central government departments along functional 
lines, in order to improve coordination. Similarly, Churchill’s experiments with ministerial 
‘overlords’ in  the early 1950s aimed to  enhance coordination across  central government 
departments .  Arguments for corporate planning in the 1960s and 1970s were based on a 
perceived need for improved strategic coordination , as were the centrist coordination reforms 
attempted by the Heath government, including an experiment to create ‘super-ministries’ . 
Callaghan also attempted to tackle coordination problems in the field of social policy by 
introducing the Joint Approach to Social Policy programme in 1976 .  In the 1970s joint 
committees were introduced to provide mechanisms for coordinating the work of different 
local  public  and  voluntary  sector  bodies  in  areas  such  as  economic development  and 
community care .
In the 1980s, concerns to avoid an ‘implementation gap’ between government policy 
and administrative practice can also be considered a ‘vertical’ expression of the coordination 
problem, in this case to ensure that civil servants and frontline public service workers were 
acting in synchrony with central policy makers.  British local government reforms initiated 
under the Thatcher era were partially  oriented towards reducing duplication,  downsizing 
bureaucracy and increasing control over local government .  As discussed further below, over 
the last decade or so, the coordination problem has been re-articulated in a number of ways, 
most notably in discussions of ‘multi-level governance’ and ‘joined-up’ government .  
The common theme of such reform programmes is  that they view organisational 
restructuring or tinkering as the answer to coordination challenges, although the motivations 
7 Collaboration can be viewed as a strong form of coordination. See section 1.2 below for a full elaboration of 
the concept of collaboration.
24
for developing new structures or altering those which already are arguably as much related to 
politics and pragmatism as to ‘rational’ or ‘scientific’ principles.
1.1.2 Coordination in the ‘differentiated polity’: multi-level and multi-agency
Discussions of coordination have heightened in recent times due to an increasingly complex 
policy landscape.  The decentralization and devolution of government and growing influence 
of supranational bodies and other aspects of globalisation have stimulated interest in multi-
level and inter-governmental coordination .  In the UK, processes of devolution, as well as 
enhanced powers for local authorities,  have  created sub-national and  regional tiers with 
coordination roles distinct  from Westminster.   At  the European level, the growth of new 
governance institutions has resulted in the dispersal of authority upwards beyond the level of 
the nation state. Such downward and upward processes imply a ‘de-centred’ state where 
coordination processes take place between and within different levels.  
Within national governments, processes of state fragmentation and specialisation have 
taken place throughout OECD countries, with an ever-larger number of bodies involved in 
the business of both central and local government, many of which are autonomous or semi-
autonomous  from  government  .  Coordination,  in  the  contemporary climate,  therefore, 
involves not  only achieving synchrony between parts  of government, but doing so with 
bodies that are at arm’s length from, or even independent of, national governments.  
The process of fragmentation and growth of autonomous or semi-autonomous bodies 
involved in the work of government within nation states are commonly characterised as one 
part of a larger ‘new public management’ reform programme. This wave of reforms sought to 
inject managerialist and private sector principles into the public sector and swept a number of 
Western liberal democratic countries during the 1980s and 1990s .  Although the term ‘new 
public management’ (NPM) exaggerates the cohesiveness of differing reform trajectories of 
affected countries , is an accepted label to describe the thrust of changes occurring in many 
OECD countries during the 1980s and 1990s.  Rooted in managerialist philosophies and new 
institutional economics , NPM reforms sought to downsize bureaucracy through processes of 
disaggregation, and  to  enhance efficiency through  privatisation  and  the  introduction  of 
competition  into the  public  sector through internal markets.  Thus  large  multi-objective 
public  sector  bureaucracies  became  divided  into  several  smaller  single-objective 
organisations, a process known as specialisation  8 (Verhoest, Bouckaert, and Peters 2007). 
8 A process which can occur both vertically and horizontally 
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NPM reforms were also part of a neo-liberal agenda to re-affirm the politics/ administration 
dichotomy between policy makers and bureaucrats, to counter a perceived erosion of the 
boundaries between these two distinct spheres in which bureaucrats were viewed as wielding 
undue influence over the policy process. 
In  the UK, these processes have resulted in  an exponential  growth of  executive 
agencies9,  quasi-autonomous  non-governmental  bodies  (‘quangos’)  and  other  non-
departmental public bodies operating at a national level .  The growth of such bodies has 
decentralised much of the work of government away from the Core Executive , and relocated 
this work to bodies operating ‘beyond the constitutional framework’ (Flinders 2004: 892). 
At the level of local public services, marketisation has created significantly increased 
involvement of the private and voluntary sectors and local quangos within the delivery of 
public services (Wilson 2003; Walker,  O’Toole, and Meier 2007), with local government 
taking on the role of purchaser or commissioner of services in addition to its provider role. 
While local bodies besides the elected local authority have always played a role within public 
services in the United Kingdom, the growth in such bodies in the last three decades means 
that elected local authorities now ‘share the local turf’ with several other bodies with varying 
degrees of governmental power .  Moreover, the state’s relationship with many such bodies 
has changed since the establishment of the welfare state . Prior to this, the majority of private, 
voluntary and community organisations providing services such as social welfare, housing 
and health  operated outside of the state’s  domain.  The establishment of public welfare 
systems in modern democratic states has brought such agencies more firmly within the realm 
of government, even if not all services are directly provided by the public sector.
The growth of non-elected bodies at the level of local government is not simply a 
consequence of reforms generated by central government.  Fragmentation has  also been 
stimulated by local government itself.  As discussed by Stoker (1991), local government in 
the UK historically has innovated and experimented through the creation of bodies to tackle 
social and economic problems such as inner city economic development partnerships and 
arm’s length agencies including community businesses, enterprise boards and cooperative 
development agencies. 
Taken  together,  such  processes  of  fragmentation,  specialisation  and 
‘autonomisation’10 fall under the umbrella term of ‘governance’ .  The notion of governance, 
as used in the field of public administration, refers to the involvement of bodies from outside 
9 Through the introduction of the ‘Next Steps’ programme
10 Autonomisation refers to the increasingly independent nature of many of the bodies involved in the work of 
government, in terms of their relationship to government.
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the traditional public sector in the work of government, such as those from the private sector 
and  civil  society.   Collectively  such  bodies  are  argued  to  form  ‘inter-organisational 
networks’.  
Rhodes’ well known application of the governance perspective to the British context 
characterises the British State as a “disaggregated” and “differentiated” polity. This model 
describes a system where Westminster and Whitehall no longer dominate, and where public 
services are delivered in multi-organisational policy networks involving complex contractual 
arrangements.  Rhodes describes this transition as a move from government to governance, 
where governance equates to “self-organising, inter-organisational networks (ibid, p. 53)”. 
Policy  networks,  according  to  Rhodes,  comprise  public,  private  and  voluntary  sector 
organisations  and  are  characterised  by  interdependence  and  blurred  organisational 
boundaries.  
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1.1.3 Service delivery networks as a mode of governance
The  governance  perspective  suggests  that  networks  are  new  and  distinct  modes  of 
governance which operate alongside, or instead of, markets and hierarchies .  In relation to 
public service delivery, terms such as ‘service delivery networks’ , ‘policy service delivery 
networks’  and ‘implementation structures’  have variously been used to characterise the 
multi-organisational networks increasingly involved in the delivery of public policies. These 
networks have become a central object of analysis for contemporary analysts of public policy 
and administration.  Implementation theorists, conventionally interested in issues such as 
central-local  government  relations  and  the  relationship  between  policy  makers  and 
administrators, are increasingly shifting their focus towards such cases.  
Implementation, these scholars would argue, is no longer simply a matter of getting 
things done in conventional hierarchical bureaucratic systems.  Instead, getting policy into 
action involves coordinating inter-dependent networks of agencies.  Wilson (2000, p. 279), 
for instance, states that “it is no longer acceptable to see central-local relations purely in 
terms of central government and local authorities”. Instead, it is necessary to investigate the 
“networks, alliances, and partnerships between elected and non-elected bodies, voluntary 
organisations and private business (that) operate at local level, albeit within a framework set 
down by the centre.”
The rise of service delivery networks can be explained in two ways. First, they can be 
regarded as  a  somewhat inevitable  consequence of  the  New Public  Management style 
reforms and processes of state fragmentation already described.  Because of the greater use of 
contracts with private sector providers, the growth of hybrid forms of provision such as 
public-private partnerships and the increasingly prominent role of the voluntary sector, public 
services take place through complex configurations of services resembling networks.  
Secondly,  they may be viewed as  emerging spontaneously,  in  response to  issues 
which  require  multiple-agency involvement,  particularly  those  issues  which  are  ‘cross-
cutting’,  as  briefly  described  in  the  introduction.  Cross-cutting  concerns  of  modern 
government, according to Peters ,  are ‘no longer seen as operating just within their own 
defined policy domain’.  Examples include the environment, social inclusion, community 
development and regeneration.  Such issues do not ‘respect’ organisational boundaries, and 
tackling them involves consideration of the wide range of contributing dimensions.  Service 
delivery networks  can be  seen as  emerging  in  response to  such issues,  and have been 
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described as ‘the patterns of interaction that emerge around policy problems and resource 
clusters’ .
1.1.4 Service delivery networks as self-organising
Governance theory discusses the difficulties facing governments in terms of their ability to 
control networks, and raises the prospect that service delivery networks may, to some extent, 
be ‘self-governing’ or ‘self-steering’, resisting central control .  This view is influenced by 
network theory which regards networks as self-organising for a number of reasons.
First,  the  morphology  of  inter-organisational  networks  is  horizontal  rather  than 
vertical.  Relationships are less formal than in conventional bureaucratic structures, with 
fewer authority-based relationships .  There is rarely a clear, coordinating actor, and as such, 
hierarchical strategies of coordination have limited relevance .  As discussed by Hanf , much 
coordination of networks results from the interactions between members, rather than as a 
consequence of purposeful steering by a decision-maker.  Furthermore, network membership 
is voluntary rather than mandatory, and decisions about participation are fuzzy, based on 
consent and negotiation, or ‘consensual self-selection’ . Rather than membership being pre-
arranged or pre-decided by an authoritative body, members join if they perceive the issue 
involved to concern to them.  
In addition, most network theorists assume that the patterns of interaction which 
emerge are based on the desire of individual actors to lever in valued resources and services 
provided  by  other  actors.   The  relationships  or  ‘ties’ that  bind  networks are  therefore 
primarily exchange-based.  However,  exchange is  not  always  immediately reciprocated, 
because actors possess unequal amounts of  resources.  The recipient  therefore becomes 
indebted to the donor until the debt can be discharged in some way .  The consequence of 
indebtedness is  that  relationships  tend to  be  more  enduring.  Exchanges are sometimes 
intangible or difficult  to quantify, and it  may not always be clear when a debt has been 
discharged.  For instance, relationships often involve exchanging information rather than 
material goods.  Such patterns of reciprocity tend to stabilise networks, with relationships 
becoming institutionalized, and network actors becoming embedded in networks.  
The stability of networks is also influenced by the fact that actors may be reluctant to 
exit a network when they have invested their own resources, since exiting the network before 
these have been re-paid may be more costly than remaining within it.  Networks also have a 
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tendency to  inhibit  entry  to  new members, becoming socially  ‘closed’ .   Networks are 
governed by the ‘shadow of the future’. Because they are relatively stable over time, there is 
a good chance that actors will  meet again.  This regulates the behaviour of actors, who 
become concerned about  their  reputation,  learning  that  cooperative behaviour  will  be 
rewarded by others.  This principle is supported by game theory, from which experimental 
research suggests  that  repeated interactions  generate cooperative rather than competitive 
behaviour .    
As a consequence of the features above, the nature of rewards and sanctions are 
somewhat different in  networks  as  compared to  other  governance structures.  Network 
behaviour  is  regulated  through actors’ reputational  concerns and according to  norms of 
reciprocity  rather than through legal sanctions.  Due to the enduring nature of relationships 
and the repeated interactions involved, actors cannot afford to ‘pull a fast one’.  Network 
members will only behave favourably to another network member if that member’s previous 
behaviour warrants this, for example if past history suggests that some reciprocal benefit will 
ensue.   So,  sanctions  are  normative rather  than  legal,  and  relationships  are  based  on 
reputation, interdependence, trust or even altruism and friendship .  
This brief depiction of networks provides some indication of why they are sometimes 
regarded as self-organising.  Networks are flat structures, with no clear leader to take on 
organisational responsibility. They tend to emerge voluntarily around an issue when actors 
perceive the need to pull in resources from other actors. Moreover, they are sustained by 
interdependencies and norms of reciprocity rather than by legal or other vertical controls. 
Applying these insights from network theory to the governance of service delivery networks, 
it  is  possible  that  they  are  bound together  by  processes of  interaction, exchange and 
reciprocity rather than by some form of deliberate steering from above, casting doubt on the 
ability of government to exercise control over them. 
1.1.5 The implications for accountability, democracy, power and control
The implications of the trend towards the involvement of autonomous and semi-autonomous 
bodies in government and the growth of networks in the context of public services have been 
characterized in  various  ways.   Particular  concerns have  emerged  amongst scholars  of 
governance around the issues of accountability, democracy, power and control . 
The  fragmented  polity  erodes accountability  and  democracy according to  some 
perspectives.  The  institutional  complexity  of  network modes of  governance means that 
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responsibility becomes fragmented and elusive (Rhodes 1997; Newman 2005).  For instance, 
where  several  organisations  are  involved  in  providing  different  aspects  of  a  service, 
responsibility for the outcomes becomes diffused amongst the parties involved, making it 
difficult  to  hold  any  particular  agency to  account. Such forms of  service delivery  are 
particularly vulnerable to accountability problems because they lack a central coordinator or 
a clear line of authority, making it difficult for the service user or citizen to identify any 
avenue of redress for expressing any grievances. Frequently the service user becomes the 
coordinator in such cases, having to resolve issues of institutional complexity on their own. 
Such problems have led Rhodes (1997) to suggest that self-organising networks pose a threat 
to democratic accountability because they become autonomous and resist central control, 
leading to ‘governing without government’.
In the context of British local government, the use of quangos appointed by ministers 
rather  than  elected  local  authorities  to  deliver  key  public  services  arguably  obscures 
accountability towards citizens.  particular measures have been introduced to hold quangos to 
account, such as According to Wilson , the sheer volume of ‘quangocrats’ now exceeds the 
number of local elected councillors, with an increasingly large share of public money vested 
in quangos.  Examples of areas of local public services where local quangos have come to 
dominate  service  provision,  as  documented by  Wilson  ,  include  housing,  health  and 
education.  Although mandatory publication of membership of quango boards and annual 
reports, annual public  meetings and the extensive use of performance monitoring, it  can 
nevertheless  be  argued  that  the  use  of  quangos  ultimately  leads  to  government  by 
appointment and removes public services from political democratic accountability structures. 
Also in the British context the plethora of partnerships in the current environment 
poses specific accountability challenges.  Formal partnerships can be seen as a distinct subset 
of quangos, operating at arm’s length from government .   Empirical studies suggest that 
accountability  arrangements,  such  as  public  access  to  board  meetings,  papers  and 
information, transparency of decision-making processes, codes of conduct and the inclusion 
of elected participants, are often lacking in formal partnerships (Sullivan and Skelcher ibid). 
One recent study of partnership boards in two areas of England, for instance, found that while 
partnerships  are  often strong on  upward accountability  towards inspectors, auditors  and 
funding bodies such as government departments, they are weak on downward accountability 
towards the  public  or  the  local  community .   While  partnerships  are often purportedly 
committed to community involvement, these authors found that participation by communities 
tends to be merely consultative rather than participatory.  Furthermore, it can also be argued 
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that because partnerships  tend to  be located outside of the formal structures of member 
organisations, they are to a certain degree removed from the accountability structures of their 
member organisations, floating between organisations.   
Finally,  the growth of private sector bodies delivering public  services means that 
accountability  is  increasingly  based  on  economic  rather  than  political  models   with 
individuals viewed more as consumers and less as citizens, with inevitable consequences for 
the economically disadvantaged and less powerful sections of society.   
In relation to control and power,  as noted in the introduction, some of the more 
pessimistic interpretations have discussed the rise of the ‘hollow state’  or of ‘governing 
without government’ .   These perspectives suggest that government, as the ‘principal’, is 
loosing control over its ‘agents’.  This is explained by the fact since the institutions through 
which it seeks to enact policy are only at arm’s length from government, these bodies fall 
outside of the direct control of central government. 
While proclamations about the hollow state and self-organising networks are helpful 
in drawing attention to the changing nature of the state, they provide a somewhat exaggerated 
picture of developments. The degree to which the state’s power has diminished is a moot 
question. A more mainstream and arguably more realistic interpretation is that the State’s role 
has undergone changes, but that the State remains central to all forms of governance .  This 
perspective acknowledges the persistence of hierarchy in the context of markets and networks 
.  Indeed, some analyses of recent reforms in the United Kingdom suggest a re-assertion of 
hierarchy, partly in response to the growing complexity of the public sector . 
A persuasive interpretation is that the state’s role is now less based on command and 
control than on coordination and steering. Since many of the organisations to be coordinated 
fall outside of the public sector, the government’s coordination strategy has to move from an 
authority-based to a persuasion-based approach in which it ‘steers’ from a distance .  
Indeed, growing recognition of the inherent limits of top-down control within multi-
actor policy settings has led to a search for new appropriate tools of governance .  Such tools 
are often described as ‘informal’ , ‘soft’ or ‘light touch’ , and contrast with the traditional, 
formal tools of government (see chapter two for a full  discussion of government policy 
tools).   These  involve  exerting  indirect influence  over  implementing  actors.   As  one 
commentator has put it, governments that use contractors to provide services can ‘negotiate, 
create incentives, or threaten non-renewal of contract, but they cannot command’ .  In an era 
of  ‘third  party  government’ where  the  State  has  limited  control  over  service provider 
agencies, it  has  been suggested the today’s  public  managers need to  learn the skills  of 
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incentive creation and collaboration, since issuing orders as in a conventional hierarchical 
system is no longer a viable option .    Moreover,  new modes of accountability may be 
required in the fragmented polity, with traditional accountability mechanisms associated with 
representative democracy  less  applicable  in  an  environment  dominated  by  non-elected 
institutions  (Rhodes 1997;  Flinders 2004).  Such views acknowledge the importance of 
networks within the context of public services but suggest that these operate in the ‘shadow’ 
of hierarchy , since it is still the public sector that sets the overarching framework for action . 
In  relation  to  service delivery networks,  since government does  not  possess  the 
authority or legitimacy to govern some of the actors involved, with actors answerable to other 
stakeholders,  governance  becomes  as  much  about  managing  relationships  between 
organisations  as with managing organisations directly.   All  this has led to calls for new 
instruments of  ‘network  governance’ capable of  exercising  leverage over  networks and 
influencing relations between actors (Salamon 2002; Rhodes 1996).  Accordingly, it has been 
suggested  that  government’s  ‘toolbox’ has  become more  ‘horizontal’ in  recent  decades 
Ringeling (2002, p. 592).  
1.2 Collaboration as ‘meta-governance’ 
This  thesis  responds  to  this  call  and is  concerned with  how the  State coordinates  and 
exercises control over networks of service providers in the age of governance. A variety of 
approaches for exercising leverage over networks have been documented in the literature, 
including merging agencies, reorganising boundaries and using performance systems to align 
organisational objectives (the full range of approaches is discussed in chapter two).  
The focus of the thesis is with one particular example of network leverage, namely, 
the stimulation, by central government, of collaboration between lower level bodies involved 
in public service delivery.  This is a type of ‘meta-governance’, which has been defined as the 
government of governance .   Meta-governance involves government or other parts of the 
state facilitating or steering new forms of governance such as networks.  As a shorthand, the 
term ‘meta-governance tools’ is sometimes used within this thesis to refer to the vertical tools 
of government used specifically for the purposes of stimulating local collaboration.  This 
form of  meta-governance can be  viewed as  a  strategy available  to  governments which 
responds to the concerns of the need to be able to influence relations between actors, rather 
than merely to exercising control over actors.  
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Meta-governance can also be seen as one response to the coordination difficulties and 
externalities arising in  service delivery networks. To ensure these networks operate in  a 
coordinated manner, the horizontal relationships between local agencies become a focal point 
for governments.   Governments  frequently enjoin agencies involved in delivering public 
services to collaborate as a means of achieving coordinated policy outcomes.  New Labour’s 
‘joined-up government’ programme has been one example of this  ,  the characteristics of 
which are  discussed further below.   In  the  field  of  human services  where coordination 
difficulties routinely arise, collaboration has for a long time been deemed important , and in 
recent years agencies in this field have come under increasing pressure to collaborate .  
1.2.1 Definitions of collaboration
Collaboration  is  usually  seen  as  a  mode of  operation  which  involves  organisations  or 
individuals working together towards some common purpose.   For instance, Huxham (1996: 
1) has described collaboration as ‘a very positive form of working in association with others 
for  some  form  of  mutual  benefit’.   Collaborations  between  organisations,  or  ‘inter-
organisational collaborations’, she suggests, at the very least involve individuals from one 
organisation  working  with  individuals  from another.   At  most,  they  involve  complete 
organisations  working  in  harmony.   Similarly,  for  Sullivan  and  Skelcher  (2002:  1), 
collaboration in relation to public policy, is ‘a way of working with others on a joint project 
where there is a shared interest in positive outcomes’.  These definitions indicate that a major 
reason for collaborating is to fulfil some mutual interest.  A third definition is offered by 
Agranoff and McGuire  who define collaborative management processes as “the process of 
facilitating and operating multi organisational arrangements to solve problems that cannot be 
solved, or solved easily, by single organisations.”  This definition suggests that effective 
problem solving for certain issues requires the input of more than one organisation, implying 
a degree of interdependence between the organisations involved.  
All three of the above definitions view collaboration as a process or form of working 
across organisational  boundaries.   For  present  purposes  it  is  sufficient  to  define inter-
organisational collaboration as  a process in which organisations actively and jointly work 
together across organisational boundaries.  As will be discussed in chapter two, there are 
differing degrees of collaboration and numerous forms of collaboration.
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1.2.2 Drivers of collaboration: mandated versus voluntary
The drivers of collaboration may be divided into two main categories: top-down and bottom-
up  forces.   Bottom-up  collaboration tends  to  be  voluntary  in  nature,  while  top-down 
collaboration is usually led by government edict or incentive .  As already noted, there is 
much  evidence  of  collaboration  being  driven  from  the  top-down  in  the  UK  context. 
Nevertheless, there is also evidence that bottom-up pressures have influenced the growth of 
collaborative modes of  governance, with  local  authorities  playing  a  major  role  in  their 
initiation, in fields such as urban regeneration (Sullivan and Skelcher 2002) and transport . 
Goss  has attributed the increased local emphasis on collaboration to a growing focus on 
service  outcomes,  improved  strategic  management  capacity  at  local  level,  better 
understanding of the wishes of local people and an increasing tendency for local authorities 
to consider the needs of local communities.  
When  collaboration  is  directed  authoritatively  from  above,  a  super-ordinate 
administrative body, usually central or local government, specifies to lower level agencies the 
nature of relationships and linkages they should have with other agencies. Alexander  has 
referred  to  this  as  the  ‘mandated framework’, which  is  distinguished by  legal-political 
mandates rather than voluntary interactions.  Examples of authoritative strategies available to 
executive or legislative bodies are to create new programmes of agencies, to legislate in order 
to formalize previously informal links between agencies, or to reorganise agency boundaries 
and linkages (Hudson 1997).   Alternatively, governments can use softer,  incentive-based 
strategies, by creating conditions which facilitate collaboration.  This is often achieved by 
altering the way in which financial resources are allocated in order to bring agencies into a 
desired set of relations  or by central policy making bodies using exhortation in the form of 
powerful ‘calls to action’ .  Vertical tools for promoting local collaboration are discussed in 
more detail in chapter two.
Within the bottom-up voluntary category of collaboration, agencies come together for 
a range of reasons, some of which may be altruistic and others more instrumental in nature. 
On the altruistic side, agencies may have a shared vision they wish to work towards or a 
conflict to resolve (Gray 1996); alternatively there may be a desire to enhance participation, 
address power relationships, empower marginalized groups or in  some other way,  affect 
change (Huxham 1996).  Agencies may also be brought together by a genuine desire to work 
to alleviate social problems, and regard a holistic, multi-agency approach as the best method. 
This has been termed the ‘moral imperative’ argument  and suggests that there is a moral 
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necessity to collaborate in order to achieve desired outcomes.  Similarly, agencies may be 
motivated to work together in an attempt to increase the seamlessness of services for the 
citizen or service user .  
Booth (1988,  see Hudson 1995,  p.  236)  calls  the  altruistic  bottom-up  voluntary 
perspective  the  ‘naïve  position’.   Hudson  (ibid)  suggests  that  the  naïve  position  is 
underpinned by an assumption of altruistic rationality which presumes that agencies will 
come together for the good of the community they serve, and because they believe they are 
more  likely  to  efficiently  attain  their  ends  by  working  collaboratively  rather  than 
independently.   
However,  voluntary  collaboration  may  be  driven  by  more  instrumental 
considerations, including the ability to access resources held by other organisations, share 
risk and achieve economies of scale, or simply because an agency cannot achieve its aims by 
working alone .   These factors, which can be powerful motivators for collaboration, are 
highlighted in exchange-based perspectives of inter-organisational relations and networks. 
These perspectives suggest that actors enter into processes of interaction and collaboration in 
order to  lever in  resources held by other organisations .   The resources sought  may be 
informational, technological, knowledge-based, human or financial.  
1.2.3 The rationale for collaboration in public service delivery networks
While the above description outlines different drivers of collaboration generally, this section 
discusses the rationale for collaboration within public service delivery networks. Specific 
reference is made to human services networks, a category to which the homelessness network 
investigated in this thesis can be considered to belong.  
In service delivery networks, where it takes several agencies to deliver a single public 
service, there is arguably a strong need for inter-organisational coordination.  Usually each 
agency provides one component of the ‘package’ and relies on others to contribute others. 
This characteristic of service provision is particularly prevalent in human services networks . 
In contrast to situations where a single agency provides the entire service, coordination must 
take  place not  simply  within  an  organisation  but  between organisations.   Although the 
organisations remain as distinct entities, collaboration across boundaries may help to ensure 
that the different components are delivered effectively.  Without collaboration of this nature, a 
range of externalities may occur.  
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Broadly,  these fit  into the three categories identified above, notably incoherence, 
over-provision (redundancy) and under-provision of services (lacunae). These problems often 
occur due to problems such as agencies’ failure to  share information, to  agree on their 
respective roles and responsibilities and to have in place appropriate formalized procedures at 
key points within the service system.  Due to the complex configuration of services, and the 
lack of a coordinating body in many cases, such problems are commonplace. 
Typical examples of  incoherence  in human services networks occur when policies 
and procedures of different agencies counteract each other.   At  an operational level,  the 
provision of contradictory information and advice to clients by different agencies is  one 
example.  At service planning level, the policies and practices of some agencies can openly 
undermine the attempts by others to achieve desired outcomes.  For instance, one recent 
British study found that the hasty discharge of elderly patients from acute hospital wards to 
increase bed spaces left social services departments to cope with large numbers of elderly 
people prematurely back at home, and in need of additional rehabilitation .   
Under-provision of services takes a range of forms. First, actual gaps in services may 
occur when agencies mistakenly assume other organisations are providing a service which 
they are not . Since no agency has clear oversight of all services, agencies collectively fail to 
detect the gap in provision.  Such a problem implies a lack of coordination at the service 
planning stage. Secondly, from a client’s perspective, they may be unable to access existing 
services.  This may be a partial consequence of the difficulty of negotiating a complex and 
fragmented service system.  However, it  may also be caused by organisations’ failure to 
inform clients of the correct details of available services and to make appropriate referrals, 
perhaps due to a lack of knowledge about other local services.  Similarly, clients can ‘slip 
through the cracks’ between services when agencies fail to share relevant client information 
with each other in a timely manner.  
Third, under-provision can also occur when agencies shift responsibility for clients 
onto other agencies.  Examples have been found in some areas of human services where 
clients with complex needs are ‘dumped’ onto other agencies when staff feel ill-equipped to 
deal with the issues at hand or when clients’ problems seem intractable .  Such problems are 
particularly acute for clients with co-morbid conditions, such as simultaneous mental heath 
and addictions problems, where there is dispute over which problem takes precedence . When 
these problems occur, it is often unclear which agency is ultimately accountable for which 
aspect of the client’s care. Examples of patients and clients who experience gaps in services 
because of straddling systems of care abound in the human services. Examples have been 
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identified in areas as diverse as adolescents with eating disorders , antenatal psychiatric care 
and managed care for the elderly .
Over-provision refers to the duplication of services and activities by more than one 
agency in the same area.  Over-provision may be a consequence of a lack of joint planning at 
an area level.   Funding arrangements are  also a  cause of  duplication, with  overlapping 
funding streams resulting in the same type of project work being funded under different 
schemes in one geographical area.  At operational level, agencies may be unaware that work 
has  already been  carried out  with  a  particular individual,  resulting  in  duplication.   A 
frequently cited example of this is the repeated assessment of the same clients by different 
agencies.  Consequently, clients are forced to repeat their ‘story’ to several agencies .    
The potential problems of incoherence, redundancy and lacunae serve to illustrate 
why human service systems and other service delivery networks are often the target of 
coordination efforts.  Local level, horizontal  coordination  involves agencies agreeing on 
devices or strategies which will minimize systemic effects and enhance the functioning of the 
service system as a whole.
1.2.4 The rationale for collaboration in central government
As discussed above, the collaboration ‘imperative’ applies equally to central and local levels, 
and a discussion of collaboration in central government is highly relevant to questions of 
government steering  of  local collaboration.  If  central  actors are  poorly coordinated, the 
capacity of  local  actors  to  collaborate is  likely  severely to  be  curtailed.   For  instance, 
conflicting targets, messages and priorities pursued by different government departments can 
act  as  impediments  to  local  cooperation  (PIU  2000).   The  differing  accountability 
requirements of local bodies towards their corresponding regulator can also impede local 
collaboration.  In addition, because local collaborative projects are often funded and tightly 
controlled by central civil servants, coordination problems between civil servants at central 
level will often keenly be felt by those working at local level .  
Collaboration in central government in the UK typically refers to both collaboration 
between ministers and collaboration between civil servants .  As central government becomes 
dispersed, a degree of collaboration is also arguably necessary between other parts of the 
government machinery such as executive agencies  and regulatory bodies .  Further forms of 
central government collaboration are discussed in chapter two. 
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However, collaboration in central government is challenging for a number of reasons. 
Most importantly perhaps is the tendency for departmentalism or ‘silo-thinking’ (Kavanagh 
and Richards, 2001; Page, 2005).  At the root of the problem is the functional separation of 
the  work  of  government  into  departments.   The  problem of  departmentalism  involves 
ministers and civil servants concentrating on their own narrow departmental remits without 
consideration of how their actions affect of the wider system of government.  The pursuit of 
one policy without consideration of the effects on other parts of government can lead to a 
number of externalities  or ‘spillover effects’ .  
Three recent examples of policy incoherence at the level of UK central government 
serve to illustrate.  Firstly was the failure on the part of the former Department for Education 
and Employment to consider the impact of introducing a universal school leaving age on the 
social  security  bill  .   Secondly,  also  in  the  field  of  education,  was  the  impact of  the 
introduction of school league tables which led schools to exclude unruly, under-performing 
pupils by schools and resulted in higher juvenile crime rates .  A third example illustrates that 
the problem of negative externalities applies as much to the vertical relationships between 
central and local government as to horizontal relationships between agencies or departments. 
In this example, James  found that the introduction of an electronic record system by the UK 
Benefits Agency impacted negatively on the ability of local housing authorities to housing 
administer benefits efficiently.  
A  number  of  commentators have  suggested  that  such  externalities  have  been 
exacerbated by New Public  Management reforms.  For example,  Pollitt   argues that  the 
emphasis on performance, outputs and targets has led central bodies to become even more 
narrowly focused on their own performance, rather than on wider systemic performance.  In a 
similar vein, Ling (2002) suggests that the incentive structure during brought in by New 
Public Management reforms have been geared towards departmental objectives instead of 
system-wide objectives.  It  has also been argued that increasing fragmentation caused by 
reforms such as the creation of Next Steps Agencies has led ministers to  become more 
‘departmentalist’ in a bid to maintain control over their policy areas (Kavanagh and Richards 
2001).  
 
1.2.5 Central exhortations for local collaboration in the contemporary policy context
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This section considers how the drive to encourage local collaborative working is manifested 
in  the  contemporary UK  policy  context.   As  noted  by  Sullivan  and  Skelcher (2002), 
partnerships have been a popular tool of collaboration used by the UK government for some 
time, and there has been growing use of central government directed partnership initiatives in 
fields including urban regeneration, community safety and health and social care since the 
late 1970s.  The use of horizontal governance approaches such as partnerships, joint working 
and collaboration, however,  have become far more prominent under New Labour .   The 
emphasis on joined-up working between local service providers underpins central policy 
frameworks affecting local government, including the modernizing government white paper 
of 1999 (Cabinet Office 1999) and the 2006 local government white paper (CLG 2006c).  In 
one  interpretation,  fairly  typical  of  other  analyses,  Labour’s  first  term  in  office  was 
characterized by a ‘hegemony of joined up governance’ .    
The ‘brand’ of joint working which has developed in the UK under New Labour is 
generally regarded as a fairly top-down one in comparison with other countries, although 
examples of governments mandating inter-agency collaboration from the ‘top-down’ can be 
found elsewhere including in Canada, Japan, the USA and the Netherlands . The drive to 
encourage partnerships by New Labour coincided with a highly prescriptive, top-down model 
of policy implementation pursued in their first few years in office .  Consequently, rather than 
leaving  local agencies to  initiate joint  working, the government vigorously  pursued this 
agenda through a range of coordinating mechanisms and policy tools. 
For instance, dedicated pump priming grants and funding streams were established to 
support multi-agency projects, and ‘Beacon Awards’ introduced to reward innovations in 
‘cross-cutting’ work.  As discussed by Asthana, Richardson and Halliday (2002), a variety of 
area-based initiatives such as Health Action Zones, Sure Start, Employment Zones, Education 
Action Zones and New Deal for Communities were established to encourage multi-agency 
approaches, and Local Strategic Partnerships were set up to consolidate partnership working. 
Indeed,  one  estimate suggests  there  to  be  as  many  as  5500  types  of  centrally-driven 
partnership body operating at sub-national level across the UK .  
Cross-cutting Local Area Agreements and Local Public Service Agreements, both 
types of central-local compact, are further examples of central initiatives which have been 
introduced to  enhance coordination at  local level.   In  addition,  a  recently  reinvigorated 
government compact with the voluntary sector aims to promote the involvement of this sector 
in  public services delivery and policy,  and to improve partnership working between the 
public and voluntary sectors.
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Although the practice of collaboration between agencies dealing with cross-cutting 
issues has a long history in the UK, there is increasing pressure from government for service 
providers to formalize their collaborative arrangements, with a growing tendency to make 
joint working mandatory .  This trend is evident in a number of other countries including 
Australia, New Zealand and the USA . In the UK a range of policy sectors have been on the 
receiving end of exhortations to collaborate with other sectors, including health and social 
care , and the social welfare and criminal justice sectors .  
Recent integration measures in the field of criminal justice include the merging of 
police and probation into the National Offender Management Service, and the establishment 
of Crime and Disorder Partnerships which compel various local bodies to work in partnership 
.   In  the health  sector,  the 1999 Health Act placed a  duty on  NHS bodies to  work in 
partnership, for example through more joint commissioning between primary health care and 
social services, particularly in relation to services for older people.  In addition, financial 
incentives for joint working in the area of intermediate care were provided through a national 
performance fund .  In social care, the structure of children’s services has been altered with 
the creation of Children’s Trusts, in an attempt to ensure that efforts to protect and promote 
the wellbeing of children and young people are more coordinated. The Children Act 2004 
also introduced mandatory cooperation between social services departments and other key 
bodies to prevent child protection failures.  As this thesis will demonstrate, homelessness is 
another policy field influenced by the growing tendency for multi-agency working to be 
mandated and promoted by government. 
The examples above illustrate the commitment of central government to a strategy of 
partnership or collaboration at local level.  However, although the plethora of partnership 
programmes and initiatives cited  suggests  a  centrally  driven  approach, the  strategy  for 
encouraging joint  working  has,  according to  Stoker ,  altered as  the  limitations  of  this 
approach have come to be known.  The initial approach used by New Labour to drive forward 
joined-up local government has been criticised and provides useful learning points about the 
difficulties of steering collaboration from the top-down.  Particular problems reported by 6 et 
al. (2002) include the speed and volume initiatives introduced across local public services in 
the UK, unrealistic expectations about how quickly results could be attained, and the design 
of bidding arrangements which meant that agencies tended to band together in the pursuit of 
additional funding rather than because of any real desire to collaborate. 
Despite  the  plethora  of  partnership  programmes  and  pervasiveness  of  political 
rhetoric  on  joined  up  governance  in  the  UK,  assessments  of  the  implementation  of 
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partnership working in local authorities have indicated slow or mixed progress to date .  For 
instance, evidence from a recent meta-evaluation of the sweep of UK local government 
reforms under  the  ‘modernizing government’ agenda  shows few indications of  stronger 
collaborative working between the public and private sectors, and little effect of increased 
partnership working on user satisfaction. The report calls for government to provide further 
incentives and opportunities to enable local authorities to make more fundamental and radical 
changes to cross-boundary working, in order to enhance collaboration, particularly at  the 
operational level .  Hambleton et al. (1995) have also documented unimpressive results from 
early attempts at  inter-agency collaboration in  the UK, such as  the introduction of joint 
financing and joint planning in community care.  
 Disappointing results have also been reported in other settings.  For instance, Weiss , 
summarizing research studies of programmes aiming to enhance service integration in the 
United  States, reports that  the  common theme of  these evaluations  is  one  of  ‘frequent 
frustration, conflict, and disappointment associated with these programmes’. The research she 
summarises suggests that few such attempts lead to greater coordination in terms of the 
number of  inter-agency linkages made.  Weiss questions  why policymakers continue to 
promote attempts to  foster  integration  in  the  face  of  such ‘overwhelming  evidence’ of 
implementation  failure,  concluding  that  much  of  the  appeal  lies  in  the  symbolic  and 
expressive content of the coordination message. Hill and Lynn (2003) similarly report a high 
rate of failure in  terms of efforts  in  the North American context to  produce lasting and 
productive collaboration in  the field of human services.  A similar concern is  raised by 
Davidson , who, investigating inter-agency relationships between housing and social services 
departments in the UK, notes that ‘commentators on the effects of coordination are almost 
wholly  pessimistic,  yet  coordination  continues to  be promoted as  a  means of  providing 
greater rationality in the delivery of services’.  The challenges of government mandated or 
‘top-down’ collaboration are discussed further in chapter two.  
The next section considers the key factors affecting collaboration generally,  both 
obstacles  and  enablers.   The  challenges  highlighted  go  some  way  to  explaining  why 
collaboration is often problematic.  They also help explain why governments may encounter 
challenges when attempting to promote it. 
1.3 Key factors affecting collaboration
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The key factors affecting collaboration can be classified in various ways, however, there is 
reasonable consensus amongst researchers about the main issues that hinder and facilitate it. 
The broad distinction first made by Halpert (1982) and subsequently employed by Alexander 
(1995)  between  interpretive and  contextual factors  affecting  collaboration  provides  a 
parsimonious classification, and is  illustrated in figure 1.1 below11.   Such factors can be 
considered explanatory  or  independent variables influencing collaboration.  Where such 
factors  are  present,  collaborative  endeavours  are  more  likely  to  meet  with  success; 
conversely, where these are lacking, collaboration may be more challenging.  The factors 
listed are consequently considered antecedents of collaboration.  This framework is used in 
subsequent empirical chapters to guide the analysis. 
Fig 1.1 Antecedents of collaboration
Interpretive antecedents
- Domain consensus 
- Trust/ positive history of collaborative working
- Goal congruence
- Mutual understanding
Contextual antecedents
Intra-organisational:
- Decentralised structure, devolution of decision-making to frontline staff
- Number of organisational levels
- Broad range of services provided, complex tasks
- Competent trained staff, although not overly professionalised
- Culture: cosmopolitan/ pluralist world view
- Sufficient resources
Inter-organisational/ environmental:
- Compatible organisational structures, e.g. coterminous geographical boundaries/ compatible 
IT systems, timetables, planning frameworks & funding regimes
- Interdependence
- Fragmentation/ volatility of political, economic or service system
- Geographical proximity
- Presence of ‘boundary spanning’ individuals/  collaborative leadership
- Facilitative policy environment, including well-coordinated central government units/ 
‘joined up’ government policy/ collaboration in central government
- Government mandate to collaborate
(Adapted from Halpert 1982 and Alexander 1995)
1.3.1 Interpretive Factors
11 Halpert and Alexander’s frameworks are based on comprehensive literature reviews of inter-organisational 
coordination generally and provide more extensive lists of factors; the adapted framework below focuses on 
those factors which are most relevant to collaboration specifically and which are supported by further 
research as discussed below).
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Interpretive factors relate to attitudes and values held by staff in organisations, including the 
perceptions and images that they hold of those in other organisations . Four core interpretive 
factors affecting collaboration identified in  the literature include domain consensus, goal 
congruence, trust and mutual understanding.  
The first factor, domain consensus, indicates agreement over the respective territory 
and roles of different organisations involved. Greater consensus in this regard implies that 
agencies will  not  feel that  other  organisations are ‘invading’ their field of  work.  While 
agencies may wish to protect their own territory , they may also wish to relinquish some of 
the less desirable tasks to other agencies, either because they are difficult to resolve or less 
glamorous.  Where the activities of agencies are very distinct, there is less potential for 
disagreement over domain .  As discussed by Hudson (1995), establishing consensus over 
domain is a difficult process, requiring different professionals to resolve disputes over who is 
responsible for what.  A similar point is made by Stoker (1991) who suggests that there are 
some areas which are ‘accepted action spaces’ dominated by particular agencies or local 
authority departments in which their role and decisions are left unchallenged, but other areas 
of  ‘debated  territory’ where  a  number of  agencies or  departments  claim  involvement. 
Disputes over territory, according to Alexander (1995) are one area where legal or political 
mandates are often used in order to specify the domain and roles of the different actors 
involved.  
In relation to the second factor, goal congruence, or similarity of goals, where goals 
are similar organisations are more likely to identify with one another, resulting in greater 
cooperation. However, goal congruence is not always possible in service delivery networks, 
since agencies are often brought together by virtue of the fact that the different agencies 
involved provide different functions and services.  Their overarching aims and goals are 
therefore  different.  When  attempting  to  provide  a  service  in  collaboration with  other 
agencies, however, it may be important for those involved to attempt to align their aims as 
closely as possible, or at least to acknowledge their differing aims. The ‘implementation 
failure’ of a number of large scale, multi-agency public sector projects has been attributed in 
part to a lack of clarification over aims from the outset .  Goal congruence is similar to the 
notion of inter-organisational homogeneity discussed by Hudson . This is the extent to which 
organisations are structurally and functionally similar.  Where organisations are similar in 
these  respects,  collaboration  is  more  likely,  although  when  they  are  too  similar,  the 
relationship may become competitive. In the case of service delivery networks, agencies with 
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very similar remits may jostle for position as they compete for funding or clients, and too 
much overlap may create organisational redundancy.   
The third interpretive factor, trust, is regarded as a vital component in the process of 
collaboration.  A number of  empirical  studies  have  demonstrated a  positive  association 
between trust  and collaboration . Trust  in  this  context  is  important  because the  actors 
involved are in a position of vulnerability or uncertainty .  Collaboration is an inherently 
risky activity, since the benefits of collaborating are not always clear from the outset. The 
benefits are often fairly intangible and may only emerge over time.  Furthermore, in order to 
attain the benefits of collaboration, actors are reliant on the participation of other actors, yet 
they have few mechanisms for enforcing participation.  Becoming involved in collaboration 
can be a highly resource-intensive process, and so unless there is a degree of trust, actors may 
feel the cost-benefit trade off is too uncertain to risk becoming involved.  
However,  trust  is  something  which  can  only  develop  over  time.   Therefore 
committing to inter-agency collaboration can initially involve something of a ‘leap of faith’. 
Once actors become embedded in processes of interaction, trust can develop.  As observed by 
Gray (1996, p. 66): ‘trust ensues when members’ interests are heard and acknowledged as 
legitimate by others’.  Additionally, once agencies develop a reputation for ‘fair dealing’ or 
‘principled conduct’ they are more likely to be trusted (Cropper 1996). As Cropper states, 
trust  at  the  inter-organisational  level  develops  when  there  is  ‘shared  experience  of 
expectations met’ (ibid, p. 96).  Consequently, agencies becoming involved in collaborative 
projects have been advised to  begin  with  small-scale, achievable tasks  which  can help 
quickly to build trust, which provides a firm basis for subsequent  interactions. When an 
organisation  has  a  history  of  successful collaboration  with  another,  future  attempts  to 
collaborate are considered more likely to succeed.   
The fourth interpretive antecedent, mutual understanding, refers to awareness of the 
constraints,  pressures and  priorities  of  other  organisations.   Several  case  studies  have 
highlighted this factor, and suggest that tensions between agencies involved in collaborative 
processes often stem form a lack of awareness and understanding of these issues.  
There is some evidence to suggest that problems associated with interpretive factors 
may be  exacerbated when a  range of  professional  groups is  involved, where there are 
differences  in  language  and  terminology,  culture,  values  or  world  view,  management 
strategies and working practices, and where core business and priorities differ .  One of the 
difficulties  of  achieving  collaboration  is  an  unwillingness  to  surrender  organisational 
autonomy and a fear of having to adapt to the working practices and institutional norms of 
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another organisation, and consequently professionals can engage in ‘turf guarding’ behaviour 
.  
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1.3.2 Contextual Factors
Contextual factors are the more ‘objective’ factors which exist within an organisation (intra-
organisational  factors)  or  its  wider  environment  (inter-organisational  and  wider 
environmental factors).  In the case of service delivery networks, the environment includes 
other organisations within the network but also central government agencies, pressure groups, 
clients, the economic climate and so forth.  
At  the  intra-organisational  level,  a  number of  contextual  factors  may  affect  an 
organisation’s propensity to collaborate. As discussed by Halpert (1982) and Alexander , 
organisations which are decentralized are more likely to be open to collaborating with other 
organisations than those which are centralised.  According to Alexander (ibid), this may be a 
reflection of decentralised agencies’ prior experience of coordinating internal units.  Second, 
collaboration is considered more problematic where it must take place across organisational 
levels.  In the context of public services it is frequently the case that policy responsibilities 
overlap between tiers  of  government,  creating  problems of  communication,  conflicting 
mandates and competing priorities. Third, organisations which provide a  broad range of 
services which engage in complex tasks are more likely to engage in collaboration than 
highly specialized organisations with a narrow focus. Fourth, organisations with well-trained 
and competent personnel may be more predisposed to collaborate, since they are likely to be 
more confident,  seeing interactions  with  other  organisations  as  posing  less  of  a  threat. 
Although  expert  competence  may  enhance  collaboration,  highly  professionalised 
organisations where members are affiliated with professional bodies and where recruitment 
and  promotion  procedures are  based  on  professional  credentials may  be  less  likely  to 
collaborate.  Fifth, in cultural terms, organisations with a cosmopolitan and pluralist world 
view which support innovation will be more open to collaboration than those with a more 
parochial outlook, concerned predominantly with local and internal issues.  Organisations 
with a ‘collaborative culture’ are also adaptive, responsive, and confident enough to devolve 
decision making downwards to frontline staff (Newman 1996, cited in Sullivan and Skelcher 
2002).  
 An  additional  intra-organisational  antecedent  of  collaboration  is  the  level  of 
organisational  resource available,  either  specifically for  collaborative  work  or  in  more 
general terms.  Inter-agency collaboration is a high cost process, and is likely to require 
additional resources, both financial and human .  Despite this, collaboration is something 
which is often ‘tacked on’ to agencies’ core work by governments without any additional 
47
existing funds.  Where local authorities are under financial strain, for instance experiencing 
budget cuts, becoming involved with external organisations comes to be seen as something of 
a luxury . Such pressures are particularly acute in smaller local authorities or public agencies 
which command fewer resources. When there is little spare capacity in the system, and in 
fields where there is a constant pressure on resources, collaboration is less likely to occur.  
At the  inter-organisational level, contextual factors affecting collaboration include 
compatibility  of  organisational  structures  and  processes,  the  level  of  interdependence 
between agencies, the  degree of  fragmentation,  geographical proximity,  the  presence of 
boundary spanners and government policy or mandate.  Clashing organisational structures 
and processes include timetables, planning frameworks, funding regimes, IT systems and 
differing geographical boundaries have been shown in previous research to differences pose 
considerable practical difficulties in relation to collaboration .  The level of interdependence 
between agencies is a key antecedent of collaboration.  As noted above, interdependence can 
stem from the need to lever in material resources held by other agencies, including financial 
resources,  equipment,  or  human  resources  including  the  expertise  of  other  agencies’ 
personnel.  Agencies may also be interdependent in the sense of being reliant on the actions 
of other agencies in order to fulfil their own objectives .  Resource interdependence has been 
shown to be one of the most important motives for cooperation within networks.  Studies 
from  this  perspective  indicate  that  as  network  actors  become engaged in  patterns  of 
exchange, they develop a norm of reciprocity.  Indeed, network theory holds that such norms 
and processes of exchange are the key agents which bind networks together in the absence of 
hierarchy .  Related to this, a fragmented or volatile political or economic system is likely to 
enhance the  likelihood of  collaboration,  since  this  enhances agencies’ sense  of  mutual 
dependence (Alexander 1995). 
Geographical  proximity  is  sometimes  considered  a  facilitator  of  collaboration, 
particularly in the context of human services where shared premises can make a significant 
practical  difference  to  agencies’ ability  effectively  to  undertake day-to-day tasks  in  a 
collaborative manner (Alexander 1995).  The presence of ‘boundary spanning’ individuals is 
also considered an important facilitator of collaboration.  These individuals have particular 
abilities which assist the process of inter-organisational collaboration, as discussed further in 
chapter two.  There is also a growing literature which highlights leadership qualities which 
may act as facilitators of collaboration.  Several attributes of collaborative leadership have 
been identified, including the ability to build consensus, settle disputes, mobilise partners, 
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‘play the politics’ where necessary, as well as the ability to develop structures and systems 
that facilitate collaboration .
Lastly, government promotion of collaboration either through incentives or forms of 
exhortation  may  be  regarded  as  a  further  environmental antecedent  of  collaboration. 
Conversely,  central government policies can often impede collaboration.  In the UK, for 
instance, there has been criticism that government promotes joint working and the sharing of 
best practice between agencies yet situates them within a framework of competition, for 
instance  through  performance  league  tables  tied  to  funding,  and  competitive  bidding 
arrangements .
In summary,  core ‘ingredients’ of successful  collaboration highlighted in  existing 
literature include both interpretive and contextual factors .  Generally speaking, the more 
abundant these properties, the greater the level of collaboration is likely to be.  However, any 
one of these ingredients alone may not be sufficient to enhance collaboration, and empirical 
studies suggest that combinations of these factors need to be present .  Furthermore, these 
factors may act as inhibitors or facilitators of collaboration, depending on the circumstances. 
For instance, while under some circumstances resource constraints may inhibit the capacity 
of  organisations  to  collaborate,  in  others  this  may  compel  agencies  to  cooperate,  as 
emphasized in exchanged-based perspectives.  
In light of the factors affecting collaboration, a number of commentators have sought 
to generate advice for practitioners involved in collaborative endeavours .  These analysts 
highlight the need to generate trust, mutual understanding, open communication, information 
sharing and to craft a sense of common purpose.  They also suggest that in order to minimise 
the negative effects of cultural and organisational differences, those involved in collaborative 
endeavours need to develop a better understanding and appreciation of the role, skills and 
prior training of others in the network and how these may impact on their professional values. 
These scholars also highlight the need to find ways of allowing agencies to enhance their 
understanding of the priorities of other agencies and the constraints within which they are 
working. Within formal partnerships, attention to partnership size, linkages at appropriate 
levels, careful selection of a lead agency and attention to the dynamics and make-up of multi-
agency boards or steering groups are considered important.  
The discussion above illustrates that collaboration is a complex, time consuming and 
resource intensive process.  Whilst a lack of collaboration is usually the focus of discussion, 
there  are  also  potentially  negative  consequences of  over-collaboration,  in  terms of  the 
diversion of time and resources away from agencies’ core business.  In addition, there may be 
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costs to organisational autonomy , and the benefits usually take time to emerge.  For these 
reasons, academics and other commentators have urged public sector managers to be cautious 
about the number of partnering arrangements to which they commit themselves, and to enter 
into them only when the benefits will outweigh the costs . 
Conceiving of collaboration as a ‘policy’ that governments may wish to implement, 
the evidence suggests that implementation is unlikely to be straightforward.  The policy is 
concerned with changing the relationships between actors, which is a time consuming and 
difficult  business.  A range of  factors  affect  the  willingness  and  ability  of  agencies to 
collaborate with others, including both interpretive and contextual factors.  A variety of 
antecedents may be required for collaboration to proceed including some combination of goal 
congruence, domain consensus, trust, sufficient resources, interdependence and the presence 
of boundary spanners.  While government can influence some of these factors, others are 
clearly local issues which can only be determined by those on the ground.  
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Chapter 2: Horizontal Collaboration and Vertical Meta-
Governance
Chapter Overview
While the previous chapter introduced the rationale for collaboration in local public service 
delivery networks, this chapter provides conceptual clarification, and classification, of the 
main forms of collaboration.  It also outlines and classifies vertical coordination tools used to 
foster collaboration in local networks, characterising these as forms of ‘meta-governance’. 
The chapter begins (section 2.1) by considering the horizontal dimension, and outlines levels 
and varieties of collaboration.  Section 2.2 classifies formal coordination tools used to ‘join-
up’ central and local government.  It also discusses issues governing horizontal tool choice. 
The third section (section 2.3) discusses informal collaboration and the role of the individual. 
The chapter then considers the vertical dimension (section 2.4), and outlines vertical tools for 
joining up local public services (section 2.5). This section also contains a discussion of issues 
governing horizontal tool choice. The last section (2.6) considers existing empirical evidence 
which has investigated the influence of government-driven collaboration.
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2.1 The Horizontal Dimension: Conceptualising Collaboration
How, then, can collaboration best  be conceptualised and how might it  be evidenced? As 
discussed in chapter one, collaboration at a very general level is usually seen as a mode of 
operation  which  involves  organisations  or  individuals  working  together  towards  some 
common purpose.   It has been defined as  a process in which organisations actively and 
jointly work together across organisational boundaries.  
2.1.1 Levels and varieties of collaboration
There are many varieties and levels of inter-organisational collaboration, and despite attempts 
to classify these, there is no universally agreed or consistent framework .  Terms such as 
cooperation,  collaboration  and  coordination  are  often  used  inter-changeably  within  the 
literature, and mean different things to different authors.   Nevertheless, most analysts agree 
that there is a spectrum of collaboration, moving from weak links at one end to stronger 
forms of integration at the other. As illustrated in figure 2.1 below, several authors view 
collaboration as a strong form of coordination.  
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Fig 2.1 Spectrum of collaboration
Author (s) Level of integration
       Weak                   Strong
Cropper 1996 Wide Networks Loose alliances  Tight federations    Novel organisational 
  entities
Sullivan and Skelcher Loose networks  Limited      Agreement to Agreement to Federal   Merger
2002 of informal, ad hoc agreement to      undertake constitute formal Structure   into single
relationships share information      activities jointly governing body   organisation
Kooiman 2003 Networking Coordination Cooperation   Collaboration
Cigler 1999 Networking Cooperation Coordination   Collaboration
Leutz 1999; Linkage Coordination   Full integration
6 2004, 2005 (eg sharing information 
in a planned manner)
Mandell 1999 Linkages/ Intermittent coordination/ Ad hoc/ temporary     Permanent/ regular Coalition   Collective
Interactive mutual adjustment task force activity       coordination through (interdependent   structure (joint & 
Contacts        formal arrangement actions)   strategically 
  interdependent actions)
Crawford and Jones 
1996; Barton and Multi-agency working  Inter-agency working
Quinn 2001
Rogers 1974 Acquaintance Interaction Information exchange  Resource exchange Overlapping  Written agreements
board membership
Reid, 1964 Ad hoc coordination                               Programme coordination
Scharpf 1994, 1997 Negative coordination                               Positive coordination
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Depending on their location on the spectrum, the nature of collaborative activities 
is  likely  to  differ.   Similarly,  the  degree of  institutionalization  and formalization of 
interactions  between  organisations  will  also  vary.   Examples  of  high  spectrum 
collaborative  activities  or  ‘coordination  tools’  relevant  to  implementation  networks 
include the establishment of new multi-agency programmes, bodies, boards or teams, 
joint written agreements,  joint commissioning, legal  partnerships and jointly provided 
services.   These  tools  move  beyond  simple  information  sharing  into  the  realm of 
establishing common goals .  Fritz Scharpf’s distinction between positive and negative 
coordination is helpful in underlining the difference in approach between the two ends of 
the spectrum .  Negative coordination has fairly limited aspirations and involves ensuring 
that  policies,  practices  and procedures do  not  interfere  with  those  of  other  units  or 
organisations.  Positive coordination, however, is more ambitious, involving the pursuit 
and utilization of joint strategies in order to improve system-wide effectiveness. 
Higher end collaborative activities are usually more costly and there is arguably a 
greater need for active network management, involving network design and the diagnosis 
and  management  of  disagreements  .  These  more  highly  integrated  varieties  of 
collaboration may yield greater benefits, and enhance inter-organisational support, but 
they also increase the likelihood of conflict .   They are highly formalised, implying 
greater commitment, cooperation and compromise from participating organisations, and 
often the selection of a central organisation to lead the collaboration. Membership of 
collaborative structures at this end of the spectrum is likely to be more stable than ad-hoc 
. These forms of collaboration are also likely to entail greater loss of autonomy, affecting 
the internal working practices and standard operating procedures of the organisations 
involved, thus institutionalising joint activity .
At the lower end of the collaborative spectrum, agencies may come together to 
work on a common area of concern, however joint activities are unlikely significantly to 
alter  the  work  carried out  by  the  individual  agencies concerned, and  only  limited 
cooperation is required.   As stated in one analysis, ‘multi-agency work is grafted onto 
existing practices, making joint  working as  non-threatening as  possible’ (Barton and 
Quinn 2001, p. 51).  Such collaboration is often referred to in the literature as ‘informal 
coordination’.  Varieties of this include discussions and information exchanges, either 
through  informal  channels  of  communication  via  telephone,  e-mail  and  written 
correspondence, or  through  face-to-face contact in  ad-hoc consultation  meetings and 
events.  These ‘loose’ forms of collaboration are more reliant on individual relationships 
and interactions than on established rules, designated roles or jointly agreed operating 
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procedures. According to Hudson (1987, p. 179), this type of informal, tacit collaboration 
is more common than highly formalised joint working in social welfare contexts.  
Examples of collaborative activity in the context of human services include multi-
agency case planning for service users, often at transitional points where clients move 
from one system of care into another, as well as the coordination of service use for clients, 
and sharing client  information between agencies  in  a  planned manner (Leutz 1999). 
Applying the ‘spectrum’ of collaboration to the field of human services, weak forms of 
collaboration include  inter-agency referrals  and  ad-hoc information  sharing between 
agencies.  Joint forums or bodies whose main purpose is to share information and consult 
may also be considered relatively weak forms of collaboration.  These activities may take 
place without affecting existing organisational arrangements or structures. Moderate level 
activities  include the  establishment of  boundary spanning posts  for  linking  agencies 
together, case management posts and planned or routinised client information sharing 
between agencies (ibid). Such moderate level procedures imply a degree of formalization, 
since rules, policies and procedures may be written down, and processes established to 
deal with points of friction. However, they are less formal, authoritative and contractually 
binding than those in fully integrated versions of collaboration.  Strong collaborative 
activities  in  this  context  include multi-agency teams,  joint  commissioning  and  joint 
management boards (Hambleton et al. 1995; Leutz 1999). 
It is a recurring theme in the inter-organisational relations literature that agencies 
tend to resist the tightest forms of collaboration.  There is a general preference for weaker 
forms, since these are less costly,  they allow organisations to maintain more of their 
independence and pose less of a threat to standard operating procedures .  However, the 
stronger forms of collaboration may yield greater potential benefits. 
In summary, there are both degrees of collaboration and several different varieties 
of collaboration. In addition, the distinction is often made between formal and informal 
collaboration, with the former implying structural, procedural, binding arrangements and 
the latter based on spontaneous, ad-hoc interactions and individual relationships.  Formal 
collaboration tends  to  involve  the  employment  of  horizontal  coordination  ‘tools’ or 
‘instruments’. The next section considers methods for classifying these tools.  
2.2 Formal tools of collaboration
Horizontal coordination tools are employed both in local service delivery networks and at 
the level of central government.  Since one of the core aims of the present research is to 
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identify and classify the tools of collaboration employed at both central and local level, 
each of these levels is considered in turn.  
2.2.1 Classifying formal horizontal coordination tools at local level
 
Numerous coordination tools or mechanisms can be employed at local level to join up 
agencies.  These tools may be used to structure interactions between the parties involved 
and increase the congruence of their activities.  As such, they can be conceived of as 
instruments of network management .  These have been classified in a number of different 
ways. The following discussion attempts to bring some order to the diverse array of 
horizontal coordination tools. 
One  means  of  classifying  coordination  tools  is  to  distinguish  between  the 
organisational level at which they are pursued.  Sullivan and Skelcher (2002) provide a 
framework which distinguishes between coordination processes and activities at strategic, 
governance, operational, practice and community levels.   In this  framework strategic 
activities  include creating  partnership  boards,  steering  groups and  other  stakeholder 
groups.  These groups define the vision and key themes of collaboration.  Governance 
level coordination includes joint accountability and performance systems, which normally 
exist alongside the performance and accountability systems of individual organisations. 
Operational level coordination refers to organisational structures and processes such as 
pooled budgets, joint planning and commissioning of services, integrated delivery, formal 
or  informal  agreements,  information sharing  and  staff  secondments. Practice  level 
coordination refers to the skills and abilities required of the workers involved.  Finally, 
community coordination methods include programmes and funding designed to enhance 
community involvement and public information strategies.  
In the context of human services12, including areas such as child welfare, mental 
health, learning disability, care for the elderly, and homelessness, strategic and operational 
levels of collaboration may also be defined.  Strategic or “policy-level” tools include 
coalitions, planning authorities and welfare councils involving officials and executives 
from relevant  funding  agencies or  service  providing  organisations  .   According  to 
Agranoff (1991, p. 536) efforts at this level must be made if collaboration is to be secured 
further ‘down the line’.  For instance, executives at the apex of organisations involved in 
a collaborative endeavour are responsible for making the decisions about resourcing and 
supporting operational coordination structures and mechanisms.  Coordination  efforts 
12 Human services have been defined as those whose mission is to “promote and protect the well being of 
individuals, families and other social units through mandatory or voluntary interventions in their lives” 
(Hasenfeld 1983, see Hill and Lynn 2003, p. 78).
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such as joint budgeting, joint service commissioning and the establishment of reviewing 
groups or task forces are likely to stem from this organisational level. 
There  are  numerous  varieties  of  operational  tools  and  these  are  sometimes 
classified into two further subcategories: one relating to administrative functions and the 
other to  frontline service delivery.  Administrative tools  include joint  information and 
monitoring  systems,  single  applications  forms  or  processes,  jointly  agreed  referral 
agreements, designated posts  for forging inter-agency links and coordinating services 
(‘boundary spanning’ posts) and joint staff training .  Operational tools relating to service 
delivery include co-location of services, interagency teams and joint case management. 
Co-location involves delivering multiple services from one location, such as the one stop 
shop approach to provide clients with services all under one roof (Leutz, 1999).  Inter-
agency teams involve regular meetings between practitioners with different professional 
backgrounds and from different agencies to coordinate services for individual clients . 
Joint  case  management  typically  entails  devising  multi-agency  service  plans  for 
individuals with multiple needs or problems .
 An additional means of classifying forms of collaboration is according to the 
‘mode’ of interaction or activity involved.  This is the principal framework adopted within 
the present study.  Van De Ven et al.  distinguish between group, personal and impersonal 
modes  of  coordination,  with  each  mode  containing  a  range  of  coordination  tools. 
Although developed in  the context of intra- rather than inter-organisational theory,  it 
nevertheless  provides  a  useful  organising  framework  for  classifying  coordination 
mechanisms.  Indeed, Alter , and Alter and Hage  have subsequently used this scheme to 
analyse inter-organisational relations.  The classification draws on earlier work by March 
and Simon  and Thompson .  
Impersonal modes are a means of achieving ‘coordination by plan’ (March and 
Simon 1958), or by ‘programming’ in Van De Ven et al.’s terminology.  This form of 
coordination is pre-established or determined in advance of the situation in which it is to 
be applied.  They are therefore ‘anticipatory’ forms of coordination, taking place at the 
planning  stage  (Alexander 1995).   Impersonal modes  involve  the  use  of  codified, 
standardised blueprints  for action.   These blueprints  are ‘impersonally  specified’ and 
provide a set of formal rules governing the roles of participants.  They imply little need 
for  verbal  communication  or  application  of  human  discretion  since  the  rules  are 
previously  codified.  Examples include standardised  information  and  communication 
systems,  policies  and procedures, formalised rules, pre-established plans, agreements, 
contracts and schedules.
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Personal and group modes are two forms of achieving ‘coordination by feedback’. 
Coordination by feedback involves the transmission of new information and therefore 
cannot be determined in advance.  They are ‘adaptive’ forms of coordination, occurring in 
‘real time’ (Alexander 1995). With both group and personal modes participants make 
mutual adjustments as they receive new information, implying the need for face-to-face 
contact.  Personal modes of coordination are based on linkages between individuals, 
either vertically  in  a chain of command or horizontally usually through a designated 
coordinator  without  formal authority  over  other  participants.   Group modes include 
committee or  staff  meetings,  which are either scheduled or unscheduled.  Scheduled 
group meetings are typically routine, planned staff meetings, while unscheduled group 
meetings are impromptu and informal, organised to tackle work related problems as they 
arise.  
Such classifications which specify different modes of coordination and associated 
tools  are  helpful  for  bringing  some  analytical  bite  to  fuzzy  notions  of  ‘joined  up 
government’.  Similar schemes can also be applied to the context of central government, 
as discussed in the next section.  
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2.2.2 Formal horizontal tools for joining up central government
As discussed in chapter one, collaboration employed at the level of central government is 
a potential stimulant to local joined up working.  Where central government policies are 
joined up,  local services themselves are more likely to  be  coherent.  Where central 
policies are not joined up,  the conflicting mandates of government departments may 
promote  incoherence at  a  local  level.   This  section  considers the  major  forms  of 
collaboration in central government.  As with local level collaboration, strategies and 
tools for coordinating action can be placed along a continuum.  At one end informal 
networks play a role, as highlighted by Heclo and Wildavsky  whose influential work 
emphasised the importance of informal cross-Whitehall contacts to treasury-based civil 
servants.  Recalling  Scharpf’s  notion  of  negative coordination,  this  concept provides 
some insights into the nature of contacts at this weaker end of the spectrum. He suggests 
that  this  type  of  coordination  involves ‘bilateral clearance negotiations  between the 
initiating department and other units whose portfolios might be affected – but whose own 
policy options are not actively considered’ (1994, p. 39).  This is in contrast to positive 
coordination which is  an  altogether more ambitious  affair,  involving joint  strategies 
pursued by multiple departments.  Approaches at the weaker end of the continuum are 
largely  ‘personal’  modes  of  coordination,  involving  face-to-face  contact  and  the 
movement of personnel around the system.  
A number of initiatives in the UK context have sought to formalise inter-personal 
networks and contacts at the level of central government by designing such interaction 
into the system.  For instance, one of aims of establishing the Senior Civil Service was to 
increase the movement of civil servants around different government departments and 
bodies .  Such approaches can help break down cultural and organisational barriers by 
providing staff  with exposure to  different policy fields, professions and departmental 
cultures  and  can  be  considered  a  form  of  boundary  spanning.   Various  formal 
‘coordinating networks’ have also been created within the Treasury and Cabinet, such as 
the Permanent Secretaries group, the Civil Service Management Board and the Principal 
Finance Officers networks.  Other examples of personal coordination modes employed in 
recent years have included the use of external policy advisors, and field visits to local 
government by central civil  servants ,  as well  as the use of government ministers or 
sponsors to lead on cross-cutting policy projects that fall outside the usual remit of their 
own department (Kavanagh and Richards 2001; PIU 2000).  Such efforts serve to create 
more cross-departmental horizontal contact at the individual level, or in the case of field 
visits, to enhance vertical integration between local and central government.  
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  At the other end of the spectrum are various formal coordination tools, exhibiting 
differing degrees of integration. In order to aid comparability with coordination tools used 
at local level, these can be categorised into group and impersonal modes.  Group modes 
used  in  the  UK context  include  the  establishment of  new central  units  to  enhance 
coordination at central level and inter-departmental working groups or task forces.  These 
units provide a forum for structuring interactions, where a range of actors from different 
departments can become involved in devising, implementing and evaluating policy.  
Central units created over recent years in the UK include bodies based in the 
Cabinet Office which provide strategic leadership and generate advice on joint working, 
such as the Performance and Innovation Unit, the Delivery Unit and the Office of Public 
Service Reform (PIU 2000; Better Regulation Task Force 2002).  Other units have been 
established  to  work  on  single  cross-cutting  issues,  such  as  social  exclusion,  rough 
sleeping and regional coordination.  Inter-departmental working groups have been used in 
a variety of policy areas.  One example is the field of criminal justice where the Home 
Office, the Lord Chancellor’s Department and the Crown Prosecution Department engage 
in joint policy appraisal and planning .  A second is the inter-ministerial working group 
coordinating the Sure Start initiative for children .   Such examples might  fit  within 
Sharpf’s  notion  of  positive  coordination.  Typical  procedures  in  this  category  are 
‘multilateral negotiations in intra- or inter-ministerial task forces whose mandate include 
consideration of all policy options of all participating units’ .
Impersonal  modes in  the  context  of  central government include three related 
techniques,  namely  the  provision  of  incentives  for  ministers  and  civil  servants  to 
encourage  joint  working,  the  alignment  of  performance  regimes  to  ensure  that 
departments work towards harmonious rather than conflicting objectives and the use of 
financial tools such as joint budgeting arrangements.  In relation to incentives, a number 
of  commentators  have highlighted the  importance of  providing  these to  ensure  that 
ministers  and  officials  are  rewarded for  delivering cross-cutting  rather  than  narrow 
departmental objectives .  There has been some modification of the incentive structure of 
civil servants and ministers in recent times to achieve this . 
With regards to the alignment of performance systems, one method is to deploy 
cross-cutting or joint targets.  In the UK some cross-cutting targets and objectives have 
been set for departments and executive agencies under the Public Services Agreement 
(PSA) regime .   PSAs are essentially  contracts  between central departments and the 
Treasury, in which money is allocated in return for meeting specified objectives.  Another 
financial tool used by the UK Treasury to promote central joint working has been the 
creation of pooled budgets in various policy areas such as criminal justice, drugs and 
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children’s  services  ,  developed in  the  context  of  the  Treasury’s  cross-cutting  policy 
reviews under the Comprehensive Spending Review. 
In summary, the three ‘modes’ of coordination discussed above provide a useful 
organising framework for classifying the horizontal collaboration tools at central and at 
local level.  It is likely that effective collaboration may need a combination of different 
coordination modes, since each mode offers a  different type of collaborative benefit. 
Impersonal devices are arguably the most binding of the modes, involving the greatest 
compulsion.  They involve intervention into the design of an inter-organisational system 
to  ensure  that  formalised  arrangements  are  in  place.  As  noted  above,  personal 
coordination can be ‘designed in’ to the system in an attempt to formalise inter-personal 
contact. However,  personal  modes are  often rather informal and sporadic in  nature. 
Because of the interactive nature of personal and group based modes, they offer greatest 
opportunity for feedback.  They are iterative and dynamic coordination modes which may 
be highly appropriate in circumstances where discretionary decision is required.    
Figure 2.2 below outlines the horizontal coordination tools typically employed by 
bodies both at local and central government level, providing examples of UK initiatives.  
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Fig 2.2 Modes of horizontal collaboration in central and local government
 
Ad-hoc, informal links        Routinised, formal links
     
Personal modes Group modes Impersonal modes
Horizontal tools:
Central 
government
Movement of civil 
servants around 
departments; Informal 
networks; Coordinating 
networks; Field visits; 
Ministerial sponsoring   
of cross-cutting groups
Inter-departmental
working groups;
Central coordination 
Units; Task Forces
Cross-cutting targets
(e.g. through PSAs);
Incentives; 
Pooled budgets
Horizontal tools:
Local 
government
Boundary spanners;
Staff placements or 
Secondments; Information 
Sharing; Informal contacts
Jointly provided
Services;
Co-location/ one-stop
shops; Joint staff 
Training;  
Multi-agency
groups/ forums
Joint budgets,
Joint local performance
Indicators/ targets;
Joint protocols;
Joint information,
Monitoring/ assessment 
systems
Although  much  has  been  written  about  the  various  ‘joining’ up’ initiatives 
instigated by recent governments in  the UK, there has  been relatively  little  in-depth 
empirical work which systematically identifies and classifies the coordination tools used 
in  different  policy  areas  at  central  government level,  and  even  less  examining the 
effectiveness of these mechanisms (for an exception see James 2003a).  Much previous 
work has focused on the rationale for collaboration or has been concerned with charting 
the trend towards the increased policy emphasis on this.  More empirical analysis of the 
patterns of coordination mechanisms and assessment of their effects may lead to insights 
about  how collaboration can  be  enhanced at  central  government  level.   This  study 
provides an opportunity systematically to map out and assess the coordination tools and 
modes  used  in  one  policy  sector,  at  both  central  and  local  level,  building  on  the 
classification scheme discussed above.  
2.2.3 Issues governing horizontal tool choice
There are a range of possible explanations as to why agencies may choose to adopt or 
develop different horizontal coordination tools.  One explanation which has been very 
influential within studies of inter-organisational coordination is the ‘contingency theory’ 
perspective associated with authors such as Burns and Stalker , Woodward  and Lawrence 
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and Lorsch  13.  According  to  these applications of  contingency theory,  the  choice  of 
coordination  mechanisms is  governed by  the  nature of  the  task  environment.  This 
literature links specific coordination modes with variables relating to the organisational 
environment in which they are used.  These approaches are generally prescriptive and 
suggest that horizontal coordination tools can be chosen to fit particular contexts.  They 
are  also  fairly ‘rationalistic’ in  orientation, implying that  tools  can be  selected in  a 
calculated and technical manner.  
For instance, March and Simon (1958) contend that coordination by ‘plan’ is only 
applicable  in  stable  and  predictable  situations  where  there  can  be  standardised or 
routinised responses to situations arising.  By contrast, coordination by ‘feedback’ is more 
relevant in situations which are more variable and unpredictable, where it is impossible to 
generate a  standard response.  In these situations  contingencies may arise  which are 
unanticipated, and instructions must be given to alter activity in order to adjust to the 
issues arising.  This mode of coordination suggests the need for problem solving.  
Van  De  Ven  and  colleagues  (1976)  postulate  that  choice  of  coordination 
mechanism is associated with three key variables, namely the degree of task uncertainty, 
task interdependence and unit size.  Greater uncertainty implies the need for group and 
personal methods, since tasks only become understood as they are executed, and there is 
no ‘typical’ task or case requiring attention.  Consequently, roles, schedules and priorities 
change and develop as these tasks are addressed.  Greater interdependence also requires 
the use of coordination mechanisms such as group and personal methods which involve 
horizontal contact between members of different units.  In contrast to impersonal methods 
such as plans and rules, these methods allow participants to make mutual adjustments. In 
the case of group methods adjustments are made simultaneously, while with personal 
methods adjustments are made sequentially.  Larger unit size, however, points to the need 
for impersonal coordination mechanisms, since larger group size is associated with lower 
group cohesion, greater complexity of organisational  tasks and costs  of coordination. 
Impersonal methods are the least costly coordination methods and so tend to prevail in 
larger settings.  Empirical testing of these hypotheses in Van De Venn and colleagues’ 
study of employment units provided support for their accuracy. 
Alter and Hage  further develop the above framework in the context of inter-
organisational human services networks using contingency theory.  They contend that ‘it 
is generally recognised that the nature of the work and the task determines the most 
effective methods of coordination’ (Alter and Hage 1993, p. 93).  Their research finds 
evidence that  greater task scope,  which is  defined as ‘the degree to which tasks are 
13 Alternative theoretical perspectives commonly applied to inter-organisational settings are discussed in 
Chapter Three  
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variable and require a multidisciplinary or multidimensional approach’ (1993, p. 117), is 
related to the use of group modes. Lower task scope is related to the use of impersonal 
methods.  They also find that task volume, that is, ‘the average number of units that must 
be coordinated sequentially by a worker’ (1993, p. 121) is positively associated with the 
use  of  personal modes. Lastly,  their  research indicates that  greater  task uncertainty, 
defined as ‘the extent to which task processes or interventions have knowable outcomes’ 
(1993, p. 119), is associated with group modes while low uncertainty is associated with 
impersonal modes.  
An  alternative  perspective  to  the  contingency  theory  approach  is  to  view 
horizontal  coordination  tool  choice  as  more  of  an  irrational,  disorganised  or  even 
‘political’ issue.  Rather than selecting tools to fit the organisational task environment, 
those involved in local public services may choose these for political reasons or to further 
their own interests.  Political accounts of tool choice have been used in relation to the 
analysis of ‘vertical’ policy tools used by government, but not previously in relation to 
horizontal coordination tools.  The distinction between political and rational-technical 
decision-making  strategies is  discussed further  in  chapter  three  which  provides  the 
theoretical framework for the empirical research which follows.  
2.3 Informal collaboration and the role of the individual
Although collaboration is often conceptualised as involving the use of formal tools, there 
is  another  perspective  which  sees  the  individual  as  pre-eminent  in  sustaining 
collaboration.  From this point of view, individual members of organisations help to join 
up services, facilitating the transfer of information and enhancing coordination by virtue 
of  inter-personal contacts  and  relationships  that  they  develop.  The  role  of  formal 
‘boundary spanners’ who have a remit to forge inter-agency links was mentioned above. 
However, collaboration may occur more informally between existing personnel, through 
inter-personal,  telephone or  written  contact,  or  through  meetings  and  events,  either 
planned or  ad-hoc  .   Such collaboration  falls  at  the  lower end of  the  collaborative 
spectrum discussed above.  It  has been suggested that  in  inter-organisational settings 
informal contact is perhaps the most common coordination device there is .  Informal 
collaboration in the context of human services at the operational level typically involves 
sharing client information, making referrals to other agencies, ‘signposting’ clients  to 
other services or problem solving in relation to individual cases.  Informal collaboration 
at a managerial or strategic level may involve sharing information, joint problem solving 
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or  ad-hoc  discussions  around  service  planning.   In  order  to  assess  the  extent  of 
collaboration in different settings some empirical studies therefore employ contact or 
interaction between individuals  in  organisations as  a  measure of  collaboration.   This 
approach is used in the present research, as discussed further in chapter four.  
Previous  literature  suggests  that  individuals  who  are  particularly  adept  at 
maintaining  collaborative  relations  may  possess  certain  abilities,  often  referred  to 
‘reticulist’ or ‘boundary spanning’ abilities, such as the ability to forge alliances, settle 
disputes,  achieve compromises and  build  consensus .   Additional  personal qualities 
include perseverance, single mindedness, the capacity to handle change, take risks and 
adapt to other organisational cultures .   As one commentator has stated, these people 
possess  the  ‘relational  and  inter-personal  attributes  required to  build  social  capital’ 
(Williams 2002, p. 106), performing the role of informal networker and facilitator.  Such 
people are likely to be trusted by all the parties involved, thus facilitating collaboration.  It 
could be argued that sustaining collaboration across boundaries depends on harnessing the 
skills of these people.  Indeed, it has been suggested that competencies of this nature are 
crucial for today’s public sector managers (Rhodes 1996; Huxham 2000) and there is a 
growing literature on collaborative leadership (see Huxham and Vangen 2000; Sullivan 
and Skelcher 2002 for reviews).  
Such  individuals  are  sometimes characterised as  ‘network managers’. These 
individuals are often self-selecting rather than officially designated.  Their roles are likely 
to include ‘crafting a common purpose’, ‘co-aligning’ the action of diverse participants 
and mobilising others to implement specific programmes or solve problems .
Despite the importance of the individual in facilitating collaboration, over-reliance 
on key individuals with strong collaborative capacities, either formal boundary spanners 
or informal networkers, brings its own risks. As Goss (2001) has noted, the individuals 
employed to forge collaborative relationships are often corporate managers or project 
managers from the ‘new’ parts of public sector organisations, such as the performance or 
strategy team or the chief executive’s office.  These boundary spanners may quickly and 
skilfully  be  able  to  agree shared objectives  and draft  joint  strategies, but  they lack 
operational authority and day to day responsibility for service delivery.  Consequently, the 
partnership working generated by these people can often be of a ‘virtual’ nature, ‘no 
longer connected to mainstream delivery or to the mass of middle managers who make 
things happen on the ground’ (Goss 2001, p. 93).  In addition, collaboration which hinges 
on the input of key individuals can stall when these people change position or job.  In a 
field such as human services which is characterised by high staff turnover, this may be 
particularly  problematic.   From  a  service  user  perspective,  reliance  on  informal 
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communications as a means of joining up services may result in poor service quality.  As 
demonstrated when high profile child or public protection failures occur, systemic failure 
is often attributed to a lack of communication between professionals. These are among the 
reasons  why  informal  coordination  is  often  underpinned  by  formal  collaborative 
mechanisms (Alexander 1995).
The distinction between formal and informal collaboration has been made by a 
number of authors.  Formal collaboration tends to be based on jointly agreed rules and 
contracts, while informal collaboration is more voluntary in nature . Twenty five years 
ago Mulford and Rogers  suggested that there was little empirical research on informal 
collaboration, or on the relative effects of informal as compared to formal collaboration. 
In  the same volume Rogers made the case for more research investigating the ‘less 
obvious’ forms  of  collaboration,  including  the  interpretive meanings  held  by  those 
involved, arguing that the majority of existing research focused almost entirely on formal, 
highly quantifiable types of transactions.  To some extent this gap has been filled, and 
Smith, Carroll and Ashford (1995) document a growth in articles on informal aspects of 
cooperative  inter-organisational  relationships.  The  increasing  interest  in  informal 
interactions is  paralleled by a  growth in network-based studies to  which the idea of 
voluntary interactions is central.  There has been a steady growth in empirical research on 
both informal and formal varieties of collaboration, although relatively little research 
examining the interplay between these two issues.  
There is,  however,  a  growing interest in  the dynamics of  inter-organisational 
working and the way in which formal and informal forms of cooperation may be inter-
related. For instance, Ring and Van de Ven  discuss how formal collaboration based on 
rules and contracts may develop over time into informal collaboration.  Similarly, Gulati 
finds that as partners engage in repeated alliances, trust  develops,  and this  begins to 
replace formal legal relationships.  Lowndes and Skelcher (1998) argue that there are 
various phases in formal partnerships, thus acknowledging the evolutionary and dynamic 
nature of formal collaboration.  The methodology used in this research permits analysis of 
both formal and informal aspects of collaboration and the relationship between these two 
dimensions.
2.4 The Vertical Dimension: Meta-governance of Collaboration
In chapter one it was suggested that collaboration between local actors can be regarded as 
a ‘policy’ pursued by governments.  More specifically, it may be regarded as a ‘meta-
policy’.  Meta-policy making has been described as ‘setting and changing the systems and 
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structures  within  which  the  processes  which  are  concerned with  substantive  policy 
outputs occur’ .  Privatisation and the establishment of new agencies can be considered 
two examples.  Ham and Hill argue that while political science is often concerned with 
the ‘big’ examples of meta-policy, such as struggles over nation building and the design 
of constitutions, other types of meta-policy are often overlooked.  In particular, they draw 
attention to issues of meta-policy concerning the relationships between government units. 
Meta-policy  making is  also  concerned with  designing  policy-making systems, or  in 
Dror’s terms ‘policy-making on how to make policy’ (Dror 1968, see Ham and Hill ibid, 
p.  89).   In  network  settings,  the  process  of  engaging  in  meta-policy  making  and 
implementation can be labelled ‘meta-governance’. As noted in chapter one, this refers to 
government coordination of horizontal networks of agencies from a range of sectors, and 
supplants traditional notions of purely hierarchical government.  
Another important term used in the public policy literature which helps to define 
the policy strategies of interest to the present study is the notion of ‘procedural’ policy 
and its associated instruments or tools.  Howlett and Ramesh (2003, p. 91) suggest the 
procedural tools are used to ‘alter aspects of policy deliberations’.  Howlett  suggests that 
they can be used to ‘manage state-societal interactions’.  These tools are fundamentally 
about altering or manipulating the policy process, at whichever level of government or 
society.   Examples include government reorganisations  and  the  creation of  advisory 
committees. Procedural tools contrast with substantive tools, which are concerned directly 
with the provision of government services or goods.
The former category of instruments is of more interest in the present study and is a 
highly  appropriate  object  of  study  in  the  context  of  research  relating  to  network 
management.   Indeed,  Howlett  (2000)  has  discussed  the  link  between  procedural 
instruments and network management. Drawing on the work of Dutch network scholars, 
he suggests that manipulating the policy process is often a question of manipulating the 
links between policy network actors by using procedural instruments in order to change 
the  number  of  actors  and  the  nature  of  relationships  between  them.   Procedural 
instruments, he contends, are often used by governments to alter policy processes in a 
manner which allows them to ‘retain their legitimacy or capacity to act’ (Howlett 2000, 
see Howlett & Ramesh 2003, p. 102).  Network management, in Howlett’s view, is one 
form of procedural policy tool. 
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2.5 Vertical tools for joining up local public services
Various  meta-governance ‘tools’ can be  employed in  a  bid  to  increase collaboration 
between local public services.  The approaches can be divided into three broad categories, 
namely,  authority-based,  information-based  and  incentive-based  strategies  .   This 
classification is similar to that which is employed by De Bruijn and Ten Heuvelhof , who 
discuss  legal,  communicative and financial governance instruments  in  relation to  the 
management of networks.  The categories employed are broadly representative of the 
range of tools in government’s tool-shed 14 .  The tools of government in this case are used 
specifically to manage linkages between local organisations by attempting to bring them 
into a collaborative relationship.  Employing government tools in this way responds to 
exhortations in the governance literature for the need for public managers to learn the 
skills  of  network  management.   While  the  threefold  classification  was  originally 
developed in relation to ‘substantive’ policy instruments as discussed above, it is possible 
to use the same broad categories in discussions of ‘procedural’ instruments which aim to 
alter or manipulate policy processes.  The section which follows briefly summarises the 
three  categories  of  tools,  providing  examples  and  outlining  their  ‘behavioural 
assumptions’ .  
2.5.1 The tools of government: authority, incentives and information
Generally speaking, authoritative tools include the use of regulatory devices in form of 
rules, standards, permits, prohibitions, laws and executive orders .  These are command 
and  control  or  ‘enforcement’ techniques  which  utilize  punishments  for  recalcitrant 
behaviour and are common for regulating the economic and social realm.  They are based 
on  the  assumption  that  the  hierarchical  and  legitimate  authority  of  government is 
sufficient to mandate desired behaviours either in lower tiers of government or in society 
more generally, without the addition of other incentives .  In the context of hierarchical 
democratic government, authority tools suggest that lower level officials are responsive to 
government authority and are committed to obeying laws and regulations because of the 
legitimacy of  government. Authoritative tools can be regarded as coercive in  nature, 
although some authoritative tools are more coercive than others.  Additional varieties of 
14 Minor differences exist in tools of government classification systems. For instance Hood (1983) 
identified four major tools of government, namely ‘Nodality’ (the location of government at the centre of 
informational & social networks, enabling it to collect and disseminate information), ‘Authority’ 
(government’s possession of legal or official power to demand, forbid, guarantee, adjudicate), ‘Treasure’ 
(government’s stock of money or exchangeable goods) and ‘Organisation’ (government’s stock of people 
and workers, land, buildings, materials e.g. computers and equipment).
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regulation involving less direct involvement of government include delegated regulation 
and the use of advisory committees and other bodies to perform regulatory functions.  
Information-based  strategies  often  involve  exhortation  or  persuasion  .  Such 
approaches make a  normative appeal, based on government’s  legitimacy,  in  order to 
encourage certain types of behaviour. Public information campaigns are one example of 
an information-based tool with normative content.  As noted by Howlett and Ramesh 
(ibid) and Hood (1983), information devices can involve either providing information to, 
or withholding it from, governed subjects.  Information-based strategies are fairly indirect 
or even weak, are relatively cheap to administer and unlikely to provoke much resistance 
on the ground.  This type of tool is linked to Hood’s concept of ‘nodality’. Government, 
by virtue of its nodal position in a network, is able to act as conduit for, and repositary of, 
information. Not only can government disseminate information, it can also collect it15. In 
relation  to  local  government,  central  government is  in  a  unique  position  to  collect 
information from across the country and disseminate this information in the form of ‘good 
practice’ guidance. In relation to local networks, local government itself is in a good 
position to act as a node.  A variety of information tools can be used by government to 
communicate policy intent to local authorities.  Nixon  highlights a range of information 
or  communication-based devices  which are  common in  the  context  of  central-local 
government relations in the UK, including local authority circulars, the publication of 
advisory literature, consultations and statutory inspections, the presence of representatives 
of government departments at local level and finally, formal or informal meetings. 
Incentive-based tools, sometimes labelled ‘treasure’, ‘inducement’ or ‘exchange’ 
usually take the form either of subsidies (positive incentives to reward compliance) or 
charges (negative incentives for failure to comply).  Subsidies take a variety of forms 
including grants, tax breaks, and the provision of land and loans, while charges include 
levying taxes and fines (Howlett and Ramesh ibid).  Therefore, once again, government 
can either collect or distribute this resource (Hood 1983). However, incentives may also 
be non-financial, for instance the conferment of freedoms for high performing institutions 
or other status-enhancing rewards.  The assumption behind the use of incentives is that, in 
the words of Schneider and Ingram (1990, p. 515) ‘individuals are utility maximizers and 
will not be positively motivated to take policy-relevant action unless they are influenced, 
encouraged, or coerced by manipulation of money, liberty, life, or other tangible payoffs’.
One subset of incentive based tools is the ‘capacity-building’ variety. These tools 
involve the provision of technical or financial assistance and are aimed at enhancing the 
abilities required to implement a particular policy .   They are used where there is  a 
15 The relates to Hood’s conception of government as both ‘effector’ and ‘detector’ (Hood 1983)
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perceived need for particular knowledge, skills or resources.  Technical assistance may 
take the form of guidance, training or visits by specialists16.  Additional resources include 
the provision of  grants, loans, subsidies, vouchers, facilities,  equipment or  personnel 
which are directly aimed at building capacity.  Although capacity building tools are here 
classified as one form of incentive-based tools, Schneider and Ingram (ibid) suggest that 
capacity tools are a category in their own right because they are based on a fundamentally 
different premise to incentives.  According to Schneider and Ingram, capacity building 
tools assume that participants will participate in the desired activity if they have sufficient 
capacity to do so.  This is in contrast to incentives which assume that actors are utility-
maximisers who will  only act in the desired way if  they are coerced, encouraged or 
manipulated into  doing  so.   In  practice, however,  it  is  often difficult  to  distinguish 
between incentives and capacity tools and they are here treated as belonging to the same 
broad group.
2.5.2 Issues governing vertical tool choice
As with horizontal coordination tools,  several scholars have sought to  move beyond 
vertical tool classification to consider the issues governing tool choice.  Although this 
literature does not constitute an entirely coherent or consistent body of work, there are 
nonetheless a number of common themes running through the literature on tool choice. 
Some explanations focus on political factors while others privilege technical issues in 
which tools are matched to the nature of the job at hand.  Many accounts acknowledge the 
complexity of tool choice, suggesting that decisions are based on a mix of political and 
technical considerations.  
One perspective falling into the ‘political’ school of thought suggests that there is 
a general preference in liberal democratic governments for the least coercive tools such as 
exhortation and other information-based tools, because they are less likely to encounter 
resistance (Doern 1981, see Howlett  and Ramesh 2003), less costly (Hood 1983) and 
easier to operationalise in administrative terms .  They are also more politically acceptable 
in countries with a conservative/ non-interventionist leaning .  Others have suggested that 
the legal traditions of different countries affect the policy tools commonly used. Ringeling 
(2002) for instance notes that the ‘Roman Law’ system which operates on the European 
continent uses a formal system of laws while the Common Law system found in the 
Anglo-Saxon world uses a system of case law and judicial judgments.  
16 Clearly there is some overlap here with information-based instruments, although this type of capacity 
building tool is a specific form of information provision aimed at technical capacity rather then mere 
exhortation
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Others suggest that tool choice is dependent on individual preference and other 
cognitive factors such as past experience of particular tools.  As pointed out by both Hood 
and de Bruijn and ten Heuvelhof , instrument choice is not always a fully rational process. 
These authors stress  that  government bureaucrats tend to  be committed to  particular 
instruments which have worked for them in the past.  In Hood’s words, each government 
agency holds its own ‘store of experience and folk wisdom about what works in its own 
particular area’ (ibid, p. 137).  Similarly Linder and Peters (1989) suggest that policy 
actors in different sectors are committed on a cognitive level to different forms of policy 
intervention.  Salamon  is sympathetic to this explanation, suggesting that different tools 
are common in different substantive policy areas.  De Bruijn and ten Heuvelhof (ibid) 
argue that choice of tool may also be affected by the skills which actors posses, since 
policy actors may have the skills required to design and use some instruments and not 
others.  
The more ‘technically’ oriented perspectives rest on the assumption that optimum 
policy tools can be selected according to the implementation context.  In this sense they 
adopt a contingency theory or rational systems approach, as discussed above.
These accounts link insights from implementation theory with more mainstream policy 
science approaches.  Applying this perspective to the choice of policy instruments, the 
argument follows that there is no one best type of policy tool but that a range of factors 
come into play when deciding on this.  Tools must ‘fit’ the implementation context and 
the broader environmental circumstances in which the policies are enacted.  A number of 
variables or contingent factors are though to influence tool choice. In particular, issues 
such as the degree of fit between the values of policy designers and implementers, the 
level of capacity in a sector and the degree to which knowledge of the implementation 
context is held mainly at ground level, are regarded as significant variables. Ingram and 
Schneider (1990) have made perhaps the most significant contribution in this respect, and 
others have followed in a similar vein . 
Ingram and Schneider (1990) place particular emphasis on the degree of discretion 
required in policy design in different contexts and put forward a number of hypotheses. 
They suggest that when there is low support for a policy at ground level and conflicting 
values between statutory designers and implementers or target groups, an authoritative, 
‘strong statute’ approach in which policy is designed by policy makers and assumed to be 
faithfully reproduced by implementers, is unlikely to work (1990, pp. 82-83).  In such 
contexts,  they hypothesise  that  tools  which build  commitment such as  incentives or 
capacity-building are likely to be more effective. 
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When there is high support for a policy at national level but some conflict or 
variation  at  local  level,  Ingram  and  Schneider  advocate  a  ‘Wilsonian’  approach. 
Following from Woodrow Wilson’s preferred approach, this approach has overlaps with a 
strong statute approach since it involves the specification of clear goals at national level, 
but leaves discretion to allow local bureaucrats the freedom to decide on how this is 
achieved (1990, p. 77). 
They  also  contend  that  the  strong  statute  approach  is  inapplicable  when 
information levels are poor, because policy designers do not have sufficient knowledge to 
specify in detail the actions required.  Policy design in this context should allow wide 
latitude at the local level, that is, a ‘grassroots’ or bottom-up approach to policy-making, 
in  which local experimentation is  encouraged to  build  knowledge in  the policy area 
(1990, pp. 83-84). Government may also use information-generating (or detection) tools 
such as task forces, pilot studies and mandatory evaluations to improve policy learning. 
Similarly, Wilsonian approaches will lead to poor practice since mandating the attainment 
of clear goals under statute in conditions of uncertainty or ignorance may lead to the 
specification of inappropriate, overly ambitious or flawed goals.  This is likely to provide 
incentives for local agencies to work towards the most achievable targets or engage in 
‘goal substitution’.  
A number of authors have made specific reference to the policy tools appropriate 
in complex implementation and policy-making environments. For instance, Linder and 
Peters (1989, p.  51)  suggest  that  where a  range of  client  groups  are  served by  an 
organisation, regulatory instruments may be needed to ensure all groups are served in an 
even-handed way. In addition, where non-governmental actors such as think tanks are 
involved  in  shaping  government  policy,  they  may  have  some  influence  over  tool 
selection, being committed to certain types of instruments.  
Bressers and O’Toole (1998) propose a  model of instrument choice linked to 
policy networks. They suggest that features of policy networks including the level of 
cohesion and interconnectedness influence tool choice.  Cohesion refers to the extent to 
which network actors share similar objectives or at least empathise with each others’ 
objectives, and high cohesion is usually related to shared values and worldview. Inter-
connectedness refers to the intensity of actors’ contacts or interactions.    Where there is 
high cohesion and inter-connectedness between government and its targets, there is little 
need  for  ‘normative’ instruments  such  as  regulations  and  persuasive  information 
campaigns, since parties share similar values.  They suggest the emphasis is likely to be 
on  ‘supportive’  instruments,  the  equivalent  to  capacity  building  tools,  including 
information, education and subsidies.  Less well-connected systems with high cohesion 
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are likely to involve similar mechanisms but require the use of intermediaries to support 
implementation efforts. Networks with both weak cohesion and weak interconnectedness 
rely  on  instruments  which  make  a  normative  appeal.   Where  there  is  strong 
interconnectedness,  tools  involving  bilateral  or  multilateral  arrangements  such  as 
covenants are expected. While Bressers and O’Toole’s hypotheses relate mainly to policy 
networks  at  the  level  of  policy formation rather  than  implementation,  the  approach 
nevertheless draws attention to the potential variables that can be considered in selecting 
tools in complex policy environments.  
Similarly, Howlett  and Ramesh (2003) provide a model of tool choice linking 
subsystem complexity with state capacity. Subsystem complexity relates to the breadth of 
the policy target.  State  capacity refers to the ability of the state to intervene and is 
associated  with  the  availability  of  financial  resources and  the  degree  of  trust  and 
legitimacy in government. Where there is a broad range of target groups, but low state 
capacity,  low-cost  information-based tools  such as  exhortation  alongside institutional 
reorganisation are likely to be used. When a broad target group is combined with high 
state capacity,  treasure-based tools  are  more common as  well  as  the  involvement of 
interest groups through consultations and advisory committees. 
By contrast, where target groups are narrow and state capacity is low, authoritative 
tools  such  as  regulation,  alongside  financial  incentives  directed  at  altering  the 
organisation of specific policy actors, are common.   Finally, narrow target groups and 
high state capacity are associated with substantive instruments such as public enterprises 
and direct state provision, and procedural instruments such as evaluations, public hearing 
and reviews.  
Despite the range of theories about policy instrument choice, few of these have 
been tested empirically, and there have been calls for more research with explanatory 
power to  help  specify the  conditions  under which different tools  might be  selected 
(Bressers and O’Toole 1998).  A similar observation has been made by Alexander (1995) 
with respect to the choice of coordination tools in inter-organisational settings. He notes 
that although there is a repertoire of coordination strategies and tools available to policy 
makers  wishing  to  influence  inter-organisational  working,  there  is  little  systematic 
evidence on which to base decisions about tool selection in different inter-organisational 
contexts.  
The  present  study  provides  an  opportunity  to  investigate  the  operation and 
perceived effectiveness  of  different vertical and horizontal  coordination  tools  in  the 
context  of  human services delivery networks,  and to  test  out  some of  the  research 
hypotheses developed by previous scholars.  In particular,  the research considers one 
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‘politically-orientated’ perspective on  horizontal  tool  choice and  one  a  ‘technically-
oriented’ perspective, as discussed in chapter three. 
2.5.3 Tools for steering collaboration
Applying the above concepts to the meta-governance of collaboration in local settings, 
authoritative tools include making collaboration mandatory through legislation and other 
forms of regulation, or reorganisation.  Such mandates typically specify the parts of the 
system which need to be coordinated, for example between particular agencies and in 
relation to specific issues.  Mandates can take the form of laws which require agencies to 
merge organisational procedures or introduce new organisational arrangements aimed at 
enhancing integration.  Alexander  refers to  two  such  varieties,  including  ‘bilateral 
government’ in which regulations or laws are introduced to control the interactions of two 
parties, and ‘relational contracting’ in which contractual frameworks are set up between 
whole ‘classes’ of parties.  A related concept is  the idea of a ‘covenant’.   These are 
formally negotiated agreements between government and other sectors, which provide a 
framework within which target  groups operate (Bressers and O’Toole 1998, p.  228). 
They provide a potential means of building legitimacy to target non-governmental actors 
which  lie  outside  of  direct  government  control.   In  the  context  of  collaboration, 
agreements between central government and the private sector or voluntary sector groups 
allow government indirectly to influence service delivery agencies outside of the public 
sector.
Mandatory  collaboration  may  also  involve  creating  multi-agency  forums  or 
planning boards in which governed actors are required to participate. This can be regarded 
as a form of group coordination. These bodies provide a forum for interaction, allowing 
actors to communicate in order to enhance mutual learning and negotiate shared purposes. 
Such measures are aimed at improving interaction between policy actors, and are a form 
of ‘process management’, one type of network management .  Similarly, government can 
tamper with organisational boundaries, re-arranging these, creating or abolishing units, 
and merging agencies.  Klijn and Koppenjan (ibid) refer to this as ‘network constitution’, 
aimed at changing the structure of a network.  This was a technique adopted by the UK 
government in relation to Community Care policies in the 1960s and 70s, when Joint 
Consultative Committees were created which compelled local and health authorities to 
work together .
Additional authoritative tools include various methods of monitoring.  These do 
not necessarily involve mandating collaboration but nevertheless make use of government 
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authority to regulate behaviour.  For instance, local authorities may be required to publish 
multi-agency plans or strategies to demonstrate joint working with other agencies.  Their 
progress on collaborative working may be assessed and monitored by central government 
in a variety of other ways, including the use of evaluation, inspection, audit, field visits or 
via other routine reporting mechanisms used between central and local government.  In 
the  UK  joint  or  cross-cutting  targets  for  local  agencies  has  been  one  method  of 
monitoring.   
Information-based devices involve government attempting to persuade agencies of 
the need to collaborate.  There is some overlap with authoritative devices since persuasion 
based approaches are based on the legitimate authority of government.  Tools which may 
be deployed include the use of practice guidance to promote joint working, containing 
suggested  modes  of  collaboration  and  outlining  strategies  for  their  effective  use. 
However,  more  indirect  informational  approaches include the  use  of  rhetoric about 
joined-up government within  political  discourse.   Stoker   labels  this  the  ‘cultural-
persuasive technique’, in which government uses its moral authority to promote and extol 
the virtues of joined up working.  As illustrated above, persuasion or exhortation has been 
a common strategy for promoting collaboration in UK public services. 
In incentive-based strategies government funding is the principal tool or lever for 
promoting  collaboration.   In  such  a  strategy,  evidence  of  collaboration  may  be  a 
prerequisite for agencies to receive funding.  The UK government has initiated numerous 
competitive funding streams to this end, as discussed in chapter one.  Several of the area-
based, cross-cutting programmes established by government in recent years require local 
agencies to work in partnership.  Financial incentive-based approaches have also been 
used in the USA in the context of human services networks , where service integration 
attempts have been made since the 1960s .   In the Netherlands, incentives have been 
provided  in  the  form  of  additional  personnel  for  those  agencies  that  enter  into 
collaborative links with other agencies . 
Capacity-building tools used for enabling collaboration may involve the provision 
of money for ‘boundary spanning’ posts to facilitate the process of local joint working, or 
even land or premises for co-located services. Technical assistance might include visits by 
specialist  advisors  to  provide  advice  on  collaboration,  involving  either  local  actors 
stimulated into action through incentives, or national actors brought in from national level 
organisations including government departments.  Other technical assistance may take the 
form of the provision of multi-agency or inter-professional training either provided by 
national organisations or coordinated and funded nationally but delivered locally.  
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In practice, combinations of authoritative, information based, incentive based and 
capacity building approaches are likely to be necessary.  For instance, De Bruijn and Ten 
Heuvelhof  argue that combinations of regulatory and financial instruments are common 
in  policies  aimed at  changing the relations between actors.   Others have found that 
exhortations  to  collaborate  are  unlikely  to  be  successful  without  the  provision  of 
resources to back them up .  Similarly, creating new bodies or merging existing ones is 
likely to  need require some form of  monitoring or  new legislation  to  facilitate  this 
process.  Figure 2.4 categorises the meta-governance approaches according to their mode 
of coordination and type of vertical tool.   
Fig 2.3 Modes of vertical coordination for stimulating local collaboration
Tool type 
Authority-based Information-based Incentive-based
Impersonal Monitoring,  Central guidance, Targets,
Legislation  Policy exhortations    Joint targets
Personal Inspections,   Direct contact,
 Joint inspections   Advisory visits
  
Group Network constitution/   Conferences, Incentives for 
Management                  Workshops joint bidding, 
Funding streams 
rewarding joint 
working
2.6 Can governments mandate collaboration?
In relation to the implementation of collaboration, there is something of a consensus in 
the literature that inter-agency collaboration is unlikely to happen of its own accord, and 
that some level of central government intervention is required to steer the process .  The 
obstacles to and challenges of collaboration discussed in chapter one highlight the reasons 
why agencies may be reluctant to collaborate. 
  As discussed above, central government can seek to induce collaboration between 
local actors in a number of ways, using authoritative, information-based, incentive-based 
or capacity-building approaches.  Some studies have found a positive association between 
government  intervention  to  specify  inter-agency  relationships  and  the  degree  of 
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collaboration. For instance, Aldrich found that the extent of collaboration (i.e. perceived 
cooperativeness  of  inter-agency relationships,  the  frequency of  interactions  and  the 
standardisation  of  transactions)  was  increased  when  the  relationships  between  two 
organisations were mandated under federal statute (Aldrich 1974b, see Aldrich 1976).  He 
argues  that  inter-organisational  cooperation  does  not  usually  occur  without  the 
intervention of governmental or review bodies that are ‘involved on the funding or input 
side’ of the system. 
However, the case is not clear-cut, with other studies suggesting a more limited 
impact of mandated collaboration.  In one such study, comparisons were made between 
nine school districts in five states of the USA .  In each context state laws regarding 
collaboration differ, with some imposing detailed requirements for joint action between 
specified local agencies and others providing no requirements and some disincentives for 
voluntary joint action, and the rest falling somewhere in between. The study revealed 
variability in compliance with legal  mandates to collaborate.  In some cases districts 
complied with state law, although with varying degrees of enthusiasm for the task.  In 
others, compliance was poor or entirely absent.  It is not possible to discern from the 
study the reasons  behind these differing responses to  legal  mandates.  However,  the 
research suggests that when agencies did not wish to collaborate, the law had little impact 
in altering their behaviour.  This led the author to conclude that legal mandates were 
neither salient nor decisive enough to dominate local decisions about whether or not to 
work collaboratively.  
Further research on the effectiveness of ‘top-down’ strategies is  considered in 
chapter three.  As discussed in chapter one, there have been debates within the British 
literature  in  particular  on  the  extent  to  which  collaboration  is  something  which 
government can impose from the top-down, partly in response to the nature of approaches 
employed in the UK.  However, there has been little in the way of systematic analysis of 
the effectiveness and limitations of government steering attempts.  
The next  chapter presents a  theoretical framework to  structure the  empirical 
analysis of the ‘implementation of collaboration’, where collaboration is conceived of as a 
meta-policy which governments may seek to implement in local public service delivery 
networks.
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Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework 
Chapter overview
This  chapter  presents and  conducts  preliminary evaluation of  rival  perspectives  for 
explaining  the  ‘implementation’  of  collaboration.   These  perspectives  provide  the 
overarching theoretical framework for the research.  As briefly outlined in the thesis 
introduction, two rival models of bureaucratic decision-making are considered, as well as 
two rival theories of policy implementation.  The first part of the chapter (3.1) provides a 
justification for selecting these particular theories to structure the analysis.  The second 
part (3.2) outlines the ‘rational administrative’ perspective and discusses how this might 
be  applied  to  explain  collaboration.   The  third  part  (3.3)  examines the  contrasting 
perspective of bureaucratic politics and its application to collaboration. The fourth part 
(3.4) considers both top-down and bottom-up conceptions of the policy process and their 
application to the research question. The last part (3.5) presents four potential explanatory 
models which combine the decision-making and implementation theories, and the rival 
hypotheses flowing from each of the models. Subsequent chapters empirically investigate 
these models.  
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3.1 Justification for the theoretical framework
The first of the two contrasting decision-making theories is the rational-administrative 
perspective.  It is selected because it seems to capture well how collaboration is ‘sold’ or 
justified  by  government  to  the  local  agencies  amongst  which  it  is  promoting 
collaboration.  As this chapter will discuss, the collaborative initiatives and structures 
often proposed by governments, such as joint commissioning and joint budgeting, are 
based on a ‘rational-altruistic’ model of collaboration. This rationalistic and optimistic 
conception of collaboration assumes that those governments seek to influence will be 
motivated to collaborate because they see this as a means of serving the interests  of 
clients and helping them to attain their ends more efficiently (Hudson 1995).  A further 
reason for selecting the rational-administrative model is that the research focuses on the 
‘tools of collaboration’, and much of the literature on this subject, particularly that which 
is influenced by economics, is inherently rationalistic (Howlett and Ramesh 2003).  As 
discussed in chapter two, this influential branch of the policy tools literature assumes that 
tools are selected in a calculated mean-ends manner.  
The  bureaucratic  politics  perspective  provides  a  challenging  and  relevant 
counterpoint to the rational-administrative perspective.  This position, as the following 
discussion will illustrate, views decisions as motivated by a different set of influences, 
including the promotion of organisational interests, and directs attention towards issues of 
power.   It  therefore  relates  well  to  alternative  conceptions  of  collaboration  which 
highlight the reasons why agencies often do not collaborate, or why they find it difficult 
to  do so.   The bureaucratic politics perspective also accords with the more political 
strands of the ‘tool choice’ literature briefly discussed in chapter two.  
Implementation  theory  provides  the  second  dimension  of  the  analytical 
framework. This strand of public policy theory is chosen because it helps to illuminate the 
main research question, namely the stimulation of collaboration in local areas by central 
government. As noted above, this in itself can be considered an implementation problem, 
where  collaboration  is  the  ‘policy’ to  be  implemented.  Top-down and  bottom-up 
implementation  theories are  employed as  they  are  perhaps the  most  useful  way of 
highlighting challenges in the implementation process.  While the top-down model may 
be considered an ideal type, the bottom-up model draws attention to reasons why practice 
frequently deviates from the ideal type.  These two rival perspectives provide a useful 
framework for examining the challenges of governmental steering from the top-down in 
the context of service delivery networks.
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Naturally,  other  theoretical approaches would  illuminate different  aspects  of 
collaboration and account for collaborative action, or inaction, in different ways. Neo-
institutionalist theories, for instance, could help to explain the challenges of collaboration 
in terms of organisations’ developing their own regularised procedures, norms and values. 
These institutional  forces could  potentially  serve to  entrench organisational  cultures 
making their  members  resistant  to  active  collaboration and  change involving  other 
organisations.  Alternatively, theories of public choice may help to account for a lack of 
collaboration by focusing on the pursuit of individual self-interested behaviour at the 
expense of collective action. However, given the aims of the research, the theories of 
decision-making and implementation  outlined above provide  a  useful framework for 
analysis,  and  can  account for  key  themes  relevant  to  the  research  such  as  control, 
coordination and accountability.
Two additional  literatures with  broad relevance to  the thesis  which were  not 
selected to shape the theoretical framework are those on policy networks and central-local 
government relations.   Since  these  streams  of  literature  would  have  been  obvious 
candidates for inclusion, a brief comment is warranted on their exclusion from analytical 
framework.  
The policy network perspective is principally a means of characterising the policy 
making process, and has  been very  influential  within  British  political  science .   It 
emphasises the way in which different interests and groups have influence over policy. 
Some of the most promising work develops typologies of networks and uses these to 
explain variation in policy style across sectors, subsystems and countries . Other work has 
attempted to link policy networks with policy outcomes .  However, the present study 
does not attempt to address questions of this nature. 
The  policy  networks  literature  also  provides  rich  detail  on  the  complex 
interactions occurring in the policy process, including conflicts, negotiations and resource 
exchanges. However,  as Dowding (ibid) suggests, many of the features of the policy 
process  identified  from  the  networks  perspective,  including  bargaining  games, 
cooperative strategies and resource differences, are generic to public policy rather than 
specific to policy networks.  This calls into question the added value of a policy networks 
perspective on top of the bureaucratic politics perspective already employed in the thesis, 
which  itself  accounts  for  power  issues  and  strategies  amongst  interacting  units. 
Furthermore, the policy network perspective largely focuses on policy formulation rather 
than implementation. Since the present research is concerned with implementation, the 
literature relating to implementation networks, reviewed in chapter one, bears more direct 
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relevance.  The policy networks perspective would have been more apt had the aim been 
to understand the development of national homelessness policy.  
The central/local relations literature is principally concerned with characterising 
the relationship between central and local government. Previous comparative work has 
examined dimensions such as the functions of local government, the degree of access of 
local authorities to central government and the discretion available to local authorities . 
The power relationship between central and local government has always been a focal 
point, and is a feature of more recent work, such as Rhodes’ power dependence model . 
Other parts of this literature have sought to assess trends in the degree of control of local 
government by the centre .  While this thesis makes reference to changing central-local 
government relations in the context of governance, it  does not explicitly focus on the 
power relationship between central and local levels; nor does it attempt to provide an in-
depth account of the nature of central-local relations. This would have taken the research 
in another direction.  The concern was to provide policy relevant analysis on the nature of 
instruments appropriate to steering local collaboration.  In view of this, implementation 
theory and the tools of government literature were more relevant.  
3.2 Collaboration as rational administration 
One way of viewing inter-agency collaboration within the context of local public services 
is as a rational response to the fragmented polity and to the cross-cutting nature of policy 
problems, as discussed in chapter one.  From this perspective collaboration is more likely 
to resolve cross-cutting issues such as homelessness than ‘silo-working’ or working alone. 
The means, or tools, of collaboration in this view would also be selected along rational or 
technical lines, according to the rational-administrative perspective.
3.2.1 Introducing the rational-administrative perspective
The rational administrative perspective, sometimes also labelled the ‘rational’, ‘rational-
comprehensive’  or  ‘legal-rational’  perspective,  is  a  highly  influential  view  of 
bureaucracies which dominated classical public administration.  Stemming from the work 
of  Max Weber,  the  rational administrative  perspective  is  based on  the  premise that 
bureaucracies are apolitical, operating as machines through the mechanistic and rational 
application of formal organisational rules and routines. This  view places faith  in  the 
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possibility  of  a  science  of  administration,  in  which  organisational  systems  can  be 
designed to maximise efficiency.  
Weber  argued that bureaucracies can be distinguished from other organisational 
forms because of their ‘rational-legal’ character.  According to this view, bureaucracies 
are governed according to legitimate hierarchical authority,  legitimacy which is  itself 
derived from the use of accepted and impersonally specified technical rules or norms. 
Because of this perceived legitimacy, the rules are applied in a rational manner by trained 
and impartial personnel who  act  not  according to  their  own interests or  values  but 
according to the rule of hierarchy.  Weber also notes that in bureaucracies, administrative 
acts, decisions and rules are usually formalised and codified in writing. 
Formal  organisation  theory  and  its  derivations  such  as  systems  theory  and 
scientific management theory are based on similar assumptions about organisations more 
generally.  As noted by Jordan , organisational problems are regarded as stemming from 
structural  inadequacy,  in  particular  failure of  authority  or  hierarchy.   Organisational 
objectives are achieved through the pursuit of coordination and control, and through the 
application of consistent and predictable rules.  
The rational-administrative perspective assumes that politics and administration 
are separable, and indeed normatively advocates this separation, as famously articulated 
by Woodrow Wilson.  In terms of government action, bureaucracies are viewed as tools, 
or means, for achieving the policy objectives set by government.  By consciously altering 
and redesigning administrative machinery, it is considered possible to improve on their 
efficiency in terms of meeting policy makers’ clearly articulated goals.  
Herbert Simon’s early work on decision-making is also a major contribution to the 
rational  administrative  perspective  in  the  context  of  public  administration  17.  Simon 
contended that the study of administration should be as concerned with decisions as with 
actions,  and proposed the concept of efficient  administrative rationality  which would 
explain  administrative  decision-making  in  an  ideal  world.  He  asserted  that  an 
administrative decision is  ‘correct if  it  selects appropriate means to reach designated 
ends’, and also that ‘the rational administrator is concerned with the selection of these 
effective  means’ .  The  process  of  selection  involves  consideration  of  all  possible 
alternatives and their consequences, and pursuit of the one that is most likely to achieve 
the desired ends. As far as possible, the scientific study of administration is concerned 
only with facts, and not values.  
17 As will be sown below, Simon was ultimately highly skeptical of the ‘purely’ rational perspective. 
Although rational administration was presented as an ideal, he demonstrated through a series of articles 
and books the limits to pure rationality.  
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The  parallel  here  with  Weber’s  ideal  type  of  the  impartial  and  trained 
administrator  able  to  make  rational  decisions  is  clear.   The  type  of  rationality 
characterised above is sometimes described as ‘synoptic’, implying that decision makers 
have a comprehensive overview of the range of all available options . Although Simon 
conceded that such synoptic, rational decision-making is difficult to achieve in practice, 
he  argued  that  the  environment  of  bureaucracies  should  be  designed  to  assist 
administrators to make decisions in this way .  
The rational-administrative perspective can be criticised from a variety of angles. 
First,  the  machine  image  and  the  idea  of  a  mechanistic  application  of  rules  are 
undermined by  subsequent  studies which highlight  the  discretionary nature of  much 
bureaucratic action.  Moreover, the assumption of clear specification of rules governing 
bureaucracies underplays the ambiguities often found in policy mandates.  In cases where 
goals  are  only  vaguely  defined,  rational  notions  of  means-ends calculations  loose 
relevance.  
Second, the emphasis on impersonally specified rules and written documentation 
underestimates  the  importance  of  informal  aspects  of  bureaucracy.   These  formal 
underpinnings  of  bureaucracy are  challenged  by  the  alternative  conception  of  the 
‘informal  organisation’  (Barnard  1938,  see  Jordan  1994).  In  this  view,  formal 
organisations  are  built  on  a  system of  informal internal  communications,  based on 
unauthorized and unofficial relationships. These relationships are largely immune from 
management control and serve the interests of the individuals involved rather their parent 
organisations.   
Third, as  a  number of  critics have noted ,  rational  calculations  of the nature 
described in the ‘pure’ rational model rest on tenuous assumptions about the decision-
making process, and are disputed by empirical evidence.  In particular, the notion that 
decision-makers possess all the information required to select the best and most efficient 
course of action, and have sufficient time to process this information, is doubtful.  In 
addition, decision-makers have cognitive limits which make it difficult to anticipate the 
consequences of different courses of action. The question of whose goals or ends the 
decision-maker acts according to is also unclear.  For instance, individual goals may differ 
from collective or organisational goals. Lastly,  the idea that  it  is possible to separate 
means from ends is also disputed.
Such  problems18 led  Simon  to  argue  that  administrative  decisions,  unlike 
economic decisions, are not purely rational but are only ‘good enough’, or ‘satisficing’ . 
He also developed the concept of ‘bounded rationality’.  Both concepts acknowledge the 
18 Lindblom (1965) levels many such criticisms at the ‘synoptic ideal’.
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cognitive limits on decision-makers when making rational choices. Drawing on insights 
from cognitive psychology, Simon argues that the process of generating alternatives falls 
well  short  of  identifying  all  possible  courses  of  action.  The number of  alternatives 
considered is affected by the time constraints available to decision-makers, the costs of 
considering  different  courses  of  action,  and  limits  to  information.   The  search  for 
alternatives,  according to  Simon, is  more  accurately described as  a  ‘heuristic  search 
aimed at finding satisfactory alternatives, or alternatives that represent an improvement 
over those previously available’ (Simon 1997, p. 292).  When evaluating the strengths and 
weaknesses of different courses of action, decision-makers do not usually posses the 
relevant information to make the perfect choice.  The scientific knowledge on which the 
decision-maker draws is therefore itself imperfect, making the choice of which course of 
action to take a matter of selecting the best possible course of action according to the best 
available knowledge.  Rationality in this variant is therefore limited or ‘bounded’ rather 
than pure or synoptic.      
According to Simon, since only bounded rationality is possible, and because of 
the  costs  of  searching  for  the  ‘optimal’ solution,  the  decision-maker  settles  for  a 
satisfactory or ‘satisficing’ solution.  Simon poses the question of how the decision-maker 
sets the levels of criteria that define satisfactory.  Again drawing on psychological theory, 
he suggests that decision-makers set themselves aspiration levels that, if reached, they 
will be satisfied with. 
Boundedly rational versions of rational choice theory have been influential in 
public  policy  analysis  because they  seem to  capture  better  the  empirical reality  of 
administrative and policy decisions than does the synoptic ideal.  Recognition of the 
inherent limits to pure or synoptic rationality also led to the development of Lindblom’s 
influential  incrementalist  model of  decision-making  .   In  this  perspective,  decision-
making occurs through the method of ‘successive limited comparisons’. In the context of 
policy formulation, this equates to policy makers proceeding in incremental steps, through 
a succession of small changes, learning from past experiences the likely results of policy 
decisions, and modifying policies in light of this.  
In  later  work Lindblom postulates  that  policy  decisions  are  the  outcome of 
‘partisan mutual adjustment’  19.   This  in  itself is  a  form of coordination and can be 
achieved without a central coordinator.  The argument made is that people coordinate 
themselves without rules that fully prescribe their relations to one another.   Although in 
practice  policy  decisions  are  made  in  an  environment  containing  a  mix  of  central 
19 His analysis focuses on ‘policy decision makers’ in the government process in the US context, 
including those in administrative agencies, the Legislature and Executive, and interest group and party 
leaders.
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coordination and partisan mutual adjustment, the latter is presumed to be very strong or 
dominant in Lindblom’s work. Attempting to describe how policy decisions are made, he 
suggests that they are a result of partisans coordinating their decision.  This is achieved by 
actors adapting their individual decisions in response to the actions of those around them 
(‘adaptive adjustments’) and  seeking to  elicit  desired responses from other  decision-
makers (‘manipulated adjustments’). The term ‘partisan’ implies that each actor makes 
decisions to serve their own ends which are not necessarily shared by other actors. In 
other words, there is no dominant common purpose.  However, through the process of 
partisan  mutual  adjustment,  partisans  will  move  towards  agreement  on  values  and 
decisions.  
Lindblom’s work anticipates some of the themes picked up in the bureaucratic 
politics  model,  discussed further below,  particularly  his  contention  that  manipulated 
adjustments include elements of negotiating and bargaining.  Negotiating, he suggests, 
refers to ‘X’ and ‘Y’ actors seeking to induce particular responses from one another in a 
variety  of  ways.  Bargaining,  however,  explicitly  refers  to  actors  seeking to  induce 
particular responses from each another using either conditional threats or promises. 
Rather than being synoptic or comprehensive,  decision-making about complex 
policy problems in this perspective is fragmented, disjointed and incremental.  Policy 
decisions are made without considering all possible options, and rather than aiming to 
solve problems, decision-makers pursue strategies to cope with them. Lindblom states that 
‘problem solving cannot be synoptically accomplished but must be strategically pursued’ 
(1965, p. 151).  
The criticisms and alternative perspectives outlined above illustrate the limitations 
of  the  purely rational-synoptic  ideal  as  an  accurate model of  decision-making.   Yet 
although the rational-administrative perspective is rarely viewed as truly representative of 
the reality of modern bureaucracies, it serves as an influential ideal type.  Indeed, the 
rationalist tradition has been described as the ‘mainstream’ approach to policy analysis . 
As noted by Ham and Hill  (1993), it  has been extremely influential over attempts to 
improve the machinery of government in various countries. Numerous studies of public 
administration have taken up the challenge of identifying administrative tools, or means, 
to suit particular ends.  Many theories of policy instrument choice, as well as theories of 
systems management, follow in this tradition.    
3.2.2 Applying rational-administration to the implementation of collaboration
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From a rational-administrative perspective, policy makers would articulate the values and 
objectives of the collaboration policy, while neutral implementers or bureaucrats would 
search  for  the  most  efficient  means  or  administrative  ‘tools’  for  delivering  these 
objectives.  Objectives would be shared by government departments that behave as a 
unified actor, implying that government departments are ‘positively coordinated’ (Scharpf 
1994), pursuing common strategies to enhance whole system effectiveness.  The approach 
used by government would therefore be one of a rational planning.  Tool selection by 
bureaucrats would be based on a logical and scientific calculation of the tools most likely 
to achieve the policy which has been already specified by the policy makers, in the most 
efficient  and  effective  manner  according to  the  context.   Local  agencies  would  be 
motivated by solving the issue to which the collaboration policy relates, rather than by 
self-interest or by their personal values.
As  outlined  in  chapter  two,  there is  a  large  prescriptive  literature on  policy 
instrument choice which matches particular instruments to particular circumstances.  The 
more rationalistic contributions to this literature suggest that governments choose policy 
instruments according to  technical  criteria.   Although  these  accounts  focus  on  the 
instruments of government or ‘vertical tools’, they may also be applied to the selection of 
horizontal coordination tools.  
Much previous  work on  collaboration,  particularly within  organisation theory, 
adopts an implicitly rational-administrative perspective. Booth (1988, see Hudson 1995, 
p. 236) argues that much of the early rhetoric on collaboration in health and social care, 
upon which collaborative service models such as joint commissioning have been built, 
takes a ‘naïve position’. This position, he suggests, has two underlying assumptions. First, 
that organisations are likely to collaborate for altruistic reasons, that is, to meet the needs 
of their service users; and secondly, that they will collaborate for rational reasons, that is, 
‘when it  can be shown that that they can achieve the same ends more efficiently by 
working together rather than separately’.  The naïve model that Booth describes may be 
considered a  fusion of  public  interest and  rational means-ends motivations.   Hudson 
(1995, p. 247) sums it up as the ‘rational-altruistic’ model of collaboration, and expresses 
doubt that this model is realistic.  He suggests that the model is only relevant where 
agencies  have  common goals,  a  systemic  overview of  client  needs  and  problems, 
consensus about what these problems are, and agreement on the best methods for tackling 
them, conditions which he implies are unlikely to occur.   
The  literature  on  selection  of  horizontal  coordination  instruments  is  also 
rationalistic.  As discussed in chapter two, Van De Venn et al. (1976) and Alter and Hage 
(1993) postulate that choice of coordination mode would be related to issues such as the 
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level of task uncertainty, the degree of interdependence and the size of the setting or 
number of units to be coordinated.  Such analyses imply that mechanisms of collaboration 
can, or should, be chosen according to the nature of the problem at hand and the context.  
Taking a  rational-administrative approach to  local  multi-agency collaboration, 
where there are several agencies  involved, impersonal coordination modes would be 
considered the most administratively efficient.  Where the task environment is uncertain 
or unpredictable, group and personal coordination modes may be adopted since inter-
agency decisions  need to  be  taken in  ‘real  time’ rather  than  specified in  advance. 
Situations of high interdependence between agencies would also imply the need for group 
and personal modes involving face-to-face contact.   
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3.3 The bureaucratic politics of collaboration
In  contrast  to  the  rational  administrative  approach stands  the  bureaucratic politics 
approach.  In this  view the bureaucratic process is  regarded as involving bargaining, 
competing interests  and  compromise, and  the  bureaucracy is  not simply  a  tool  of 
government employed by decision-makers to reach their goals. While the machine image 
is  often used to  characterise Weber’s  model, images such as  ‘opposing  indirectly or 
covertly,  distorting,  altering  orders,  maligning  by  gossip,  foot  dragging,  sabotage’ 
conjured up by Dexter (see Jordan 1994, p. 76) perhaps best sum up the bureaucratic 
politics  perspective.  The bureaucratic politics  framework can be  applied to  facilitate 
understanding of  the  dynamics of  collaboration  between agencies and of  the  policy 
implementation  process  involving  central  and  local  government.   As  will  be 
demonstrated, the  bureaucratic  politics  perspective  has  parallels  with  rational  choice 
theory20 in its concern with the pursuit of individual or organisational interests. However, 
it extends the analysis by attempting to explain how actors seek to satisfy those interests 
through an explicit focus on the power dynamics of interacting groups. 
3.3.1 Introducing the bureaucratic politics perspective
As the label suggests, the basic premise of this perspective is that the bureaucracy is 
inherently  political.   The  bureaucratic  politics  perspective  challenges  the  artificial 
separation of politics and administration espoused in ‘orthodox’ (although empirically 
disputed) public administration literature.  Dwight Waldo (1948), one of the first scholars 
to  convincingly  challenge this dichotomy argued that  ‘administration  is politics’ (see 
Frederickson and Smith 2003). In theories of bureaucratic politics, rather than being seen 
as neutral implementers of public policy,  bureaucrats are viewed as shaping,  or even 
making, laws.   Organisations are considered political and are made up of competing 
factions engaged in processes of bargaining, exchange and compromise .
The bureaucratic politics perspective is not of itself a coherent theory, and is more 
accurately described as a school of thought or even simply set of propositions about the 
nature of political and administrative life.  Nevertheless the underlying principle of the 
bureaucratic politics perspective, that government actions are a product of bargaining and 
20 The term ‘rational’ used within rational choice theory is employed in a different sense to the notion of 
rationality employed in the rational-administrative perspective. Rational choice theory uses the term to 
refer to bureaucratic decision-making as the pursuit of individual interests in an individual utility 
maximising sense. This is in contrast to the rational-administrative approach which, although also 
applying a means-ends logic, assumes that bureaucrats’ decisions are focused on searching for efficient 
means to solve the administrative problem itself rather than to satisfy the bureaucrats’ own interests. 
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compromise  involving  both  bureaucrats  and  politicians,  has  served as  an  important 
influence on subsequent theory and research in political science (Frederickson and Smith 
2003).  Allison’s  Essence of  Decision  and  its  more  comprehensive development by 
Allison  and  Halperin  are  together generally regarded as  representing  the  first  full 
academic articulation of the bureaucratic politics framework . The Allison and Halperin 
contribution is worth describing in some detail since the propositions which flow from 
this account have provided the framework for many subsequent studies of bureaucratic 
politics.
In  Allison  and  Halperin’s  model  government decisions  and  actions  are  the 
outcome of a bargaining game between policy actors, where each division acts according 
to its own organisational interests, and where the outcomes favour the most powerful of 
the actors involved.  This latter point represents the crucial departure from the rational 
administrative perspective.   The  bureaucratic politics  perspective, in  contrast  to  the 
rational-administrative  perspective,  is  concerned  with  the  exercise  of  power  in 
organisations, acknowledging how inequalities in power affect the outcome of decision-
making.  Allison  and  Halperin’s  model also contrasts  with the  rational  actor  model 
because rather than single actors making choices to maximize performance against pre-
decided organisational or individual aims, decisions are made as a result of bargaining 
between several different  actors  each with  their  own  set  of  priorities,  interests  and 
perceptions.   According  to  Allison  and  Halperin  (1972,  p.  43),  ‘players  make 
governmental decisions not by a single rational choice, but by pulling and hauling’.  The 
bargaining process is, however, highly structured, is governed by ‘action channels’, which 
are  defined as  ‘regularized sets  of  procedures’.  The authors thus  acknowledge the 
importance of standard operating procedures and routines, as emphasised in institutional 
and organisation theory. 
Allison and Halperin advance three central questions to organize the bureaucratic 
politics paradigm (1972, pp. 46-47), namely (i) who plays? (ii) what determines each 
player’s  stand?  and  (iii)  how are  players’ stands  aggregated to  yield  governmental 
decisions and actions? They note that who plays is often determined by the issue at stake 
and the type of game. They suggest that ‘decision games’, the arena in which government 
policy is worked out, are dominated by senior players such as Heads of Government and 
their immediate circle. ‘Action games’, concerned with producing government actions, 
are dominated by junior players which includes those charged with carrying out senior 
players’ decisions.  In addition, they suggest that action channels determine which players 
enter which game, thus acknowledging that the exercise of power may institutionalise 
who plays and who does not.  On the second question, each player’s stand is determined 
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by a  combination of  interests including  national security  interests, domestic political 
interests, organisational interests and personal interests21.  
On the third question, the authors consider both decision games and action games. 
In decision games, the domain of senior players, government decisions are the outcome of 
a series of strategic moves on the part of the players involved.  Players’ decisions on what 
stand to take are the product of an implicit calculation about ‘resources and reputation’, in 
which the actor decides on the level of resource they are willing to put into the move, and 
how much influence they feel they have over other players. In deciding on their move, 
they consider their own prior track record and reputation, as this is likely to influence 
other players’ responses to their move. Who wins is determined by bargaining advantages 
such as control of implementation, control over information, persuasiveness with other 
players and ability to affect other players’ objectives. However, the results of the game are 
also influenced by various constraints, particularly organisational constraints and broader 
societal values. 
In action games, the primary domain of junior players, the success of individual 
players is determined by a similar range of factors to those affecting senior players, such 
as bargaining advantages and control over resources and information.  In addition, junior 
players may take actions in  pursuit  of  policy decisions that  are different from those 
anticipated by senior players. This is partly because policy decisions often do not specify 
in detail the intended purpose of the policy, and also because organisational routines may 
determine what course of action is pursued, or sometimes because junior actors distort 
actions when they are specified from above. Distortion is most likely to occur where 
junior actors do not support the original decision. This may cause them to implement ‘the 
letter but not the spirit’, or in more extreme cases to disobey the policy decision entirely. 
The perspective therefore sees bureaucratic politics in the relationships between 
actors firstly at  the level where policy decisions are made, which can be termed the 
‘senior horizontal level’, secondly in the relationships between actors where decisions are 
enacted, the ‘junior horizontal level’, and thirdly in the relationship between these two 
levels, the ‘vertical level’.  Each of these dimensions is characterised by inequality in 
terms of bargaining advantages, and policy decisions and outcomes are a reflection of 
negotiation  between the  various  interests  of  parties  at  these  levels  and  an  uneven 
distribution of power. 
21 Since Allison and Halperin were predominantly concerned with foreign policy and national security 
issues, the interests they articulate reflect this.  However, applying this to other areas of public policy, an 
individual’s policy stance may be considered to by made of up of similar sets of interests determined by 
the relevant influences in that particular field. National security is unlikely to be relevant in other 
domains.  The point is that policy stances are not based on a single but affected by multiple influences and 
interests such as citizen or public interests, personal, interests, and organisational interests.
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The perspective has been criticised for failing to  account for how aspects of 
organisational design, culture and hierarchy within public administration may affect the 
actions of government (see Clifford 1990; Frederickson and Smith 2003 for discussions of 
the various critiques). However, it can be argued that attempting to account for all these 
dimensions within a single model may result in loss of meaning and explanatory power. 
The model has also been criticized from the opposite angle for lacking in parsimony. 
Indeed, the model is a rather complex one which explains decision-making by referring to 
multiple sources of influence including organisational routines and constraints, strategic 
moves and organisational and social values.  
It is suggested here that the perspective is helpful because it successfully draws 
attention towards the importance of bargaining within the policy process, and the unequal 
way in which bargaining ‘advantages’ are distributed.  Its core contribution is to highlight 
the way in which policy decisions and actions are the product of a struggle between 
factions or  divisions  with  disparate and sometimes competing interests.   It  is  also  a 
perspective which captures the interactive nature of much public policy decision-making 
without the limitations of classical pluralist accounts which underplay the way in which 
certain interests may be excluded from decision-making.  
The broad bureaucratic politics perspective has been applied in numerous areas of 
political science.  Some of these studies preceded Allison and Halperin’s work which can 
be thought of as a formalisation of many of the characteristics of these earlier studies into 
a single analytical framework.  Studies following in this vein include those investigating 
the  relationship  between  politicians  and  administrators,  and  between  and  within 
government departments, either centrally or locally.  Others have focused on the political 
nature of the design of government machinery and its coordination. 
Bottom-up models of policy implementation are one important  variant  of  the 
bureaucratic politics approach.  These models of the policy process call into question the 
image of the rational organisation in which subordinates unquestioningly implement the 
orders of their superiors, such as Elmore’s (1979) bottom-up policy making model and 
Lipsky’s (1980) theory of street level bureaucracy. These accounts illustrate that frontline 
bureaucrats have a significant role in determining ‘who gets what, when and how’, which 
Laswell  described as the essence of politics. James Q Wilson (1989) also followed in this 
vein, arguing that frontline bureaucrats, or ‘operators’, help to shape the policy which is 
only vaguely defined in legislation.  These three studies highlight the pertinence of the 
bureaucratic politics perspective for analyzing policy implementation at ‘street level’, a 
tier of bureaucracy which some would argue enjoys considerable autonomy from the 
central state, particularly in realms of public policy involving professionals (see below for 
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a fuller discussion of implementation theory).  In this sense they acknowledge the vertical 
dimension of Allison and Halperin’s model which suggests that junior players may distort 
the policy made be senior players.  
Another category of studies which broadly fit the bureaucratic politics mould are 
public choice theories including the economic theory of bureaucracy , and later variants 
of this approach such as bureau-shaping models .  These approaches also reject the idea of 
bureaucrats as neutral implementers of policy.  Instead, bureaucrats are strategists who 
attempt to  maximize the budgets  of their own departments or to  carve out  the most 
interesting and important work for their own agencies.  However, while these works may 
be characterised as studies of bureaucratic politics because of their focus on the strategic 
action of the individuals involved, there are more commonly thought of as rational choice 
or public choice theories.  They are more centrally concerned with the self-interested 
nature of bureaucratic decision-making than with the exercise of power per se. 
A more direct and explicit application of bureaucratic politics is Peters’  account 
of the relationship between elected political institutions and bureaucracies or non-elected 
public agencies.  He attempts to open up the black box of bureaucratic politics in order to 
enhance understanding of  how bureaucracies use the strategies and resources at  their 
disposal to exert power and influence over the policy making process, and how elected 
politicians seek to curb this power. Various sources of bureaucratic power are observed in 
Peters’ account. 
Compared to political institutions, bureaucrats possess a relative monopoly of 
information on certain aspects of policy by virtue of their training and technical expertise. 
This information can be used to bargain or trade for influence. In addition, bureaucracies 
are  comparatively  efficient  decision-making  structures  as  compared  to  political 
institutions, making it appealing for political executives to delegate responsibility to these 
bodies, which enhances their power. The supporters and interest groups of bureaucratic 
bodies are typically more cohesive and vocal than the supporters of political institutions, 
making the bureaucracy’s appeal for influence all the more powerful.     
Peters also suggests that since bureaucracies are not involved in partisan politics, 
they are more isolated from the demands of the voters than politicians, allowing them to 
rise  above  party  politics  and  project  an  image  of  technical  expertise.  Bureaucratic 
agencies also develop strong agency ideologies which are used as ‘weapons’ to seek 
justification for their actions.  These ideologies provide the policy direction of the agency, 
and are similar to the concept of organisational culture, and allow agencies to preserve 
existing policies.  
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By contrast, the main resources possessed by political institutions are legitimacy, 
finance, the ability to grant latitude or autonomy to agencies and their capacity, as public 
representatives, to mobilise public support against the bureaucracy.  Such resources are 
used by political institutions to curb bureaucratic power, for instance by trading these 
resources for expert information held by bureaucrats or employing them in some other 
way to hold bureaucrats to account.  According to Peters (1995, p. 229), the resources or 
weapons that each side possesses are used ‘to play the game of politics within formal 
organisations’.  
Peters’ work can be thought of as a dissection of how groups in the political 
process –  in  this  case elected politicians versus bureaucrats -  use their resources to 
exercise power over the each other, using tactical and strategic moves.  This account 
therefore highlights ways in which the politics-administration dichotomy proposed in the 
rational-administrative perspective is often broken down in practice.  
Applying bureaucratic politics to the organisation of British local government, 
Stoker (1991), highlights how decisions around service organisation are frequently related 
more to bureaucratic rivalry between departments than to any rational considerations. 
Citing evidence from several case studies, he suggests that departments regularly seek to 
protect their own turf, staff, budgets, values and responsibilities.  One example concerned 
a  high  profile  housing  renewal programme  being  split  between departments to  the 
detriment of the programme itself in order to ‘appease’ the various competing interests. A 
second example involved an industrial policy programme where departmental jealousies 
over the planning department ‘winning’ responsibility for the programme resulted in the 
programme subsequently being divided between several departments.  Further studies 
revealed instances of departmental priorities overriding the agreed council’s  corporate 
priorities,  such as Liverpool’s  commitment to  the provision of  social  facilities  being 
bypassed by the housing and health departments’ concern to maintain momentum for a 
slum clearance programme in opposition to the planning department. 
Such examples lead Stoker to characterize local authorities as terrains of ‘debated 
territory’.  One strategy adopted by departments to avoid conflict, he suggests, is to agree 
‘accepted action spaces’ where departments’ decisions remain unchallenged. Where these 
accepted actions break down, departments use negotiation and persuasion to process these 
conflicts.   This  type of  strategy is  used because despite  power differences between 
departments, no department has formal authority over the other departments involved in 
the dispute, and there is therefore no scope for using coercive or regulative strategies. 
The  momentum for  such  policy  struggles,  he  contends,  is  fostered  by  officials’ 
perceptions that they are involved in a competition where each official must strive to 
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protect  and  extend  their  own  ‘administrative  empire’,  and  where  long-standing 
professional jealousies and value clashes exist.   
In the context of central/ local government relations, central government possesses 
far greater resources than local authorities and other local bodies, giving it a stronger 
bargaining position in policy games.  The same point may also be applied to the inter-
organisational or inter-departmental arena.  It can be argued that the distribution of power 
between actors in local service delivery networks is also uneven, reflecting differences in 
resources such as finances, democratic legitimacy and perceived expertise.  Stoker (ibid), 
for instance, notes that the relative power of different local authority departments is likely 
to be affected by the political popularity of their policies and their ‘organisational status’, 
reflected in  the  size  of  their  departments and  budgets.  Within  central government, 
departments and executive agencies also enjoy differing status depending on the size of 
their budget and the political importance of the services and policy area for which they 
are responsible.  Moreover, they have differing interpretations of the same problem, and 
may not represent a unified or single perspective to neutrally arbitrate the game (Howlett 
and Ramesh 2003). 
A final area of relevance where ‘bureaucratic politics’ has been applied, is to the 
study of policy tools . As discussed in chapter two, many theories of instrument choice 
assume that tools are selected on a rational means-end basis. However, some political 
scientists have challenged the possibility of such neutral and systematic tool selection 
processes.  Peters makes a strong case for the politics of tool selection.  In his analysis he 
illustrates how the choice of policy tools used by governments often favours the more 
powerful groups.  For instance, he suggests that the more powerful political groups or 
actors will typically succeed in securing their interests through less visible policy tools, 
such as tax exemptions.  The lack of visibility disguises the true impact of the policy tool 
and allows powerful actors to preserve their interests without much opposition. As well as 
seeking to preserve the interests of such groups, governments may also choose tools with 
popular appeal to maximise support from the electorate at large.  For instance, in societies 
where there is a public preference for limited state intervention, governments are likely to 
employ less visible tools.  Peters’ framework serves to highlight how competing interests 
come into play when governments and bureaucracies choose policy tools.  Policy tools, or 
means, as much as policies themselves, or ends, are viewed as serving the more powerful 
interests. 
3.3.2 Applying bureaucratic politics to the implementation of collaboration
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A bureaucratic politics perspective on collaboration would view the collaborative process 
as a game.  In this game, certain interests are likely to dominate since the terrain is one of 
unequal influence. The resulting forms of collaboration pursued would be the outcome of 
a process of negotiation, compromise and bargaining.  Rather than all parties benefiting 
equally from the process, certain parties may benefit from collaborating more than others. 
Therefore, collaboration, either between different arms or levels of government, occurs 
within a broader context of bargaining and negotiation .
In  terms  of  the  implementation  of  collaboration,  the  political  nature  of 
bureaucracy is manifested in three ways: first, in the ‘horizontal’ relationships between 
agencies in the multi-agency homelessness network; secondly, in the horizontal relations 
between central government departments; thirdly, in the ‘vertical’ relationship street level 
bureaucrats (from across several agencies) and central government.  
On a horizontal level, inter-agency relations across the public/ private/ voluntary 
sector interface can be viewed as a realm of conflict, competition and differing priorities. 
The conceptualisation of the collaborative process as a political one acknowledges the 
struggles, bargains and compromises that take place at  an inter-organisational level . 
Although collaboration is a term which connotes consensus, motivations for collaborating 
can be seen as occurring within a wider context which is more conflictual and competitive 
in nature.  Indeed, previous studies of network management have been criticised for 
failing to account for the role of power and conflict in inter-organisational settings .  In 
contrast to the ‘naïve’ position associated with rational administration , which assumes 
that actors collaborate because they are more likely to achieve their goals this way, the 
bureaucratic politics perspective would acknowledge that goals may not be shared and 
that actors may have differing motivations for collaborating.  Hudson (1995, p. 236) 
suggests that ‘it maybe more realistic to assume that organisations will strive to maintain 
their autonomy’.
Within this context, the ‘horizontal tools’ selected by street level bureaucrats, that 
is, the  means of collaboration, would be used as part of a bargaining process in which 
each agency seeks  to  promote its  own organisational  priorities.   The  resulting  tool 
selection would favour the most powerful actors, rather than a collective aim. 
The  horizontal  dimension applied  to  the  level  of  central  government would 
assume that government departments each have their own interests to pursue. Rather than 
articulating a unified voice, mandates to their subordinate units may be incoherent or 
contradictory.   With respect to an issue such as homelessness, departments may have 
differing interpretations  of this,  casting doubt  on the ability  of the state to set out  a 
rational or strategic plan for tackling it.  Again, the processes of collaboration, that is, the 
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horizontal tools used to coordinate government departments, would result from pulling 
and hauling between government departments rather than being selected on the basis of a 
synoptically rational assessment of all available options. 
In terms of the vertical dimension, a bureaucratic politics perspective would view 
government’s ‘meta-policy’ to encourage collaboration amongst street level bureaucrats 
as a game between these two players, with each player responding or adjusting to the 
moves of the other. The game involves government using the ‘tools’ at its disposal to try 
to  exert  influence over  street  level  bureaucrats to  elicit  a  desired way of  working. 
However, these tools are not simply mechanisms of control but more complex bargaining 
strategies involving incentives to elicit desired behaviour.  The motivations for selecting 
particular  vertical  policy  tools  to  encourage local  collaboration  would  be  seen in  a 
political  sense,  with  central  government selecting  tools  not  on  a  rational basis  but 
according to influences such as ideas, interests and institutions .  Central and local actors 
may have different preferences regarding policy tools, and local actors may resist certain 
tools and comply with others.  Street level bureaucrats would therefore have their own 
means of ‘playing  the game’ which previous theory suggests  may involve moves to 
produce a veneer of compliance, particularly if the risks and costs of collaborating are 
seen as curtailing the attainment of individual organisational goals.  
Furthermore, while a rationalistic argument would view government’s promotion 
of local collaboration as the most efficient and effective response to a fragmented polity, a 
bureaucratic  politics  perspective  would  view  the  motivations  behind  this  rather 
differently. For instance, a bureaucratic politics perspective may consider the promotion 
of local inter-agency collaboration by government a method for shifting the responsibility 
for obtaining resources off  the central state and into the local arena where agencies 
compete for resources.  In addition, central government encouraging collaboration could 
be seen as a method for detracting from the broader difficulties facing agencies that stem 
from the  fragmentation  of  services.  In  this  view collaboration  may be  seen as  the 
politically acceptable face of privatization, and as a ‘soft’ and less visible policy tool as 
compared to privatization.  Finally, collaboration itself may be regarded as a ‘powerful, 
noble idea’ (Peters ibid).  Government may extol the virtues of a collaborative approach 
to street level bureaucrats and appeal to their altruistic side in order to legitimize this 
meta-policy. 
The above discussion illuminates how the implementation of collaboration would 
be  viewed  from two  very  distinct  perspectives,  the  rational-administrative  and  the 
bureaucratic politics perspective, each reflecting a  different set  of assumptions about 
decision-making in relation to government policies.  Based on existing literature, the 
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bureaucratic politics  perspective seems a more relevant  and useful  explanation of the 
implementation of collaboration within service delivery networks.  
Firstly,  as  noted in  the preceding discussion, these  networks are made up  of 
distinct organisations with individual and sometimes competing remits, and processes are 
often governed by  a  logic  of  exchange and bargaining.  As such they are arguably 
fundamentally conflictual rather than cooperative.  As already discussed, networks are 
often characterized as being ‘closed’ in that they prohibit access to certain actors.  The 
bureaucratic politics  perspective may  help  explain  why  some  actors  participate  in 
collaborative endeavours or negotiations while others do not, why some players gain from 
collaborating more than others, and lastly why dominant or powerful players may gain 
from limiting access to certain other players.  
In addition, since there are controversies over the extent to which collaboration is 
a top-down or a bottom-up process, to understand the implementation of collaboration it 
is  essential to account for the nature of relations between the central state and local 
agencies.  Bureaucratic politics draws attention towards such conflicts and tensions, and 
empirical studies following in this tradition have fruitfully examined such aspects of the 
policy process. 
Finally, there is evidence to suggest that the nature of the relationships between 
central government departments involves dynamics associated with bureaucratic politics. 
There is a long pedigree of literature which indicates that British Central Government is a 
terrain of competition between departments, each seeking to protect their own interests. 
For instance, problems of turf fighting have been well-documented, with departments 
keen to pursue their own interests in order to protect their own territory and areas of 
responsibility .  Indeed, it is acknowledged amongst academics and civil servants alike 
that the sectional interests of government departments frequently dominate the collective 
interests of government as a whole .   In British Government, the relationship between 
individual departments in their relationship to the Treasury is recognised to be one of 
competition  or  ‘bargained allocation’ .   Anthony  Crosland (see Jordan 1994, p.  49) 
reflecting  on  his  experience  as,  observed  that  Ministers  get  resources  for  their 
departments in  ‘an  endless  tactical battle  which requires determination,  cunning  and 
occasional unscrupulousness’. Such observations indicate the relevance of a bureaucratic 
politics perspective to collaborative working in central government.
The next section moves to a discussion of the level at which policy decisions are 
made, drawing on two influential and opposing perspectives from implementation theory. 
As discussed in the preceding chapters, there is much debate in the collaboration literature 
on the extent to which colaboration is, or should be, a top-down or a bottom-up process.
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3.4 Implementation theory and collaboration
Implementation theory is concerned with the process of translating public policies into 
action.  Within the overarching policy process, implementation is often viewed as the 
stage occurring after policy formulation and before policy evaluation. In practice these 
stages are not  always clearly defined, as  will  be illustrated below.  Nevertheless, the 
distinction between these different aspects of the policy process provides a useful starting 
point.  According to Howlett and Ramesh (2003, p.13), the implementation stage relates 
to ‘how governments put policies into effect’.  The main question addressed in the present 
research can be considered a manifestation of this classic implementation concern, in this 
case  concerned with  how  governments get  their  meta-policy  of  collaboration  into 
practice. 
Implementation theorists  have been characterised as  falling into three camps, 
namely  ‘top-down’ theorists,  ‘bottom-up’ theorists  and  ‘synthesizers’ who  combine 
elements of the first two models .   The following section focuses on  top-down and 
bottom-up perspectives of  implementation before proceeding to  a  discussion of  their 
application to the implementation of collaboration. 
3.4.1 Top-down perspectives
Top-down perspectives are concerned with explaining why policies do, or do not, get into 
action as anticipated by policy makers. Top-down studies therefore usually begin with 
specific political decisions or laws and investigate whether these are implemented in a 
manner  consistent  with  their  official  purpose .   They  are  typically  prescriptive  in 
orientation,  providing  ‘recipes’ for  effective  implementation, usually  in  ways  which 
enhance control  over  implementers. When  governments themselves  take  ‘top-down’ 
approaches, in  practice this  means ‘laying out  what  they  want  to  occur and taking 
measures to ensure others comply with their wishes’ (Stoker 1991, p. 206).  
Top-down approaches are generally construed as having arisen in response to 
seminal studies such as Pressman and Wildavsky’s  Implementation, and Bardach’s The 
Implementation  Game .  Such studies  highlight  the  numerous challenges to  effective 
policy implementation. They draw attention towards policy failures, or ‘implementation 
gaps’, which occur either due to bad policy design, to the number of veto points and 
actors in  the  implementation process, or  because of  implementers having their  own 
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interests to pursue.  These challenges create policy distortions or failures, and top-down 
studies have responded by highlighting ways in which these can be minimized.  
Minimising implementation deficits in the top-down perspective places emphasis 
on strengthening government and securing a tighter grip on bureaucracy .   Authority-
based  tools  such  as  tighter  monitoring  are  therefore employed, although  additional 
methods to ensure effective implementation are also employed.  Top-down perspectives 
advocate  a  range  of  strategies  including  greater  clarity  and  less  ambiguity  in  the 
communication of policy intent (i.e. strong statutes), the provision of adequate resources 
and reducing the number of links in the policy chain . 
Several  studies  with  a  top-down orientation  construct ideal-typical models of 
implementation,  under  which  conditions  ‘perfect  implementation’ can  be  attained  . 
Perfect implementation conditions include having a single implementing agency which is 
not overly-dependent on others, and a single line of command.  In the ideal typical model 
the subunits of the implementing agency have uniform objectives, norms and rules. There 
is also perfect communication, information sharing and coordination among the various 
elements of a programme or service.  
There  are  clear  parallels  between  the  top-down  perspective  and  rational-
administrative decision-making models.  According to Ham and Hill (1993, p. 111) a top-
down perspective assumes that ‘rationality in public policy involves goal setting followed 
by activities in pursuit of those goals which may be systematically monitored’. When 
their policy goals or ends are not achieved, the assumption of the top-down perspective is 
that those at the apex of the political and administrative system will revise these to select 
alternative courses of action in order to achieve these goals.  This may involve tampering 
with the bureaucracy in ways highlighted above, such as reducing the number of links in 
the  policy  chain  or  pursuing  other  measures  to  enhance  coordination.  Top-down 
perspectives, like rational-administrative perspectives, therefore involve a search for the 
most  efficient  means to  achieve policy  goals  or  ends.   They assume that  decisions 
regarding policy instruments and  implementation  are  made on  technical  grounds,  as 
means towards specified ends.  
Furthermore, top-down models are rationalistic in the sense that the policy process 
itself is  considered to occur in  orderly and sequential stages ,  beginning with policy 
formulation at the top of the organisational hierarchy and proceeding to implementation at 
the bottom, with different actors involved at each stage.  Top-down models,  like the 
rational-administrative model, generally assume that elected politicians make the value 
decisions while the officials  carry out the more detailed choices about  the means for 
achieving these. 
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3.4.2 Bottom-Up Perspectives
The contrasting perspective highlights the bottom-up nature of much policy making and 
implementation.  Indeed, many accounts normatively prefer policy making to occur at this 
level.  This perspective challenges the idea of a linear, top-down policy process in which 
high  ranking  officials  control  those working  at  the  lower tiers.   Instead,  bottom-up 
perspectives view policy formulation as a product of negotiation and compromise, with 
policy modified and ‘concretised’ as it goes through the implementation process .  
The bottom-up perspective has been particularly influential in studies of ‘street 
level’ bureaucracy.  Street level bureaucrats are the administrators and officials working at 
the frontline of public agencies who work at the interface between citizens and the state. 
Their typical areas of responsibility,  according to Meyers and Vorsanger  encompass 
many of the core activities of public agencies such as “determining program eligibility, 
allocating benefits, judging compliance, imposing sanctions and exempting individuals 
and businesses from penalties”.  
Lipsky’s  study of street level bureaucracy is arguably the most influential study 
of bottom-up policy-making.  In his research into public service ‘semi-professionals’ 
including teachers, police and social workers, he suggests that street level bureaucrats 
make rather than merely implement policy, due to the need to exercise human judgment in 
many of their decisions.  Street level workers have to adjust their response according to 
the circumstances of clients who walk into their offices, thus effectively making policy at 
street level.  
  Making policy at street level in Lipsky’s study is also viewed as a response to the 
limited  resources  available  to,  and  pressures  upon,  such  street  level  bureaucrats. 
Bureaucrats in human services organisations have to find ways of rationing the finite 
resources they are allocated in the face of infinite demands on services.  In this analysis, 
street level bureaucrats perform a rationing job on behalf of the state and public sector 
organisations in the distribution of social welfare.  This is achieved in one of two ways. 
First bureaucrats may limit or modify client demand, using bureaucratic procedures such 
as delaying tactics, withholding information and stigmatising service use. Second, they 
may modify client  conception, which involves making a distinction between deserving 
and undeserving cases, or prioritising those most likely to succeed.  Therefore, in Lipsky’s 
view,  street  level  bureaucrats  have considerable discretion in  policy  implementation. 
Thus, the interactions between frontline workers and citizens cannot be specified from 
above in the realms of higher level policy making.  Rather, they need to be decided at 
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street level, in social services departments’ offices and in town halls, where government 
policy interfaces directly with citizens.
Similarly for  Elmore ,  problem solving  in  complex systems depends  not  on 
hierarchical control, but on maximising discretion at the point where the problem is most 
immediate.  He suggests that ‘forward mapping’ solutions relying on formal devices of 
command and control such as funding formulas, authority relationships, regulation and 
administrative controls are likely to have limited effectiveness in solving policy problems. 
In his view, delegated discretion with adequate resources directed at the points within the 
system  where  this  discretion  is  needed  is  a  more  effective  method  for  effective 
implementation.   Since  policy  implementation  is  heavily  dependent  on  specialized 
problem solving capacities at lower levels, he argues for a ‘backward mapping’ approach 
to  implementation  which  builds  local  bargaining  and  problem  solving  capacity. 
Hierarchical controls, he contends, encourage standardised responses and uniformity, and 
serve to restrict rather than facilitate these skills and capacities.  James Q Wilson  argues 
in  much  the  same  vein,  arguing  for  greater  de-regulation  of  local  public  services, 
something he views as necessary to allow street level bureaucrats the discretion required 
to perform effectively in their roles.  His study which was concerned with prisons, schools 
and armies argued that over-regulation encouraged bureaucrats to ‘go by the book’, which 
ultimately did not serve the public interest.  
Some bottom-up studies identify ways in which bureaucrats may help to secure 
the public interest through their non-compliance.   For instance,  Wood and Waterman 
(1994, see Frederickson and Smith 2003) suggest that strict bureaucratic compliance with 
official  mandates is  sometimes  less  likely to  secure the  interests of  the  public  than 
bureaucratic resistance.  They argue that bureaucrats frequently ignore policy mandates 
when they see this as likely to further the public interest.  To illustrate they cite the 
example of bureaucratic curbing of presidential power in the case of President Reagan 
who was committed to de-regulation of the environment, contrary to public preference. 
Similarly, Blau (1963, see Jordan 1994) demonstrated in his case study of a Federal law 
enforcement agency that bureaucratic non-compliance with official priorities can create 
benefits for an organisation.  In the case in question federal agents were charged with 
reporting attempted bribes by employers. Agents, however, managed to discourage bribes 
from taking place by agreeing an informal deal with employers that they would not report 
the bribe in return for voluntary modification of their behaviour.
Another variant of the bottom-up perspective, associated with authors such as 
Barrett and Fudge, sees the policy process as a continuum, or an iterative and recursive 
‘policy action’ process which takes place vertically and horizontally . This view provides 
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a partial synthesis of top-down and bottom-up perspectives.  As with the conventional 
bottom-up  approach, it  suggests  that  the  policy  process  cannot  be  seen  simply  as 
involving the implementation of policies developed at higher levels into practice at lower 
levels.  Although sometimes characterised as ‘bottom-uppers’ (for example Hill and Hupe 
2002), Barrett and Fudge criticize the ‘pure’ bottom-up perspective which they argue 
mistakenly assumes that most action at the implementation level is spontaneous, thus 
understating the coordination capacity of super-ordinate policy actors.  They see policy 
action in  a  political  context,  which  involves negotiations that  take  place over  time. 
Successful implementation is not simply about achieving compliance, but is also about 
compromise, which is seen as being needed as much at the policy formulation level as at 
the implementation level. The approach therefore implies a dialogic relationship between 
central and local levels rather than a simple hierarchical one.  Nevertheless, the ‘action 
space’ given to policy actors can be restricted, and negotiation is used in conjunction with 
other modes of action, including coercion, persuasion, manipulation and regulation.  
This perspective acknowledges that the complexity of the relationship between 
policy formulation and implementation. For instance, the consequences of a policy cannot 
always be anticipated.  It is suggested that policy is not constant, but is mediated by those 
involved in its implementation, undergoing interpretation, modification and sometimes 
subversion.  According to Barrett and Fudge (ibid), individuals’ and organisations’ actions 
and reactions may determine policy as  much as  policy itself  determining action and 
response.
There are many similarities between bottom-up studies of the policy process and 
bureaucratic politics  perspectives.  For instance, bottom-up studies  such as  Lipsky’s 
which emphasises bureaucrats’ power to allocate public resources, share similarities with 
Waldo’s bureaucratic politics view that administrators have a large say in who gets what, 
when and how.  Barrett and Fudge’s work also has parallels with bureaucratic politics in 
its conception of policy as something which is negotiated in an arena where action space 
can  be  restricted.   Indeed,  some  commentators  categorize  theories  of  street  level 
bureaucracy  as  falling  within  the  bureaucratic  politics  paradigm  (for  example 
Frederickson and Smith 2003).  The two perspectives are united in their concern with 
negotiation  and  bargaining,  and  are  concerned  with  unravelling  the  politics/ 
administration dichotomy.  
However,  bottom-up perspectives can also have a rational character.  As noted 
above, some ‘bottom-uppers’ suggest that higher level policy makers only possess partial 
knowledge and are reliant on lower level implementers who have the requisite skills and 
know-how to translate policy intentions into practice.  Studies such as Goodsell’s, Wood 
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and Waterman’s and James Q. Wilson’s imply that bureaucrats and those involved in 
public service delivery have the capacity to select appropriate courses of action in a 
technical and rational manner based on their training and professional expertise.
3.4.3 Application of top-down and bottom-up perspectives to the implementation of 
collaboration
It has been argued that policy implementation is an inherently complex process. Previous 
studies have demonstrated that translating government policy into action is problematic, 
with many policies devised by central government failing to be implemented at local 
level. A range of solutions in the top-down-model have been proposed for countering 
implementation deficits.  As discussed above, solutions offered in the literature include 
tighter monitoring and control, and clearer mandates.  
In terms of the implementation of collaboration, in the top-down perspective we 
would expect governments to employ largely authoritative policy tools such as close 
monitoring  of  collaboration,  clear  and  unambiguous  specification  of  the  nature  of 
collaboration and perhaps also to issue legislation.  Such approaches would, in theory, 
enhance compliance with official mandates.  The top-down approach may be seen in two 
ways, either as an authoritative response to the bargaining which takes place between 
central  government and  local  public  service  providers,  serving  to  curb  recalcitrant 
behaviour,  or  as  a  rational  approach  to  administration  in  which  the  top  selects 
coordination tools most likely to deliver the aims of collaboration. 
From a bottom-up perspective, decisions around collaborating would be made at 
the local level, and government mandates would have only limited influence.  Decision-
making at street level would imply that policy aims, or ends, may be set at this level as 
well  and  the  means for  achieving these. Bottom-up collaboration may be driven by 
rational considerations where the professionals and other technical experts at street level 
who are closer to the people and more in tune with their needs, would make decisions on 
the most appropriate means and level of collaboration, helping to serve the public interest. 
However, in the bottom-up perspective collaboration may also be driven by bureaucratic 
politics, resulting from a process of bargaining, negotiation and compromise in which the 
agencies involved pursue their own interests and where the outcomes favour those with 
the strongest bargaining influence.
Existing evidence on the nature of collaboration and arguments about the limits of 
authoritative strategies in network settings cast doubt on the appropriateness of traditional 
top-down models for explaining the implementation of collaboration.  As discussed in 
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chapter one, the processes of monitoring, coordination and control are complex in service 
delivery networks as compared to ‘conventional’ hierarchical systems.  The solutions 
offered in the top-down implementation literature for increasing compliance with policy 
mandates may  therefore  not  be  applicable  when seeking to  influence behaviour  in 
implementation networks. Indeed, a number of authors have discussed the difficulty of 
applying  ‘traditional’ (top-down)  implementation  theory  to  situations  of  fragmented 
governance .  
The ideal-typical conditions for enhancing top-down coordination identified by 
scholars such as Hood, Hogwood and Gunn have limited applicability in service delivery 
networks for a number of reasons.  First, it was noted above that one condition of perfect 
implementation is a single line of command. However,  service delivery networks are 
influenced by several lines of command, with implementation agencies subject to the 
demands of different government departments, and in the case of private and voluntary 
sector agencies, to other stakeholders. It is therefore not always clear who is in control in 
such situations.  Secondly, under conditions of perfect top-down implementation it was 
noted that there would be a single implementing agency which is not overly dependent on 
others. Clearly service delivery networks which are the subject of central coordinating 
efforts  have  more  than  one  implementing  actor,  and  are  also  characterized  by 
interdependence.  Thirdly, the ideal typical condition of subunits of the implementing 
agency  having  uniform objectives,  norms  and  rules  is  unrealistic  in  multi-agency 
networks consisting of agencies with different professional and cultural values, priorities 
and  organisational  systems.  Finally,  conditions  such  as  perfect  communication, 
information sharing and coordination among the various elements of a programme are 
contrary to much of the evidence of multi-agency implementation systems where such 
processes are frequently found to be problematic.
Top-down  strategies  to  enhance control  such  as  tight  monitoring  and  clear 
specification  of  policy  content  are  also  problematic  in  service  delivery  networks. 
Monitoring is challenging since it may be difficult to identify non-compliant agencies.  As 
two knowledgeable observers have commented, ‘recalcitrant agencies are generally less 
visible to  mandating authorities when many actors are involved;  and other agencies, 
which may depend on their actions, have few mechanisms for enforcement’ .   Clear 
specification of unambiguous policies may be problematic since messages may be lost in 
transmission  where  there  are  numerous  implementing  agencies  involved  and  long 
implementation  chains  (ibid).  For  instance,  government  departments  may  specify 
mandates and messages to their subordinate agencies in the expectation that these will be 
passed on to other relevant agencies in service delivery networks. However, empirical 
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studies have demonstrated that where implementation relies on multiple actors, messages 
are frequently weakened or lost (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973; O’Toole and Montjoy 
ibid).  In addition, where there are various conflicting groups affected by a policy decision 
as in service delivery networks, clear and unambiguous policy directives may be more 
difficult to achieve (Ham and Hill 1984).  The variety of actors involved locally means 
that common definitions may not be appropriate and consequently it may not be possible 
to achieve clarity .
Pressman and Wildavsky’s  seminal study of a multi-organisational job creation 
programme in Oakland, California provides an illuminating account of the difficulties of 
achieving top-down methods of control in complex implementation settings involving a 
large and diverse range of actors.  Three particular difficulties are highlighted, namely the 
widely diverging and conflicting interests of the actors involved, the frequency at which 
actors changed and the number of clearance points at which agreement was needed.  The 
study also highlights the challenges of achieving joint action in such settings, stemming 
from issues such as the incompatibility of  organisational goals,  legal and procedural 
differences between organisations, and dependence on actors who lack a sense of urgency. 
The number of decision or veto points is seen as especially problematic, requiring dozens 
of people with different perspectives to give clearance to controversial issues.  
Such perspectives suggest  that  the implementation gap and the ability  of  the 
centre to  control  implementers is  more problematic in  situations  involving multiple 
organisations.  The greater number of links in the implementation chain makes it more 
difficult to exert top-down control and to ensure policies are ‘correctly’ implemented, as 
intended by the original policy makers.  All this suggests it is more difficult to invoke 
authority as a mode of action in implementation networks than in hierarchies, and there 
may be a number of ‘control deficits’ . Other strategies involving information-based tools, 
incentive-based tools and capacity building tools may be required, as discussed in chapter 
two. 
Turning specifically to the implementation of collaboration, there are a number of 
reasons why  the  bottom-up perspective  appears more  relevant than  top-down down 
perspective. At least three issues can be discerned, first, resistance from lower level policy 
actors may occur because of the costs involved in collaborating; secondly, the knowledge 
and expertise required for devising collaborative strategies is likely to be held locally; and 
thirdly, collaboration is difficult to monitor.  
In relation to the first point, the policy may be one which local actors have a 
propensity to resist due to the costs and risks involved. Agencies fear they are likely to 
have to surrender some of their organisational autonomy .  For instance, many varieties of 
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joint working involve the merging of organisational procedures, requiring agencies to 
abandon systems with which they are familiar.  In addition, in adjusting to the prevailing 
values and ethos of other professions and sectors, ideological compromises have to be 
made.  Professional values tend to be deeply rooted, and are not readily departed from. In 
the most extreme cases, there is the unwelcome possibility of one organisation being 
subsumed by another.  Moreover, the benefits to be gained from collaboration can appear 
fairly intangible in the early stages, and it may take some time for their impacts to be felt. 
As already discussed, collaboration is a time consuming and resource intensive activity. 
Certainly, collaboration is unlikely to produce quick wins.  As Pollitt (2003, p. 46) has 
succinctly put it: ‘it would be wise for proponents of joined up government to regard it as 
a long term project, a selective project, and a cooperative project – not something that 
central government can just decide to ‘have’.  Because of these costs and risks, agencies 
are  likely to  resist a  meta-policy  promoting collaboration unless  there is  a  sense of 
ownership of, and a shared commitment to, the idea within the local area.
Resistance  to  collaboration  is  likely  to  be  enhanced  when  the  form  of 
collaboration promoted or imposed is highly ambitious, for example varieties falling at 
the higher end of the collaborative spectrum. At this end, collaboration poses more of a 
threat and disruption to the organisations involved.  In such cases, it has been suggested 
that agencies may adopt coping strategies to produce a veneer of joint working.  These 
strategies  will  ensure that  their  organisational independence is  retained and standard 
operating procedures unaffected .  In a similar vein, Hudson , drawing on Lipsky’s theory 
of street level bureaucracy, notes that it is up to street level workers whether or not they 
engage in collaborative working.  One of the notable features of welfare organisations, he 
suggests, is that operational staff have ‘considerable contact with outside bodies, and in 
some cases have de facto autonomy from their superiors’ (ibid, p. 237).  If the goals of 
policy makers or superiors are perceived as too difficult to achieve, he suggests, they will 
redefine or abandon them. 
Research by  Jennings   lends  support  to  this  idea.   In  a  systematic study of 
coordination tools used in the employment and training sector in the American States, he 
found that states adopted ‘low payoff’ tools, that is, tools that were perceived as having 
least impact but which are easiest to implement.  These were the tools required by law, 
and included formal planning requirements.  The horizontal coordination tools which 
were seen as most effective – the high payoff tools – were least likely to be implemented. 
These tools were entirely voluntary and were either group modes of coordination that 
involved  increasing  communication  between  agencies  such  as  regular  inter-agency 
meetings  and working partnerships,  or  impersonal  modes for  operational  integration 
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around the client level, such as joint electronic client record systems and the creation of 
universal eligibility and referral mechanisms.  Jennings is pessimistic about the findings 
and suggests that state personnel seemed to persist with ineffective coordination tools 
either because they are mandated or easier to implement, resulting in much waste time 
and effort.  Yet this leaves open a conundrum in that without any form of government 
steering, it is quite possible that states would have engaged in no coordination efforts 
whatsoever. 
With reference to the second problem, it can be argued that collaboration is an 
intrinsically bottom-up affair because the knowledge about how to make collaboration 
work is held at the local level.  As noted but Hudson (1995; 1999), the knowledge of the 
issues which are likely to benefit from collaboration may need to be determined locally. 
Similarly, local agencies are best placed to determine the actors with whom they should 
collaborate.  As has been illustrated, much collaboration is of an informal nature, based on 
inter-personal ties, which are developed through personal contacts and local networks.  In 
the same way as Lipsky suggested that higher tiers of government bureaucracy could not 
specify the interactions between street level workers and citizens, it can be argued that 
higher level actors cannot specify the required interactions between agencies. 
Finally, monitoring local compliance with a collaborative agenda is problematic, 
casting  some doubt  on  the  possibility  of  a  top-down approach.  We have seen that 
monitoring in implementation networks is generally problematic.  As discussed by Winter 
(2003), some aspects of administration are more visible than others, rendering them more 
amenable to political control.  For instance, Winter notes that the number of penalties 
issued by a regulator or the inspections carried out are more visible than the harshness of 
penalties or strictness of inspections.  Similarly, collaboration is not easily observed since 
many cooperative actions are of an informal nature, involving interactions between street 
level  actors as  they  deal  with  day-to-day,  operational  issues.  The centrality  of  such 
informal interactions to human services networks was discussed in chapter two.  While 
one approach to assessing the implementation of collaboration is to evaluate the extent to 
which government best practice on formal collaboration mechanisms is being followed , 
this approach only measures the more visible elements of collaboration.
Despite  these  observations  on  the  limitations  of  top-down control,  empirical 
research has also demonstrated that collaboration may not naturally happen of its own 
accord without  some  form of  central  steering.  Although altruism or  the  pursuit  of 
resources may motivate agencies to collaborate, as illustrated in chapter one, the costs and 
risks mean that it cannot be assumed that actors will collaborate voluntarily.  In summary, 
collaboration can be seen as a process which requires significant bottom-up or grassroots 
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development and the use of the skills, knowledge and personal contacts held by local 
actors.  However, because of the costs and risks involved, legal mandates, exhortations 
and other strategies are likely to be needed to induce agencies to collaborate.  The next 
section combines the perspectives discussed above to create alternative models to explain 
collaboration. 
3.5 Potential explanatory models and hypotheses
As outlined above, there are several potential ways of explaining collaboration in service 
delivery  networks.   Two  principal  types  of  explanation  have  been  discussed:  one 
pertaining to the nature of decision-making and another pertaining to the level at which 
decision-making occurs. The first dimension is concerned with the question ‘how and 
why is collaboration policy set?’ (i.e. in a rational-administrative or a bureaucratic politics 
sense?), and the second dimension with ‘who sets it?’ (i.e. at which level of government, 
the centre or the street?).  The question of who sets policy can be subdivided into two 
further questions, namely, who sets the policy aims, and who sets the policy means?  In 
the context of the present study, the policy aim is for agencies to collaborate. The means 
are the tools or mechanisms (formal or informal) through which collaboration occurs. 
An overview of the rival explanatory models is captured in figure 3.1, and the 
core aspects of these models are outlined in figure 3.2.  Each of the models and the 
hypotheses flowing from these are detailed further below.
Fig 3.1 Overview of the rival explanatory models
 View of bureaucratic decision-making behaviour
Rational-administrative         Bureaucratic Politics
Top-down
View of policy      
Process
Bottom-Up      
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Model 1:
Top-down rational 
administration
Model 2:
Bottom-up rational 
administration
Model 4:
Bottom-up 
bureaucratic 
politics
Model 3:
Top-down 
bureaucratic 
politics
Fig 3.2 Key aspects of the rival explanatory models
Model
View of decision-making
Locus of 
control
Nature of 
horizontal 
relationships
Nature of 
vertical 
relationships
1 Rational-altruistic Centre Unified Unified
2 Rational-altruistic Street Unified Conflictual
3 Political-instrumental Centre Conflictual Unified
4 Political-instrumental Street Conflictual Conflictual
Model 1: The top-down rational administrative explanation:
H1a Local agencies collaborate because government tells them to; government’s aims are 
unified and unambiguous; 
H1b  The  values  and  objectives  of  the  collaboration  policy would  be  defined  by 
government, and neutral implementers or bureaucrats would search for the most efficient 
means of delivering these objectives.  
In  model  1,  the  top-down rational  administrative  model,  local  agencies  collaborate 
because government tells them to.  This would be evidenced by local agencies generally 
complying  with  government  policy  on  collaboration.   In  the  top-down  rational 
administrative model we would expect government to set the  aims of the collaborative 
policy and neutral bureaucrats to select the  means or tools of local collaboration.  The 
bureaucrats selecting the tools are likely to be higher level bureaucrats working at the 
level of central government rather than service providers themselves, that is, ‘street level’ 
bureaucrats.  Tool  selection  may either proceed according to  synoptic  rationality  or 
bounded rationality.  In  the  synoptically rational  variant  the  full  range of  options  is 
considered when selecting tools. In the ‘boundedly’ rational variant actors, in view of 
their cognitive limitations and constraints, would choose collaboration tools from a more 
limited range of options, producing outcomes that are good enough or ‘satisfycing’ rather 
than optimal.
In this scenario it is government that is sovereign and sets the priorities and there 
is a strong central steer over local agencies through bureaucratic control.  The assumption 
is that the weight and legitimacy of government authority is  enough to compel local 
actors to act in accordance with central mandates to collaborate.  Vertical relationships are 
consequently unified.  
Confirmation  of  Hypotheses  1a  and  b  would  add  weight  to  the  view  that 
government can stimulate collaboration at local level, and provide support for a top-down 
view  of  the  policy  process  in  which  neutral  bureaucrats  implement  the  will  of 
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government. It would also indicate the persistence of hierarchy in an era of governance 
and cast doubt on the governing without government/ hollow state thesis.
Model 2 The bottom-up rational administrative explanation:
H2a Collaboration is locally defined and local agencies collaborate because they see this  
as the most effective mode of action for attaining their aims and for meeting clients’ 
needs; local agencies’ aims are unified and unambiguous;
H2b The means pursued are the most administratively efficient to meet these aims.
In the bottom-up rational administrative model both the ends or goals of collaboration and 
the means for pursuing these are decided locally. Local agencies collaborate because they 
view collaboration as the best way to meet the needs of their client group rather than 
because government tells them to. In this model it is local networks that are sovereign. 
Street level bureaucrats, by virtue of their close proximity to service users, posses the 
technical expertise  and  local  knowledge to  choose the  most  efficient,  effective and 
relevant mechanisms of collaboration for the issues involved and to meet client needs. 
We would expect local bureaucrats to adopt collaboration mechanisms based on technical 
rather than political or strategic grounds, and the tools employed may be additional or 
different to those recommended by government or central bureaucrats, generated from the 
‘bottom-up’.  Again,  the  horizontal  tools  of  collaboration  choices  may  be  either 
synoptically rational or ‘boundedly’ rational.  
In this model there is little need for vertical steering since collaboration occurs 
spontaneously without any government intervention.  Agencies collaborate because they 
view joint working with other agencies as more likely to deliver their shared aims than 
working alone.  Confirmation of hypotheses 2a and 2b would provide support for the 
notion  of  self-governing or  self-organising  networks  and  indicate  limited  ability  of 
government to mandate collaboration from the top-down.
Model 3 The top-down, bureaucratic politics explanation:
H3a Government or central bureaucrats set collaboration policy aims and means, and 
local agencies are generally responsive to their parent government departments;
H3b Government policy is, however, not unified, with different departments pursuing 
their own interests and the outcome favouring the most powerful department.
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Government sets  the  collaborative policy  but  is  not  unified,  with  different  central 
government departments directing policy to their respective subordinates in ways which 
reflect their diverging interests.   Central government departments may have differing 
motivations for promoting collaboration and some may be more committed to this than 
others.   Local  agencies  are  generally  responsive  to  the  mandates  of  their  parent 
government departments,  but  because of  the  differing  aims  and  priorities  of  these 
departments, the aims and priorities of local agencies within the network are themselves 
unlikely to be unified. The horizontal tools or collaboration mechanisms promoted to 
local agencies by central bureaucrats are an outcome of ‘pulling and hauling’ between 
government departments rather than being selected on technical grounds. 
Evidence  to  support  hypotheses  3a  and  3b  signifies  central  government 
sovereignty over local sovereignty,  casting doubt  on the hollow state/ self-organising 
networks thesis. However, because of the differing interests operating at central level, this 
model  suggests  that  government may  be  unable  to  specify  clear  and  unambiguous 
collaboration policy in the way suggested by the conventional rationalistic versions of 
top-down implementation theory.  
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Model 4 The bottom-up, bureaucratic politics explanation: 
H4a Collaboration decisions (both means and ends) are generated from the bottom-up;  
however aims are not unified;
H4b  Collaboration  decisions  are  the  outcome of  strategic  and  instrumental  moves 
between actors in the local arena, each promoting their  own interests;  the outcomes 
favour the most powerful local agencies.
In this model decisions around collaboration are generated at local level, regardless of 
governmental attempts to promote collaboration.  Local agencies may resist government 
policy, and the relationship between central and local government is one of struggle and 
compromise.   Inter-organisational  working  takes  place  in  an  arena  of  conflict,  and 
collaborative processes would be characterised by negotiation and bargaining.  In this 
explanation, motivations for adopting tools would be more strategic and instrumental in 
nature.
In Model 4, the patterns and mechanisms of collaboration pursued locally may 
bear no particular resemblance to those advocated by government.  Indeed, there may be 
little collaboration pursued at all because of the differing priorities  of local agencies. 
Evidence to support hypotheses 4a and 4b would indicate limited capacity of government 
to  steer  collaboration  and  provide  some  support  for  the  notion  of  self-organising 
networks.  
There are, however, two possible variants of the bottom-up bureaucratic politics 
model.  In one view, conflict is so endemic that collaboration is unlikely to happen of its 
own accord, implying that a need for government steering, even in view of the difficulties 
of doing so.  Ultimately,  however,  such steering is  unlikely to prove successful.  In 
another  more  optimistic  view,  following  Lindblom’s  theory  of  partisan  mutual 
adjustment,  agencies  will  make  mutual  adjustment  despite  their  differing  interests 
agencies, moving towards agreement  on  values and  decisions.   In  this  latter  view, 
agencies will ultimate coordinate themselves without the need for a central government 
coordinator.  
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Chapter summary
The chapters which follow examine the relative weight of these potential explanations. 
The purpose of using these theoretical models is not to formally test the rival theories 
presented.  Rather,  the  models  are  used  as  a  mechanism  for  exploring  the  key 
dimensions  of  the  research  question  on  the  ability  of  government to  implement 
collaboration  in  local  service  delivery networks.   The  particular  models  selected 
represent the dominant rival explanations in the collaboration literature, viewed through 
a political science/ public administration theory lens.  The strategy of presenting rival 
models and testing the empirical evidence against the competing perspectives enables 
the salient dimensions of collaboration to be analysed.  As discussed by Elmore (1978), 
viewing implementation processes through the presentation of alternative models is also 
analytically  useful  because it  forces  the  analyst  to  make  explicit  the  assumptions 
underlying  their  explanations.   Before presenting  the  empirical data,  chapter  four 
provides details of the empirical setting of the research and the research methodology 
employed.
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Chapter 4: Empirical Context and Research methods
Chapter overview
This chapter begins by introducing the context of the empirical research.  This provides 
essential  background information to  facilitate  interpretation  of  references  made  in 
subsequent chapters and enables the reader to make judgments about the applicability of 
the research findings to other settings.  It also provides contextual information enabling 
further  ‘contingency’  related  hypotheses  regarding  the  nature  of  coordination 
mechanisms one might expect to see in the sector.  The chapter firstly presents evidence 
to highlight the cross-cutting nature of homelessness (section 4.1.1), and maps out the 
various  service  providers  involved  in  the  homelessness  system  (section  4.1.2).  It 
subsequently outlines the funding and governance arrangements in the sector (section 
4.1.3), and the policy and legislative context (section 4.1.4). Next, the nature of the task 
environment is discussed and some hypotheses are presented relating to the nature of 
horizontal coordination tools that might be expected in terms of the task environment 
(section 4.1.5).
Section  two  applies  the  theoretical framework to  the  case  of  homelessness 
(section 4.2).  Section three discusses the methods used for the empirical research, firstly 
providing an overview of the research methods and procedure (4.3.1), followed by a 
details  of  phase one  of  the  research, the  survey phase (4.3.2) and phase two,  the 
interview phase (4.3.2).  
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4.1 Empirical Context
The  research questions  are  examined within  the  context  of  English  homelessness 
services22.  Homelessness is a so-called ‘cross-cutting’ issue (Rittel and Webber 1973), 
transcending  departmental  and  organisational  boundaries  by  virtue  of  its  multi-
dimensional nature, and demanding holistic approaches.  It is also a sector23 that has 
been heavily influenced by New Public Management processes of fragmentation and 
specialization common across other OECD countries (Verhoest, Bouckaert, and Peters 
2007).  The English homelessness sector has been the target of coordination efforts on 
the part of UK central government.  Collaboration or ‘multi-agency working’ has been a 
central plank of official homelessness policy since 2002, and a series of initiatives has 
been introduced to promote local collaboration24.
4.1.1 The cross-cutting nature of homelessness
There is something of a consensus amongst researchers, practitioners and policy makers 
alike that homelessness is about more than housing. It is generally regarded as a multi-
factorial issue  with  multiple  causes and  consequences which require multi-agency, 
collaborative approaches .   Indeed, the current UK government strategy for tackling 
homelessness, influenced by the government report More Than A Roof (DTLR 2002), is 
underpinned by this view.  
The root causes of homelessness arguably lie in structural and socio-economic 
factors relating to demographics, housing supply, poverty and unemployment . However, 
the personal and social problems stemming from these are often the most immediate 
cause of homelessness to be identified.  For instance, one study of 95 homeless people in 
the UK found that of 264 reasons given by participants for their homelessness, only 8% 
were specifically housing related . Common causes of homelessness include financial 
difficulties (especially mortgage or rent arrears), relationship breakdown, mental illness, 
alcohol or substance abuse and domestic violence (Lemos and Goodby 1999; Fitzpatrick 
et  al.  2000).   Other  risk  factors associated  with  homelessness  include making  the 
transition from institutions into the community.  In particular, people leaving prison, 
young offender institutions or police custody, the armed forces, hospital or psychiatric 
wards, rehabilitation centres and the care system have an elevated risk of homelessness .
22 Homelessness services in other jurisdictions of the United Kingdom operate along similar lines 
although the governance structures vary slightly due to institutional reforms associated with devolution.
23 The term ‘sector’ is used here to refer to the full range of agencies involved in service delivery – 
encompassing public, voluntary and private actors directly involved in providing services or housing to 
homeless people or those threatened with homelessness.  
24 ‘Meta-governance’ strategies are discussed in detail in chapter six.
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Once  a  person  is  homeless,  their  experience  of  homelessness  is  often 
compounded by other associated problems.  For entrenched rough sleepers, there is a 
particularly high prevalence of health, mental health and substance abuse problems25 , 
and the life expectancy for rough sleepers is estimated to be only 42 years (NAO 2005).  
Research also suggests that there are links between offending behaviour and 
homelessness  (SEU 2002).  Almost a  third of  prisoners are  estimated to  lose their 
existing housing whilst in prison, and around the same proportion of people entering 
prison have no permanent accommodation to start with.  Around 10% of prisoners who 
return to prison after a period in the community report that they ‘slept rough’ between 
convictions.  For ex-offenders, reconviction  rates are  higher amongst those without 
stable accommodation by around 20%.  There is also some evidence that street homeless 
people, particularly those who beg, are at risk of physical and verbal abuse from passers 
by and other homeless people (Fitzpatrick and Kennedy 2000).  Because of problematic 
drug dependency issues around many street homeless people, begging, petty crime and 
theft may provide a means of financing substance addiction.  High crime rates have been 
found in some homelessness hostels, with both single homeless people and housing staff 
reporting feelings of vulnerability .  
The wider social and personal problems associated with homelessness are not, 
however, confined to rough sleepers. Official statistics suggest that people applying to 
local authorities  for  homelessness  assistance have a  wide range of  needs  including 
mental  health  problems,  substance  addiction  and  physical  illness26.  Research  also 
indicates  that  a  high  proportion  of  people  applying  for  homeless  assistance  have 
problematic family backgrounds, with many having suffered abuse or with a background 
in institutional care .  
4.1.2 Defining the homelessness service delivery network
Due  to  the  multiple  causes  and  consequences of  homelessness,  no  single  agency 
possesses the full range of resources required to tackle it. Consequently the structure of 
homelessness services in England, like in many other countries, resembles a ‘service 
delivery network’ .  The network is not a formalised structure but rather a population of 
25 Common health problems amongst rough sleepers include respiratory problems, musculoskeletal 
problems, skin disease and tuberculosis.  Mental illness is estimated to be eleven times higher in street 
homeless people and eight times higher among those living in temporary hostel or bed and breakfast 
accommodation than in the general population, with Schizophrenia one of the most common mental 
illnesses in street homeless people.  Serious alcohol problems are estimated to occur in between a third 
and a half of street homeless people, and high levels of drug dependence have been found amongst young 
street homeless people in particular (Fitzpatrick et al. 2000).
26 Local Authority Annual Returns Data (P1E Data Returns), accessed at www.communities.gov.uk, 
website of the Department for Communities and Local Government. 
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inter-dependent agencies involved in service provision.  As with other human service 
systems  a  typical  client  case  may  involve  several  agencies,  with  each  agency 
contributing a component of the care package (Bardach 1994).  
Homelessness in the present study is taken to mean any person either without a 
home or threatened with losing their home, including those who sleep rough or reside in 
temporary or emergency accommodation.  In order to define some boundaries for the 
present study, however,  the focus is on the network of agencies surrounding ‘single 
homeless’ people.  Single homelessness is a recognised term in UK homelessness policy 
and practice which refers to homeless people without dependent children (Fitzpatrick et 
al. 2000).  While there is considerable variation even within the single homelessness 
subcategory, the term is well understood by those in the sector and therefore serves as a 
valid means of limiting the scope of the study.  It is necessary to specify a category 
because  collaborative  arrangements  and  the  agencies  involved  are  likely  to  vary 
depending on the particular client group27.
The homelessness service delivery network for ‘single homeless’ people consists 
of organisations from across the public (statutory), private and voluntary sectors.  Some 
agencies  can  additionally  be  classified  as  quangos  or  ‘quasi-public’ agencies,  as 
discussed in chapter one.  For some organisations homelessness represents their core 
business but for many it is only one part of their remit.  In England the local housing 
authority has lead statutory responsibility for homelessness in local areas and is therefore 
arguably the central actor operating in local service delivery networks.  While each local 
authority is served by a service delivery network, these networks do not fit perfectly 
within  local  authority  boundaries.  In  practice, many agencies’ geographical  remits 
extend  across  more  than  one  authority,  serving  several  areas  within  a  region  or 
subregion.   Therefore networks  are  to  a  certain  extent  overlapping,  and  agencies’ 
boundaries within networks are not necessarily coterminous. The number of agencies 
involved in any given area varies according to factors such as population size, geography 
and the level of homelessness or housing need.  
The  core  statutory actors within  the  homelessness service  delivery network 
include local authority housing departments, social services departments, health services 
and criminal justice agencies.  Housing authorities have a legal responsibility to provide 
housing advice and accommodation to those who are homeless or threatened with this 
(further details on the housing authority’s duties are provided below).  Other statutory 
agencies including social services departments, the probation service, the prison service, 
27 Both statutory and non-statutory cases of single homelessness are included in the present study.  This 
includes rough sleepers (some of whom may be entitled to statutory provision, depending on their 
circumstances) as well as people accepted under statutory definitions because they are vulnerable due to a 
threat of violence, old age, ill-health, or time spent in the armed forces, prison or custody.  
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the NHS and the armed forces have a role to play in the prevention of single adult 
homelessness, particularly in relation to transitory groups of service users moving from 
institutions into the community.  Other statutory agencies involved with homeless clients 
include the police who have a role in tackling antisocial behaviour and crimes associated 
with homelessness. 
For single homeless people, health and welfare-related statutory agencies play a 
particularly important role because of the high prevalence of physical ill-health, mental 
illness and substance misuse problems amongst this group as reported above.  Agencies 
such  as  NHS  Trusts,  General  Practices,  Mental  Health  teams,  Social  Services 
Departments and Drug and Alcohol Teams are the key agencies in this regard.  
The  voluntary  sector  has  long  played  an  important  role  in  homelessness 
prevention and provision .   Housing advice services, Citizens’ Advice Bureaux, debt 
management and resettlement projects, mediation services, hostels, drug and alcohol 
projects and  mental  health  projects are  amongst the  voluntary sector  organisations 
contributing to the multi-agency network.  For single homeless people in particular, the 
voluntary sector  has  traditionally  provided  a  safety net,  since  this  group has  until 
recently been denied statutory housing assistance under homeless definitions and face 
difficulties accessing mainstream statutory services .
Accommodation for homeless people is dispersed between a range of providers, 
from across the public, private and Registered Social Landlord (RSL) sector. This is a 
consequence of wider changes to social housing in the UK context.  Like many other 
public service areas in the UK, the housing sector has been affected by New Public 
Management reforms as discussed in chapter two.  In particular, the residualisation of 
social housing resulting from the ‘Right to Buy’ policy and the Large Scale Voluntary 
Stock Transfers (LSVT) programme have increased the reliance of the state on housing 
associations and private landlords .  In England by 2007 approximately 49% of local 
authorities had transferred some or all of their council housing stock and associated 
management functions to an LSVT organisation28. Private sector management has also 
been introduced through the use of Arms Length Management Organisations (ALMOs) 
to  manage  remaining  council  housing  stock  in  a  large  number  of  English  local 
authorities .  The Communities Plan 2003 for England provided strong incentives for the 
continued process of reform, with additional money made available for local authorities 
linked to  housing  stock  transfer,  the  development of  ALMOs  and Private Finance 
Initiatives . 
28 DCLG ‘Completed LSVTs’ - Excel Spreadsheet listing all Large Scale Voluntary Transfers completed 
by local authorities in England. Updated 3 April 2007. 
http://www.communities.gov.uk/index.asp?id=1152563 Website accessed 23/04/07. 
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Consequently  while  housing  authorities  are  responsible  for  providing 
accommodation  for  statutorily  homeless households,  they are dependent on  various 
providers in order to discharge this responsibility.  The latest figures29 indicate that the 
private sector is an important partner of local authorities in dealing with homelessness, 
providing accommodation for over half (58%) of statutory homeless households. The 
remaining households  are  placed in  local  authority  or  housing  association property 
(28%), hostels and women’s refuges (9%) or bed and breakfast hotels (5%).  These 
statistics reveal a significant rise in the role of the private sector over recent years (up 
from 31% in 1995) and a declining role for social housing overall (down from 38%). 
The growing dependence on the private sector makes it increasingly important for local 
authorities to  attain cooperation from private sector landlords.  The LSVT Housing 
Associations  appear to be important actors in  the provision of housing to homeless 
people, with figures for 2003-2004 indicating that they let on average 25% of their stock 
to  homeless people (statutory and non-statutory), compared to  18% for  non-LSVT 
Housing Associations.
The main agencies involved in meeting the needs of single homeless adults, 
therefore,  fall  into  three  categories:  statutory  services,  accommodation  providers 
(consisting of public, private and quasi-public housing agencies) and voluntary sector 
support/ advice services (see figure 4.1).  Within any given area it is not untypical for 50 
or 60 organisations to have some degree of involvement in homelessness, partly due to 
the large number of Housing Associations in each locality.  This number is higher in 
some areas, particularly large cities.  One study of homelessness services in London 
found that there were almost 200 agencies with some involvement in the welfare of 
homeless people (Pleace 1995).
Fig 4.1 The homelessness service delivery network
29 Table 623 ‘Statutory Homelessness: households in temporary accommodation by type of 
accommodation’, ODPM. Last quarter for 2006. CLG Quarterly P1E Returns. 
http://www.communities.gov.uk/pub/308/Table623_id1156308.xls Website accessed 10/05/07.
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4.1.3 Funding, governance and accountability arrangements
A brief outline of the funding, governance and accountability arrangements in the sector 
is warranted since these features of the institutional setting structure the way in which 
central government executes its meta-policy of collaboration.  For instance, the level of 
funding and the way it is distributed has implications for the nature of relationships 
between central government and the consequent ability of government to influence local 
agencies.  Similarly, the governance structure and lines of accountability are potential 
influences on the choice of vertical policy tools used by governments to implement its 
collaborative policy. 
The  funding  arrangements  involve  the  allocation  of  government  money 
principally to local authorities, voluntary sector bodies and housing associations. Central 
government provides funding to  English local authorities in  the  form of  an annual 
homelessness grant, worth £74m in 2007-2008.  The grant  is  split  between the 354 
English local authorities proportionately to reflect authority size and the level and nature 
of homelessness in different areas.  The allocation of national funding for homelessness 
is determined in the Treasury’s three-yearly Spending Review. In return local authorities 
have a range of statutory homelessness  duties to perform and are expected to  meet 
government homelessness  targets  (see below).  The homelessness grant is  allocated 
partly on a formulaic basis related to historical levels of homelessness, and partly on a 
performance basis  (ODPM 2005b).  Local housing authorities  themselves have the 
freedom to spend their grant as appropriate in the local area, and this typically involves 
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contracting external agencies in the local homelessness network to provide services such 
as advice, resettlement, mediation, or rent deposit schemes. 
Government funds an additional £15m per annum30 to the voluntary sector for 
homelessness to support national charities such as Shelter, the National Association of 
Citizens Advice Bureaux and Women’s Aid.  Charities such as these carry out national 
campaigning  and  advocacy work,  and  also  have  a  core  service provision  function 
through their networks of local services.  Bespoke funds have also been established to 
support  homelessness  services,  including  an  innovation  fund  to  encourage service 
development in particular government priority areas, and additional funds specifically 
aimed at developing services for ethnic minority groups.  A hostels capital improvement 
programme for England worth £90m was launched in 2005, aiming to improve and 
upgrade existing homeless hostels.  Such funds are distributed largely on a competitive 
basis, inviting bids from local services.   
Housing-related  support  work  is  funded  through  the  Cross-Whitehall 
‘Supporting People’ programme, with a £1.72 billion budget for 2006-07.  The scheme 
brings together finance for supported housing under a single funding stream.  Each 
authority is allocated a sum of money annually according to local need, and decisions 
about the allocation of funding are taken locally.  This programme tackles a wide range 
of housing need, of which homelessness is one part31.  The Audit Commission (1995, p. 
2)  states  that  the  aim of  the  programme  is  ‘to  prevent  problems that  can  lead to 
hospitalisation, institutional care or homelessness’, and to ‘protect tenancies and assist 
the transition to independent living for those leaving an institutionalised environment’. 
Approximately 20% of the fund is earmarked for homelessness related work32 and the 
homeless groups covered include families, rough sleepers and single homeless people 
with support needs.  Importantly, this funding is restricted to housing–related support 
services  rather  than  social  care  services  or  accommodation.  In  the  context  of 
homelessness this involves funding for hostels as a step towards independent living, 
immediate  refuge for homeless people or  those at  risk  of  homelessness because  of 
domestic  violence,  ‘floating  support’,  and  other  support  elements  of  specialist 
accommodation for groups at risk of homelessness.  The Supporting People fund is the 
principal source of homelessness funding for the voluntary sector in England, and the 
largest source of domestic government revenue funding for the voluntary sector as a 
whole.  
30 This figure reflects the 2007 level (Source: Department for Communities & Local Government, 
Interviewee ID37).
31 Additional groups covered by this fund include older people, people with learning, physical or sensory 
disabilities, HIV/AIDS, or drug and alcohol problems, refugees, ex-prisoners and women at risk of 
domestic violence.
32 £350m for 2004-05 from a total budget of £1.8b (NAO, 2005) 
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The  accountability  framework  for  homelessness  includes  Best  Value 
Performance Indicators (BVPIs) related to national homelessness targets.  Local housing 
authorities  are  required to  monitor and  demonstrate improvement on  homelessness 
performance indicators33.  Statutory homelessness services are inspected by the Audit 
Commission’s  Housing  inspectorate through its  housing  authority  inspections,  with 
several ‘Key Lines of Enquiry’ directly related to homelessness.  These assessments are 
combined with Best Value Performance Indicators and combined to provide an overall 
ranking for  housing  authorities  within  the  Comprehensive Performance Assessment 
system.  Housing Associations are also subject to a regime of performance targets and 
inspections  (elements relating to  homelessness  are  discussed  in  chapter six).   The 
introduction of such measures in homelessness can be seen as part of a more general 
trend over the past 25 years towards greater central control over local government in 
relation  to  the  housing  sector  as  a  whole,  which has  experienced a  tightening  of 
regulation, inspection and performance monitoring (Malpass and Murie 1999).
The governance structure of the English homelessness  sector,  at  the time of 
writing, is illustrated in fig 4.2.  As can be seen, as much as services are delivered in a 
multi-agency setting, the governance structure is also multi-level.  The Department for 
Communities and Local Government (DCLG) sits at the head and is the government 
department  responsible  for  homelessness  and  housing  policy  more  generally. 
Government Offices in the Regions (GORs) and Regional Housing Boards sit below. 
These Housing Boards, chaired by the Government Offices, provide strategic direction 
for housing policy in the English regions and are required to produce regional housing 
strategies. The Boards themselves are comprised of representatives of the GOR, English 
Partnerships, the Regional Development Agency, the Housing Corporation and other 
relevant regional bodies.  However, Government Offices and Regional Housing Boards 
appear to have had only marginal involvement of homelessness to date.  The National 
Audit Office (NAO 2005), for instance, found little evidence of partnership working 
between the regional tier and local authorities in relation to homelessness and noted that 
only some regional housing strategies specifically addressed homelessnes .
Local  Housing  Authorities  (LHAs)  and  Supporting  People  ‘Administering 
Authorities’ fall  under the  domain of  the  DCLG, although they sit  under  different 
Directorates, respectively the Homelessness and Housing Support Directorate and the 
Supporting People Directorate.  Local Housing Authorities have the role of strategic lead 
for commissioning homelessness services from voluntary and private sector providers 
33 Performance indicators include levels of rough sleeping, length of time spent in temporary 
accommodation, prevention of homelessness, levels of repeat homelessness and the number of domestic 
violence refuge places provided in local authorities.
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and  are  also  themselves  service  providers,  responsible  for  delivering  national 
homelessness policy in local areas.  Supporting People Administering Authorities, which 
reside at county level in two-tier authorities and district level in unitary authorities, also 
commission services.   Each Supporting  People Administering  Authority  has a  joint 
commissioning  body which must,  by  law,  include a  representative  from the  Local 
Authority (in practice usually social services and the housing authority), the Probation 
Service and the Primary Care Trust 34.  This body contracts out housing related support 
work mainly to housing associations and voluntary sector organisations, although the 
grant is  ‘tenure neutral’ meaning  that  support can be provided within  any  form of 
accommodation including the private sector.
Other  public  sector  statutory  agencies  with  a  more  peripheral  role  in 
homelessness,  such as health and social services and probation,  sit  under their  own 
parent government departments, in this case the Department of Health (DH) and the 
Ministry for Justice (MoJ) respectively35.   Registered Social Landlords (RSLs)36 are 
regulated and funded by the Housing Corporation.  The Housing Corporation is also 
responsible for overseeing the overall governance, financial viability and performance 
management of RSLs. The Audit Commission regulates both the Housing Corporation 
and LHAs.  It also works in partnership with the Housing Corporation to assist with 
Housing Association inspections.  The governance structure of local voluntary sector 
organisations  varies.  Those  with  charitable  status  are  regulated  by  the  Charities 
Commission, and many have regional or national offices directing their local operations. 
However, they also have strong accountability links towards their funding agencies such 
as the Supporting People Directorate.  A range of other representative bodies and interest 
groups, including  professional  housing  bodies,  private landlord bodies  and national 
‘umbrella’ homelessness charities are also represented in the sector (the role of these 
bodies in encouraging collaboration is discussed in chapter six).  
Fig 4.2 Governance structure of the English homelessness sector
 National tier
34 As discussed further in chapter six, Supporting People joint commissioning bodies can be viewed as a 
form of meta-governance for encouraging collaboration.
35 The role of various government departments is discussed further in chapter six
36 Housing Associations are one form of Registered Social Landlord
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The  diagram  above  illustrates  the  complexity  of  accountability  and  governance 
arrangements in the homeless sector.  Each body within the service delivery network is 
accountable to a different higher level body, and many agencies have multiple lines of 
accountability, sometimes from a range of tiers.  The effects of these multiple lines of 
accountability on inter-agency collaboration are considered in the empirical chapters 
which follow.             
4.1.4 Policy and legislative context
Although homelessness has not enjoyed much political priority historically , the issue 
has  risen up  the  political  agenda in  recent decades.  The introduction of  the  1977 
Housing (Homeless Persons) Act, consolidated into the 1985 Housing Act Part V and 
amended under the  Housing  Act  1996, places responsibility  on  local  authorities  to 
provide housing for those deemed to be ‘statutorily’ homeless.  Statutory duties for 
certain categories of homeless people were introduced for social services departments 
through the Children Act 1989 and the NHS and Community Care Act 1990.  Prior to 
this central government had played only a minor role in responding to homelessness, 
with local government, charities and various types of housing providers the major forces 
for intervention.  
The issue of rough sleeping has also received greater attention in recent years. In 
1990 the visibility of rough sleeping in many of the United Kingdom’s major cities, 
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particularly London, provoked the then government to  invest  in  a ‘Rough Sleeper’s 
Initiative’ .  This was a three year block grant, renewed several times, which provided 
fixed funding to homelessness agencies with the aim of reducing rough sleeping, in the 
end worth around £200m in total .
Homelessness has arguably been afforded still greater priority under New Labour 
with the creation of the 2002 Homelessness Act which extended statutory provision to a 
larger  group  of  people  affected by  homeless,  and introduced a  more strategic and 
preventive  approach  with  a  strong  focus  on  collaborative  multi-agency  working 
(discussed further in chapter six).  In addition to the updating of legislation in 2002, the 
introduction of national targets and performance monitoring of homelessness, and the 
recent creation of National Homelessness Strategies in all parts of the United Kingdom, 
provide evidence of the increasing political salience of homelessness as a policy issue.  
As  discussed  above,  local  housing  authorities  are  the  principal  bodies  with 
statutory  homeless  responsibilities  which  operate  at  local  level.   Under  current 
legislation37 English local authorities have a ‘main duty’ to provide accommodation to 
those with a local connection who are in ‘priority need’38 and are homeless through no 
fault of their own, or in other words, are ‘unintentionally homeless’. While a person’s 
case is being assessed, there is a duty to provide interim accommodation, and the local 
authority may provide this from its own stock or use an alternative provider.  Once a 
homeless application has been accepted, accommodation should be provided until the 
client has found suitable settled accommodation or until the homelessness duty ends. 
Authorities  have  a  ‘general  duty’  to  provide  advice  and  assistance  on 
homelessness and its prevention, free of charge, to anyone within their district.  This 
advice can be provided by the housing authority or another agency on its behalf.  Advice 
is  typically  provided on housing options and the factors which cause homelessness 
including financial matters, tenancy issues and family breakdown.  Authorities are also 
expected to provide information on specialist support services such as counselling, debt 
management and drug and alcohol services where needed.  Part of the general duty is to 
undertake a housing needs assessment and, on this basis, to make information available 
about where to  find appropriate accommodation and support.   Lastly,  local housing 
authorities have strategic functions in relation to homelessness.  In particular, under the 
37 The Housing Act 1996 and Homelessness Act 2002
38 The definition of ‘priority need’ as updated in the 2002 Act includes families with children, or 
households that include someone who is vulnerable because of factors such as ill-health (physical or 
mental), pregnancy or old age, those who are fleeing domestic violence, people who are vulnerable due to 
having left prison, the care system or the armed forces, and young people aged 16 and 17 (ODPM/ DH, 
2002). Rough sleeping does not in itself qualify a person for statutory assistance.
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Homelessness Act 2002 housing authorities are required to review homelessness in their 
area and publish a five yearly homelessness strategy39.  
4.1.5 The nature of the task environment
As discussed in chapter two, many of the more rationalistic contributions to the literature 
on coordination mechanism choice take a contingency theory view. Such contributions 
suggest  that  choice of  mechanisms are,  or  should  be,  related to  the  nature  of  the 
organisational or policy environment and tasks involved.  It  is therefore pertinent to 
sketch briefly the nature of the task environment in homelessness services before making 
some brief hypotheses on the nature of collaborative mechanisms one might expect in 
this policy sector.
The  nature of  work  carried  out  by  homelessness agencies  is  fairly  diverse 
because  of  the  range  of  agencies  involved  and  the  different  manifestations  of 
homelessness they deal with.  However, two principal aspects of frontline homelessness 
work can be discerned, namely ‘people changing’ and ‘people processing’ tasks, tasks 
which are common in the area of human services .  ‘People changing’ tasks involve the 
empowerment of individuals and facilitation of behavioural change.  Agencies such as 
drugs rehabilitation services, resettlement services, criminal justice agencies and social 
work services are particularly associated with this role.  Such work is highly technical 
and professionalised, and requires individualised solutions, implying a significant level 
of discretion among frontline staff,  and making it  difficult  to specify in advance the 
exact tasks involved.  In this respect the task environment can be described as uncertain.
The other main element of frontline work is  a  ‘people processing’ function, 
which involves referring clients onto other services and allocating resources such as 
housing or  welfare  benefit entitlements.  Typically this  involves placing clients  on 
accommodation registers or waiting lists, negotiating accommodation, assisting with the 
completion of application forms or signposting clients to relevant services.  Such work is 
more routinised than ‘people changing’ work, often involving the use of standardised 
assessment forms or the application of eligibility criteria.  Nevertheless a  degree of 
discretion and tailoring to individual circumstances is required on the part of staff.  In 
order to make assessments about eligibility or need, workers have to gather service user 
testimony, exercise their own judgment and make subsequent referrals to other agencies, 
something which often involves performing an advocacy role on behalf of the client.  
39 This is a multi-agency strategy and another form of meta-governance (see chapter six) 
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Many agencies involved in homelessness perform a dual people processing and 
people changing role. For instance, most registered social landlords providing specialist 
accommodation  to  homeless  people  also  perform a  housing  support  role.   Where 
‘mainstream’ accommodation is offered, key workers are often attached in the form of 
floating support.  Housing authorities and voluntary sector providers frequently provide 
a range of services including both advisory/ referral services and resettlement services. 
Similarly, mental health services are at once providers of treatment and referral agencies. 
A further characteristic of the homelessness sector, in line with other areas of 
human services, is  that there is  a  high degree of  professional  specialization (Nylen 
2007).   Specialization,  as  discussed  in  chapter  one,  describes  a  situation  where 
organisations  perform  single  rather  than  multiple  objectives.  While  homelessness 
agencies do perform a range of tasks, as noted above, the professional skills involved in 
the network as a whole are divided between these agencies.  
In addition, the agencies comprising the homelessness network are relatively 
interdependent.  Since homelessness is a multidimensional problem, it requires multi-
professional input. This is particularly true for the client group under investigation, the 
‘single’ homeless, since people falling into this category include both rough sleepers 
who typically have multiple problems and ‘statutorily’ single homeless people who are 
defined as such because of their additional vulnerabilities such as ill-health (physical or 
mental), old age, or problems arising from leaving an institutionalised environment.  Yet 
since the system for dealing with single homeless people is  specialised, this  creates 
interdependence between  agencies.  Devising  solutions  for  individual  clients  with 
multiple needs involves agencies drawing on the knowledge and professional expertise 
of other agencies.  
Interdependence  also  stems  from  the  highly  fragmented  nature  of  the 
homelessness  service  system,  partly  due  to  reforms  associated  with  New  Public 
Management.  As discussed above, the pool of social housing owned by local authorities 
is  severely restricted due to the LSVT and ‘Right  to  Buy’ processes.  The housing 
authority  is  therefore highly  dependent  on  other  accommodation  providers such as 
registered social landlords and the private sector to meet its ‘main duty’ to accommodate 
the homeless.  It is also reliant on the dispersed network of voluntary sector agencies 
which have long been part of the homelessness system, and on other specialist statutory 
agencies to meet the broader support  needs of homeless people and to discharge its 
advisory duties. By the same token, these agencies and providers are dependent  on 
housing authorities for contracts, making the relationship one of interdependence.  
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In short, homelessness agencies’ frontline work is characterised by a significant 
degree of uncertainty in the sense that many decisions, particularly at case level, cannot 
be specified in advance.  The network itself is both specialised and interdependent.  The 
multi-dimensional nature of homelessness indicates broad task scope. These features of 
the task environment would indicate that horizontal coordination tools such as group and 
personal  modes involving  ‘coordination  by  feedback’ may  be  relevant  (March and 
Simon 1958; Van De Ven et al. 1976; Alter and Hage 1993). 
4.2 Application of the theoretical framework to homelessness
Chapter three presented the theoretical framework for investigating the implementation 
of  collaboration.  Following the above introduction to  the empirical context  of  the 
research, it is now possible to make some brief comments on how the framework relates 
specifically to the case of homelessness and to present preliminary predictions on the 
likely persuasiveness of the rival theoretical positions.  
4.2.1 Collaboration in homelessness as rational administration?
The first aspect of the theoretical framework concerns the decision-making process, 
which can  be  construed  either  as  rational-administrative  or  as  bureau-political.  As 
discussed in chapter three, from a rational-administrative perspective one might expect 
agencies to collaborate because they view this as the most effective means for tackling 
homelessness.  There are fairly strong arguments to support the view that inter-agency 
collaboration may constitute an effective and appropriate response to this issue.  As 
discussed in  this  chapter,  the  causes and consequences of  homelessness are  multi-
factorial and diverse, and no single agency is equipped to deal with this multitude of 
problems.  
In order to direct clients to appropriate services, agencies are likely to need to 
share information and make referrals, two forms of collaboration.  Furthermore, in order 
to make appropriate referrals to other agencies, workers need sufficient understanding 
and awareness of the different issues affecting clients.  For instance, it may be important 
for housing staff to be able to recognise the symptoms of mental health conditions, or for 
drugs workers to have an understanding of the benefits system.  Collaboration in the 
form of multi-agency training may be appropriate in this respect.  Additionally, in order 
to refer clients to appropriate services, knowledge is required of other agencies’ referral 
criteria and procedures, opening hours, location and services offered. This suggests a 
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need for information sharing to ensure that agencies possess the relevant information 
about the work of other agencies.  Clients with multiple needs may require intensive 
packages of support from several agencies simultaneously, and in these circumstances it 
is likely to be appropriate for agencies to share client level information, either informally 
through discussions between individual fieldworkers or more formally through joint care 
planning, a strong form of collaboration.
Moreover, because of the fragmented system of provision, agencies may need to 
collaborate in order to minimise externalities such as gaps, duplication and other forms 
of incoherence.  This argument has been articulated with respect to other parts of the 
housing sector. Reid , for example, argues that effective delivery of social housing is 
dependent on  the  development and  maintenance of  cooperative inter-organisational 
relationships.   This  can help prevent clients  in  fragmented service delivery systems 
‘falling through the cracks’ .  From a service user’s perspective, ensuring services are 
well-integrated can help the system appear seamless (Leutz 1999).
As discussed in chapter three, the rational-administrative view would see actors 
as selecting horizontal collaboration mechanisms according to their ability efficiently 
and effectively to deliver their clearly articulated collaborative aims.  This is likely to 
involve  consideration  of  the  nature  of  the  task  environment.  From  a  rational-
administrative perspective, we might expect actors in the homelessness network to adopt 
tools such as those listed in section 4.1.5 above.  Existing theory and research indicates 
that these types of tools – group and personal modes in particular – are likely to fit 
environments exhibiting the characteristics of the homelessness network.  
4.2.2 Collaboration in homelessness as bureaucratic politics?
The bureaucratic politics perspective, by contrast, emphasises the conflictual nature of 
inter-agency relationships.   Rather than  decisions  being  the  outcome of  a  rational 
process, they are the result of a bargaining game of pulling and hauling between various 
interests. In this view there may be no united view of the need for collaboration, either 
centrally or locally.  A number of features of the above account of the homelessness 
sector indicate that the bureaucratic politics perspective may be relevant.
As  discussed  in  section 4.1.2,  homelessness  is  a  core  part  of  the  work  of 
particular agencies but only a peripheral part of other agencies’ work.  This indicates that 
collaboration on homelessness may be prioritised more by some agencies than others, 
creating a possible source of tension.  In addition, the complex governance structure of 
homelessness suggests that there are likely to be a variety of views on homelessness 
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represented nationally rather than a unified view.  The multiple lines of accountability in 
the sector as presented in figure 4.2 indicate that each local agency has a different super-
ordinate body to answer to. In addition, some agencies have more than one body to 
whom they must be answer and consequently may have competing agendas to satisfy.   
Although  the  bureaucratic politics  of  homelessness  services  is  a  relatively 
unexplored issue, related research on collaboration between public sector providers in 
human services areas such as health, social care and housing provides some insights into 
the  tensions  surrounding  collaboration  between  organisations  with  a  role  in 
homelessness.  A number of studies have reported problems stemming from differences 
in professional perspectives, philosophies or world views between community care and 
health agencies .  Similar tensions have been found between the differing perspectives of 
voluntary  and  statutory  agencies,  with  voluntary  sector  agencies  concerned  with 
grassroots empowerment and individual rights, and local authorities more focused on the 
fulfilment  of  statutory  obligations  .  Studies  of  the  relationship  between  housing 
authorities and health and social services agencies  have also identified difficulties in 
inter-agency relations stemming from a lack of appreciation and understanding on the 
part of social services departments and health authorities about the nature of changes in 
the governance and structure of the housing sector.  Since homelessness services involve 
many of  the agencies investigated within  these studies, it  seems plausible that  this 
particular ‘sector’ or network may suffer from similar tensions.
4.2.3 Collaboration in homelessness as top-down?
The  second  aspect  of  the  theoretical  framework  looked  at  the  level  at  which 
collaborative decision-making occurs, suggesting that this may occur either at central 
government level or at the level of local multi-agency networks.  Since a key question of 
the research is the extent to which government can mandate or impose collaboration, the 
level at which collaborative decision-making occurs has implications for the appropriate 
type of meta-governance strategy for encouraging collaboration.
As  discussed  in  chapter  three,  top-down  views  suggest  it  is  possible  for 
governments and higher tiers of bureaucracy to gain control over implementing actors 
and lower bureaucratic tiers by pursuing a hierarchical implementation strategy.  Such 
strategies  strive towards ‘ideal-typical’ conditions  for perfect  implementation.  These 
include a  single line of authority,  few links in  the policy chain, uniform objectives 
amongst implementing agencies, clear mandates and strong control over implementing 
actors.  
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As noted above, there is a clear line of authority between the Department for 
Communities and Local Government (CLG) and local housing authorities (LHAs), the 
principal national and local government actors responsible for homelessness. There is 
also  a  performance assessment and regulatory  regime in  place which  provides  the 
infrastructure for controlling local agencies.  However, extending beyond the principal 
CLG-LHA relationship  is  a  set  of  additional  relationships  which  create a  layer  of 
institutional  complexity  that  are  likely  to  impact  on  the  principal  relationship. 
Moreover, encouraging collaboration in homelessness requires government to influence 
a range of bodies beyond the LHA, casting doubt on the idea of a single line of authority. 
More accurately, there are multiple lines of authority involved. 
In terms of the number of links, figure 4.2 reveals that there are several ‘links’ in 
the policy chain, both horizontally and vertically.  Due to the importance of multiple 
bodies, particularly on a local horizontal level, it seems that reducing the number of links 
in the policy chain as a means of enhancing implementation success is unlikely to be a 
viable option.  The idea of clear mandates and uniform objectives also seems suspect in 
the homelessness network. As already noted, the multiple lines of accountability and 
number of bodies involved indicates that objectives may be diverse rather than unified, 
and this may militate against the notion of clear mandates.
In chapter three it was suggested that top-down perspectives seem difficult to 
apply  in  the  context  of  service  delivery networks  generally.  On  the  basis  of  the 
contextual information on the homelessness sector presented above, it would seem that 
this prediction is also likely to apply to the homelessness service delivery network.
4.2.4 Collaboration in homelessness as bottom-up?
The  bottom-up  perspective  on  implementation  suggests  that  policy  is  significantly 
shaped or even made within the ‘street level bureaucracy’.  Many bottom-up analysts 
argue that policy decisions should be made at this level, arguing that complex decisions 
require problem solving capacities at the point where the problem is most immediate. 
Such analysts  suggest  that  top-down approaches are likely to  promote standardised 
responses which undermine the specialised problem solving capacities which exist at the 
local level.  Bottom-up perspectives are also sympathetic to the view that organisations 
which are dominated by professions are significantly self-governing, heavily influenced 
by professional norms and ethical codes, and less influenced by national  regulatory 
institutions.  
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These bottom-up conceptions of the implementation process seem relevant to the 
context  of  homelessness.  As  this  chapter  has  illustrated,  many  decisions  around 
homelessness,  particularly case level  decisions,  cannot be specified in  advance and 
require  face-to-face  or  inter-personal  problem  solving.   Moreover,  both  people 
processing and people changing functions of homelessness services require the exercise 
of  street  level  discretion.  People changing  tasks  in  particular  do  not  easily  lend 
themselves to the routine application of rules specified in law or by other governmental 
edicts.  The highly professionalised and specialised nature of the agencies involved with 
homelessness also implies that local agencies, compared to central agencies, may have 
asymmetrical access to information on the solutions to homelessness based on their 
training and professional skills,  raising questions about the capacity of  the state to 
prescribe solutions on local services.  
It was suggested in chapter three that collaboration is an inherently bottom-up 
process, with its  basis  in informal interactions,  trust  and relationships which cannot 
easily  be  specified in  advance or  mandated from the  top-down.   The  contextual 
information in  this  chapter highlights  the  relevance of  bottom-up processes within 
homelessness decision-making generally, and since tackling homelessness is a multi-
agency  endeavour,  it  also  seems  reasonable  to  suggest  that  decisions  around 
collaborating are also likely to be made at this level.
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4.3 Research methods
4.3.1 Overview of research methods and procedure
In order to address the research questions in the context of the theoretical framework 
presented, a mixed-method design was regarded as most appropriate40.  This approach, 
sometimes labelled under the alternative headings of synthesis, integration or multi-
method research,  is  used by  researchers who wish either to  confirm findings  using 
different  methods  or to  use  a  range  of  methods  in  order  to  provide  a  more 
comprehensive picture of the research problem.  Mixed methods approaches are used in 
recognition  that  all  methods have limitations and that  different  methods may yield 
different  results  in  response  to  the  same  question.   Moreover,  these  approaches 
acknowledge that different methods may be suitable for exploring different aspects of a 
research problem. The mixed-method approach is growing in recognition in a range of 
disciplines and has been the subject of a number of recent publications . 
The research procedure began with a  pilot  phase involving analysis  of local 
authority documentation and central policy documents, statutes and guidance in order to 
become familiar with the context and research issue.  Pilot interviews with local agency 
staff  and  observation  of  multi-agency  meetings  provided  further  background 
information. These sources collectively aided the design of the main data collection 
instruments.  
The main data collection phase had  two main components, and  employed a 
‘sequential’ research design  (Brannen 2005;  Cresswell  2003),  with  one  component 
following on from the other.   First,  a fixed response postal survey of English local 
housing authorities was conducted41 in order to assess general patterns in the level and 
nature of local collaboration in relation to homelessness. The data collected via this 
method were quantitative in nature, using likert scales and checklists.  Secondly, semi-
structured interviews with staff from local authorities and other homelessness service 
providers were employed42 to provide rich detail or ‘thick descriptions’ (Cresswell ibid) 
on street level actors’ motivations for collaborating, the challenges of doing so, and 
further information on the nature of collaboration, building on the quantitative data 
collected in the survey component. Interviewees’ views on the perceived effectiveness of 
vertical and horizontal coordination tools were also investigated.  The interview phase 
40 Ethical approval for the research was obtained from the relevant University of Exeter Ethics Committee 
(School of Historical, Political and Sociological Studies). School Ethics Committee approval ref no. 
8.02.05/5.iv.
41 The survey was conducted in the Summer-Autumn of 2006
42 Interviews were carried out in Spring-Summer of 2007
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also included a smaller number of interviews with civil servants in relevant government 
departments. The aim of the latter interviews was to gather background information on 
joint  working  between government departments and between these departments and 
other national bodies, as well as on meta-governance issues relating to steering local 
network actors.  
The methods used in the main data collection phase were complementary43, in 
that each method provided information on different elements of the research topic .  No 
single  method  would  have been sufficient  to  address the  research questions.   For 
instance, a survey was considered most appropriate for charting the general pattern and 
level of collaboration in local authorities.  On the other hand, views on the dynamics of 
collaboration would not easily have been captured in a fixed response survey.  While the 
main reason for employing mixed methods was to explore different dimensions of the 
research  puzzle  (through  a  complementary approach),  the  sequencing of  the  data 
collection process allowed for some elaboration and further exploration - at the interview 
phase - of findings yielded by the survey.  
The first,  largely quantitative phase of the research was used to address the 
descriptive questions  of  the research (the ‘what’ of collaboration) while  the second 
qualitative  phase  predominantly  addressed the  explanatory  questions  (the  ‘why’ of 
collaboration)44.  Neither method is seen as being dominant over the other. The following 
shorthand  usually  denotes  this  design:  QUAN >  QUAL45.   This  is  a  recognised 
sequential  method, known  as  ‘sequential  explanatory design’ (Creswell 2003),  and 
involves testing theories or concepts using a quantitative method followed up with a 
qualitative method in which detailed exploration is  undertaken with a  few cases or 
individuals. The term explanatory indicates that the second qualitative phase is used to 
explain and interpret the results of the first quantitative phase.  This contrasts with the 
sequential exploratory strategy whereby quantitative data and results are used to assist in 
the interpretation of qualitative findings. While the explanatory model is more useful for 
explaining and interpreting relationships, the exploratory model is more appropriate for 
studies where the main aim is to explore a particular phenomenon, for example to test 
elements in an emergent theory resulting from the qualitative phase.  Therefore, the 
43 This is in contrast mixed methods approaches whose main aim is to triangulate in order to corroborate 
findings using different methods or sources to examine the same phenomenon as a means of enhancing 
validity.
44 In each Local Authority interview the completed survey for the relevant authority was brought along to 
the interview as an aide memoire for interviewees, and was used where needed to highlight the 
coordination mechanisms in place, with interviewees asked to elaborate their perceptions of the 
effectiveness, strengths and weaknesses of these tools. The completed surveys were therefore used, where 
appropriate, in conjunction with the interview topic guides. 
45 Note that both words are capitalised to indicate that neither part of the data collection was seen as more 
dominant than the other. QUAN > qual would indicate primacy of the former method over the latter. 
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research  design  combined  dimensions  of  both  ‘complementary’  and  ‘sequential 
explanatory’ mixed methods approaches. The data collection procedure is illustrated in 
figure 4.3 below, with methods used at each stage added underneath.  
Fig 4.3 Sequential explanatory-complementary design46
Pilot phase Main Phase
Phase 1 (Description) Phase 2 (Explanation)        Phase 3
(‘What’ questions) (‘Why/ How’ Questions)
QUAL QUAN QUAN QUAL QUAL
        Interpretation
Data Data Data Data Data         of Entire
Collection Collection Analysis Collection Analysis      Analysis
Documents, Postal Interviews
Observation Survey (including opportunity for interviewees to 
of meetings, elaborate on/ explain survey results for
Pilot interviews their area)
4.3.2 Phase One: Postal Survey
Sampling and survey administration
As noted above, the survey was conducted amongst local housing authorities.  As the 
local agency with overall statutory responsibility for homelessness and the strategic lead 
for  forging  inter-agency  links,  this  was  the  most  relevant  unit  of  analysis. 
Questionnaires, along with a covering letter and information sheet, were sent to the lead 
manager or senior officer responsible for homelessness in each authority47.  Where it was 
not possible to identify this person from public directories and websites, they were sent 
to the Director of Housing with instructions to pass them on to the appropriate person. 
Lead homelessness managers or the equivalent senior officers were targeted because 
they are likely to straddle both operational and strategic domains, and have knowledge 
of joint working practices and inter-agency contact at both these levels, which was one 
of the key issues being explored within the survey48.  
In order to ensure a sufficient number of responses for the analysis, a census 
sample  approach  was  used,  with  questionnaires  posted  to  all  354  English  local 
authorities.  The census sample approach means that every member of the ‘population’ 
46 Diagram adapted from Creswell (2003, p. 213)
47 See Appendices A-D for the questionnaire, the two covering letters and the information sheet
48 See Appendix E for a break-down of questionnaire respondent information, including job titles, 
managerial position, unit or section of the housing authority 
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of interest (i.e. English local authorities) has an equal chance of being involved in the 
study,  thereby reducing the  chance of  sampling error.   Sixteen randomly selected 
authorities which were included in the pilot phase were excluded from the main census 
sample, which therefore comprised 338 authorities.  Piloting the questionnaire allowed 
the researcher to identify any questions which were subject to misinterpretation, and 
several  individuals  provided  in-depth  feedback  on  improvements  for  individual 
questions.    
The first mail-out achieved a 41% (n=139) response rate, and a subsequent mail-
out to non-responding authorities six weeks later increased the overall response rate to 
57% (n=193).  Aside from a second mail-out, additional steps were taken to maximise 
response rate in line with standard postal survey procedures (De Vaus 2002) such as the 
inclusion of  an  official academic letterhead,  personalised salutations,  stamped, self-
addressed envelopes and confidentiality assurances.  Participants were also offered a 
summary of the research results as an incentive to participate.  
One problem arising with any survey is the issue of non-response bias, since it is 
always possible that respondents will be systematically different from non-respondents, 
resulting in a skewed sample.  Since a 100% response rate is highly unusual in any 
survey research it  is usually the case that respondents will  ultimately therefore only 
represent a sample of the total population.  
While it is impossible to discover whether non-respondents would have provided 
a different set of answers, key characteristics of respondents and non-respondents can be 
compared to determine how representative respondents are of the broader target sample, 
and responses weighted to  account  for any major differences.  Analysis of returned 
surveys revealed that responding authorities were broadly representative of the national 
population of local authorities on key dimensions such as authority structure, geography 
and region and therefore no weighting was necessary49.
Survey design and analysis
The  survey50 measured  organisational  collaboration  on  two  dimensions,  firstly, 
formalised  collaboration  through the  use  of  horizontal  coordination  tools  in  local 
authority areas, and secondly, informal collaboration defined as interactions between the 
housing authority and other local bodies in its local network in the course of day-to-day 
work. Two separate measures were developed to investigate  these  dimensions.  For 
formal  collaboration an ‘index’ of  horizontal  coordination tools  was employed. For 
49 See Appendix E for data table comparing characteristics of responding authorities with wider 
population of English local authorities
50 See Appendix D for a copy of the survey
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informal collaboration a Likert scale was used to gauge the level of contact or interaction 
between the housing authority and other agencies from a standard list of agencies.  The 
Likert scale was used twice, once relating to case level contact and once relating to 
service planning level contact.  The measures and data analysis methods are discussed in 
more detail in chapter 7 in conjunction with the survey results.  A third measure was 
used to assess collaboration at the  individual respondent level.  This measure simply 
involved asking respondents to estimate the proportion of their work time spent over the 
last year in contact with other external bodies in relation to single homelessness. 
The  measures  were  modelled  on  existing  research  which  has  sought  to 
quantitatively assess inter-organisational coordination.  For instance, previous studies of 
organisational  coordination  have assessed use  of  formal coordination  mechanisms in 
fields such as economic development and mental health (Jennings 1994; Macmanus 1986; 
Van De Ven et  al. 1976; Alter and Hage 1993).  The general approach involving the 
measurement of contact has been used in previous studies of human services as a method 
for of measuring collaboration or network integration .
A number of additional questions were included to elicit relevant institutional 
and individual respondent information suggested in previous research to be associated 
with collaboration, as discussed in chapter one.  Institutional information included issues 
such as authority structure, number of homelessness personnel and the degree of external 
contracting of homelessness services.  Individual respondent data included length of 
time working the local area,  previous experience of  working in  other organisations 
within the homeless network and professional background.
The  survey data  overall  provided an  indicator of  the  degree  and  nature  of 
organisational  collaboration  in  English  local  authorities  on  formal  and  informal 
dimensions, as well as some indication of the level of the collaborative or networking 
behaviour at an individual level. While the survey provides only a snapshot in time, it 
nevertheless  serves as a  reliable  and valid  means of gauging the general pattern of 
collaboration in local authorities.  It also permits analysis of the potential impact of the 
different independent variables of interest in the study including central government 
steering, local institutional factors and individual level variables. 
The  questionnaire  was  designed  with  reference  to  existing  literature  on 
collaboration in the homelessness sector and the public sector more broadly, and drew on 
the information contained in local authorities’ homelessness strategies and other relevant 
documentation.  In order to develop the two measures described above, a random sample 
of 40 local authority homelessness strategies was selected and the content systematically 
analysed to generate a list of horizontal coordination mechanisms typically used in local 
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authorities, and a list of homelessness service providing agencies typically involved in 
local areas.   The rule of thumb employed was that when an ‘item’ (a coordination 
mechanism or agency) was mentioned in 10% (N=4) of cases or more, the item was 
included in the survey measures.  The lists generated were also cross-checked with other 
documents, including government guidance, Audit Commission reports and publications 
generated by  other  relevant national  bodies.   This  approach helped increase ‘face 
validity’,  by ensuring that  the items included in  the questionnaire were meaningful 
constructs.  As discussed by Bryman and Cramer , determining face validity, i.e. that a 
measures really measures what it purports to, is a minimum requirement for researchers 
seeking to develop new measures.  Survey data analysis was carried out with SPSS v 
11.5 using a combination of descriptive and bivariate statistical analysis techniques. 
Further details of particular tests performed and justifications for selecting these tests are 
provided in chapter seven.  
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4.3.3 Phase Two: Interviews
Sampling
As already noted, interviews were conducted with frontline staff in the homelessness 
network as well as with civil servants working in relevant government departments.  The 
inclusion of both these groups provided insights into the complexities of collaboration at 
both national and local level, and also enabled investigation of the relationship between 
these  two  levels.   This  approach  sets  the  study  apart  from  previous  studies  of 
collaboration in public services which have tended to focus on either one of these tiers in 
isolation.   Since the  aim was  to  examine the  process of  central  steering of  local 
collaboration, gathering evidence from both these levels was important.   
At the local level, representatives from each of the core service provider agencies 
in the homelessness implementation network were included. These included frontline 
staff  in  housing authorities  as  well  as  other relevant  statutory and voluntary sector 
agencies and accommodation providers.  While many studies in public administration 
tend to focus exclusively on the role of governmental bodies, the nature of the aims of 
the present study demanded inclusion of this broader range of perspectives.  To make a 
full assessment of the impact of national initiatives to stimulate collaboration, it was also 
important to obtain a mix of practitioner and managerial viewpoints. As discussed in 
previous chapters, both organisational levels make a contribution to collaboration.
A total of 43 interviewees were included in the qualitative part of the research51. 
The sample incorporated 38  frontline  practitioners or  managers, including 21  from 
statutory agencies, 10 from the voluntary sector and seven from the accommodation 
sector (see figure 4.4  for  a  full  breakdown  of  agencies included).   Out  of  the  38 
involved, 23 were in managerial roles and 15 in practitioner/ officer roles. The local 
interviewees were drawn from three local authorities from different regions of England, 
with similar numbers drawn from each authority (11 in LA1; 14 in LA2; 15 in LA3). At 
national level, five civil servants from relevant government departments were included, 
including  the  Department for  Communities  and  Local  Government (Housing  and 
Homelessness Directorate and Supporting People Directorate), and the Department of 
Health.  
Fig 4.4 Sampling frame for interviews
51 A list of job titles and ID numbers are provided in Appendix H. Some job titles are changed marginally 
(without altering the approximate meaning) in order to protect anonymity. 
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Local level
     Statutory Agencies (21)   Voluntary Sector Agencies (10) Accom. Providers (7)   
     Housing Authorities (7)    Day Centres (2) Hostels (2)
     Supporting People (3)    Housing Advice  projects (2) RSLs (5)
     Other LA  (1)    Night drop-in centre (1)
     Prisons (2)    Accommodation project (1)
     Probation Service (2)    Meaningful occupation (2)
     Police (2)    Other homeless projects (2)
     PCT (2)
     Health Outreach (2)
Central level 
      Communities & Local Government                  Department of Health
                          (4)                               (1)
Interviews with central civil servants can be classified as ‘elite’ or ‘expert’ interviews 
since participants have privileged access to the political institutions of interest.  Civil 
servants  are  generally  considered  an  important  source  of  knowledge  for  such 
information and are more easily accessible than other political elites .  Elite interviewing 
has a number of advantages .  For instance, elites can usually provide an overview of an 
organisation and its relationship with others, and often possess knowledge about the 
legal  and  financial  structures  of  an  organisation.   In  addition,  they  often  possess 
knowledge about organisational policy and have an understanding of an organisation’s 
history and future plans.  While the limited number of interviewees within this category 
of  interviewees must be borne in  mind when interpreting the findings,  this  can be 
defended in that the aim of the interviews, as with most qualitative research, was to 
explore a diversity of perspectives in order to generate insights into the phenomena of 
interest, rather than to make generalisations based on large numbers.  
Case selection
The three  local  authority areas were selected from among the  survey respondents. 
Because  of  the  need  to  include  a  wide  range  of  interviewees  involving  different 
organisations  within  each authority,  it  was not  possible  in  practice to  conduct  field 
interviews in a larger number of local authorities.  The sub sample of case study areas 
selected was a ‘purposeful’ one, in line with standard qualitative practice .  This involves 
selection of cases that are likely to be able to yield information of interest to the research 
question and central research phenomenon.  
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All areas selected had significant levels of single homelessness in their area, 
either at or above the national average52.  By holding this variable of the sub-sample 
‘constant’, it meant that any variation in joint working practices or levels could not be 
attributed to major differences in the nature of the homeless demographic . It was crucial 
to  choose  areas  where  single  homelessness  was  a  significant  issue  because  it  is 
unrealistic to expect developed collaborative arrangements for single homeless people in 
areas where there is no significant client group to serve.  Conversely it could be argued 
that in areas where there are low levels of single homelessness, the low number could be 
attributed to  the existence of successful  collaborative arrangements.  However,  while 
collaboration can contribute to better practice and the prevention of homelessness, the 
existence of this is not considered a strong enough variable to significantly affect the 
levels of single homelessness in an area, which are affected by a range of demographic, 
economic and geographical factors.   
The three authorities were selected on the basis of various independent variables 
that may have an influence on the level and nature of collaboration (see table 4.1 below). 
First, it was considered important to include at least one London authority, since there 
are a number of features which make London authorities of interest to the research topic. 
In particular, the nature of homelessness in London is such that a sub-regional approach 
to collaboration is particularly important. Because homeless people in London tend to be 
a  fairly  transient  group,  moving  frequently  across  Boroughs,  cooperation  between 
London authorities is important.  Much joint working in London therefore has either a 
sub-regional  or  pan-London basis,  for  instance in  the  development of  sub-regional 
homelessness strategies for North, West, East and South London, and a London-wide 
electronic database for  monitoring  homeless clients  as  they  move  across  borough 
boundaries.   In  addition,  London  is  the  area  with  the  highest  levels  of  single 
homelessness and rough sleeping in the country and consequently was a valid case to 
include. 
A limited  number  of  institutional  features  were  also  of  interest,  including 
authority structure (single versus two-tier), whether a local authority was an LSVTO, 
and  whether  it  had  contracted out  its  homelessness  service  to  an  external agency. 
Because the provision of social housing and the role of the homelessness or housing 
advice service are so intrinsic to the homelessness services provided by local authorities, 
it was considered plausible that the outsourcing of these could impinge on collaboration. 
52 Figures are based on local authority ‘P1E returns’ for 2005. The mean number of single homeless 
people in English local authorities was 103. As a proportion of all homeless people in local authorities 
this equates to 29%. 
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Finally,  it  was  considered relevant to  include  examples  of  authorities  with 
differing experiences of central government steering.  This is not an easy variable to 
measure, since central government policy  is  largely generic to  all  local  authorities. 
However, certain vertical coordination methods in this sector, as will be discussed in 
chapter  six,  are  experienced more  acutely  in  some authorities  than  in  others.   In 
particular, one form of funding supporting the development of multi-agency working, 
the ‘Innovation Fund’, is a competitive stream in which some authorities have received 
grants and not others.  Therefore the sub-sample included at least one authority which 
had been a  beneficiary of this funding and one which had not,  in  order to explore 
whether and in  what way this  had made a  difference  to  the  working relationships 
between agencies.  
The choice of variables on which to select the case studies was therefore made in 
order to provide a range of perspectives.  As noted by Marshall and Rossman (1999), 
most  sampling  strategies  in  qualitative  research attempt to  provide  a  sample  with 
reasonable variation in the phenomenon, settings or people under investigation.  The 
central concern of the research was to examine implementation issues and the role of 
vertical and horizontal coordination mechanisms in aiding collaboration.  As noted in 
chapter one, independent variables likely to influence the extent of local collaboration 
include vertical steering and a variety of local institutional factors. Case studies were 
chosen, as far as possible, to reflect this.
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Table 4.1 Key characteristics of the case study areas
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LA1 LB N N 1 N Both in-house N/A 1114 309 28%
LA2 SW Y N 2 N Both in-house 6 290 117 40%
LA3 NW N Y 1 Y Both contracted out 9 1160 802 69%
National 
data
- - - 1 tier: 
22%
2 tier:
78%
LSVT:
49%
% Contracted out: 
-homeless service: 14% 
-housing advice  service: 
18%
5 
(mean)
2
(median)
326
(mean)
189
(median)
103  (mean)
55 (median)
29%
53 Innovation Fund Money
54 Ethic Minority Innovation Fund Money
55 Estimate based on official street counts. Data drawn from Local Authority Housing Strategy Statistical Appendix made in June 2006. 
56 Statistics on homelessness and single homelessness are based on annual Local Authority Annual Returns to Central Government for the year 2005 (P1E Data) 
143
Interview format
The interview schedules developed for the both national and local interviews were semi-
structured in  format, involving  specified questions but  leaving  open the  option  for 
further probing and for asking respondents to elaborate on particular issues.  As noted by 
May , semi-structured interviews are sufficiently standardised to allow for comparisons 
between participants but nevertheless allow people to answer on their own terms rather 
than being restricted to the frame of reference imposed by the researcher.  While there 
were clear theoretical propositions to explore, it was important to leave sufficient room 
for unanticipated themes to arise.  
Questions were organised under three main headings, namely perceptions  of 
collaboration at  local  level,  the  relationship between central government and  local 
agencies, and collaboration between central government departments57.  These were the 
main headings in both the central and local interviews. Within each theme there were a 
series  of  secondary  questions,  some  aimed at  gathering  factual  information about 
practices and procedures, and others  aiming for  more subjective information about 
interviewees’ organisational experiences.  The latter  questions were left  deliberately 
broad  to  enable  explanations  for  collaboration  to  be  generated  by  interviewees 
themselves rather than being imposed by the researcher.  The same broad questions were 
asked in each interview, although some flexibility was required to allow participants to 
focus on  those issues most  relevant to  their  own remit or  area of  expertise.  The 
questions themselves were devised to build on previous theory and research as discussed 
in chapters 1-3.  Some specific questions were also included to allow interviewees to 
expand on the data yielded from the survey in phase 1 of the research58.
Data collection and analysis
Interviews were conducted face-to-face and tape-recorded with informed consent59.  The 
majority were one-to-one although in three cases two staff were jointly interviewed. Most 
interviews were held in participants’ place of work in order to maximise convenience for 
participants and to allow the researcher to gain a  feel for the settings in which they 
worked.  Interviews ranged in length from 47 - 81 minutes, with a mean running time of 
68 minutes.
57 See Appendices F & G for copies of the local and central interview schedules.
58 As discussed above, a copy of the completed postal survey for the relevant authority was brought to the 
interviews and discussed where appropriate. 
59 All interviewees were provided with an information sheet explaining the aims and background of the 
research and including a statement regarding confidentiality and anonymity (see Appendix C). 
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Interviews were transcribed verbatim and analysed using a thematic approach 
which involves generating themes from categories and codes .  Transcripts were first 
scanned to gain an overall feel for the data. The text was organised into tables using the 
broad headings used in the interview schedules.  The data under these headings were 
then systematically coded using  labels  which summarised the  meaning  of  the  text. 
Where these  codes began to  recur they were clustered into  themes.  The thematic 
analysis  was  an  iterative  process  and  involved  refining the  coding  framework as 
additional  text  was analysed.   Within  qualitative  research it  is  desirable,  as  far  as 
possible, to let the data speak for itself rather than to impose a predefined frame of 
reference, and so this approach seemed appropriate.  
Where qualitative data are reported in the following chapters, these are presented 
in tabular form displaying themes and illustrative quotes.  As noted by White, Woodfield 
and Ritchie , presenting qualitative data involves an attempt to display the integrity of 
the findings, by illustrating that the conclusions presented are grounded in the data. 
Presentation  of  quotations  is  the  accepted  means  of  doing  this  within  qualitative 
research.  However, it is important when reporting findings to display diversity, since 
one  of  the  aims  of  qualitative  research is  to  explore  the  different  aspects  of  the 
phenomenon under investigation.  White  et  al.  (ibid) therefore advise  inclusivity,  by 
reporting the less typical as well as the highly recurrent themes.  The approach used 
within the present study is to display themes in order, with those raised most frequently 
at the top of each table.  However, all themes included were mentioned by several rather 
than by just one or two interviewees. ID numbers are included alongside quotes in order 
to allow comments to be matched to job titles. 
The above discussion provides an overview and justification of the research 
procedure,  including  the  sampling,  methods  and  data  analysis  techniques.  The 
supporting  appendices  include  copies  of  the  research  instruments.   Further 
methodological details can be found in the relevant empirical chapters.
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Chapter 5: Local Views of the Rationale for and 
Factors Affecting Collaboration
Chapter overview
This chapter begins to investigate the rationale for, and factors affecting, collaboration in 
homelessness  services.   It  firstly  presents  empirical  interview  evidence  on  the 
‘externalities’ created by the fragmented homelessness service system. As outlined in 
chapter one, collaboration is one potential response to such externalities, and a rational-
administrative perspective would suggest that recognition of these factors may contribute 
to local actors’ motivations for collaborating.  It is therefore pertinent to examine the 
degree to which such externalities are recognised by street level bureaucrats.  The chapter 
then moves to an assessment of the level of local support for the policy of collaboration 
and the explanations provided for this, issues which are likely to have a bearing on local 
actors’ responsiveness to central government’s exhortations to collaborate.  Lastly, actors’ 
perceptions  of  the  challenges and  enablers  of  collaboration  are  discussed.   It  was 
suggested in chapter one that a range of factors, both interpretive and contextual, are 
considered  important  influences on  collaboration,  affecting  organisational  ability  or 
propensity  to  collaborate.   This  chapter  assesses  these  issues  in  the  context  of 
homelessness and discusses these in light of the rival theoretical models presented in 
chapter three. 
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5.1 Externalities in the Homelessness System
As  discussed  in  chapter  1,  systemic  performance  effects  or  externalities  refer  to 
coordination problems which arise  because of the involvement of multiple bodies in 
complex systems.  They usually occur when one part of the system fails to take account of 
how its actions will affect the other parts.  Common externalities highlighted in previous 
literature  include  incoherence (e.g.  policies  working  at  cross  purposes;  unintended 
consequences of policies), organisational redundancy (e.g. organisations duplicating one 
another’s work), and lacunae (e.g. gaps in services). In areas of human services chapter 
one illustrated that such problems are common, and provide a rationale for collaborative, 
multi-agency working.   One of the aims of the interviews was to  uncover any such 
problems arising in  the  homelessness system and  to  determine whether such factors 
motivated, or provided a rationale for, agencies to collaborate.  The extent to which inter-
agency collaboration attenuates such problems is discussed further in chapter eight.  The 
evidence presented in the two subsections which follow (5.1.1. and 5.1.2) was generated 
in response to a  question put to interviewees which asked them to comment on any 
problems arising from the way in which services were delivered through a multi-agency 
network60. 
5.1.1 Client level externalities
A number of themes emerged in terms of externalities experienced at the client level and 
illustrative  quotes  for  each  of  these  themes  are  presented  in  table  5.1.  Although 
homelessness staff  cannot speak on behalf  of service users, their experience working 
directly with service users provides them with insights into the difficulties created by a 
fragmented system of provision. 
60 All qualitative material presented in this and in subsequent chapters was analysed according to the 
method set out in chapter four.
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Table 5.1 Client level externalities
Theme Illustrative Quotes
Confusion 
caused by 
service 
complexity and 
number of 
agencies
“There are 7 or 8 support services, so lots of people are confused about 
who does what… staff, volunteers, clients. The accommodation sector has 
also massively expanded, it’s incredibly complicated. It’s hard enough 
trying to explain to a volunteer how it all works, so imagine how it feels 
for a service user who has got an afternoon to sort their accommodation 
out”. ID 19, LA 2
“My ideal would be closer partnership working within the voluntary sector, 
that they co-locate, cause it must be very confusing for clients cause 
everything is in different place in the City” ID 8, LA2
Difficulty 
accessing 
services for 
clients with 
multiple needs
“Because the county is broken up into lots of districts, it’s very 
complicated. And imagine having mild learning difficulties and a problem 
with alcohol and trying to manage that system. It’s difficult, and I don’t 
think it has to be that complicated”. ID 13, LA2
Difficulty 
accessing 
services for 
clients making 
transition 
between 
services
“If you are discharged from hospital you are given a centralised phone 
number which you ring and they direct you to 1 of 10 treatment centres to 
get your dressings done, even before that you have to phone your GP 
before you go and get a prescription for your own dressings, then get to 
where the centres are if you can, then go there 2 or 3 times a week to get 
them changed. For Joe Public that is complicated but for someone who is 
homeless without access to a phone, money, a GP…I think that is more of a 
barrier to treatment than a service”. ID 41, LA3
Duplication of 
assessment and 
information 
collection by 
different 
agencies
“Client A goes from service to service... and each service says, ‘sit down, 
Name, Age…’ goes through this long needs assessment, then the client 
goes to the next service and the same thing happens”. ID 14, LA2
  
“People reasonably think that they speak to the council and the council will 
pass on information between its departments, but it’s really difficult to 
somehow all be working together …cause we’ve all got different 
priorities… so even within one department it’s quite difficult”. ID 5, LA1
Accountability/ 
failure to take 
responsibility 
for in-between 
people
“One problem working with mental health services is when there is a dual 
diagnosis. Often the mental illness predated the addiction but Mental 
Health just see the addiction. These clients are seen by mental health 
services as too difficult to deal with – probably a skills issue & maybe to 
do with resources. There are some dangerous people with severe mental 
health problems that don’t get seen.” ID10, LA2
Gaps in 
services
“Unless they provide more money specifically for people who fall between 
the gaps – it’s them that the closer working needs to be about. If you’re 
clearly defined it’s fine because you fall into this or that category, but if 
you’re not… there’s no money for those sort of in-between people. People 
don’t want to take responsibility for them”. ID20, LA3
Confusion caused by service complexity and number of agencies
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The most commonly raised theme, a form of incoherence, was the general confusion 
created by the complexity of the service system. Interviewees could see arguments for 
providing a range and choice of services and believed this to be important. For instance, 
service users who were excluded from certain agencies would be able to obtain support 
elsewhere. In addition, having a variety of services was considered essential for catering 
to the diverse needs of clients.  However, the sheer number of agencies was considered to 
make it difficult for clients to know where to go for help, and services were characterised 
as difficult to navigate and geographically fragmented.  Some interviewees commented 
that there was no single place or coordinating agency that clients could visit to obtain all 
the information they needed. 
Difficulty accessing services for vulnerable clients with multiple needs
Second, there were difficulties around accessing services for clients who were in the 
position of having to move between different agencies, either because of multiple needs 
requiring multi-agency support, or because of making a transition from an institution to 
another form of  service provision.   Clients  with  multiple  and complex needs  were 
sometimes described as needing ‘hand holding’, and some interviewees were concerned 
that if these clients were left to negotiate access to services unassisted they might not 
receive the support needed.  This was explained partly by the nature and severity of 
problems faced by some vulnerable clients such as learning disabilities, mental health and 
drug or alcohol issues. However, it was also related to a concern that particular agencies 
acted as ‘gatekeepers’ of services, judging vulnerable service users to deny them access to 
services.  Particular problems related to local housing authorities denying service users 
the opportunity to make formal homeless applications, and receptionists in GP surgeries 
and other statutory agencies making clients feel unwelcome.  Some interviewees stressed 
that they physically accompanied such service users to other agencies or engaged in other 
forms of advocacy to ensure that they obtained the services required.  
Difficulty accessing services for clients making transition between services
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Difficulties  around accessing services for transitional  groups  of  users included those 
leaving prisons and hospitals.  In the case of prisons, on one authority there was a gap 
between people leaving prison and being assessed for homelessness by the local authority, 
since practical difficulties prevented the local authority from holding regular surgeries in 
the prison itself.  During this gap many former prisoners found themselves homeless, 
having lost  their accommodation whilst  in prison.  In the case of hospitals, homeless 
people  leaving  hospital  found  it  difficult  to  access  rehabilitative  community-based 
treatment because of the practical challenges involved and their lack of a stable place of 
residence from which to coordinate such treatment.
Duplication of assessment and information collection by different agencies
An additional theme at the client level was the problem of duplication of lengthy needs 
assessments by different agencies.  Interviewees suggested that it was not uncommon for 
this  to  happen, creating  frustration  for  clients  who  were repeatedly  asked the  same 
questions by different agencies.  This duplication occurred in part because agencies did 
not  share  client  assessment  information.   Although  there  may  be  valid  reasons for 
agencies wishing to conduct their own assessments (discussed further below), in some 
cases agencies seemed unaware that other agencies had already collected information 
from a particular client.  This problem occurred both between different agencies and 
within different local authority departments.    
Accountability problems
Another major issue experienced at the client level was the problem of agencies’ failure to 
take  responsibility  for  clients  whose needs  lay  on  the  borderlines  between different 
agencies.  Examples included clients with  a  ‘dual diagnosis’, particularly  those with 
mental health as well as drug or alcohol problems.  Staff in some agencies did not feel 
suitably trained or qualified to deal with clients’ additional problems, arguing that it was 
not their responsibility to tackle these issues, and frustrated in their attempts to obtain 
support from other agencies. Social and mental health services had proven particularly 
problematic in this respect.  
A  further  example  of  this  involved  a  housing  association  which  provided 
supported accommodation for people with mental health problems. However, a number of 
residents also had social care needs including incontinence and other physical problems 
which the association felt unable to deal with.  Their perception was that the local social 
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services department had ceded responsibility for these people, seeing it as the housing 
association’s ‘problem’.  One interviewee noted how policy changes to allow users of 
social services to purchase their own care had led to a situation where some users with 
severe needs either did not or were unable to arrange this independently.  This enabled 
social services departments to evade responsibility, but the housing association concerned 
did not see it as their role to arrange the appropriate care.  This had led to eviction in some 
cases for clients considered unable to manage their accommodation. 
Prisoners serving less than 12 months in prison were described as a group for 
whom nobody had responsibility, since probation services were restricted to dealing with 
those with sentences of 12 months or more. It was also difficult to obtain support for 
prisoners and others with low level mental health needs since they did not meet the 
criteria for psychiatric or mental health care.  Similarly,  few ex-prisoners with mental 
health issues were classified as statutorily homeless because their mental health problem 
was not sufficiently severe for them to pass the vulnerability test.  
In summary, rather than agencies being set up around clients’ needs, it seemed 
apparent that certain clients did not ‘fit’ into existing services, falling between the cracks 
in services. Moreover, it appeared that where clients had multiple problems, there was 
some dispute over who was ultimately responsible for providing support.  In such cases 
determining responsibility was problematic, with no single agency apparently accountable 
for these clients.   
Gaps in services
A number of gaps in service provision were identified by interviewees.  As discussed in 
chapter one, lacunae are an externality common in fragmented human service systems, 
often caused by the fact that since no single agency has a sufficient overview of the 
system to detect these gaps.  Numerous examples were provided in the study context, 
although the most common were around ‘move-on’ accommodation, specialist tailored 
accommodation for particular client groups, dedicated services for those with multiple 
needs who fell  between the  cracks between services  and affordable accommodation 
generally.  
Move-on accommodation was described as providing a bridge for people between 
temporary accommodation and longer-term independent accommodation, and typically 
including an element of support, either ‘floating’ or residential support.  Interviewees in 
all  areas  commented that  there  was  a  severe shortage of  move-on  accommodation, 
resulting in clients spending too long in hostels. This was a major problem in terms of 
creating space  for  new residents  in  need  of  emergency accommodation, sometimes 
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described as ‘silting up’.  It also posed problems for clients who had successfully engaged 
with support services, were trying to tackle their problems but were unable to progress 
further whilst residing in a hostel environment. 
In terms of ‘single homeless’ people of interest in the present study, specialist 
accommodation which was lacking included hostels specifically catering for homeless 
women and homeless couples without children.  The majority of existing facilities for 
women and couples in all authorities were working at full capacity with long waiting lists. 
Other  groups for  which  there  were gaps  in  supported accommodation  included ex-
prisoners and people with drug and alcohol problems.  Interviewees attributed the lack of 
provision for such groups partly to landlords’ fears of damage to property,  perceived 
negative impact on neighbourhoods, social exclusion and agencies’ fear of not being able 
to provide the level of support needed. Interviewees also commented on the need for 
tiered accommodation  for  alcoholics  and  drug  users  at  different  stages  of  recovery 
because of the necessity for moving recovering addicts from environments where other 
residents  were  actively  using  substances.   However,  many  hostels  maintained  no 
substance  abuse  policies  for  fear  of  criminal  proceedings  and  as  part  of  a  risk 
management strategy.  These concerns illustrate how the diversity of problems faced by 
homeless people creates challenges for providing standardised services to all homeless 
people.
Third, and related to the theme above on agencies’ failure to take responsibility for 
service users whose needs lie in the interstices between agencies, interviewees noted a 
lack of services for these people.  They perceived this to be a particular gap, indicating 
that this may be an area requiring additional and specific funding.  Lastly, interviewees 
commented on a lack of affordable and accessible accommodation for homeless people 
generally. This theme is returned to below and is an important contextual issue which 
provides the backdrop against which attempts to work collaboratively are played out.   
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5.1.2 Externalities relating to service provision/ planning
Interviewees also perceived there to be a  number of wider systemic problems which 
militated  against  the  development  and  delivery  of  effective  services.  Externalities 
included  duplication  and  incoherence  created  by  funding  arrangements  and  by 
specialisation (illustrative quotes are provided in table 5.2). 
Table 5.2 Externalities relating to service provision/ planning
Theme Illustrative Quotes
Duplication
“It’s good in essence that there’s choice, but what happens is that service 
users play one off against the other. The people we are dealing with are 
survivors, desperate people do desperate things, and therefore if you go 
and get a meal somewhere, you’ll go to the next place and get one there 
too and you’ll say you didn’t get one over there. That will happen of you 
have seven sets of people doing the same thing. So there is the danger of 
having different agencies in different places in one city doing similar 
things”. (ID18, LA2)
Funding 
arrangements 
creating 
incoherence
“SP have fragmented the way we do things, that you literally have to carve 
out housing related support, where it used to be a bit more, it used to 
encompass many different threads, it was very clearly defined, so there are 
few threads now that are missing that no one’s providing”. (ID13, LA2)
Problems 
created by 
dependence on 
other agencies 
to meet 
statutory duties 
“To go back to stock transfer, soon we will not be a housing authority, and 
it’s fine for the judge at the end of the judicial review to come up with the 
recommendation that the local authority must re-house this person in 7 
days, but what do you do if you haven’t got any housing? You can’t force 
an RSL to give you a house. Whereas when we own our own properties, 
you pick up the phone to a local office and say ‘have you got a property in 
such and such an area’… ‘yeah, come and have a look at it’… So in that 
respect I think we’re going to have some difficulty”. (ID2, LA3)
Duplication
There  were  strong  concerns  that  there  was  some  duplication  in  agencies’ work, 
particularly amongst services set up with a pure ‘homelessness’ remit. One particular area 
of duplication related to day services for homeless people. This problem stemmed in part 
from the  nature of  funding  arrangements  in  the  voluntary  sector  which  meant that 
agencies proactively and opportunistically sought funding from disparate sources as and 
when calls for bids were announced.  This had resulted in overlapping services in some 
cases.  In one instance when funding for a day centre had come to end, a new centre had 
been established to fill  the void, with funding from an alternative source. However, a 
successful bid had subsequently led to the original day centre re-opening, resulting in 
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immediate duplication of activities of these two centres.  One of the outcomes of such 
duplication in service provision was that clients in severe need would sometimes play 
services off  against  each other,  trying to  obtain  as  much assistance as  possible,  as 
illustrated in the first quotation in table 5.2.
Another form of organisational redundancy included duplication of work carried 
out by different strategic housing groups or boards, and there was a general feeling that 
different  groups  covered much  of  the  same  ground.  Most  of  the  senior  managers 
interviewed were members of numerous groups but attended meetings of these selectively 
because of perceived duplication.  
Interviewees also  considered  there  to  be  duplication  in  terms  of  agencies 
developing  ‘outcomes  monitoring’  tools  separately  rather  than  collectively.  The 
Supporting People funding requirements were driving this development and while the 
increased emphasis on  measuring  outcomes  was  viewed as  a  positive  development, 
agencies felt  that a  more coordinated approach to  achieving this  would be desirable. 
Linked to this, there were some cases of ‘double counting’ of outcomes, with different 
agencies monitoring and claiming responsibility for the same outcomes with the same 
clients. 
Funding arrangements as a form of incoherence
The broad funding system was viewed by interviewees as creating a number of challenges 
in terms of service development. Interviewees commented on two themes in particular. 
First, agencies were sometimes frustrated in their attempts to develop services because 
national and government funding streams facilitated the development of certain aspects of 
services but  not  others.  For  instance, a  number of  interviewees commented on  the 
difficulty of developing new supported accommodation. While money was available from 
the Housing Corporation for building costs, there appeared to be a shortage of funding for 
the  support  element61.   Similarly,  interviewees spoke of  an  increase in  funding  for 
rehabilitating prisoners but a lack of accommodation to sit alongside this.  Therefore, in 
spite of national policy attempts to rationalise funding by bringing together disparate 
streams for housing related support into a single pot (under ‘Supporting People’), certain 
aspects of the funding system seemed to suffer from a lack of ‘joined up’ thinking. 
Secondly, the present funding system for the voluntary sector places agencies in 
direct competition with one another, encouraging them to act to protect their own interests 
rather than consider the effects of their own actions on other parts of the system.  As 
61 Edgar et al (1999) note that the former Rough Sleepers initiative suffered from the same problem in 
reverse, with revenue funding available but no capital funding.
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discussed  in  chapter  four,  recent  local  government reforms  have  devolved  funding 
decisions  to  the  local  level.   As  a  result,  local  authorities  are  now  responsible  for 
distributing central government homelessness grant to local voluntary sector agencies.  A 
consequence of this policy reform has been the creation of a system whereby voluntary 
sector agencies bid  for  funding from local authorities  in  a  competitive environment, 
placing the local authority in a position of power within the multi-agency network. This 
theme is returned to in the discussion below of factors affecting collaboration. 
The problem of specialisation: dependence on other agencies to meet statutory 
responsibilities
The fragmentation of services was also problematic in terms of agencies’ ability to meet 
their statutory responsibilities.  Some agencies were concerned that they may be unable to 
meet their legal duty to make provisions for eligible vulnerable people because of their 
dependence on other bodies.  For instance, in one local authority undergoing completion 
of the large scale voluntary transfer (LSVT) process, the housing authority was concerned 
about its ability to provide a safety net of housing for those deemed to be eligible for 
assistance under the Homeless Act.  While housing authorities had legal duties in this 
respect, they felt their ability to meet these was restricted by their dependence on housing 
associations to provide the housing needed. 
In addition, housing authority staff commented on their heavy reliance on the 
private sector to provide temporary housing for homeless people.  Although government 
was promoting private sector involvement for housing homeless people, interviewees felt 
at the mercy of the market place since any significant change in the market could create a 
slump in private rental market.
In  summary,  a  range of  client  level  and  service  planning  level  externalities 
permeated the fragmented homelessness networks in the three case study areas.  At client 
level, the sheer volume of agencies made it difficult for clients to navigate the system. 
This was particularly so for vulnerable clients with multiple needs who, because of the 
nature of their problems, required multi-agency support, or for transitional clients moving 
between different institutions or systems of care. Organisational redundancy occurred in 
the form of duplication of assessment by different agencies.  Clients whose needs lay on 
the interstices between agencies or who had dual diagnoses of health and other problems 
were not well served by the system, falling between the gaps in services, with no agency 
accepting responsibility for these clients.  Finally, despite the large volume of agencies 
involved in homelessness, there were numerous gaps in services.  At service provision 
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and planning level, externalities included duplication, incoherence associated with the 
funding system and dependence on other agencies to carry out core activities. 
Comments made by interviewees suggested that an awareness of such issues did 
provide a motivation for collaboration in some cases. For example partnership working 
was viewed as an appropriate means of ensuring that clients with dual diagnosis and 
multiple needs got the services they required.  Co-location was considered a possible 
form of  collaboration  for  reducing confusion  for  clients  attempting  to  navigate  the 
complex homeless system.  In addition, devising a joint outcomes database was viewed as 
a means of avoiding double counting of service outcomes. The role of such forms of 
partnership working in minimising externalities is returned to in chapter eight.  
5.2 Local Support for Collaboration
In order to determine the level of support for collaboration amongst local street level 
bureaucrats,  interviewees  were  asked  how  important  multi-agency or  collaborative 
working was for them personally, and whether they felt it was a priority for local agencies 
generally.  The vast majority of local agencies were strongly in support of collaborative, 
multi-agency  working.   Interviewees  variously  suggested  that  is  was  ‘essential’, 
‘necessary’ or ‘very important’ for tackling homelessness, especially in relation to clients 
with multiple and complex needs.  Indeed, there appeared to be a general acceptance that 
this was the only way to work. Some suggested that inter-agency working had become 
‘part of the culture’ and that agencies generally had a strong will to work in this way, even 
in  spite  of  the  challenges  of  doing  so.   Interviewees also  distinguished  between 
operational  and  strategic  level  collaboration,  and  perceived it  to  be  important  that 
collaborative approaches were pursued both of these organisational levels.
Two main reasons were given in support of a collaborative approach to practice. 
First, interviewees  recognised  the  multi-dimensional  nature  of  homelessness,  and 
collaborative multi-agency approaches were viewed as essential to meeting the multiple 
needs of service users.  Secondly, and related to the first issue, interviewees felt that they 
alone did not have the skills needed to tackle homelessness.  Interviewees acknowledged 
their dependence on other agencies in this regard.
Table 5.3 Local support for collaboration
Theme Illustrative Quotes
Support for collaboration at local level 
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General support for 
collaboration
“I just think that partnership is the only way. The sum of the parts is 
always going to be better than the individual parts. There’s 
something magical that happens when people bring different things 
together, share wisdom, expertise, and there’s just something in the 
mix that happens that is quite powerful.” ID 7, LA2
“If you don’t work with the other agencies in a joint support plan 
approach then I don’t know what we’re here for.” ID 14, LA2.
Importance of 
collaboration at 
different 
organisational levels
“It’s essential for us really, we’ve got to have a good working 
relationship both at day to day level, and that staff can relate to each 
other, just simply to enable service users to move between agencies. 
Strategically, as well, it’s very important for people to be included in 
any joint decisions being made.” ID 17, LA
“I think right from an individual service user being in a supported 
housing project & needing their key worker & drugs worker to work 
together, you know, right through to a very senior strategic level, it 
has to work all the way through.” ID 4, LA2
Reasons for supporting a collaborative approach
Recognition of 
multi-dimensional 
nature of 
homelessness 
“I just don’t think any of us will get anything done without it, I mean 
from a service user basis they don’t just have one need, do they, they 
have a variety of needs.” ID 4, LA2
“Without a collaborative or multi-agency approach, it’s inevitable 
that the people who don’t fit into the standard boxes are going to get 
a poor standard of service.” ID 24, LA1
Dependence on other 
agencies to meet 
multiple needs
“We’ve got to make sure that we’re able to support then in the right 
way, and so recognising that we can’t do that 100% ourselves, 
there’s a need to work together with them so that our clients get the 
best service possible.” ID 23, LA3
In summary,  collaboration between local agencies was something which interviewees 
perceived to be important.  However, despite the perceived importance of collaborative 
working,  there were numerous challenges to  putting this  into  practice.  Interviewees 
suggested that despite a willingness and commitment to collaboration, the reality was 
often somewhat different.  
One civil servant summed this up in the following way: 
‘What I’ve come across is a very strong willingness to undertake multi-
agency working but (people are) often hampered by the sheer mechanics of 
it doing it’ (ID33)
Several reasons  were provided by interviewees to explain why collaboration did not 
always ensue.   The  next  section  considers  the  main  factors affecting collaboration 
including both challenges and enablers. 
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5.3 The Factors Affecting Collaboration
The factors affecting collaboration can be broadly organised under the headings presented 
in chapter  one,  notably interpretive and contextual  factors.  Comments  were made in 
response to a general question on the main challenges and enablers of collaboration (see 
Appendix F for interview schedule). The thematic subheadings provided in figure 5.1 
below represent the most salient themes emerging in the analysis.  
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Fig 5.1 Main factors affecting collaboration: thematic analysis
5.3.1 Interpretive Factors 
As noted in  chapter  one,  a  range of  interpretive factors are  highlighted in  literature 
investigating  the  antecedents of  collaboration,  where  interpretive  factors refer to  the 
subjective images that organisations hold of one another.  The presence of factors such as 
domain consensus, goal congruence and trust are considered to facilitate collaboration. 
However,  there was evidence that these factors were lacking in the study context,  as 
illustrated in the analysis below.
Trust and mutual understanding
A lack of trust appeared to undermine inter-agency relationships in the case study areas. 
Mistrust emerged for a number of reasons (see table 5.4).  One reason given for low trust 
relations related to power and dependency issues created by funding arrangements.  The 
reliance of  agencies on  local  authority  funding  made them reticent to  openly  share 
information with  the  council  or  with  other  agencies.   Specifically,  agencies  were 
unwilling  to  admit  problems,  preferring  to  project  an  image  of  success.   Explicit 
Interpretive factors Contextual factors
Intra-organisational Inter-organisational Lack of Trust
Lack of Mutual 
understanding
Disagreements over 
Domain 
Lack of Goal 
Congruence
Differing Philosophies, 
agendas & priorities
Degree of 
interdependence
Organisational 
structure & internal
restructuring
Time constraints/ 
capacity issues
Support for 
collaboration at higher 
organisational levels/ 
collaborative 
leadership 
Broader policy & 
funding context
Presence of ‘boundary 
spanners’ working 
between agencies
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references were made to a ‘culture of mistrust’ and to the ‘blame culture’ generated by 
agencies’ fear of losing funding.  
A second area of mistrust centred on the desire by agencies to protect their own 
client groups, which again led them to withhold certain information from partner agencies 
or withhold client referrals.  Workers believed that other agencies would not always act in 
the appropriate way if certain information about their clients was shared. Two examples 
serve to illustrate.  First, in one voluntary sector agency working with offenders there was 
a reticence among staff to share pre-sentence reports with Housing Associations. This was 
due to a perception that Housing Associations often made prejudicial assumptions about 
offenders and that this  would impede their  clients’ ability to  gain access to  Housing 
Association properties. The second example involved drugs  workers failing  to  share 
information about their clients’ drug use for fear of them being evicted from hostels or 
other forms of supported accommodation.
Some interviewees attributed agencies’ lack of willingness to make client referrals 
to their desire to keep hold of their own clients in order to protect funding.  The concept 
of agencies ‘owning’ clients was one which emerged a number of times, and interviewees 
were critical of agencies that behaved in this way.  Others commented that they were 
reluctant to refer clients to certain agencies because of a lack of faith that they would deal 
appropriately with their clients. For instance, some voluntary sector interviewees were 
concerned  about  the  judgemental  attitude  of  other  agencies,  particularly  statutory 
agencies, to some of their more vulnerable clients.  Lack of trust was also expressed in 
terms of perceptions that certain agencies, in particular the local authority, would deny 
clients the service to which they were entitled.  The theme of local authorities failing to 
complete formal homelessness assessments was one which emerged a number of times. 
Discussing how trust was built up, interviewees suggested that this emerged when 
agencies fulfilled their end of the bargain by following up their words with actions. On 
the other side of the coin, when agencies did not keep their word, or where there was a 
history of tensions between agencies, this inhibited future collaborative relations. One 
example involved smaller agencies being unwilling to enter into consortia with larger 
statutory  bodies  because of  negative  experiences of  this  in  the  past.   This  finding 
resonates strongly with the concept of ‘fair dealing’ or ‘principled conduct’ as discussed 
in chapter one, which suggests that collaboration ensues when shared expectations are 
met. 
Trust was characterised as something which developed over time. For instance, 
interviewees spoke  of  agencies learning to  understand each other’s  positions  in  the 
‘fullness of time’. By way of illustration, one local authority worker commented on how 
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their homelessness prevention policy had been viewed suspiciously by voluntary sector 
workers initially but had been accepted in time as they learned to understand the purpose 
of  the policy.  She described how voluntary sector agencies had initially  viewed the 
authority’s practices as a ‘gate keeping exercise’ but had come to recognise that the local 
authority’s aim was to prevent homelessness by exploring alternative options prior to 
conducting  formal  homeless  assessments.   Interviewees  also  commented  on  the 
importance of communication and contact in building trust.  
Much  of  the  explanation  for  low  trust  stemmed  from  a  lack  of  mutual 
understanding  between  agencies  (see  again  table  5.4).   Interviewees  commented 
principally on a lack of understanding about the pressures that other agencies are under, 
unrealistic expectations about what they could deliver, and a limited appreciation of the 
issues facing their clients.  Part of developing understanding meant acknowledging the 
different agendas and priorities of agencies.  For instance, one interviewee commented on 
the need for voluntary sector agencies to recognise that statutory services are driven by 
legislation, and for statutory agencies to recognise that voluntary sector agencies were 
driven by a different set of demands. Another stated that agencies simply had to have 
‘respect’ for one another’s roles. 
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Table 5.4 Trust and mutual understanding
Theme Illustrative Quotes
Trust
Lack of willingness 
to openly discuss or 
admit problems in 
order to protect 
funding
“Some people would just turn the forum into a PR opportunity and say 
how fabulous everything is going. Whereas it’s just as useful to share 
problems. Because of the increasing competition in the sector with the 
introduction of SP I watched the inter-agency forum change from 
being a very supportive environment to a... you know, who can seem 
to be the best around the table and try and impress the council as 
commissioners”. ID 19, LA2
Desire to protect 
own clients
“I have heard workers from several organisations saying ‘this is our 
client’, well, nobody owns people, and I think that’s something in the 
system that needs to be addressed at some point. We are providers of 
services, to help people, we don’t own people”. ID 17, LA2
“They’ve got no trust with one another. So if they get a client they 
should be encouraging them to progress by referring them to another 
organisation, but in so many cases they don’t ‘cause they think we 
want to keep this client because it affects their funding”. ID 18, LA2
Lack of confidence 
in other agencies’ 
ability/ willingness 
to treat clients 
appropriately
“We are actually loathe to send anyone anywhere on their own, we 
have to take them, because we don’t know what the staff’s going to be 
like when they get to the other end”. ID 22, LA 3
“One of the things we hear from drugs workers is ‘I’m not going to 
tell the housing worker about my client’s drug use because they might 
evict them’… which actually they might. So there’s a mistrust there”. 
ID 16, LA2
Incremental nature 
of trust-building; 
importance of 
contact and 
communication
“Trust had built up over time.. phone calls were being made about this 
issue or that, there was a kind of contacts or communication process 
going on”. ID 39, LA1
Mutual understanding
Lack of 
understanding 
between agencies
“Complaints about each other’s service are based on lack of 
knowledge. They’re assuming that we’re turning everyone down and 
that we don’t give a pop about the clients. And we assume they just 
meddle and interfere, advocate for people who aren’t actually 
homeless in the first place”. ID5, LA1
“One thing is people don’t know each other’s roles very well, what 
their remits are”. ID 40, LA3
Importance of 
recognizing other 
agencies’ priorities
“It’s about recognising and acknowledging that there is difference 
between us in terms of our agendas.” ID 7, LA1
Disagreements over domain
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Several interviewees made reference to disagreements over the proper remit and domain 
of different agencies, relating to the notion of ‘domain consensus’, a further interpretive 
antecedent to  collaboration introduced in  chapter one.   The most  common problem 
involved interviewees feeling that other agencies should be providing input on certain 
issues where they did not appear to be doing so.  Some interviewees suggested that this 
was due to an inability of other professionals to see the links between different issues. 
For instance, one specialist health visitor for homeless people suggested that other health 
professionals did not see mediation as part of their role, despite the fact that this may 
prevent mental ill-health in many cases.  As illustrated in the quote below (ID16), another 
example concerned a drugs agency failing to see sexual health issues as part  of their 
remit.   However,  interviewees also attributed the  lack of  willingness of  agencies  to 
provide input to resource limitations and funding priorities.  There is a clear link between 
the domain issue and the  problem of  agencies failing to  take responsibility  for  ‘in-
between’ clients, as discussed in section 4.2.3 above. 
The other side of domain consensus is where agencies stray into the territory or 
turf of other agencies.  This was less common than the phenomenon described above, 
although two examples emerged. One involved workers who were described as lacking 
professional boundaries.  These people tried to achieve everything alone and failed to 
recognise their dependence on other agencies.  A second example links to the issue of 
duplication already discussed, and involved agencies undertaking work that was already 
covered by existing agencies. Agencies were concerned of the implications of this in 
terms of wasting resources and there was also a sense of fear that funding bodies would 
make cuts where this duplication occurred.
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Table 5.5 Lack of domain consensus
Theme Illustrative Quotes
Disagreement 
over 
appropriate 
remit of 
different 
agencies 
“I was doing some sexual health training and as part of this I had to do 
visits to different organisations, I said ‘can I visit your needle exchange 
cause I am doing this sexual health course’, and they were like ‘well, 
what’s that got to do with sexual health?’, and I was just like, ‘What?! It’s 
got everything to do with sexual health. What’s the point in giving 
somebody a clean needle if you are not talking about their sexual 
behaviour, wearing condoms, transmission of blood borne viruses, it’s 
sexual health’ … and that link seems to have been lost in drugs services, 
they were like, ‘well what’s it got to do with us?” ID 16, LA2
Lack of 
professional 
boundaries/ 
straying into 
turf of other 
agencies
“Some organisations have this dying breed of worker who somehow 
think they can do everything… that they can be the drugs worker, the 
housing worker and everything else. But we all need to be big enough to 
go ‘this isn’t my field of expertise but I can refer you to someone’. ” 
ID 16, LA2
Lack of goal congruence
As discussed in chapter one, goal congruence is thought to enhance collaboration. Where 
organisations have similar goals, collaboration is considered more likely to occur due to 
their greater ability to identify with one another (although it was also noted that where 
organisations’ goals are too similar, conflicts may emerge because of competition over 
territory).  There was considerable evidence that lack of goal congruence posed problems 
in  terms of  developing  collaborative  relationships.  Two  major  themes emerged,  one 
relating  to  differing  philosophies  and  worldviews,  and  another  relating  to  different 
priorities and agendas.  
On the theme of differing worldviews and philosophies, agencies with differences 
in these respects often found it challenging to work together.  In particular, there was an 
inherent tension between statutory agencies which were driven by government priorities 
and  legal  obligations,  and  voluntary  sector  agencies  with  an  advocacy  remit.   For 
instance, the Probation Service was characterised by voluntary sector agencies as having a 
punitive approach in contrast to what they saw as their own rehabilitative approach.  
Similarly, there were clashes in two of the case study areas between local housing 
authorities  and  voluntary  sector  advice  agencies  over  the  issue  of  homelessness 
assessments.  In all three authorities, housing departments were following government 
policy of preventing homelessness, by diverting homelessness applications and promoting 
alternative options.  While voluntary sector agencies generally viewed this as a ‘gate-
keeping’ exercise  to  prevent  homeless  people  appearing  in  official  statistics,  local 
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authorities  were more supportive  of  government policy,  suggesting that  a  preventive 
approach was appropriate.  Housing authorities’ actions were also driven by their lack of 
available housing which meant that they had to ration existing stock.  
In one authority housing advice agencies regularly sent clients to the local housing 
authority for formal homelessness assessments, even when they knew there was little 
chance of those particular clients successfully meeting the requirements under homeless 
legislation. While they viewed this as a means of keeping the housing authority informed 
of the level of need in the local area and for ensuring that clients received their legal 
entitlement to  an assessment,  one interviewee suggested that  this  was tantamount  to 
clients being used as ‘pawns’ in a ‘game’ between these two agencies (see quote below, 
ID 16).
Other cultural tensions emerged around the perception of non-statutory agencies 
that their statutory counterparts viewed them as ‘untrained’, ‘casual’, or ‘unprofessional’. 
Some voluntary sector interviewees held the view that statutory agencies were unaware of 
the extent to which their sector had become professionalised and was subject to similar 
levels of scrutiny and monitoring as public sector agencies.  Statutory agencies were 
similarly concerned that voluntary sector agencies often held unrealistic views about what 
they could deliver and were unaware of the government priorities to which they were 
working.
Within  the  voluntary  sector,  interviewees  dichotomised  those  with  an 
‘empowering’ approach versus those with a ‘helping’ or paternalistic philosophy, and also 
contrasted secular with religious-based organisations. Such differences were considered to 
impede collaboration.  By contrast, one voluntary sector day service worker commented 
on how he found it easy to work with his counterpart in a neighbouring local authority 
agency because of a shared philosophy on how to help homeless people.
Secondly, the different agendas and priorities of the organisations involved were 
also cited as an obstacle to collaboration.  Reflecting on why agencies found it difficult to 
work collaboratively,  some interviewees commented that  in  the absence of  a  shared 
statutory  responsibility  for  homelessness, agencies’ individual  agendas took  priority. 
Examples  included  health  authorities  whose  priorities  lay  in  other  areas  than 
homelessness. For instance, one homelessness health worker summarised a case where 
she had devised a funding bid in order to establish a homelessness discharge coordinator 
post.   Despite  obtaining  the  support  of  the  Drug  Action  Team,  the  Public  Health 
Department and the Health Protection Agency, she ultimately failed to the funding due to 
a lack of support on the part of the local NHS trust which did not see homelessness as its 
priority.  There were also different agendas and priorities intra-organisationally in some 
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cases. For instance, different local authority housing teams were characterised as working 
to their own agendas, even in spite of the fact that all teams were working under the same 
legislation.  
The differing agendas of the various agencies stemmed from two main issues. The 
most commonly cited factor determining the strategic priorities of agencies was their 
funding.  Interviewees commented that funding priorities determined their core business 
and that this was often not flexible enough to give agencies discretion to pick up on the 
wider issues associated with their core business.  Additionally, when funding was cut, 
issues such as  homelessness which were not  core priorities  for some agencies were 
usually the first to be sacrificed. 
The second issue which influenced the agendas of agencies was the government 
targets they worked towards, a theme which is picked up in more detail in the section 
below.  A  number  of  interviewees  mentioned  this  factor,  suggesting  that  unless 
organisations had joint targets, it was unrealistic to expect them to work towards the same 
issues. An additional, although less widespread, explanation for differing agendas was 
that the strategic priorities of agencies varied according to the personal interests of senior 
staff.  
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Table 5.6 Lack of goal congruence; contrasting agendas and priorities
Theme Illustrative Quotes
Lack of goal congruence
Dissimilarity of 
worldview/ 
philosophy, eg 
campaigning 
versus 
government 
targets remit
“Our agency’s priority is to meet government targets. Other agencies have 
a different agenda, like campaigning or proving where gaps in services 
are, or how rubbish the government are, and I think sometimes the clients 
can be pawns in that game. So yes, constantly sending clients up to the 
council might make a point about the inadequacies of the Housing Act or 
resources to house them, but for that individual who has their expectations 
raised and then crushed, it’s not good”. ID 16, LA2
Contrasting agendas & priorities
Homelessness 
seen as a low 
priority by 
some agencies
“The money was literally sitting there waiting for us, I had been asked to 
submit a bid to this fund, had it all ready, sent it to the general discharge 
coordinator at the Hospital and they said ‘we don’t have a problem with 
homelessness, primary care do’. So that bid failed”. ID 41, LA3
Contrasting 
priorities 
stemming from 
funding 
arrangements 
“That has been one of the worst things to happen to local government… 
the devolved financial management. People get entrenched in their own 
budget and their own priorities become ultra-important. And to an extent 
that money is not flexible enough to go lateral with, and that’s what 
you’ll find a lot in these departments”. ID 26, LA3
“There’s a silo mentality, they come together and talk about it but 
ultimately they’ve still got their silos with their money and they can only 
spend their money on their client group, but they can’t do joint budgets 
which is the thing that’s going to unlock it all”. ID 18, LA2
Contrasting 
priorities a 
reflection of 
disparate 
government 
targets
“One example is the PCTs and the Health authorities. If they don’t have 
any targets around alcohol treatment or prevention, then it’s not going to 
be a priority for them. You’ve always got to find the back door way of 
getting them to commit to something like saying ‘you’ve got a target to 
reduce heart disease, therefore if you prevent some of the alcohol 
problems you might prevent the heart disease’, I mean that is just so time 
consuming and so convoluted.  If they simply had a target to say you must 
treat alcohol problems that would be so much more straightforward”. ID 
29, LA2
“Not having the same targets.. if you don’t have jointly owned targets the 
I think it’s very difficult to get people to work towards the same thing”. 
ID 8, LA2
Many of the issues above provide support for a bureaucratic politics conception of inter-
agency relationships.  As discussed in chapter three, bureaucratic politics emphasises the 
different goals between agencies, as compared to the rational-administrative perspective 
which suggests unity of goals. The lack of goal congruence discussed above provides 
support for the former perspective.  The metaphor invoked by one interviewee of a game 
between agencies where clients are pawns is also consistent with the bureaucratic politics 
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perspective which conceives of  collaboration as  a  series of  strategic moves between 
players.  This  perspective  also  suggests  that  agencies  will  strive  to  maintain  their 
autonomy.  This was notable in two respects in interviewees’ accounts of the challenges of 
collaborating, firstly in relation to agencies’ concern to protect their own client groups and 
client outcomes, and secondly in their lack of willingness to admit mistakes and share 
information in  order  to  protect  themselves  against  competitors vying  for  the  same 
funding. 
5.3.2    Contextual Factors 
Turning next to contextual factors, it was noted in chapter one that certain intra- and inter-
organisational features are amongst the antecedents to collaboration.  These are the more 
‘objective’ features that exist within an organisation’s external or internal environment 
which may either  impede or  facilitate  collaboration.  When such factors are  present, 
collaboration is  more likely  to  ensue.  While  for  both  pragmatic and methodological 
reasons it is not possible to address all of the issues identified in previous literature, the 
framework outlined in chapter one nevertheless acts as a guide to help identify potential 
areas of importance in the current study.  Using the interview data it is possible to reflect 
on the extent to which such factors appear to influence the ability and propensity of 
agencies to collaborate. 
Intra-organisational factors
As  outlined  above,  features  of  the  internal  organisational  environment  considered 
antecedents of collaboration include decentralization, a complex and wide ranging task 
environment, staff  competence and training, the  presence of  sufficient organisational 
resources,  an  open  and  cosmopolitan  organisational  culture  and  certain  leadership 
qualities.  The major intra-organisational factors affecting collaboration as perceived by 
interviewees in the present study were, in order of importance, organisational structures 
and restructuring, time/ resource issues, and the level of commitment to collaboration by 
senior management or the extent of collaborative leadership (table 5.7). 
Organisational structures and restructuring
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With regards to organisational structure, internal restructuring was a major challenge to 
the development of collaborative working. For instance, in one area several interviewees 
described how the re-organisation of management tiers within the local authority had 
created collaborative inertia, since key posts leading on this agenda had been abolished, 
leaving a strategic vacuum.  Furthermore, practitioners found it  extremely difficult to 
establish and maintain relationships and contacts with individuals in organisations where 
job titles and personnel seemed to be constantly changing due to restructuring and high 
staff  turnover.   This highlights the importance of key individuals to the collaborative 
process, a  theme which is  discussed in  more depth  in  chapter  seven.  Examples of 
organisations cited as being prone to re-structuring included mental health trusts, housing 
associations, primary care trusts, the Connexions service and local authorities.
Another theme relating to organisational structure concerned the issue of single 
versus two tier council structures.  At the time of carrying out the interviews one of the 
case study authorities was awaiting the outcome of a bid for unitary council status62.  The 
majority of those working in this  two tier authority found the two tier system to be 
problematic. In particular, the difficulty of having Social Services and the Supporting 
People team in one authority (i.e. the County level authority) and the Housing Department 
in another (the District level authority) was highlighted.  
Some interviewees commented on the practical challenges this  posed such as 
being located in different buildings in different parts of the city (ID 9 below), which was 
considered an obstacle to communication, while others focused on local political tensions 
created (ID 16 below).  In particular, the two tier system created tensions between District 
and County level due to the District Housing Authority having to ‘compete’ with other 
local housing authorities within the County for Social Services and Supporting People 
money.  This had also caused resentment amongst the other District local authorities in 
the County because of a perception that the case study area, a City Council, obtained a 
larger share of the available money.
62 This was in the context of the recent Local Government Whitepaper (CLG 2006c) which invited 
interested local authorities to submit bids for unitary status.
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Table 5.7 Contextual intra-organisational factors affecting collaboration
Theme Illustrative Quotes
Organisational 
structure/
restructuring
“I don’t feel the two tier government situation actually helps us, because 
it’s quite difficult to have proper joined-up working between social services 
and housing, and Supporting People, when you’ve got Supporting People 
and Social Services in one local authority and Housing in another”. ID 9, 
LA2
“I think one of the issues about joint working at the moment is the tension 
between those agencies which are part of the City Council and those which 
are County. There’s a feeling in the City that Supporting People should be 
putting more stuff into the City but of course we’re competing with the 
Districts that say we get everything”. ID 16, LA2
Time and 
capacity 
issues
“I have a lot of very broad responsibilities so probably don’t have as much 
time to get out & see other agencies as I’d like cause I have to run a large 
operational service as well. It’s just the time factor really. So more 
management time to devote to it would be one thing that would facilitate 
joint working”. ID 3, LA 3
“Everybody has their own thing to do, so they don’t feel like they have the 
time to dedicate to this extra bit which is working with this other 
organisation”. ID 1, LA1
“If you’re going to properly facilitate active valid and vibrant partnership 
working, you have to have adequate resources of staff time in particular”. 
ID 9, LA2
Collaborative 
leadership
“At a high level it’s been really good cause not only have senior people 
shown that they understand the other service but they’ve actually put 
things in place that seem to actually offer the other organisation some real 
options. It seems to show that there’s a commitment to joint working, 
‘cause it’s actually put things in place to say this department will do this 
as part of its joint working arrangements with yours”. ID 5, LA1
“A lot of the issues that you are talking about trying to overcome you 
would need Directors there at a senior level to say right, I’m gonna send 
down this mandate and this is how we are going to work”. ID 8, LA2
“I went to this meeting and the director of the partnership trust said, ‘we’ve 
done a lot of research and it says people need to work in partnership’, and 
it’s just like.. you don’t say…really?. And then he’s off somewhere, off 
again… it’s like they live in a different world”. ID 16, LA 2
Time and capacity issues
Second, time was a central concern.  Interviewees suggested that collaboration with other 
agencies was something requiring time, but demands on services and workload pressures 
meant they had little spare time to devote to this. Indeed, there was a perception amongst 
several interviewees that collaboration was an ‘extra’ activity that staff had to undertake 
on top of their own jobs rather than a core part of their job.  
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Support for collaboration at higher organisational levels
Third, the level of commitment to  collaboration by senior personnel  was considered 
important. Interviewees considered it important that their strategic managers themselves 
adopted a collaborative approach, and that they support efforts amongst frontline staff to 
collaborate.  In some cases senior managers had been supportive in this respect (ID 5 
above). However, some interviewees were critical of senior managers who were perceived 
to be disconnected from the reality of partnership working at a frontline level (e.g. ID 16). 
Inter-organisational factors
As discussed in chapter one, previous literature suggests that key inter-organisational 
factors impacting on collaboration are conflicting organisational structures, timetables, 
planning  frameworks,  funding  regimes,  IT  systems,  as  well  as  the  level  of 
interdependence between agencies, the broader policy environment and the presence of 
boundary spanners.  Some of these factors were pertinent in the study context, with the 
most salient themes relating to the broader and funding policy environment, the degree of 
interdependence between agencies and the presence of boundary spanners. The first of 
these themes was mainly an inhibitor of collaboration while the second and third were 
principally  facilitators.  Practical issues  around  clashing  organisational  structures and 
systems, particularly inflexible budgets and differing geographical boundaries, as well as 
distance from other agencies and size of network were mentioned by a smaller number of 
interviewees, but do not constitute core themes.
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Table 5.8 Contextual inter-organisational factors affecting collaboration: broader policy & 
funding environment
Theme Illustrative Quotes
Competitive 
funding system – 
voluntary sector
“There is in-fighting within the voluntary sector - a lot of it is funding 
related... they all seem to be putting in their own funding bids for 
everything, and not really communicating despite the fact that there is a 
forum there which is meant to make things more strategic. There is that 
issue of protectionism of their service & making sure that they are 
delivering a service, despite the fact that there might be another agency 
maybe better placed to do it.”  ID 8, LA2
“The political backdrop is important because you’re not going to want to 
share information and be as honest with other agencies if you deem them 
to be a threat” ID 19, LA2
“They are that frightened of loosing 5 bob that people are like ‘no, we’re 
not doing that because they might take our results and our outcomes, and 
we’ve got to keep hold of them” ID 22, LA3
Competitive 
funding system – 
related to changes 
to Supporting 
People rules
“We’re beginning to see people saying ‘I’m not sharing that’, cause it’s 
all tendering & people competing for business. Now Supporting People 
have started to tender services I think people will be less willing to share 
their good practice” ID 4, LA3
“I am worried that the new SP way they are commissioning things. Some 
of the competition is starting to feel people are a bit back-bitey and not 
going to share as much” ID 13, LA2
Perceived power 
inequalities
“They are the preferred provider so get the most funding. If you haven’t 
got the big structure, your policy department, your recruitment 
department, you don’t get the money. It’s the services nearer the ground 
like us that have the most impact in my opinion. And yet we don’t get the 
money because we haven’t got that underpinning”. ID 22, LA3
Resource 
constraints “The eternal stumbling block is the lack of finance. That’s a real problem 
for homeless services, some charities are there today and gone tomorrow, 
or they are struggling”. ID 40, LA1
“It’s also the financial limitations of the PCT about what they can afford. I 
think that means the PCT sometimes take a sticking plaster approach 
rather than dealing with the route causes. And the homeless client group is 
very needy and they don’t get treatment at the point of need”. ID 41, LA3
Pressure to meet 
government 
targets
“The government expects a lot of local authorities, but apart from the 
money that it gives us, it doesn’t give us much else other than heartache 
about meeting targets and additional responsibilities”. ID 10, LA2
Parameters of 
government 
funding 
programmes
“With joint working you’ll be sitting round a table with different agencies 
and we have this client and we want to enable them to do this, but because 
of the parameters of the funding for this group over here, or that group 
over here, it’s very difficult. I don’t know if it has to be so bureaucratic.” 
ID 13, LA2
The broader policy and funding environment
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The broader policy and funding environment was a major influence on collaboration in a 
number of ways.  In many respects this wider environment impeded collaboration.  Four 
aspects which inhibited collaboration included the competitive funding system, scarcity of 
resources, the pressures of government bureaucracy including targets, and the parameters 
of  government funding.  All  this  created a  challenging backdrop within which local 
agencies  were  operating  and  meant  that  even  where  there  was  a  desire  to  work 
collaboratively, this was often not possible.
The competitive funding environment was a very strong theme throughout the 
interviews, as also noted above in the discussion of externalities.  There was a perception 
amongst interviewees from all sectors that competition, especially in the voluntary sector, 
was undermining efforts to collaborate.  Interviewees characterised the voluntary sector as 
affected by ‘in-fighting’ (ID 8, LA2), with agencies unwilling to openly share information 
with their competitors (e.g. quote ID 19), or as one interviewee put it ‘playing their cards 
close to their chest’ (ID 12, LA3).  The competitive edge of the voluntary sector was also 
manifested in agencies’ lack of willingness to share successful outcomes (see quote ID 22 
above).
Also illustrating the competitive nature of the sector, there were perceived power 
inequalities between smaller voluntary sector agencies and larger agencies that were more 
successful in  obtaining funding.  In some areas one or two very large homelessness 
organisations dominated the local arena and were regarded as being favoured by the local 
authority.  In  one  area  smaller  agencies  were  resentful  of  one  particular  large  and 
successful voluntary sector agency, and considered there to be a lack of transparency in 
the way funding was allocated by the local authority.
Changes to  the  way in  which  the  Supporting People fund  is  delivered were 
underway during the period of the research, and there was evidence that these changes 
were further exacerbating the level of competition, including amongst accommodation 
providers such as Housing Associations and other Registered Social Landlords who are 
major beneficiaries of this fund. This fund was in the process of moving from a grant-
based to a tender-based system, and several interviewees suggested this would result in 
greater tensions between agencies competing for  this  money,  to  a  sector  which was 
already characterised by rivalry between providers.  
The  resource  constraints  within  which  agencies were  operating  also  created 
tensions between agencies. For instance, many agencies found it difficult to provide the 
level of service required within existing resources, causing frustration and resentment on 
the part of other agencies that were referring clients to these agencies.  Examples included 
local authorities’ lack of housing, the ‘squeeze’ on Supporting People budgets and social 
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services  departments’ budgetary  constraints.   Agencies  referring  to  these  services 
understood the resource constraints these services were under,  but  were nevertheless 
attempting to ‘battle’ with these agencies to obtain services for clients. 
General resource constraints were reflected in the language of interviewees who 
commented that local authorities operated in a ‘vice’, that the ‘screws’ had been put on 
local authorities and that the system was ‘on its knees’.  Some interviewees noted how the 
efficiency drive in the context of the Gershon Review63 meant that public organisations 
had  to  maintain  and  improve  services  with  less  funding.   Others  commented that 
voluntary sector were ‘scrapping around’ for money, and that there were ‘diminishing 
pots of money’.  They described the unstable and short term nature of voluntary sector 
funding, which meant that some  charities  were ‘there today and gone tomorrow’ (ID 40, 
LA1).  These resource constraints meant that joint working was ‘the last thing people 
thought about’, according to one interviewee (ID 13, LA2). For organisations such as 
primary care trusts  and social  services departments operating under severe financial 
constraints, wider issues such as homelessness which were not their core priorities often 
suffered.  
Pressure to meet government targets and fulfil bureaucratic reporting requirements 
were additional  background factors which preoccupied agencies.  While interviewees 
understood why monitoring and targets were important, these demands frustrated their 
attempts to work laterally or flexibly across organisations.  Targets meant that statutory 
services devoted their time to fulfilling these at the expense of pursuing wider issues, 
often the cross-cutting issues which were relevant to several agencies but were of lower 
priority.  Similarly, bureaucracy and paperwork was frequently seen as leaving little time 
or  opportunity  to  pursue the  more creative cross-cutting  work.   The  parameters  of 
government funding and the rules of particular programmes regarding how money was 
spent also impeded the development of collaborative multi-agency approaches (see quote 
ID23 above).
Despite these wider policy and funding issues impeding collaboration, certain 
government agendas were recognised as having contributed to greater collaboration. One 
example  concerned  a  resettlement  policy  introduced  by  the  National  Offender 
Management Service which had ‘forced’ the prison & probation services to ‘talk to other 
agencies’ (ID1, LA1).  Another concerned the ‘Options agenda’ introduced into housing 
and homelessness services, which one interviewee suggested was ‘what has brought us all 
together’ (ID7, LA1).  
63 The Gershon Review was an independent review of public sector efficiency in the UK published in 
2004, aiming to provide advice on making efficiency savings in order to release funds for frontline 
services.  The government response to the review was to initiate measures to produce annual efficiency 
savings of 2.5% for every government department. 
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These issues relating to the broader policy environment serve to underscore the 
important role  of government in  terms of creating a  framework which enables local 
agencies to collaborate.  Interviewees’ views of the level of coordination and coherence at 
the level of central government are examined in more detail in chapter six.   
The degree of interdependence
The degree of interdependence between agencies was the second major contextual inter-
organisational factor affecting collaboration. Interviewees indicated that dependence on 
other agencies was a major motivating factor or antecedent of collaboration.  The main 
reasons for agencies’ interdependence were the need to pull in the skill sets of staff from 
other organisations, to gain client referrals, and to draw on other organisations’ resources 
(table 5.9).  Resources included human resource input from other agencies, as well as 
housing.   Several  interviewees  commented  that  individuals  were  more  likely  to 
collaborate when they could see the personal or organisational benefits of doing so.  Such 
comments provide evidence of instrumental motivations for collaborating.  
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Table  5.9  Contextual  inter-organisational  factors  affecting  collaboration:  level  of 
interdependence
Theme Illustrative Quotes
Need to draw in 
other agencies’ 
resources e.g.
human resources/ 
housing
“Partnership working is a big feature of our work.  We offer over 70 
hours of activities, and that’s through a lot of working with our 
volunteers and tutors. We can’t do that on our own, we are a small 
team of three people, we rely heavily on partnerships”. ID17, LA2
“Every local authority department would say they value joint working 
approaches to dealing with problems, like involving the voluntary 
sector. They welcome anyone assisting which is going to reduce 
pressure on their own services”. ID24, LA1
“The council have been very helpful, I think partly because we’ve 
lifted the burden from them”. ID11, LA2
“In terms of the joint working, as much as I think that a lot of the 
agencies would still like to see local authorities providing council 
housing & offering temporary accommodation, I think they are aware 
of the crisis in council housing being made available, and that has 
made us have to work more closely together”. ID7, LA1
Dependence on 
skills of other 
professionals
“I think partnership working is driven by need simply because prisons 
are unable to fund or find the skills they need to work with the current 
support needs of offenders from within their own ranks”. ID32, LA2
Need to gain client 
referrals
“If we didn’t work with other agencies then no one would be referring 
to us. Because of the way the funding works we have to sustain high 
occupancy levels, and because of the network we’ve got, we are able 
to. So it’s necessary for our organisation to network”. ID12, LA3  
The presence of boundary spanners and other individual level factors
Third, interviewees’ comments (see table 5.10) provide support for previous work which 
argues that  collaboration is  to  a  significant degree influenced by the contribution  of 
individuals with relevant skills and abilities, sometimes referred to as boundary spanners 
(Williams 2002).  Numerous references were made to the importance of personality traits 
and it was clear that in many cases certain key individuals had contributed significantly to 
building and maintaining collaborative relationships.  Such people had helped to build 
bridges and ease tensions, and had ‘orchestrated’ joint working arrangements. They were 
described as being assertive,  proactive, persistent, creative,  able  to  cut red tape, and 
willing to take risks.  Other personal qualities included a willingness to engage, to put in 
effort, time and energy, and being committed to meeting the needs of clients. Interviewees 
also stressed the importance of individuals ‘getting on’, on a personal level.  
The perceived credibility of the people skilled at collaborating stemmed in part 
from their  ability  to  understand the  roles  and priorities  of  other  agencies. Previous 
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experience working in other agencies was considered beneficial in this respect, with many 
of those singled out for praise having worked in other local organisations involved with 
homelessness.  Having a relevant professional background was also thought to enhance 
individuals’ ability to understand other agencies’ perspectives.  Some housing workers 
suggested that collaboration over homelessness issues with agencies in the wider network 
would only succeed if homelessness was a personal priority for those working in those 
other organisations. Professional background was felt to be one of the factors influencing 
the prioritization or otherwise of issues such as homelessness. 
Interviewees commented that  in  the  sector  in  which they  worked there  was 
significant movement of staff between agencies as funding for jobs ceased and as new 
jobs  came up  in  other local  agencies.  This  helped increase understanding  between 
agencies  and  individuals  often  retained  links  with  ex-colleagues which  facilitated 
collaboration.  However, negative aspects were that the sector could become ‘cliquey’, 
and one interviewee commented that it could be difficult for new staff to penetrate the 
existing network of contacts.  
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Table 5.10 Boundary spanners and other individual level factors 
Theme Illustrative Quotes
Professional 
background
“We’ve got a really good worker whose got a history of working in 
drugs services, she’s also got also worked at the prison for quite a while, 
so she’s well-versed in both criminal justice & drug & alcohol issues”. 
ID5, LA1
Previous experience 
in other local 
agencies: positive 
and negative aspects
“People who work in housing or support needs with this sort of client 
group tend to pop around between the jobs when they become available, 
so everyone’s got a bit of experience here and there so they kind of 
understand the needs” ID14, LA2
“There is lots of movement of staff between agencies. The homeless 
sector here is quite cliquey – there are advantages to that but also 
disadvantages.  Advantages in that people know about other agencies but 
negative in that it’s all about who you know and if you are new to the 
area you don’t know where to start”. ID11, LA2.
Proactive/ Assertive 
approach
“It’s my personality I think. I try to cut every red tape if I can. If 
someone tries to fob me off with an email or says they haven’t time I’ll 
ring that person and say ‘why can’t you talk to me?’ You’ve got to be 
assertive”. ID40, LA1
“To be honest it’s probably down to my personality to have the cheek to 
ask. Some of it is networking, bumping into people. And having the gall 
to go up and ask somebody”.  ID17, LA2
Dedication, 
commitment, 
willingness to take 
risks
“They are willing to take risks as well as us. Both managers are willing 
to bend over backwards to make this work”.  ID17, LA2.
Importance of 
personal 
relationships  
“It’s very personality dependent. If the managers get on and like each 
other then they’re in each other’s pockets, if they don’t then they’re at 
each other’s throats”. ID19, LA2.
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Chapter summary and discussion
The aim at the outset of this chapter was to assess, from the perspective of street level 
bureaucrats, the perceived rationale for collaboration and the key factors affecting this, 
including challenges and enablers.  Overall,  street level bureaucrats working with the 
homeless were committed to  the  idea  of  collaboration, considering this  essential  for 
meeting the needs of service users.  They were generally of the view that homelessness 
was bound up with many other issues, and regarded their respective agencies as incapable 
of dealing with this multitude of issues alone, viewing themselves as interdependent in 
this respect. Altruistic considerations appeared to play a part in motivating collaboration, 
however, some of the main drivers were more instrumental in nature, relating to the need 
to lever in  resources from other agencies including human resources in  the form of 
relevant skills, accommodation and client referrals.  
Street level  bureaucrats cited a number of key externalities resulting from the 
fragmented network of agencies, such as gaps in services and a lack of accountability for 
providing services to clients with multiple needs who did not fit within any dominant 
service.  They suggested that from a client’s perspective services could seem inaccessible 
and confusing, and there was a perception that agencies did not always share information 
and duplicated at least some aspects of one other’s work, particularly in relation to the 
collection of client data.  In some cases these issues were cited as reasons for pursuing a 
collaborative  approach, although  it  was  not  clear  whether  these  considerations  had 
actually stimulated collaborative working.  Some externalities stemmed from the broader 
environment and were therefore outside of the control of local agencies, although could 
be ameliorated through greater policy coherence and collaborative working at the level of 
central government departments. 
In spite of interviewees’ broad support for the idea of collaboration, there were 
numerous obstacles to inter-agency working, both interpretive and contextual.  Many of 
these  factors,  especially  the  interpretive  factors,  resonate  fairly  strongly  with  the 
bureaucratic politics  perspective.  This  perspective stresses the differing priorities  of 
agencies, and suggests that agencies will seek to pursue their own interests in the absence 
of a common dominant interest.  The discussion above suggests that agencies involved in 
the homelessness network have differing priorities and agendas and that these differences 
do impede collaboration.  These agendas and priorities are in many cases a reflection of 
the  priorities  of  agencies’ funding  bodies  or  their  parent  government departments, 
channelled down to the local level.  The lack of a shared legal responsibility among 
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statutory agencies for homelessness suggests that it is a greater priority for some agencies 
and some parts of the local authority than for others.
The  bureaucratic  politics  perspective  also  views  governmental  actors  as 
competing factions,  engaged in  processes of  bargaining,  exchange and compromise. 
Certainly the environment of voluntary sector agencies and housing providers appears to 
be a competitive one, with agencies actively competing for funding and services.  It was 
clear  that  agencies employed strategies  such  as  withholding information  from other 
agencies and behaving possessively over their successful outcomes and even their clients, 
in order to protect their own positions.    
Bureaucratic  politics  also  draws  attention  to  the  unequal  terrain  in  which 
governmental actions are pursued, with some factions endowed with greater power and 
resources than others, and the outcomes of negotiations favouring those with greatest 
bargaining power.  Power inequalities in the case study areas were manifested in several 
different relationships. First, there were perceived inequalities between smaller and larger 
voluntary sector agencies, with interviewees from smaller organisations suggesting that 
larger agencies usually benefited from any new sources of government or local authority 
money, indicating that in this case the outcomes favoured these larger more powerful 
agencies. Second, inequalities were a feature of relationships between different district 
local authorities in a single county which were competing for shares of the county council 
budget. In this context the city authority was the largest player and there was a perception 
amongst the other district authorities that the city authority was the ‘winner’ in resource 
allocations from the County Council. Third, the local authority itself  was a powerful 
player  with  greater  bargaining  power  in  comparison to  the  other  agencies  in  the 
homelessness network. While the local authority itself was dependent on other agencies to 
provide services, the relationship was asymmetrical, with agencies depending heavily on 
the local authority for funding. 
Interviewees’ testimonies do, however, draw attention to ways in which some of 
the obstacles to collaboration associated with bureaucratic politics can be ameliorated. 
The  role  of  senior  staff  in  determining  organisational  priorities  and  supporting 
collaborative endeavours, as well as the persistence of key individuals with collaborative 
capacities appear to facilitate collaboration.  Furthermore the inherent interdependencies 
between agencies do sometimes compel agencies to collaborate in order to achieve their 
aims. 
On the basis of the evidence presented thus far, decisions around collaborating 
appear to  be more complex than rationalistic explanations of decision-making would 
suggest.  While collaboration can be viewed as a ‘rational’ response to agencies’ desire  to 
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pull in resources and to deal with homelessness holistically, decisions on whether and 
how much to collaborate are governed by a broader range of factors.  The range of 
options open to agencies is constrained by the policy context and funding environment, 
and by time and cost considerations, indicating bounded rationality at best.  Furthermore, 
decisions take place in an environment which is characterised by some of the features 
described in the bureaucratic politics perspective.  The next chapter examines similar 
issues at the level of central government. 
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Chapter 6: The Meta-Governance of Collaboration: 
Steering from the top-down?
Chapter Overview
The previous chapter began to explore what motivates actors in homelessness agencies to 
collaborate.  The motivations discussed were predominantly bottom-up, both altruistic 
and  instrumental.   As  discussed in  chapter  one,  a  further  potential  motivation  for 
collaborating is government edict or incentive, a ‘top-down’ driver.  It was suggested in 
chapter four that the field of homelessness is one where the UK government has promoted 
a collaborative approach to local service provision.  The aim of the present chapter is to 
characterise the  nature of  governmental  steering of  local  collaboration  in  relation to 
homelessness.  
This  chapter  first  assesses,  from the  perspective of  central  and  street  level 
bureaucrats,  the  degree  of  importance  attached  to  local  collaboration  by  central 
government.  It is asked whether collaboration appears to be a government policy priority 
(section 6.1).  The second section of the chapter (6.2) describes the vertical tools used by 
government to encourage local inter-agency collaboration, that is,  the tools of ‘meta-
governance’, using a combination of documentary and interview evidence.  The third 
section  (6.3)  discusses  the  level  and  forms of  collaboration at  the  level  of  central 
government, as well as the nature of links between government departments and national 
bodies, again drawing on perspectives from both central and street level and documentary 
evidence.   It  also  examines  the  challenges  of  collaboration  at  the  central  level. 
Collaboration in central government can itself be considered a form of vertical steering. 
As illustrated in chapter five, the priorities of central government departments set the 
framework within which local public sector agencies operate, and consequently the extent 
to which central policies are coordinated or joined up has implications for the ability of 
local agencies to work collaboratively.  
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6.1 Local collaboration as a government priority
Both central and local bureaucrats were asked whether they viewed local multi-agency 
collaboration as a government priority, and as something government was generally trying 
to promote in its approach to homelessness (see interview schedules, Appendices F and 
G).  The majority of street level interviewees were of the view that this was a government 
priority,  with  several  suggesting  that  collaborative,  multi-agency  approaches  to 
homelessness were firmly on the government’s agenda (see table 6.1).  This view was 
expressed by  local authority housing department staff  in  particular,  who felt  that the 
Department for Communities and Local Government was prioritising this. Those working 
in other statutory agencies including the probation service, the prison service and the 
health service also perceived there to be pressure from their own parent  government 
departments to work collaboratively with other agencies on a range of issues.  In the 
criminal justice sector there appeared to be particular emphasis on accommodation issues 
for  offenders and  ex-offenders.  The  majority  of  voluntary sector  interviewees also 
viewed collaboration as a priority at national level, although were less aware of specific 
government priorities on homelessness.  Their awareness of collaboration as an agenda 
more generally was generated principally through funding streams promoting this.  
Interviewees cited various examples of how collaboration was being promoted, 
including through funding which was increasingly tied to multi-agency working, through 
monitoring  visits  to  local  authorities and through greater emphasis  on involving the 
voluntary sector.   Several interviewees also mentioned the move towards Local Area 
Agreements  as  examples of  government’s  support  for  partnership and  collaborative 
approaches more generally.
However, a small minority of interviewees from the voluntary and RSL sector 
were unsure about how much of a government priority this was. In addition, some local 
authority interviewees felt that inter-agency collaboration was fading as a priority or was 
lower priority than other issues such as performance targets. Some suggested that sub-
regional collaboration and community involvement were issues with  greater political 
currency, with notions of partnership working beginning to extend beyond inter-agency 
collaboration towards community collaboration.  
Table  6.1  Street  level  bureaucrats’ views  of  central  government  prioritisation  of  local 
collaboration
Theme Illustrative Quotes
183
Local collaboration 
firmly on 
government agenda
‘The impression I get from all the White Papers is there’s a very clear 
agenda. The latest White Paper is promoting that one stage further still, not 
just local government, housing, social services working in partnership with 
voluntary agencies, but now also other agencies like the Police, Health, 
drawing those into the partnership working, so the idea is joined up 
communities, getting the Community involved in running their Estates. 
That kind of thing is a stage further in actually bringing the community 
itself back into the partnership.’ ID 9, LA 2
‘Yes, I get that impression. Not as much as with social & health care I 
don’t think. Cause it’s come on later, but yeah, I certainly get the 
impression that joint working is... through the strategy and everything, 
that’s what they want to see’ ID 3, LA3
Collaboration 
promoted through 
funding streams
‘Yes, it’s on the agenda, if you look at any government funding it specifies 
voluntary sector involvement’. ID 41, LA3
‘I think so, simply because all their funding is coming through that way’. 
ID 21, LA3
Collaboration 
promoted through 
visits to local 
authorities and 
monitoring
‘I think the stuff that comes out from CLG on homelessness makes it very 
clear that you have to work with agencies, and the way in which they 
monitor our performance and come down here and say what are you doing 
on this and that, is always encouraging working with agencies’ ID 1, LA 1.
‘Sometimes when people come down from CLG to the council review 
days, they certainly say that they promote that kind of stuff’ ID 23, LA 3.
Government 
priorities lie 
elsewhere, e.g. sub-
regional working; 
performance targets
‘I think they’re going even further than that, the government’s priority is at 
the moment is sub-regional working. Partnership working doesn’t appear 
to me as a priority, because there’s not been any impetus on trying to make 
people do it. Their focus at the moment is targets, measurable outcomes. 
They are trying to push people towards it, but there’s no requirement to do 
it. So it doesn’t come across as a priority’ ID 8, LA 2.
‘Yeah, it’s slightly faded but it’s still one of the buzzwords. Not as much as 
Community engagement. That’s certainly flavour of the month. Even then 
you do community engagement on a multi-agency partnership basis. So 
yeah, it’s still there.’ ID 29, LA 2.
Central  bureaucrats  themselves  viewed  collaboration  as  something  that  was  being 
promoted by government (table 6.2).  One of the principal means of doing this was by 
emphasising this in their guidance to local authorities, although one civil servant noted 
that their department would fall short of specifying to local authorities who their partner 
agencies should be, suggesting that this was up to local authorities to decide. 
In relation to rough sleeping and single homelessness,  one CLG civil  servant 
indicated that there was a strong push in this direction and suggested that these particular 
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manifestations of homelessness were multi-faceted and required a multi-agency approach, 
betraying  a  rationalistic  motivation  for  encouraging  collaboration.   Similarly,  a  civil 
servant from the Department of Health noted that this department recognised the interface 
between health and other aspects of people’s lives such as their housing, social support 
networks and employment status. In recognition that health services could not address 
these wider issues  alone,  the department had begun to  work with  other  government 
departments. It also encouraged local agencies such as health and housing services to 
work together, and had introduced a joint commissioning framework to facilitate this.
One  interviewee  noted  that  in  return  for  the  funding  provided  to  national 
voluntary sector organisations such as Shelter and the Citizen’s  Advice Bureau, they 
would expect to see the local arms of these agencies assisting local authorities in terms of 
homelessness  prevention  and  supporting  them  in  the  development  of  their  local 
homelessness strategies. In addition to multi-agency working, civil servants suggested 
that sub-regional working between local authorities was being promoted. 
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Table 6.2 Central bureaucrats’ views of level of priority attached to local collaboration by 
central government
Theme Illustrative Quotes
Central government 
prioritisation of 
local collaboration
‘We  want  agencies  to  work  together  in  the  delivery  of  our 
homelessness  strategy  in  the  local  authority  areas…  the  LA  are 
unlikely to deliver everything they need if they don’t work together’. 
ID 36, CLG
‘Obviously  Supporting  People  has  a  huge  role  in  terms  of  the 
prevention of homelessness and avoiding crisis,  so those links,  we 
would expect them to be made at a local level’. ID 34, CLG.
Rationalistic 
motivations for 
encouraging local 
collaboration
‘In order to crack rough sleeping you have to have a joint working 
approach, including the voluntary sector who provide the services for 
people on the street, like outreach teams… it won’t just work with the 
Local Authority. Police, because there’s a big crime issue, and you also 
need links into Health Services to address  drug and alcohol  issues, 
mental health issues, so rough sleeping tends to bring together, it’s the 
only way it’s going to work, cause you’re not only getting people off 
the street, you’ve gotta get them to address their problems, and once 
that’s happened onto some form of employment or training, so Local 
Authorities in the lead,  working with the voluntary sector and with 
other agencies…it wouldn’t work without a multi-agency approach’. 
ID 36, CLG
‘The joint commissioning framework and health inequalities – that’s 
really the way DH is moving, there is a recognition that if you haven’t 
got somewhere decent to live, a job, or social networks, then you’re 
not likely to be very well. So actually providing work or meaningful 
activity and somewhere decent to live, the health service can’t provide 
those,  so  it  has  to  work  together  with  other  departments…  Joint 
commissioning is about signing up to the same kind of document and 
suggestions that local areas on the ground should work together’. ID 
34, Department of Health
Prioritisation of 
sub-regional 
collaboration
‘We are  encouraging wider  working on a sub-regional  basis.  We’re 
keen  to  get  the  smaller  boroughs  to  work  together  on  their 
homelessness  strategy.  Our  homelessness  prevention  best  practice 
guides  encourage  smaller  areas  to  work  together  and  consider 
commissioning things like mediation and rent deposit schemes that go 
wider than just boroughs, to use economies of scale.  In London we 
have  been  funding  posts  so  that  authorities  work  together  sub-
regionally on homelessness issues’. ID 36, CLG
In summary, there appears to be agreement between central and local bureaucrats that 
collaboration is a policy priority for central government.  The above section highlights 
some of the ways in  which this  priority is  manifested, for example through funding 
streams,  government  guidance  and  cross-cutting  policy  agendas  in  government 
departments.  Comments from civil servants suggest that civil servants in government 
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departments hold  fairly  rationalistic  motivations  for  encouraging  local  agencies  to 
collaborate, believing that this is the best way to tackle homelessness and the wider issues 
with which it is associated64.  The next section provides a more systematic analysis of the 
particular ways in which government has promoted collaboration in the homelessness 
sector in recent years, drawing on documentary evidence such as government reports, 
official guidance and legislation, as well as on interview data.
6.2 Classification of vertical meta-governance tools to stimulate local 
collaboration
As discussed in chapter two, the stimulation by central government of local collaboration 
falls within the realm of ‘meta-policy’, concerned with the systems and structures within 
which substantive policy outputs occur. Governments seeking to induce collaboration in 
local actors  can do so using  a  variety of coordination tools,  that is,  tools  of ‘meta-
governance’. Broadly these fit into the categories of authoritative, information-based and 
incentive-based tools.  Each of these can categories can also be considered a type of 
governance strategy.  Table 6.3 summarises the main types of governance strategy and the 
associated meta-governance tools discussed in chapter two. 
64 Although this analysis of civil servants is based on a small number of interviews, this point is backed up 
by government guidance which has a strong rationalistic orientation.  
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Table 6.3 Governance strategies and tools for promoting collaboration
Governance 
strategy
Tools of meta-
governance
Examples
Authority-based
Mandatory 
collaboration via 
legislation
Bi-lateral government;  Relational contracting; 
Covenants
Network constitution/ 
Process management 
Creation of multi-agency bodies/ new 
organisational arrangements 
Monitoring/ 
Regulation
Inspections/ audit/ field visits/ analysis of local 
plans; Joint inspections; Shared targets
Information-based
Exhortation/ Suasion 
(effector tools)
Written guidance esp. jointly produced;  Rhetoric 
of collaboration within government policy 
literature;  Inter-personal information provision 
e.g. events, conferences or informally
Various detector tools Collection of good practice on collaboration
Incentive-based
Treasure Funding streams to reward collaboration
Capacity building 
measures
Additional personnel to reward/ facilitate 
collaboration;  Funding to defray costs of 
collaboration; Technical assistance
It was also suggested in chapter two that the implementation of collaboration is likely to 
require a mix of coordination tools (Lynn 1996; De Bruijn and Ten Heuvelhoff 1997). 
However,  as  discussed by  Alexander (1995), there is  little  research investigating the 
appropriateness  of  different tools  mixes for  governments wishing to  influence inter-
organisational relationships.  The next subsection of the chapter identifies the range of 
coordination tools  that are used in  the English homelessness sector,  using the above 
framework to guide the analysis.  
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6.2.1 Authority-based tools
Mandatory collaboration
There is some use of mandatory collaboration in the form of legislation in the sector. 
These laws specify particular points within the system where particular  agencies are 
required to cooperate, thus corresponding to the concept of ‘bi-lateral government’ in 
which laws are introduced to control the interactions of pairs of organisations (Alexander 
1995).  In terms of mode of vertical coordination, laws are ‘impersonal’ and formal, since 
they are codified in writing.  Table 6.4 below outlines various pieces of housing, health 
and social services legislation with collaborative implications for local service providers 
in relation to homelessness.  The table provides a full range of examples beyond single 
homelessness in order to illustrate the general approach used in the sector.  
As illustrated, there is a legal requirement under the NHS and Community Care 
Act  1990 for  social  services departments to  inform housing  authorities  when  client 
community care assessments reveal issues of housing vulnerability.  On the other hand, 
under the Housing Act 1996, housing authorities must inform social services departments 
where families  with  children do  not  qualify  for  statutory homelessness  assistance65. 
Similarly, the NHS and Community Care Act stipulates that when people are found to be 
vulnerable and homeless under  statutory  definitions,  housing  authorities  should  also 
consider their eligibility for social care services.  There is also a requirement under the 
Housing Act 1996 for Registered Social Landlords and Housing Action Trusts to provide 
‘reasonable assistance’ to Local Housing Authorities where requested to enable them to 
meet their statutory homelessness duties. In practice this  involves making available a 
reasonable proportion of their accommodation to homeless households as requested by 
the local authority.  Under the same Act, Local Housing Authorities must also cooperate 
in  providing  assistance  to  other  Local  Housing  Authorities  when  requested.   The 
Homelessness Act 2002 requires Social Services Departments to provide ‘all reasonable 
assistance’ in  helping  the  Housing  Authority  to  produce  its  compulsory  five-yearly 
Homelessness Strategy. 
Although the list of powers and duties relating to collaboration appears to be fairly 
extensive, it can be seen that the tenor of these legislative requirements is advisory rather 
than prescriptive.  Injunctions about ‘reasonable cooperation’, ‘expectations to engage 
with other agencies’ and ‘consideration of joint action’ are fairly ambiguous and open to 
interpretation by  the  authorities  concerned.  This  is  likely  to  have  implications  for 
65 For example because of being deemed ‘intentionally homeless’
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enforcing the legislation since clear evidence of failure to cooperate may be difficult to 
detect, highlighting one potential difficulty of monitoring and mandating collaboration 
from the top-down.  
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Table 6.4 Legislation with collaborative implications relevant to homelessness sector
Legislation Relevant 
section(s)
Nature of duty/ power 
Housing Act 
1996
213, 213a, 
170
• ‘Reasonable cooperation’ from housing and social services 
authorities and relevant housing bodies (registered social 
landlords and housing action trusts in England and Wales) in 
relation to housing duties and inquiries when requested.
• ‘Reasonable cooperation’ from RSLs to accommodate 
priority applications under LA’s allocations policy.
• Notification by housing authorities to social services 
authorities where families with children are ineligible for 
homelessness assistance.  
Homelessness 
Act 2002
1, 3 • Consideration of how joint action between local 
homelessness bodies could help achieve objectives of local 
homelessness strategy.
• Expectation that relevant homelessness bodies* will engage 
in creating and updating the local authority homelessness 
strategy. Legal duty for Social Services to cooperate in this 
process. 
• Consideration of cross-boundary partnerships with other 
local authorities and local strategic partnerships. 
Local Govt. 
Act 2000
2 • Community wellbeing power provides scope for cross 
boundary partnership working between local authorities.
Children Act 
1989
27 • Duty for statutory authorities to provide help provide 
services as requested by local authorities in relation to 
children and young people homeless or threatened with 
homelessness. Emphasis on joint agreements between 
relevant departments for assessing clients, & coordinated 
strategic planning/ service provision.
• Cooperation from the housing authority when requested by 
social services authority in accommodating young care 
leavers and 16 & 17 year olds. Emphasis on jointly agreed 
protocols between housing and social services authorities.
NHS and 
Community 
Care Act 1990
47 • Social services assessment of those with community care 
needs must include assessment of housing need. Housing 
authority to be notified when housing need is identified.  
• Use of established eligibility framework in assessing 
eligibility for social services for vulnerable homeless 
people. 
Health Act 
1999
27, 31 • Duty for NHS bodies & local authorities to cooperate in 
exercising their respective functions to secure health and 
welfare outcomes. 
• Power to set up pooled budgets, lead commissioning and 
integrated provision between Health Authority and any other 
related authority, including the housing authority.
Source: Department for Communities and Local Government, Homelessness Code of Guidance 
for Local Authorities 2006
* Bodies specified include social services departments, primary care trusts, the national offender 
management  service,  the  police,  voluntary  and  community  sector  organisations,  registered 
social landlords and private landlords.
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Network constitution
At least two forms of authoritative network constitution have been used in the context of 
English homelessness services.  Network constitution, as noted by Klijn and Koppenjan 
(2000), are tools of ‘process management’ aiming to improve interactions between actors. 
Creating or merging agencies, tampering with organisational boundaries, or establishing 
new organisational structures are common forms of network constitution.  In the present 
context, the requirement to produce a multi-agency homelessness strategy (see table 6.4 
above) in most authorities has necessitated the creation of a multi-agency homelessness 
group responsible for writing the strategy and overseeing its implementation.  This group 
provides a forum for managing interactions and relationships between organisations.  
Supporting  People  Commissioning  Bodies  are  a  second  form  of  network 
constitution.  As discussed in chapter four, these are compulsory multi-agency bodies in 
every  Supporting  People administering  authority,  in  which the  Local  Authority,  the 
Probation Service and the Primary Care Trust are required to participate.  Each agency 
has  a  vote  on  service  commissioning  decisions  related  to  housing  related  support, 
including homelessness. This multi-agency body is a reflection of the broad aims of the 
programme  to  assist  the  transition  to  independent  living  for  those  leaving  an 
institutionalised environment such as prisons or hospitals, and to prevent homelessness. 
Both Supporting People Commissioning Bodies and Homelessness Strategy groups are 
examples of group coordination modes mandated by government, involving face-to-face 
communication  in  which  several  actors  to  come  together  simultaneously to  devise 
coordinated responses to homelessness in local areas. 
Monitoring and Regulation
Other  authoritative  tools  include  several  varieties  of  monitoring  and  regulation. 
Regulation of collaboration takes place through inspections of Local Housing Authorities 
carried out by the Audit Commission’s Housing inspectorate, a form of personal vertical 
coordination. Two of the ‘Key Lines of Enquiry’ used in these inspections are intended to 
measure aspects of collaboration66.  The Audit Commission has produced a number of 
reports which highlight strengths and weaknesses in joint working arrangements between 
66 KLOE 7: ‘Allocations and lettings’: assessment of arrangements of working with partners to ensure an 
appropriate level of allocations/ nominations go to homeless households, including formal nominations 
agreements with partners, which are to be regularly monitored.
KLOE 8: ‘Homelessness and housing needs’: Assessment of involvement of relevant partners with 
homelessness review and strategy; assessment of partnership working with other teams to secure funding 
from cross-cutting sources to prevent homelessness; assessment of protocols with partner agencies for 
certain vulnerable groups. 
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local  authorities  and their  relevant partner  agencies  with  a  role  in  the  wider issues 
associated with homelessness.  Research has been undertaken by CLG to monitor the 
implementation  of  homelessness  strategies,  including  assessment  of  the  extent  of 
involvement of relevant partners in contributing to the strategies and the development of 
multi-agency working  more  generally  (ODPM 2004b).   Issues  around  partnership 
working in homelessness services have also been assessed within House of Commons 
Committee of Public Accounts and Public Administration Select Committee processes. 
Another form of monitoring, although a more indirect and impersonal variety, is 
the use of a self-assessment toolkit for local authorities to assess their own progress on 
tackling  homelessness. This  toolkit  incorporates assessment  of  inter-agency working 
(CLG 2006b).   The tool  encourages authorities  to  assess their  progress  against  the 
development of  a  range  of  collaboration  mechanisms and  processes such  as  joint 
protocols,  information  sharing  procedures,  multi-agency  forums  and  sub-regional 
working.  Authorities are encouraged to send this information to CLG, although this is not 
compulsory.  
Finally, as noted in chapter four, CLG monitors housing authorities’ homelessness 
performance  using  a  combination  of  indicators  and  targets,  another  impersonal 
coordination mode. Although this performance information does not directly measure 
inter-agency  collaboration,  central  bureaucrats interviewed for  the  purposes  of  this 
research expressed the view that local authorities’ ability to meet these government targets 
was dependent upon them working in partnership with other relevant bodies. 
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6.2.2 Information-based tools
Effector Tools: Exhortation and Guidance 
Information or communication-based strategies to encourage collaboration include tools 
aimed at imparting advice and information to local agencies as well as those aimed at 
gathering information, that is, government as both effector and detector (Hood 1983). 
Information  effecting tools  range  from  simple  exhortation  to  detailed  guidance. 
Exhortations for local agencies to collaborate are pervasive in central policy documents. 
For instance, collaboration is a strong theme in the government’s national strategy for 
homelessness  (ODPM 2005b).   The  following  extract  from the  national  strategy is 
illustrative. One of the core strands of the strategy is stated as:
‘to encourage and support stronger partnerships between local authorities, 
housing associations, private landlords and other statutory and voluntary 
sector  agencies  –  so  that  they  act  in  concert  to  help  people  avoid 
homelessness and provide solutions to homelessness’ (ODPM 2005b, p. 
14).  
The strategy states that collaboration is  central to delivering on government’s  priority 
areas for homelessness, such as reducing rough sleeping and the numbers of people living 
in temporary accommodation.  As noted above, interviews with central policy makers 
confirmed that the official view was that the government’s priorities for homelessness 
could only be achieved by local agencies working in partnership. Government extolling 
the virtues of partnership working in a general sense can be seen as a ‘cultural-persuasive’ 
implementation tool in which government uses its moral authority to promote the virtues 
of partnership approaches (Stoker 2000).
Detailed  guidance  on  collaboration  is  provided  nationally  through  the 
Homelessness Code of  Guidance (ODPM 2002a; CLG 2006a). It  contains  an  entire 
chapter devoted to ‘working with others’ which provides guidance to housing authorities 
on working in partnership with other agencies, including forms of collaboration and lists 
of  agencies  relevant to  the  prevention of  homelessness.  The forms of  collaboration 
recommended in the Code of Guidance are listed in table 6.5.  The Code of Guidance also 
clarifies the legislative requirements for collaboration as discussed above. 
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Table 6.5 Horizontal coordination tools suggested in central guidance
_____________________________________________________________________________
• Establishment of multi-agency forum to share information, ideas etc
• Making clear links between homelessness strategy and other key strategies
• Joint protocols for referring clients between services and sharing information
• Establishment of formal links between organisations
• Joint planning and commissioning of services
• Funding of joint posts
• Joint training
• Senior housing representation on key corporate groups
• Common assessment procedures
• Client confidentiality protocols
• Visits between agencies
• Joint case conferences
• Easily updated guide on the work of different agencies
• Exchange of information between agencies about services provided, how they can be 
accessed and what an agency cannot do
• Increased  liaison  through  contacts  between  staff  at  both  frontline  and  management 
levels  
• Sharing information and joint research on local needs
• Joint initiatives and development plans
• An agreed officer or agency to facilitate and drive the process of joint work 
_____________________________________________________________________________
 Sources: ODPM 2002a; CLG 2006a
This official guidance is supplemented by additional best practice guides on collaboration 
in homelessness. Guidance has been produced on collaboration for Housing Associations 
and  Local  Authorities  (ODPM 2003;  2004a),  Primary  Care  Trusts,  Hospitals  with 
Housing Authorities (ODPM 2004c; 2005c) and Drug Action Teams, Local Authorities 
and Voluntary Sector homelessness agencies (ODPM 2002b). Much of this  particular 
guidance  is  issued  jointly  by  CLG  (previously  ODPM) in  cooperation  with  other 
government departments and national bodies as appropriate, such as the Department of 
Health, Home Office, National Treatment Agency and Housing Corporation.  In addition, 
a  ‘joint  commissioning  framework’ aimed  at  housing,  health,  and  social  services 
authorities, has been produced by CLG (2007). This framework aims to encourage joint 
planning  and  joint  commissioning between health  providers  and  local  authorities  to 
ensure that the health needs of homeless people and those in temporary accommodation 
are met.  Table 6.6 summarises the advice contained within central guidance on issues 
over which collaboration is advised, including the key partners with whom local housing 
authorities are expected to work. 
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Table  6.6  Specific  issues  requiring  collaboration  highlighted  in  official  guidance  and 
recommended partner agencies
Relevant Partners Client group Purpose of collaboration
Prisons, Youth Offending 
Teams, National Offender 
Management Service, 
Probation Service, Housing 
Advice Projects 
Ex-offenders, Offenders, 
Users of Criminal Justice 
System
- To prevent homelessness and 
   re- offending 
Police, Voluntary Sector 
Organisations
Rough Sleepers, People 
at Risk of Homelessness
- To tackle issues associated with  
   with homelessness eg anti-  
   social behaviour, begging,  
   street drinking, drug misuse
Primary Care Trusts (PCTs)
All homeless groups - Improve access to mainstream 
   health services and health   
   outcomes for homeless people 
Hospital-based social 
workers (Social Services, 
NHS Trusts)
Homeless patients - Accommodation assessment/   
   plan prior to discharge to avoid  
   homelessness
Drug Action Teams (DATs)
Homeless Drug Users - Meeting accommodation of  
  homeless drug users
- Improving access to drug  
   treatment for homeless people
- Assure DAT Treatment Plans in  
   line with homelessness  
   strategies
GPs, Community Mental 
Health Teams, Hospitals, 
Mental Health Crisis Teams, 
A&E Wards, Supported 
Accommodation Providers
Homeless People with 
Mental Health Problems
- Accessing Mental Health   
   Services
- Preventing homelessness in 
   discharged patients through 
   early identification of housing  
   needs
Private sector landlords
All prospective and 
existing private sector 
tenants
- Increase access to private rented 
   sector
- Prevent evictions
Housing associations
All prospective and 
existing housing 
association tenants
- Improve allocations & make  
   temporary accommodation  
   available for homeless people
- Prevent evictions
Ministry of Defense (MOD) 
Resettlement Services, Joint 
Service Housing Advice 
Office
Armed Services 
Personnel
- Prevention of homelessness 
   amongst ex-services personnel
Various Statutory Agencies, 
Voluntary Agencies and 
Accommodation providers
All homeless or 
potentially homeless 
people
- Create local homelessness   
   strategy
Sources: ODPM 2002a; 2002c; 2003a; 2004a; 2004b; CLG 2006a; 2007
Detector/ Effector tools
196
Information-based tools which can be considered both effectors include the identification 
of  examples of  good  practice  through schemes such  as  the  ‘Regional  Champions’ 
programme67. One of the aims of the scheme is to select local authorities which have 
demonstrated excellence  in  preventing  and  tackling  homelessness (detecting).  These 
authorities  subsequently  provide  support  to  other  local  authorities  in  their  region 
(effecting).  This support takes the form of peer assessment, advice and sharing of best 
practice and information across local authorities. This vertical coordination measure is 
therefore an attempt to enhance collaboration across local authorities. 
An additional example is the use of field visits to local housing authorities from 
CLG civil servants.  These are conducted predominantly in local authorities with either 
particularly high or particularly low performance.  In the former case visits are used to 
identify  areas of  good practice  which  may serve as  potential  models to  be  applied 
elsewhere, while in the latter case civil servants provide advice to authorities to enable 
them to improve services. Interviewees suggested that such visits were widely used in the 
homelessness sector and that direct contact between CLG central civil servants and local 
authorities was fairly high.  Interviewees also commented that collaborative arrangements 
were a core topic discussed during these visits.  Similarly, CLG runs regular ‘Roadshows’ 
which serve as  information gathering and imparting tools.  These events take place 
regularly throughout the  country and are used by CLG to  promote its  homelessness 
agenda in local areas.  
6.2.3 Incentive-based tools
Governmental promotion  of  collaboration  amongst  local  homelessness  services  also 
makes some use of incentive-based instruments, particularly  through funding streams 
which reward collaboration.  The Supporting People programme discussed above is a 
potential incentive for collaboration by encouraging submission of joint or multi-agency 
bids.  The use of joint commissioning bodies with probation, health service and local 
authority membership is also a means of ensuring that those services which are funded 
take account of the different agendas of these agencies and the needs of their respective 
client  groups, thus channelling funding towards projects which take a holistic, multi-
agency approach.
67 Formerly the Beacons Scheme for Homelessness. www.communities.gov.uk – accessed 30/04/07
197
  Collaborative working is  also financially rewarded through two ‘Innovation 
Funds’68.  Local authorities, voluntary sector organisations and RSLs are entitled to apply 
to these funds. All existing funded projects incorporate some element of collaboration 
between relevant agencies,  accommodation providers or  community and service user 
groups69.  Many of the projects focus on increasing the availability of accommodation for 
homeless people  by  building  links  between landlords,  relevant agencies and  tenant 
groups. Some have an educational and preventive emphasis, while others seek to provide 
multi-agency support  to  help  formerly  homeless  people,  including  single  homeless 
people, to  move from temporary into  permanent accommodation.    A national  pilot 
project, the ‘Move-On Plans Pilot’ funded through this scheme is a developmental project 
to devise models of joint protocol working between local authorities and hostel providers. 
 The  above-mentioned  ‘Regional  Champions’  scheme  is  arguably  both  an 
incentive-based and an information-based tool.  While it encourages information sharing 
between local  authorities,  it  also  provides  a  financial  reward70 to  those  which  can 
demonstrate strengths in partnership working, since successful applicants must display the 
skills and ability to work across boundaries with other local authorities in order to share 
good practice71. 
As noted in chapter two, capacity building tools can be classed as a particular sub-
set  of  incentive-based tools  which aim to  provide  targeted support for  collaborative 
working.  A number of the incentive-based tools summarised above can be viewed as 
attempts to build local capacity for collaboration.    The Regional Champions scheme, for 
instance, is a mechanism for building local innovation and encouraging local transfer of 
best  practice.   The  centrally  produced guidance  on  forms  of  collaboration  can  be 
considered a form of technical assistance to develop collaborative skills.  The Move-On 
Plans Pilot is a method for developing methods and templates for collaboration. 
In summary, government uses a range of tools to encourage local agencies to 
collaborate.  This is in line with observations in the literature discussed in chapter two that 
governments seeking to influence networks of agencies cannot rely solely on authority-
based tools and may require a mix of tools.  However, not all the available tools of meta-
governance are used in  the context of  homelessness services. National homelessness 
targets, for instance, are aimed at local authorities rather than being jointly shared.  While 
meeting  such  targets  may  require  local  authorities  to  work  in  partnership,  unless 
government targets are shared by different statutory agencies, it seems likely that their 
68 The Innovation Fund and Ethnic Minorities Innovation Fund (EMIF) www.communities.gov.uk – 
accessed 30/04/07
69 42 such awards had been made by May 2007
70 Approximately £12,000 per champion
71 CLG website ‘Regional Champions’ www.communities.gov.uk - accessed 01/05/07 
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own  departmental priorities  will  take  precedence.   Similarly,  while  inspections  do 
examine housing authorities’ arrangements with other agencies, there is  relatively little 
use72 of joint inspections between the Housing Inspectorate and the Inspectorates of the 
other  public  sector  delivery  agencies  involved in  the  wider  issues  associated with 
homelessness.  
6.2.4 Additional national actors and local governance structures
Although the above discussion has focused on the role of government departments in 
promoting collaboration between homelessness agencies, non-governmental actors and 
quasi-public bodies also have a potential role to play in targeting the bodies within their 
own domain.  For instance, the Housing Corporation has a ‘Gold Award’ scheme aimed at 
Housing Associations, similar to CLG’s Regional Champions scheme.  In addition, it has 
produced its own national Homelessness Strategy aimed at Housing Associations.  The 
Housing Corporation in its Regulatory Code stipulates that RSLs should give reasonable 
preference to those in housing need, and further states that RSLs must cooperate with 
Local Authorities  to  assist  them in  carrying out  their  homelessness duties,  therefore 
reinforcing the duties of the Housing Act 1996 as discussed above.
National voluntary sector organisations such as Shelter, Crisis and Homeless Link 
have  produced  guidance  on  collaboration.   Homeless  Link,  the  national  umbrella 
organisation for homelessness charities, has been particularly involved in the promotion 
of multi-agency approaches, providing training in association with Shelter and others for 
local agencies. Other national housing organisations involved with the RSL sector such as 
the  National  Housing  Federation and  the  Chartered  Institute  of  Housing  have  also 
collaborated with CLG in the provision of guidance for local agencies.    
There are a range of broader local governance structures in which collaboration 
processes between homelessness agencies in England are embedded.  These are not all 
directly related to homelessness but serve as a potential means of joining up services at a 
local level.  They include Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs), Local Area Agreements 
(LAAs), the Joint Commissioning process for Health and Wellbeing, and the National 
Value  Improvement  Programme amongst  others.   These  governance structures vary 
widely in their aims and scope.  
LSPs  aim  to  join  up  the  myriad of  partnership  programmes  in  local  areas, 
providing overarching coordination.   They provide  a  means of  identifying interfaces 
between different public service agendas at a local strategic level.  LAAs also aim to 
72 Although joint inspections are not widely used, one of the local authority case studies had experienced a 
joint inspection as discussed in chapter nine.
199
improve the delivery of local services by securing better coordination between central and 
local government and its partners.  Indeed, a statutory duty for local agencies to cooperate 
in delivering their LAA there has recently been introduced.  A number of local authorities 
have included homelessness  targets within their LAAs73.   These structures provide a 
potential  means  of  raising  the  corporate  responsibility  for  cross-cutting  areas  like 
homelessness across local authorities. Other strategic mechanisms which provide a means 
of  coordinating  work  on  homelessness  include  local  authority  Housing  Strategies, 
Community  Strategies  and  numerous  other  strategies  for  areas  overlapping  with 
homelessness,  such  as  those  relating  to  Domestic  Violence,  Community  Safety and 
Substance Abuse.
The Commissioning Framework for Health and Wellbeing (DH 2007) is targeted 
at Primary Care Trusts, practice-based commissioners and local authorities, and the aim is 
to  encourage integrated approaches to  service  commissioning  and  delivery,  through 
processes such as joint needs assessment and improved information sharing procedures. 
The above mentioned joint commissioning framework for homelessness (table 6.2, ID34) 
is one component of this broader process. 
Lastly,  the  ‘National  Value  Improvement  Programme’ aims  to  support  local 
authorities to work with their partners locally, particularly in relation to issues around 
contracting and commissioning. The programme is delivered through Regional Centres of 
Excellence, and is driven nationally by relevant government departments and directorates. 
It is led from CLG but also involves other relevant government departments and national 
voluntary sector partners.  
In summary, the vertical steering strategy for promoting collaboration which is 
currently employed in the English homelessness sector utilises a fairly wide mix of tools, 
including  authoritative,  information-based  and  incentive-based tools  including  those 
aimed at building local capacity for collaboration.  Some tools are aimed specifically at 
addressing homelessness. However, these tools are embedded within other, more broadly 
based meta-governmental processes such as Local Strategic Partnerships and Local Area 
Agreements.  The latter tools set a broad framework for collaboration at local authority 
level, arguably creating a  culture of partnership in public services delivery,  therefore 
acting as potential facilitators of collaborations in service areas such as homelessness. 
Although central government is the main actor, a range of government departments have 
some involvement in steering collaboration, and other national bodies play a minor role in 
steering collaboration.  Nevertheless, CLG is the strategic lead at a national level for 
73 For example the London Borough of Camden and Devon County Council. In Devon the Local 
Agreement was also used to align and simplify budgeting arrangements for housing budgets such as 
Homelessness and Supporting People Budgets with others.  
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homelessness,  and the majority  of meta-governance initiatives have been led by this 
department.  
6.3 Collaboration in central government as a form of vertical steering
As discussed in previous chapters, there are significant challenges to collaboration at the 
level of central government.  Since central government is organised along departmental 
lines, there is a propensity for ministers and civil servants to focus on their own narrow 
departmental objectives, leading to a neglect of cross-cutting issues. Moreover, because 
budgets are allocated departmentally rather than cross-departmentally, there is a tendency 
for  departments to  seek to  defend their  budgets.   The priorities  of  departments are 
frequently in  conflict,  creating problems for  local  service  providers.   An influential 
Cabinet Office report on Whitehall’s management of cross-cutting policies and services 
(PIU 2000) backs this up.  As the report states:   
‘mechanisms for reconciling conflicting priorities between departments can 
be weak, leaving service deliverers to wrestle with uncoordinated central 
initiatives and policy initiatives and without the flexibility to deal with these 
in a way that makes most sense at local level’ (PIU 2000, p. 12).
The last section of this chapter assesses the extent and forms of collaboration at the level 
of  central government in relation to homelessness.  As the above quotation illustrates, 
where  central  government departments are  uncoordinated,  systemic  effects  such  as 
conflicting priorities may ensue.  The effects of these conflicts are often channelled down 
to local level, creating tensions between agencies and competing priorities which militate 
against collaboration.  As with the local level, collaboration in central government is one 
potential  means for addressing systemic effects  such as  policy incoherence,  and can 
therefore be considered a form of vertical steering of local collaboration.  
6.3.1 Forms of collaboration in central government
Evidence  of  forms of  collaboration  employed in  central  government in  relation  to 
homelessness  was  gathered both  from  civil  servant  interviewees  and  from  official 
documentation74.  Comments from central civil servants suggest that they do recognise the 
importance of joining up at the level of central government in order to support  such 
efforts further down the line. The following quotations from civil servants are illustrative:
74 Five civil servants including representatives from CLG, the Supporting People Directorate and the 
Department of Health. The limited number of civil servant interviewees does not warrant a full thematic 
qualitative analysis. The themes presented in this section are therefore indicative only.
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“At national level you need to have someone that can get to grips with and be 
informed about the problems and the implications of things so that if a policy is 
being  developed  you  can  look  at  it  and  say,  ‘this  is  going  to  have  these 
implications for homeless people and it’s not good’... and I would hope that most 
policy  areas  would  automatically  include  homeless  issues  in  their 
considerations”. ID 33, Department of Health Civil Servant
“It’s getting people to understand how the issues are linked and if  they don’t 
understand that at central level, it can be a bit of a bugger at local level”. ID 37, 
CLG Civil Servant
The first quote illustrates a belief that departments should take into account the systemic 
effects – positive or negative – that their policies have on other departments.  The latter 
acknowledges the tensions created for local agencies when departments do not do this. To 
what extent, then, are these aspirations realised in practice and what forms does central 
collaboration take? 
Collaboration  within  Whitehall  appears  to  occur  through  a  combination  of 
informal channels  and  formal  mechanisms, although there  may  be  growing  use  of 
formalised  arrangements.   Interviewees  indicated  that  informal  and  ad-hoc 
communication with colleagues from other departments was used to deal with specific 
issues as and when they arose, often via email or telephone or face-to-face discussions. 
They also highlighted the importance of  having good contacts in  other departments. 
Informal contact typically involved departments copying colleagues in other departments 
into e-mails or sending copies of strategies or policy documents on which to comment. A 
practical difficulty of managing informal communication of this type was dealing with the 
volume of emails and correspondence sent by different departments.  
Individuals were most connected with departments which overlapped with their 
own areas of work.  Examples included informal contact between CLG and the Ministry 
of Defence on resettling ex-service personnel, liaison between CLG’s Supporting People 
Directorate and  the  Home Office  on  accommodating  ex-offenders,  and  interactions 
between the Supporting People Team and the Department for Work and Pensions on 
issues  relating  to  Housing  Benefit.   However,  the  issues  over  which  departments 
collaborated were themselves a reflection of government priorities at the time, and the 
changing nature of government policy meant that relationships with officials  in other 
departments were also continually changing.  For instance, one CLG interviewee (ID35) 
commented  that  government priorities  were  moving  towards  refugees  and  migrant 
workers, and away from offending, which would lead to a strengthening of his personal 
links with relevant parts of the Home Office and a decrease in contact with the National 
Offender Management Service.
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Collaboration with other departments was also generated in response to issues 
raised by MPs during parliamentary questions or by Ministers.  One interviewee noted 
that departmental work programmes on which civil servants worked were often diverted 
by having to spend time responding to ministerial business, and characterised their work 
as ‘reactive’.  This interviewee also noted that  issues high on the political or public 
agenda came to dominate cross-departmental working.  Examples included stories in the 
press around prisoners, asylum seekers and migrant workers.  When issues such as these 
emerged, they would become the priority for cross-government work.  This highlights the 
difficulty of undertaking planned, rational collaborative working in a dynamic political 
environment. 
Much joint  contact was generated through shared work programmes between 
departments, with some individual staff sitting on other departments’ boards when these 
were relevant to their own work75 .  There also appeared to be a fairly significant amount 
of movement of personnel horizontally around government departments and vertically 
from local government to central government.  For instance, all civil servant interviewees 
had previously worked in other government departments or within local government.  As 
noted in chapter two, such personal contact between individuals in different departments 
has the potential to enhance understanding between the different arms of government. 
However,  these  informal  methods  were  supplemented  by  more  formal 
collaborative processes. The most widely used processes fall  into the group mode of 
coordination as discussed in chapter two, although personal and impersonal modes are 
also used (table 6.7).  The most common group modes cited by interviewees were inter-
departmental groups and networks, such as a joint Home Office/Department of Health 
group working on prisoners’ health issues and a housing network within the Department 
of  Health. There were also regular  inter-departmental meetings  including  a  monthly 
meeting  between  CLG,  the  Home  Office  and  the  National  Treatment  Agency  on 
offending, drugs and housing issues, with a rotating Chair.  Ad-hoc meetings were also 
held between departments and other national partners to deal with specific issues when 
they arose.  At  a  more strategic level,  the  National  Homelessness  Strategy and the 
Supporting People programme both had cross-departmental steering groups attached to 
them which included additional para-public bodies such as the Audit Commission and 
relevant national charities.  A group had also recently been established to enable CLG to 
develop a more strategic and systematic approach to its work with other government 
departments and to  identify shared priorities. Additional group modes included inter-
75 For instance, CLG representatives sitting on the Home Office’s Re-Offending Board
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ministerial groups attended by civil servants, and seminars and meetings held with other 
relevant national bodies such as charities and accommodation providers.  
Although not discussed by interviewees themselves, a final group coordination 
mode employed was the creation of the Rough Sleepers Unit in 1999. This was a new 
body created to  coordinate responses to  rough sleeping, and itself  part  of  a  broader 
strategy of the then Social Exclusion Unit to develop a cross-departmental approach to 
issues of social exclusion (NAO 2001).  The unit was based in the then Department for 
the Environment, Transport and the Regions and brought together national funding for 
rough sleepers within a pooled budget, established national targets and provided an arena 
at the national level for partnership working with the voluntary sector.  Although now 
defunct, the work of the unit continues within CLG’s Housing Support and Homelessness 
Directorate and the approach employed by the unit  can be considered a precursor to 
CLG’s multi-agency approach to homelessnes  more generally.  
As also shown in table 6.7, several formalised personal collaboration modes were 
also used.  Jointly appointed posts included drugs advisors funded by the Home Office 
and Department for Communities  and Local Government.  There was also  a  jointly 
appointed specialist homelessness advisor within the Department of Health, and a health 
specialist working on homelessness within the Department for Communities and Local 
Government.  In  a  number  of  departments  existing  personnel  had  been  assigned 
responsibility for inter-departmental working such as the Head of Housing Need within 
CLG who had a specific remit to work with other departments.  The Department of Health 
also had officers leading on joint work with the Department for Work and Pensions and 
the Supporting People Directorate.   Secondments were also used, such as an official 
seconded from the National Offender Management Service to the CLG.  The person had a 
remit  to  free-up prison bed-spaces nationally by working to  enhance accommodation 
options for prisoners in order to speed up prison discharges. 
Two examples of central government collaboration cited by interviewees fell into 
the impersonal category.  First, interviewees mentioned the cross-Whitehall Supporting 
People budget which brings together funding from different government departments, 
streamlining funding for different client groups in need of housing support.  In theory, this 
should reduce competition between departments over funding for their respective client 
groups.  Second, a  joint  work-plan had been established between the Department of 
Health and CLG to address the health component of homelessness, which should provide 
a structure for ensuring that the health dimension of homelessness is taken into account. 
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Table 6.7 Formal central collaboration mechanisms used in Homelessness Sector
Group modes Personal Modes Impersonal Modes
Inter-departmental groups & 
networks (officer level)
Jointly funded/ appointed 
posts 
Cross-cutting Budget (i.e. 
Supporting People)
Joint meetings, either ad-hoc 
or regular
Assigning responsibility for 
inter-departmental working to 
a named individual
Joint work-plans 
(e.g. DH/ CLG)
Cross Whitehall 
Homelessness Strategy 
Steering Group
Posts created specifically to 
join-up departments
Cross Whitehall Supporting 
People Steering Group
Secondments
Inter-ministerial  groups  & 
meetings
Seminars, Conferences (e.g. 
with national voluntary sector 
organisations & 
accommodation providers)
Rough Sleepers Unit
Based on an analysis of civil servants’ accounts of their principal inter-organisational 
links76, it is possible to map out the main actors involved in homelessness at the national 
level, including both government departments (fig 6.1) and other national bodies (fig. 
6.2). 
76 Civil servants were asked to describe which government departments and national bodies they had 
contact with in relation to homelessness and to summarise the nature of these links
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Fig 6.1 Government departments involved in homelessness
Ministry of Justice 77
(housing & re-settlement for ex-offenders, refugees, 
asylum seekers & migrant workers; drugs policy, 
domestic violence, police and probation service for 
crime issues associated with homelessness)
Department for Work and Pensions
(employment & welfare benefits for 
homeless people, inc. Housing Benefit) CLG (Housing Support   
  and Homelessness 
Department of Health   Directorate; Supporting 
(health needs of homeless people,              People Directorate)
including mental & physical health, 
drug & alcohol treatment)
Ministry of Defence
(accommodation for 
ex-service personnel)
Department for Education & Skills
(young people at risk of homelessness,
homelessness prevention in schools
& with Connexions service, teenage parents)
77 Formerly part of the Home Office. Various Directorates and agencies have a role including the National 
Offender  Management  Service  (NOMS),  the  Respect  Taskforce  (anti-social  behaviour),  the  Crime 
Reduction  and  Community  Safety  Group (the  police  service),  the  National  Asylum Support  Service 
(NASS) and the Drug Interventions Programme (DIP) for offenders. 
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Fig 6.2 Wider network of national bodies involved in homelessness
Government Departments:
CLG, Home Office, 
DWP, DH, MOD, DFES
Housing Association sector/ Voluntary sector:         Other:
National landlord bodies
Housing Corporation Shelter78 Audit Commission
SITRA79 Crisis80 LGA81
National Housing Federation82Homeless Link83 London Councils84
Chartered Institute of Housing85 NACRO86 ACPO87 
St Mungo’s88 HACT89 CFOA90
Citizens Advice91 National Treatment
Women’s Aid, Refuge92 Agency 
78 Homelessness prevention charity with service provision/ campaigning/ research & policy remit
79 Membership umbrella body for supported housing providers, mainly housing associations and 
managers
80 Homelessness prevention charity specialising in single / hidden homelessness
81 Local Government Association
82 Representative membership body for Housing Associations in England
83 Membership/ umbrella organisation for frontline homelessness agencies in England
84 Representative body for London local authorities with lobbying and policy functions, formerly 
Association of London Government (ALG)
85 Professional body for those working in the housing sector across the UK
86 Crime reduction charity providing housing and support services (employment, resettlement and mental 
health) to ex-offenders & those at risk of offending
87 Association of Chief Police officers
88 London’s largest frontline service provider for homeless people providing accommodation & support, 
principally hostels and outreach services for rough sleepers (an Industrial and Provident Society)
89 Housing charity aiming to develop housing solutions for people on the margins of mainstream housing. 
A ‘bridge’ organisation between Housing Associations and the Voluntary Sector.
90 Chief Fire Officers Association
91 National advice charity with network of Citizens Advice Bureaux throughout the UK. Provides the 
National Homelessness Advice Service in partnership with Shelter, funded by CLG.
92 Domestic Violence Charities
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The above discussion outlines the nature of central government collaboration in relation 
to homelessness, which appears to involve both informal contact and formal collaboration 
mechanisms.  The main actors collaborating are government departments, although other 
government agencies and national bodies are involved where relevant.  The use of formal 
horizontal  mechanisms indicates  that  there  have  been  active  attempts  to  improve 
coordination at the level of central government in order to support efforts further down 
the line in local areas.  While on paper these formal mechanisms suggest a structured and 
rational  approach  to  joining  up  government,  the  above  discussion  highlights  the 
importance  of  political  context  which  may  produce  a  more  reactive  approach  to 
collaboration,  with  inter-departmental  working  relationships  affected  by  changing 
political priorities.  The next section focuses on the key challenges of collaboration within 
central government.    
6.3.2 The challenges of collaboration in central government
Civil servant interviewees were asked to describe the main challenges of collaborating 
across government departments. Many of the themes raised mirror the challenges faced at 
local level as discussed in the previous chapter.  The main difficulty revolved around the 
competing priorities of different government departments, and tensions around which 
departmental agendas should take priority. Even within departments, different directorates 
had their own priorities, with each directorate viewing its own client group as the top 
priority.   This  impacted  on  collaboration  because  of  disagreements  about  whose 
departments’ policy priorities other departments should be supporting in terms of delivery. 
There  were  suggestions  amongst  interviewees  that  the  more  powerful 
departments’ priorities  dominated  collaborative  working.  For  instance,  the  Home 
Office’s93 reducing re-offending agenda was particularly dominant.  CLG officials stated 
that their own priorities in terms of preventing homelessness should be around groups 
such as victims of domestic violence and refugees who in statistical terms contributed 
more to  statutory homelessness  acceptances. Offenders represented less  than 1% of 
homelessness acceptances but because of pressure from the Home Office, the work of 
CLC was being diverted towards  this  client  group.  When probed about  the reasons 
behind  the  Home Office’s  domination  of  the  collaborative  agenda, one  interviewee 
suggested  that  bureaucratic  structures  such  as  inter-ministerial  groups  and  other 
mechanisms  were  in  place  which  ensured  that  this  Department’s  issues  were 
communicated to  other  departments.  Another  suggested  that  the  style  of  political 
93 During the period of the research re-offending lay within the domain of the Home Office, although this 
has since been transferred to the new Ministry of Justice
208
leadership of the Home Office was fairly aggressive which meant that their issues tended 
to be given greater priority.  Overall, CLG interviewees considered there to be a lack of 
reciprocity in that while they assisted other departments to meet their priorities, they 
received little support in return.  One interviewee commented: 
“We do a lot to support other departments and their agendas but 
how much do  we  actually  get  back,  that  is  something  we’re 
starting to question” (ID35).  
A second issue  related  to  departments’ unwillingness  to  accept  even  partial 
responsibility  for  homelessness.  CLG  officials  believed  that  other  government 
departments viewed homelessness as CLG’s problem.  This was partly attributed to other 
departments’ failure to recognise that homelessness was about more than housing.  An 
illustrative example involved homeless immigrants from the recently enlarged European 
Union.  One CLG official (ID36) expressed frustration at  other departments’ lack of 
cooperation over this issue.  This was a clear priority for CLG because large numbers of 
immigrants were finding themselves destitute in London without anywhere to live, and 
this was affecting CLG’s ability to meet its rough sleeping targets.  The official noted that 
the  issue  also  related  to  immigration,  benefits  and  employment,  suggesting  that 
Departments such as the Home Office and Department for Work and Pensions should also 
be involved.  This example is resonant of the phenomenon described in chapter five of 
local agencies failing to take responsibility for clients whose needs lay in the interstices 
between agencies.   
An alternative explanation for other departments’ failure to accept responsibility 
for  homelessness was  attributed to  the  way in  which  the  issue  had  been allocated 
organisationally.  A Department of Health representative (ID33) noted that despite the 
existence of the inter-departmental steering group for homelessness, the National Strategy 
itself had been written by CLG several years previously without involving other relevant 
departments. He suggested that the long term effects of this were visible at local level, 
where health agencies had found it difficult to become involved with homelessness, even 
where they wanted to, because CLG nationally and housing authorities locally had been 
assigned the lead role. 
A third major challenge of  inter-departmental working related to  expectations 
about what other departments could deliver within existing resources.  For instance one 
CLG official suggested that the Home Office held unrealistic views about CLG’s ability 
to deliver accommodation to ex-offenders.  This demonstrated a lack of awareness of the 
housing  pressures on  local  authorities  and  the  more  general  challenges of  sourcing 
suitable accommodation within the community for this client group.  CLG interviewees 
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also noted that they could not over-burden local housing authorities with requests to assist 
with other departmental agendas. Local Authorities had capped budgets and therefore had 
to meet their core responsibilities within this budget, leaving little room for addressing 
wider issues.  A Department of Health interviewee commented that his department had to 
be  realistic  and  to  make  choices  about  what  they  could  be  involved  in  cross-
departmentally,  and  had  to  manage  other  departments’ expectations  in  this  regard. 
Therefore, as with the local level, resource issues played their part  at central level in 
inhibiting  collaboration.   One  interviewee commented: “I  think  resources are  under 
increasing pressure and that creates tensions both centrally and locally… everyone is 
scrabbling around for their client groups” (ID 35).  
This  brief depiction of the obstacles to collaboration provides support  for the 
bureaucratic politics perspective.   Several features of the inter-departmental relations are 
indicative of this, including departments’ pursuit of their own priorities, the lack of unity 
over priorities, the power inequalities of the departments involved, the way in which the 
outcomes appear to favour the most powerful actors, and the struggle for resources.  The 
above analysis  is  based on  a  small number of  interviews and therefore provides an 
indication of the nature of inter-departmental relations only, rather than a full analysis. In 
order to cross-check these findings, the next section analyses perceptions of the degree of 
collaboration in central government from a different perspective – that of the street level 
bureaucrats.
6.3.3 Local perceptions of collaboration in government
Street level bureaucrats were asked how ‘joined-up’ they considered central government 
to  be with respect to  homelessness. A minority  of  interviewees believed that central 
departments did collaborate well, or were at least improving in this respect.  However, the 
vast majority were sceptical about the extent to which central government departments 
were actually ‘joined-up’, as illustrated in table 6.8.  
Several interviewees considered there to be a lack of communication between 
departments.  For instance, they commented that different departments and directorates 
seemed unaware of one another’s policies.  One example concerned a consultation held 
by the Supporting People directorate on tenancy deposit schemes which made no mention 
of  a  new tenancy deposit  scheme established by  CLG.  There was also  recognition 
amongst  street  level  bureaucrats  of  the  differing  priorities  of  different  government 
departments, and the competitiveness of their relationships. 
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Interviewees’ doubts about the degree of joining up in central government were 
also expressed in terms of several examples of incoherence in government policy.  One 
example concerned the conflicting guidance on where, geographically, homeless people 
could receive local  authority  assistance.  The message to  local  authorities  from the 
Homelessness Directorate was that homeless people should be encouraged to return to 
their  former  place  of  residence  since  this  was  where  their  social  networks  were 
established.  However,  the Supporting People  Directorate’s  recommendation was that 
homeless people  should  be able to  access local authority  support  in  any part of the 
country.  The Probation Service was also sending out its own messages on the need for 
ex-offenders to have a fresh start and to be accommodated away from their previous 
locations.  A further example concerned the conflicting anti-social behaviour or ‘respect’ 
agenda and the homelessness prevention agenda. The former agenda encouraged eviction 
of families exhibiting anti-social behaviour in their estates, leaving local authorities to 
deal with the homelessness resulting from this. Similarly,  there was a perception that 
regeneration policies to stimulate housing renewal drove up property prices and led to a 
reduction in affordable housing which created difficulties for local authorities seeking to 
accommodate homeless people.
Others commented on departments simply ignoring issues which were not directly 
on their agenda. For instance, one interviewee commented that when officials from CLG 
came to inspect their housing services, they seemed uninterested in their work in relation 
to Supporting People. Other examples revolved around government policy papers missing 
housing off their agenda. In a new initiative creating local multi-agency youth advisory 
boards to deal with youth offending, there was no national specification within national 
guidance that housing agencies should be represented on the board, despite several other 
agencies being listed.  Similarly, a new national targeted youth strategy led by social 
services made no mention of local areas involving homelessness or housing services. 
Table 6.8 Street Level Bureaucrats’ perceptions of collaboration in central government
Theme Illustrative Quote(s)
Doubt over level of 
collaboration in 
central government
‘I’m not sure how much it happens at national level… I do think they are 
clear about how we should, it’s just whether they do it’. ID 1, LA 1.
Perceived lack of 
communication 
between departments
‘They don’t give the appearance of talking to each other. ’ ID 7, LA2
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Recognition of 
competitive nature of 
inter-departmental 
relations
‘The same is happening from top to bottom. Lack of communication, 
competitiveness, who wants the most money. I think departments within 
departments within departments are competing’ ID 22, LA3
‘You get a sense that there is a sort of combative relationship going on 
there. They’re obviously all bidding to the Treasury for funding’ ID38, 
LA1
Lack of policy 
coherence
‘I’m not sure they do. When you take through the logical consequences 
of some of their policies you kind of come into conflict. The issues on 
asylum seekers and migration, or anti-social behaviour from one 
department have a massive effect on homelessness, so I don’t see them 
working those through in a very logical manner or coming up with joint 
solutions.’ ID 4, LA1.
‘You’ve got all of those competing things going on up there, and we’re 
trying to make sense of it all down here, so leading by example on joint 
working would be good.’ ID16, LA2
Recognition of 
differing priorities
‘I don’t think there’s really a lot of joined up thinking and certainly not 
in terms of prioritising or agreeing a set of priorities’ ID 29, LA2
‘Yes I think they are (promoting collaboration) in terms of each 
department, but I think they can have really conflicting, different 
proprieties that impact that’ ID 4, LA3
Lack of inclusion of 
homelessness within 
other national policy 
frameworks 
‘The new targeted youth strategy has got a huge amount of stuff about 
agencies working together… but when it lists agencies you must work 
with it doesn’t mention Housing’. ID1, LA2
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Chapter summary and discussion
The overarching aim of this chapter has been to characterise and explore government 
steering of local collaboration in the homelessness sector.  This has involved identifying 
and  classifying  the  vertical  meta-governance tools  employed, assessing  the  level  of 
importance attached to collaboration by central policy makers, and finally evaluating the 
degree of collaboration at the level of central government, which is in itself a form of 
vertical steering.    
Overall, multi-agency collaboration is something which government is trying to 
promote in local areas.  This is a view shared by central and local bureaucrats, and is also 
evidenced in  a  variety  of  documentary  sources  including  guidance, legislation  and 
statements in national strategies.  Civil servants, like street level bureaucrats, view local 
collaboration and multiple agency involvement as appropriate to the multi-dimensional 
nature of homelessness, indicating that their articulated motivations for encouraging local 
collaboration are at  least partly rational in nature.  However,  collaboration itself  was 
partially influenced by political priorities at the time, with inter-departmental linkages 
shifting according to Ministerial agendas, which were themselves affected by the mass 
media and public pressures.  This appears to undermine a planned, rationalistic approach 
to cross-government working. 
Some street  level  bureaucrats  interviewed were more aware of  government’s 
collaborative agenda than others.  Perhaps unsurprisingly,  those working in statutory 
agencies were most aware of government’s prioritisation of collaboration, with voluntary 
sector actors and accommodation providers less so.  This highlights the limited ability of 
central  actors  to  influence local  agencies outside  of  their  own line  of  authority,  as 
previous  theories  of  implementation in  networks  have  suggested.  The  strategy  of 
pursuing meta-governance jointly with other national bodies is one potential means of 
addressing this, for instance by issuing joint guidance or undertaking joint inspections. 
Clearly  there  had  been  some  attempts  to  undertake  meta-governance initiatives  in 
collaboration with other national bodies and government departments, although CLG was 
the lead department within these attempts. 
A combination of  meta-governance tools  is  used to  promote collaboration  in 
homelessness, including those based on authority, exhortation and incentive.  These meta-
governmental approaches are  embedded within  a  broader  meta-governance strategy 
aiming to enhance collaboration more generally across local public services, suggesting 
that the promotion of collaboration in relation to homelessness is something of ‘a policy 
within a policy’.
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Attempts to stimulate a collaborative approach at  local level are perceived by 
local  actors to  be  undermined by  a  lack of  joined-up policy at  the  level  of  central 
government. Although central civil servants were aware of the need to join up centrally to 
facilitate such efforts locally, and had instigated formal collaborative mechanisms within 
central government in an attempt to enhance policy coherence, street level bureaucrats 
nevertheless found government policies and priorities in many respects to be conflicting. 
These conflicting priorities may to some extent to be related to a lack of communication 
and the difficulty of keeping abreast of policies across departments. However, they are 
also a consequence of different agendas rubbing up against one another, something which 
may be an inevitable feature of public policy regardless of attempts to improve policy 
coherence through better coordination in central government.  
The  terrain  of  inter-departmental relations  –  like  that  of  local  inter-agency 
relations as described in chapter five – is one of differing priorities, power inequalities 
and competition for resources.  In some respects departments are interdependent, relying 
on one another to support delivery of their respective policies. However, departments are 
also unequal, with some more powerful than others and consequently more able to gain 
the support of other departments in delivering their agendas.   
The disagreements over where responsibility lies for different policy issues, and 
the tendency of departments to ignore or neglect those that are outside of their core 
business, stems back to the departmental organisation of central government.  At present 
homelessness  is  the primary responsibility of one department alone, CLG, and other 
departments such as the Home Office have no obligation to assist with this.  Similarly, 
when the research was conducted, the reducing re-offending agenda ‘belonged’ to the 
Home Office and there was little incentive for departments such as CLG to assist with this 
work, although the power exercised by the Home Office compelled them to do so.    
Certain themes raised in relation to the challenges of collaboration within central 
government resonate with aspects of the literature discussed in chapter one relating to the 
antecedents of collaboration. In particular this research has underlined the importance of 
mutual understanding – such as of the resource pressures different departments are under 
– and of reciprocity. Where departments did not reciprocate other departments’ efforts to 
assist them with their agendas, this created resentment and contributed to a breakdown of 
trust. 
In  terms of  the  level of  government at  which collaborative policy is  set,  this 
chapter has illustrated that there have been clear attempts to define this centrally.  While 
the relevant legislation is not itself overly prescriptive, information-based tools do flesh 
out this legislation, providing advice on how this might be translated into practice at a 
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local level.  Even although central actors stated that they would not specify in detail to 
local areas which agencies should be their collaborative partners, the guidance itself is 
fairly detailed with respect to recommended forms of collaboration.  
Later chapters will investigate further the extent to which collaboration policy can 
be considered to be formulated at central level, by examining local actors’ responsiveness 
to  central  mandates, guidance and  exhortations  to  collaborate,  as  well  as  the  more 
‘bottom-up’ factors which may influence their decisions around collaboration.
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Chapter 7: Collaboration and its relationship to 
Government Steering and Other Key Factors
Chapter overview
While  the  previous  chapter  assessed  the  nature  of  government  steering  of  local 
collaboration in relation to homelessness, this chapter turns to the relationship between 
government steering and collaboration.   It  is  asked whether government steering, or 
‘meta-governance’,  appears to  be  positively related to  collaboration.  This  potential 
antecedent of collaboration is considered alongside several other possible explanatory 
variables.  
Since one of the aims of the research was to assess the extent and nature of 
collaboration in  the  multi-agency homelessness  network, the  chapter first  presents a 
summary of the degree and nature of collaboration in local authorities, using evidence 
from the postal  survey discussed in chapter four.   Formal  horizontal collaboration in 
English  local  authorities  is  first  assessed  (sections  7.1-7.3),  followed  by  informal 
collaboration, including analysis of the degree of interaction with different types of bodies 
and the amount of time spent interacting with other bodies generally (sections 7.4-7.7). 
The picture revealed is one of moderate levels of formal and informal collaboration, but 
with variation across local authorities. 
The  chapter  then  moves on  to  assess  how this  variation  may be  explained, 
beginning with a consideration of government steering (section 7.2) and proceeding to 
analyse additional  factors  highlighted  in  previous  collaboration literature  which  are 
relevant to the context of English homelessness services (section 7.3).  The discussion at 
the end of the chapter provides a recap of the main findings and assesses these in light of 
previous research and in relation to the qualitative findings presented in chapter five.    
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7.1 The level and nature of homelessness collaboration in English local 
authorities
7.1.1 Formal collaboration: introduction 
As discussed in  chapter two,  horizontal  coordination  tools  are  mechanisms used to 
enhance integration  between organisations.   They have been described as  the  ‘basic 
elements employed to effect inter-organisational coordination’ (Alexander 1995, p.40). 
Horizontal coordination tools can be considered forms of collaboration which, for the 
purposes of this thesis, has been defined as a process in which organisations actively and 
jointly work together across organisational boundaries.  Horizontal coordination tools 
require the active participation of more than one agency for their establishment and 
operation.  They are formal in the sense of being concrete arrangements or mechanisms 
that systematise inter-agency working. 
To provide a measure of formal collaboration, postal survey respondents were 
provided with a list of 20 horizontal coordination mechanisms94 and asked to tick those 
present  in  their  local  authority  in  relation  to  single  homeless people,  with  a  clear 
definition of single homelessness provided.  It was specified that they should tick ‘yes’ 
even if the arrangements involved only some agencies or applied to certain categories of 
single homeless people.   A dichotomous yes/  no  response  was  the most appropriate 
measurement level since these coordination mechanisms are of a fixed nature; either they 
are in place or they are not, although a ‘don’t know’ category was also included.  From 
the list it was possible to generate a score of formal collaboration for each local authority. 
This approach facilitates comparisons between authorities and is used to help explain 
variation (see sections 7.2 and 7.3). It also provides an indication of the contribution of 
formal collaboration as compared to informal collaboration (see section 7.1.5). 
As noted in chapter four, the index of coordination mechanisms was generated 
after conducting a systematic content analysis of a random sample of 40 local authority 
homelessness strategies and consulting other relevant documentation in order to enhance 
face validity.  A reliability test was also performed to ensure that it was appropriate to 
combine the listed items to create a single scale of formal horizontal coordination.  This 
was achieved using a test for uni-dimensionality, which suggested that the items on the 
scale measured the same underlying construct (Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.7995)95.
94 See Appendix D for a copy of the questionnaire containing the list of 20 mechanisms
95 Reliability coefficients of 0.8 are desirable although scores of above 0.7 are considered acceptable 
(Bryman and Cramer 2005). 
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7.1.2 The level of adoption of formal collaboration tools
The mean number of  tools employed was 9.5 (sd 3.89, range 0-20), just  below the 
midpoint  of  the  range, indicating  moderate levels  of  formalised collaboration.   The 
dispersion of data is presented in fig 7.1 below and indicates an approximately normal 
distribution96.   Most  authorities  were clustered around  the  middle  of  the  scale, with 
relatively few extreme values, particularly at the higher end of the scale.  An analysis of 
scores which involved categorising authorities as low, moderate or high placed 24% in the 
low category, 59% percent in the moderate category and 17% in the high category97. 
Fig 7.1 Number of horizontal coordination tools employed in local authorities
Number of horizontal coordination tools
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It should be noted that in some cases there were missing data or ‘don’t know’ responses 
for  particular  items  on  the  list,  suggesting  that  some  respondents  may  have  been 
unfamiliar  with  particular  items  listed  or  unsure  of  whether  these  coordination 
mechanisms were in place in their authority.  The mean level of missing data for the 20 
items listed was 9.5%.  There are a number of ways of dealing with missing data. One 
96 The normal distribution indicates that approximately 2/3 of cases lie within one standard deviation of 
the mean, 95% within 2 standard deviations and 99% within three standard deviations.  Visual inspection 
was cross-checked with a formal test of normality, the Shapiro-Wilks test, which confirmed this 
interpretation with W = 0.983 where 1 indicates a perfectly normal distribution.  
97 Data were collapsed into these categories using the substantive approach which divided the range into 3 
equal divisions (0-6 tools; 7-13 tools; 14-20 tools).
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method is to drop certain variables or items from a scale.  In view of the results of the 
Cronbach’s Alpha test for reliability reported above, however, it was decided to retain all 
items.  Other common methods for minimising the effect of missing values, including 
substituting missing responses with group or sample means and regression analysis, are 
dependent on interval data. Since the responses to individual items on this scale were 
dichotomous, these methods would have been inappropriate.  Similarly,  consideration 
may be given to deleting cases involving missing data .  This was the approach used here. 
For instance, when analysing frequencies  on the  particular  types of  tools  employed, 
missing  cases are excluded from the analysis98.  However, when calculating the formal 
collaboration score for each authority, the first dependent variable, all cases were included 
and only ‘yes’ items were included in individual authorities’ total scores99. 
It is also important to recognise the possibility of social desirability of responses. 
Given the central pressure to work in partnership and the endorsement of the research by 
the government department responsible for homelessness, it is possible that respondents 
may  have  over-stated  the  level  of  collaboration  in  their  authorities  in  some  cases. 
Attempts were made to minimise social desirability effects by stressing that the research 
was an independent academic study and guaranteeing  the anonymity of respondents. 
Furthermore, anonymous  postal  surveys are  generally  recognised  as  providing  more 
reliable  answers  as  compared  to  face-to-face  methods  of  data  collection  in  which 
problems such as interviewer bias may feature .  
98 This was achieved by using the ‘system missing’ function in SPSS.
99 As a reliability check a separate analysis was carried out on formal collaboration scores which excluded 
all cases containing 20% or more missing items on the formal collaboration score.  However, the analysis 
revealed that excluding these cases from the analysis would have produced little difference since
the distribution of scores (mean 9.7, range 0-20, sd 3.99) was almost identical to the overall sample.  
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7.1.3 The nature of collaboration tools employed
It  is  possible  to  characterise the  nature  of  formal  collaboration by  identifying  the 
frequency of adoption of specific types of tools.  As discussed in chapter two, horizontal 
tools may be classified by their ‘mode’ of coordination, namely personal, impersonal or 
group-based modes.  This is the first level of classification adopted in this analysis. It was 
also noted in chapter two that tools of coordination are sometimes classified according to 
the degree of integration involved, with more tightly integrated varieties representing 
more ambitious forms of collaboration.  The degree of integration is therefore the second 
level of analysis used to classify horizontal tools. 
To recap, impersonal methods are of a routine and formalised nature, and are more 
anticipatory  than  adaptive.   Coordination  is  established  by  ‘programme’ or  ‘plan’, 
implying  little  need for  face-to-face contact  beyond  the  initial  establishment of  the 
coordination tools themselves.  Impersonal tools include standardised information and 
communication systems, and jointly agreed rules and procedures which provide blueprints 
for future action and specify the tasks and responsibilities of the parties involved.  While a 
degree of joint action is required to establish the rules, procedures and systems, once 
these are agreed, they become institutionalised, embedded with the standard operating 
procedures of the organisations involved, and require relatively little need for ongoing 
inter-personal contact. Consequently impersonal methods are said to remove discretion 
from individual workers.  
Personal and group-based methods, by contrast, usually involve face-to-face or 
inter-personal  contact  in  ‘real  time’.  They  entail  ‘coordination  by  feedback’,  with 
decisions reached as  issues arise within the context of  daily work.  Because of  the 
presence of two or more interacting participants, mutual adjustments can be made as new 
information is transmitted and received.  In the context of inter-organisational working, 
personal tools involve linkages between individuals from different agencies, often in the 
form of staff transfer such as placements and secondments, or informal communication 
between staff.  Group tools involve several agencies being simultaneously involved in 
meetings or other joint activities, and include scheduled or unscheduled staff meetings 
and standing committees that coordinate the work of participating units (Van De Ven et al. 
1976).  
In chapter four, it was suggested that because of the nature of work undertaken by, 
and  the  task  environment of  homelessness  agencies,  group  and  personal modes  of 
coordination may be more common than impersonal modes.  It was noted that the task 
environment of homelessness services is characterised by uncertainty, broad task scope 
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and interdependence, organisational characteristics related to group and personal modes. 
Furthermore,  the  homelessness  sector,  like  other  areas  of  human  services,  requires 
significant coordination at the operational level.  Such work includes assessing clients’ 
needs, sharing this information with other agencies and the use of discretion and human 
judgement to allocate available resources.  Standardised responses - often regarded as the 
most ‘efficient’ in administrative terms - are therefore less appropriate.  With the respect 
to  the  degree  of  integration of  coordination  tools  employed,  previous  literature,  as 
discussed in chapter two, suggests that there may be a general propensity for agencies to 
adopt the least ambitious tools which are less costly and lower risk.  
Table 7.1 below indicates the percentage of authorities adopting each tool from 
the list provided in the survey.  The table also identifies the mode and level of integration 
of each tool.  Although there is no universally agreed method for quantifying the level of 
integration of  different tools,  there are  nevertheless clear  indications  in  the  existing 
literature of the nature of collaborative activity at  different ends  of the spectrum, as 
identified in chapter two. These indications serve as a guiding framework for assessing 
the degree of integration of each tool listed below.  As will be demonstrated, examples of 
weak, moderate and highly integrated tools can be found within group, personal and 
impersonal categories. 
In line with previous literature, those tools which impact least on the working 
arrangements and standard operating  procedures of  individual  agencies are  assigned 
lower scores (Rogers 1974).  Joint service provision such as multi-agency teams (a group 
mode) and joint commissioning of services (an impersonal mode) can be regarded as the 
most fully integrated variety of collaboration (Hambleton et al. 1995; Leutz 1999).  Co-
location  of  services,  another  group  mode,  may  be  characterised as  marginally  less 
integrated than multi-agency teams, since co-location in this context is usually a form a 
satellite provision within other agencies, for instance the provision of drug treatment 
services within existing homelessness facilities such as drop-in centres. 
Most  prior  literature  classifies  information  sharing  as  a  relatively  weak  or 
moderate  form  of  collaboration  (Rogers  1974;  Sullivan  and  Skelcher  2002),  and 
consequently mechanisms which are centred on information sharing are assigned lower 
scores, although some tools for sharing information are more ambitious than others. For 
instance,  information  sharing  activities  which  involve  written  agreements  between 
agencies  such  as  impersonal  client  information  sharing  protocols,  involve  greater 
commitment and compromise than do group-based operational multi-agency forums and 
events which are a less formal mechanism for sharing service information. Joint case 
conferences are  more  ambitious  than  other  information-based tools  since  they  also 
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involve an element of integrated case-planning.  Joint case conferences do not, however, 
involve  joint  service  provision  since  services  still  operate  largely  through separate 
structures of existing systems, and so occupy a moderate position on the scale (Leutz 
1999). 
In relation to the personal modes listed, dedicated posts for forging inter-agency 
links may be regarded as moderate level tools . While they involve active attempts to 
bridge organisational boundaries and often involve the joint dedication of funding, they 
do not  alter services, rules  or  structures. The aim of dedicated posts  is  generally to 
facilitate  information sharing.  Forms  of  staff  transfer such  as  staff  placements  and 
secondments in other agencies perform a similar function although may be regarded as 
less ambitious since these posts may service to improve links between specific agencies 
rather than within a wider network of agencies.  
Common  monitoring  systems  and  joint  client  assessment  forms  are  fairly 
ambitious forms of impersonal collaboration since they involve agencies aligning their 
operating  systems.  Similarly  joint  local  targets  are  considered  strong  forms  of 
collaboration  since  they  are  accountability  mechanisms  involving  a  high  level 
commitment to collaboration and a commitment to shared outcomes. Joint protocols are 
classified as ‘moderate’ since they are formal agreements outlining the responsibilities of 
different agencies, but do not require significant further joint action beyond the inception 
stage. Other impersonal modes such as common directories of information on services or 
accommodation providers are classified as lower end activities, since once these have 
been compiled there is little need for further joint action and there is no sense in which 
these tools radically impact on the service provision of individual agencies. Service level 
agreements involve agencies contracting other organisations to provide services on their 
behalf and have been characterised as more of a contractual than a collaborative form of 
joint working (Sullivan and Skelcher 2002) and are therefore assigned a low score.  
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Table 7.1 Forms of horizontal coordination tools adopted
Coordination 
mode
Level* of 
Integration
Coordination tool Authorities 
employing tool
% N
Group 3 Joint case conferences/ multi-agency 
assessment panels
83 161
3 Multi-agency forum (strategic level) 76 147
3 Multi-agency forum (operational level) 70 135
1 Multi-agency training events/ workshops 65 125
5 Multi-agency outreach service 51 99
4 Location of additional specialist services 
within existing agencies (co-location of 
services)
38 74
5 Multi-agency homelessness team, project 
or
one stop shop
19 34
Impersonal 3 Joint protocols (operational level) 72 138
3 Client information sharing/ confidentiality 
protocols
69 133
1 Service Level Agreements 69 133
2 Joint directory of information on local 
services
55 106
2 Common directory of accommodation 
providers
54 105
4 Joint client monitoring procedures/ multi-
agency monitoring
49 94
3 Joint protocols (strategic level) 46 89
4 Joint client assessment forms 35 68
5 Jointly commissioned services 30 57
5 Joint local performance indicators/ targets 21 40
5 Joint budgets 6 12
Personal 3 Dedicated post for forging inter-agency 
links
18 34
1 Staff placements in other agencies 15 28
*1=LOW, 2=LOW-MODERATE, 3=MODERATE, 4=MODERATE-HIGH, 5=HIGH
As illustrated in table 7.1, the most widely used joint working methods are group 
coordination modes, that  is,  those involving interpersonal contact between groups of 
agencies.  Three of  the top four responses fall  into this  category,  namely joint  case 
conferences (83%), strategic multi-agency forums (76%) and operational multi-agency 
forums (70%).  Multi-agency training events and workshops are another commonly used 
group method (65%).  Interestingly, all of these tools are classified as moderate or low 
level integrative activities.  The more ambitious group modes with higher integration 
scores such as those involving joint service delivery that may require senior commitment 
to establish, are less widely used.  For instance, co-location of services and multi-agency 
teams are in place in only slightly more than a third of authorities.  Multi-agency outreach 
services are available in approximately half of authorities.   Personal coordination modes 
which involve formal methods of linking individuals are relatively uncommon on this 
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evidence, with staff placements in other agencies used in only 15% of authorities and 
dedicated posts for forging inter-agency links in only 17% of authorities.   
There  is  also  fairly  extensive  use  of  some  impersonal modes,  in  particular 
operational  protocols  (72%), client  confidentiality  protocols (69%) and  service level 
agreements (69%).  Joint directories of accommodation providers or services are present 
in over half of authorities. Again, the most commonly used impersonal tools are the more 
moderate or weak forms of collaboration.  The more highly integrated impersonal tools 
such as joint monitoring procedures and assessment forms are less common, employed in 
only 49% and 35% of authorities respectively.   Other ambitious forms of impersonal 
collaboration which involve commitment at a senior level and may be characterised as 
strategic level coordination tools, such as joint commissioning, joint performance systems 
and joint budgets, are even less common (30%, 21% and 6% respectively).  
In  summary,  the  findings  indicate that  formal horizontal coordination in  the 
English homelessness sector involves a combination of group and impersonal modes. 
Group methods take the form of face-to-face contact through established groups, forums 
and multi-agency events while  impersonal methods involve information sharing  and 
written agreements clarifying roles and responsibilities.  The prevalence of group modes 
fits with the predicted forms expected in relation to task environment, although contrary 
to the prediction, there is little use of formal personal modes100.  It was also hypothesised 
that the nature of operational work is unlikely to be conducive to standardised systems 
which  routinise  decisions  and  remove  discretion  from  workers.   Although  some 
impersonal tools are adopted by the responding local authorities, standardised systems 
such  as  joint  monitoring and  assessment are  fairly  uncommon as  might  have  been 
expected. 
As hypothesised, the coordination tools  employed are the less  ambitious  ones 
which can be grafted onto existing practices without too much alteration of standard 
operating procedures or existing organisational structures.  Collaborative practices that 
involve deeper integration of services or joint accountability mechanisms are much less 
common.  Collaboration often  involves pooling  information,  either  about  services or 
clients, but rarely involves pooling other resources, such as financial resources, office 
premises or staff. Furthermore, operational level horizontal tools are more common than 
those at the strategic level, with the majority of coordination tools employed likely to be 
enacted by frontline rather than strategic level staff, with the exception of strategic level 
multi-agency forums and service level agreements.  The reasons behind the pattern of 
adoption of different tools are examined in chapter eight.
100 However, note that section 7.1.5 below illustrates that informal personal coordination is reasonably 
common.
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7.1.4 Informal collaboration: introduction
As discussed in chapter two, inter-personal contact or interaction between individuals in 
organisations  is  another  dimension  of  collaboration.   Within  the  spectrum  of 
collaboration, such interactions are classed as a weaker form of collaboration, since they 
are usually informal and ad-hoc rather than formalised or routine.  However, informal 
interactions between agencies may be as important as formal varieties, since repeated 
interactions generate trust, which itself has been shown in previous literature to be a key 
antecedent of collaboration.  Chapter four suggested that in the context of homelessness 
services, interaction between agencies is likely to be important for assisting individual 
clients in need of multi-agency support.  Much of this interaction is likely to occur at the 
operational  level  between field-level  staff  engaged in  client  work, and may involve 
referrals, information sharing or discussions of issues associated with particular clients. 
In addition, regular contact is required at managerial level for a range of purposes related 
to service planning, information sharing and monitoring.  
The postal  survey provides information on the degree of  interaction  between 
housing  authorities  and  other  relevant  bodies  in  the  homelessness  network  at  both 
strategic  and  operational  levels,  which  serves  as  a  means  of  assessing  informal 
collaboration.  The scores of the degree of interaction are used to assess the relative 
strength of the Housing Authority’s links with different bodies as a way of identifying 
identify potential ‘cracks’ in the system.  As with the measure of formal collaboration, an 
informal collaboration score is calculated for each authority.  This helps to explain the 
contribution  of  informal interactions to  the  collaboration  process overall.  Again, as 
above, an aggregate measure of this nature allows for testing of the factors considered 
likely to affect the level of collaboration, such as government steering and other variables 
of interest as discussed in sections 7.2 and 7.3.
Survey respondents were asked to rank the amount of contact in relation to single 
homelessness between the housing authority and each other body, from a list of 25 bodies. 
As noted in chapter four,  these bodies were identified after analysis  of homelessness 
strategies, relevant documentation and discussions with those in the field. The agencies 
listed represent the core bodies with a role in homelessness provision for single homeless 
adults.  Because of the wide range of bodies involved in homelessness and the need to 
define some boundaries for the study, those aimed at specific user groups other than 
single homeless adults were excluded from the checklist101. 
101  The list of agencies and stakeholders included can be found in the Questionnaire, Appendix D.
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The agencies involved in delivering services to single homeless people fell into 
three main categories: statutory agencies; voluntary sector agencies; and accommodation 
providers.  A five point Likert scale was used where 1 represented ‘very little contact’, 2 
‘little contact’, 3 ‘a moderate amount of contact’, 4 ‘a lot of contact’ and 5 ‘a very great 
deal of contact’.  Contact was defined as any contact with the bodies listed (for example 
by phone, e-mail, fax, or in person) firstly in relation to service planning and secondly in 
relation to client referrals/ casework.  A ‘don’t know/ not applicable’ response was also 
offered for respondents who could not answer,  for instance where there was no such 
agency in place locally.  
While  this  provided  a  measure  of  the  amount  of  contact  occurring,  this 
information is difficult to interpret without some idea of how much contact there ought to 
be.  For instance, it is likely that contact is more important with some agencies than with 
others, and that some agencies will perform a principally strategic role in relation to joint 
working  and others  an  operational  role.   The  question  was therefore repeated, with 
respondents asked to rate, on the same scale, the ‘ideal’ amount of contact with each 
agency.   The  gap between the ideal and actual levels of  contact  could therefore be 
calculated.  The ideal contact scores provide an indication of the perceived importance of 
informal collaboration generally and with particular bodies.
7.1.5 The level of informal collaboration and its relationship with formal 
collaboration
For each local authority a total horizontal contact score was calculated by aggregating 
‘actual’ contact scores for 23 of the agencies102 in the homeless network for both service 
planning and casework.  Since agencies could be assigned a score of 1-5 and there were 
two scales, the maximum possible score was  230 and lowest possible was 50103.  The 
distribution of horizontal  contact scores is  presented in figure 7.2. The mean overall 
contact score for local authorities is 136, just below the midpoint of 140.  The range is 55-
196 and the data distribution is within the normal range104.  This reveals a similar pattern 
to adoption of horizontal coordination tools.  However, as illustrated in table 7.2 a slightly 
greater proportion of scores were in the upper range of the scale when this scale as 
102 Local elected members and other local authorities are excluded from the aggregate horizontal contact 
score since the overarching aim was to assess collaboration within local authority multi-agency networks. 
However, data for these bodies are provided within the analysis by sector and organisation below for 
descriptive purposes. 
103  Where respondents selected the ‘not applicable’ category for specific agencies (for example because 
there was no such agency locally), the substitution method for dealing with missing data was used in 
order to ensure comparability across authorities.  This involved assigning an estimated value based on the 
sample mean.  
104 The Shapiro-Wilks test indicated normality, with W = 0.984.
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collapsed  into  low/  moderate/ high  categories, with  figures of  11%,  59% and 30% 
respectively105.  This data indicates that collaboration overall may be marginally more 
reliant on informal than on formal measures.  
Fig 7.2 Histogram of informal collaboration scores in local authorities
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105 The same means of collapsing data into categories was used here as with the formal collaboration 
scale, with 3 equal cutpoints along the range of scores (low=55-101; moderate=102-149; high=150-196). 
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Table 7.2 Proportion of authorities in low/ moderate/ high categories for formal and 
informal collaboration
Level of collaboration Formal Informal
N % N %
Low 46 24 21 11
Moderate 113 59 113 59
High 32 17 57 30
Total 191 100 191 100
While  the  comparative data  presented above provides  an  indication  of  the  relative 
importance of formal and informal collaboration, it reveals little about how the two are 
related, for instance, whether those authorities with high formal collaboration scores also 
have high informal collaboration scores.  The relationship between formal and informal 
collaboration is assessed here by correlating the number of tools adopted and the total 
horizontal contact scores for each authority. The scattergram below shows visually the 
pattern  of  results  (figure  7.3).  The  results  indicate  a  moderate-substantial  positive 
relationship which is unlikely to have occurred by chance (r = 0.487, r² = 24%, p <0.01)106
.  In other words, the greater the number of formal horizontal coordination tools in a local 
authority, the greater the level of informal contact.  The r² figure indicates that nearly 24% 
of variation in one variable is likely to be explained by variation in the other. This finding 
indicates that formal and informal collaboration may positively reinforce one another.  
106 Pearson’s correlation co-efficient was used, the usual measure of correlation for normally distributed 
interval data (Bryman and Cramer 2001). For social scientific data,  a correlation coefficient of 0.487 
indicates a moderate-substantial relationship (De Vaus 2002).  
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Fig 7.3 Scattergram of formal and informal collaboration (N=191)
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Pearson’s r = 0.487     r² = 24%    p <0.01
7.1.6 Informal collaboration: breakdown by sector and organisation
Data on the level of contact between the housing authority and different types of agency 
in the homelessness network both in terms of service planning and casework is provided 
in table 7.3.  The ‘actual’ contact scores provide an indication of the extent of interaction 
while  the ‘ideal’ contact scores provide an indication of the perceived importance of 
different bodies.  The ‘gap’ score indicates how close the actual level of collaboration is 
to the ideal. 
In terms of actual contact, there is most contact with accommodation providers, 
both  at  planning level  and case level.   There is  least  contact with  voluntary  sector 
agencies, both for planning and case work, with statutory agencies lying in between for 
both types of work, although the difference between these two sectors is small.  The 
results  for  the  ideal  amount of  contact  show the  same pattern  across  sectors,  with 
accommodation providers deemed most important, followed by statutory agencies and 
then voluntary sector agencies.  There is greater contact in relation to casework than 
planning level work in each sector and across all sectors as a whole. 
Overall, there is less contact between housing authorities and other agencies than 
would be desirable as perceived by survey respondents themselves.  Taking all of the 
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agencies together, there is only a ‘moderate’ amount of contact for both planning and 
casework (mean 3) whereas in an ideal world there would be ‘a lot’ of contact (mean 4). 
This indicates that overall, interaction between agencies is regarded as fairly important by 
respondents.   The gap between the actual and ideal level of contact is  smallest  with 
accommodation providers and managers, and greatest with voluntary sector agencies.  In 
terms of overall mean contact gaps, there is a bigger gap between actual and ideal amount 
of contact at planning than case level.  
Further analysis in section 7.2 discusses the relative levels of contact between the 
housing authority and specific bodies prioritised in central government guidance, as one 
means of assessing the success of government exhortations for agencies to collaborate.
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Table 7.3 Mean contact scores with local bodies for service planning and casework
 Service Planning Contact        Casework Contact
 ‘Actual’        ‘Ideal’      ‘Actual’   ‘Ideal’
 Score (N)     Score (N)    Gap       Score (N)    Score (N)    Gap
Statutory agencies
Supp. People Team   3.79 (188)    4.08 (180)   0.29      2.82 (176)    3.39 (173)    0.57
Housing Benefit   3.50 (187)    4.06 (182)   0.56      3.66 (181)    4.09 (176)    0.43
Other LHAs   3.30 (188)    3.69 (181)   0.39      3.07 (179)    3.53 (175)    0.46
Mental Health   2.97 (189)    3.98 (184)   1.01      3.38 (189)    4.01 (178)    0.63
Drug/ Alcohol   2.95 (189)    3.92 (181)   0.97      3.14 (183)    3.91 (176)    0.77
Probation Service   2.86 (188)    3.71 (183)   0.85       3.15 (180)   3.73 (177)   0.58
Social Services   2.85 (190)    4.02 (182)   1.17       3.25 (183)   4.04 (176)   0.79
Police   2.69 (191)    3.46 (184)   0.77       2.94 (183)   3.44 (178)   0.50
Primary Care Trust   2.17 (189)    3.48 (183)   1.31       2.55 (181)   3.53 (178)   0.98
Prison Service   2.15 (184)    3.24 (180)   1.09       2.33 (176)   3.34 (176)   1.01    
NHS Trust/ Hospital   1.98 (184)    3.33 (182)   1.35       2.34 (177)   3.40 (177)   1.06
Mean   2.84            3.73       0.89       2.97             3.67             0.70  
Voluntary Sector agencies/ NGOs
Tenancy Support Proj.  3.33 (176)    3.95 (173)   0.62       3.50 (172)   4.08 (167)   0.58
Housing Advice Cent.   3.17 (157)    3.83 (156)   0.66      3.39 (152)   3.81 (151)   0.42 
Welfare Rights Service 2.97 (189)    3.73 (181)   0.76       3.25 (183)   3.78 (176)   0.53
Drug/ Alcohol Project   2.61 (173)    3.71 (171)    1.1        2.82 (169)   3.80 (164)   0.98
Street Outreach Team   2.50 (120)    3.50 (117)    1.0        2.50 (119)   3.54 (114)   1.04  
Mental Health Project   2.47 (167)    3.73 (168)    1.26      2.74 (164)   3.74 (164)   1.00
Day/ Drop-in Centre   2.30 (149)    3.30 (147)    1.0        2.41 (147)   3.29 (144)   0.88
Skills/ Empl. Project   1.92 (156)    3.30 (163)    1.38      1.92 (152)   3.23 (158)   1.31
Mean   2.66           3.63        0.97       2.82            3.66 0.84
Accommodation Providers
LSVT Organisation   3.95 (093)    4.21 (094)    0.26       4.01 (089)   4.13 (091)   0.12
Hous. Associations   3.70 (187)    4.20 (181)    0.50       3.78 (180)   4.09 (175)   0.31
Homeless Hostel(s)   3.63 (150)    4.05 (150)    0.42       3.88 (147)   4.14 (146)   0.26
Supported Accom.   3.55 (176)    4.10 (174)    0.55       3.76 (170)   4.05 (168)   0.29
Private sector L’lords   2.68 (188)    3.79 (180)    1.11       3.25 (179)   3.84 (174)   0.59
Mean   3.50           4.07        0.57       3.74             4.05             0.31 
Other
Elected Members   2.77 (189)    3.26 (181)    0.49       2.44 (181)   2.68 (173)   0.24
     
Mean for all bodies   2.91            3.75             0.84       3.05             3.70             0.65
Scale
1 = very little contact
2 = little contact
3 = a moderate amount of contact
4 = a lot of contact
5 = a very great deal of contact
7.1.7 Time spent interacting with other bodies
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In order to provide an indication of how the above statistics relate to a person’s workload, 
respondents were asked to estimate approximately how much of their time over the past 
year had been spent in contact with other agencies in relation to homelessness.  They were 
asked to express this as a percentage of their total work time.  The mean figure given was 
19% (sd 16,  range 0-90%), suggesting that although there is  wide variation,  a fairly 
significant portion of respondents’ time is spent interacting with other agencies.  This 
figure is consistent with other empirical studies where the degree of time spent engaging 
in collaborative activity has been assessed, with figures of 15-20% reported for public 
managers  in  the American context  .   Hambleton et  al.  (1995) report wide  variation 
amongst local public service officers in a UK context in terms of time spent collaborating 
(2-100%), although over half of their sample (51%) spent less than 20% of their time on 
this.  That respondents report that they spend nearly a fifth of their time in contact with 
other agencies suggests that networking is a significant although perhaps not a central 
element of their daily work.
7.2 Explaining variation in local authorities
The  preceding  analysis  provides  an  indication  both  of  the  level  and  nature  of 
collaboration in relation to single homelessness in local authorities.  The next two sections 
consider  how variation  in  collaboration  scores may be  explained.   Collaboration  is 
considered the dependent variable and each of the aggregate measures discussed above is 
investigated separately in  the  analysis.   These  two dependent  variables are  assessed 
against a number of key independent or explanatory variables. Both contextual variables, 
including intra-organisational and inter-organisational factors, and interpretive variables 
are considered.  However, it is important to note that because the data in the present study 
are not part of an experimental design, it  is not appropriate to infer causality for the 
analyses which follow107.  In all cases the analysis should be treated as descriptive only.
The present study involves analysis of different types of data. Since the choice of 
techniques for analysing quantitative data is driven by the nature of the data itself, it is 
necessary in the present study to employ a number of different strategies for analysis. 
Much of  the  analysis  below  is  conducted using  bivariate  tests  which  examine the 
relationship between the dependent and independent variables.  In most cases independent 
sample t-tests are the most relevant statistical test.  T-tests compare means between two 
107 As discussed by Warner (2008), determining causality in social scientific analysis is difficult even with 
experimental designs, and causality can only begin to be inferred when several well constructed 
experimental studies yield similar results.
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groups of  cases  where the  groups  correspond to  the  two  values  of  a  dichotomous 
variable108.  T-tests are reliant on three key assumptions about the data corresponding to 
the  dependent  variable  being  investigated.   The  dependent  variable  must  be 
quantitative109, approximately normally distributed and the variance between the groups 
compared must be similar (homogeneity of variance).  These assumptions are all tested 
and satisfied in the analyses which follow.  In most cases independent samples t-test are 
appropriate rather than paired sampled t-tests (where it is otherwise this is specified).  The 
former  are  used  when  the  comparison groups  are  unrelated,  that  is,  where  each 
participants is  a  member of  one  of  the  groups only.  The latter  are  used  where the 
comparison groups are related in some way, that is, the same participants may be part of 
both comparison groups (e.g. where scores have been taken from the same people at 
different time points).  
In  those  parts  of  the  analysis  where  the  independent variables are  interval, 
correlation is used which is a bivariate analysis technique for assessing the strength of the 
linear relationship between two quantitative variables .   Pearson’s correlation is  used 
where both  variables  are  normally distributed and  Spearman’s  correlation,  the  non-
parametric correlation coefficient, is used when data are  not normally distributed .  In 
other  parts  of  the  analysis  where  it  is  not  possible  to  determine variation  on  the 
independent variable, purely descriptive statistics are employed.
Where significance tests are carried out and p values are reported, ‘one tailed’ 
significance tests are used where hypotheses are directional and ‘two tailed’ tests are used 
where hypotheses are non-directional.  The pre-selected significance level is 0.05, as is 
standard for  social  scientific  analysis  .  Where p  values  are  less  than 0.05,  the  null 
hypothesis of no association between variables is rejected.
  
7.2.1 The influence of government steering
The present section investigates the potential influence of government steering on local 
collaboration, the main independent variable of interest in the present study. Using the 
framework  presented  in  chapter  six  of  meta-governance  tools  used  to  promote 
collaboration  in  combination  with  the  survey  evidence,  it  is  possible  to  make  a 
108 The dichotomous variable is categorical with only two values.  That is, it may consist either of two 
naturally occurring comparison groups (e.g. rural versus urban authorities/ male versus female) or two 
groups created by collapsing quantitative data into two groups using cut-off points on a scale (e.g. high 
versus low/ large versus small).
109 In the present  case the formal collaboration variable is a purely interval scale,  while the informal 
collaboration scales is an aggregate score combined from several ordinal Likert-type scales and is treated 
as an interval variable.  While some statisticians contend that t-tests should be confined to interval data 
rather than ordinal data, in practice most researchers require scores only to be quantitative, and means on 
Likert scales are commonly compared using t-tests (Bryman and Cramer ibid; Warner 2008). 
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quantitative  assessment  of  the  relationship  between  government steering  and  local 
collaboration.  Three particular varieties of government steering were delineated in the 
previous chapter, including strategies involving information-based, incentive-based and 
authority-based tools.  Each of these is addressed in turn below.
The influence of information-based tools
Information-based tools include written government guidance as well as inter-personal 
contact in  the form of field visits  to  local authorities from government officials  and 
official ‘road-shows’.  Taking the first of these tools, written guidance, it is possible to 
assess its influence by examining the degree to which guidance on collaboration appears 
to be followed in local areas.  As noted in chapter six, government practice guidance 
recommends specific horizontal  coordination tools to local authorities (ODPM 2002a; 
CLG 2006a).  Table 7.4 compares implementation in local areas of these ‘top-down’ 
coordination tools as compared to other tools which may be considered more ‘bottom-up’.
Overall, there is  greater use  of  top-down than bottom-up tools,  with  a  mean 
implementation rate of 57% for tools advocated in central guidance as compared to a 
mean implementation rate of 36% for locally generated tools.  In terms of specific tools 
advocated in central guidance, there is a fairly high level of compliance with some of the 
suggested tools such as joint training, operational level joint protocols and multi-agency 
forums. However, other tools including joint commissioning, dedicated posts, strategic 
protocols and common assessment procedures are less common.  Nevertheless, given that 
implementation  of  these tools  is  not  a  legal  requirement, the  compliance level  with 
official guidance can be considered fairly high.  
Interestingly,  the majority  of  tools  promoted in  official  guidance are the less 
‘ambitious’ ones according to the scale of integration developed above.  This is perhaps in 
recognition of the difficulty of mandating overly ambitious forms of collaboration.  The 
few examples of ambitious tools which are advocated centrally are adopted only in a 
minority of cases (e.g. joint commissioning, common assessment procedures).  While the 
use of additional tools which are not explicitly mentioned in the official guidance is not as 
high as for the centrally advised tools,  figures of around 50% for some tools may be 
considered high in view of the fact that such activity is entirely voluntary, and indicate a 
degree of locally defined collaboration. 
Table 7.4 Implementation of formal horizontal coordination tools
Centrally advocated/ ‘top-down’ tools %   (N)  
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1 Joint case conferences 84   161
2 Multi-agency forum (strategic) 77   147
3 Joint protocols (operational) 72   138
4 Multi-agency forum (operational) 71   135
5 Client confidentiality protocols 70   133
6 Multi-agency training events 65   125
7 Joint directory of support services 56   106
8 Joint protocols (strategic) 47   89
9 Common assessment procedures, eg forms 36   68
10 Joint commissioning of services 30   57
11 Dedicated post for forging inter-agency links 18   34
Mean 57
Locally developed/ ‘bottom-up’ tools %   (N)
12 Service Level Agreements 70   133
13 Common directory of accommodation providers 55   105
14 Multi-agency outreach service 52   99
15 Joint client monitoring procedures 49   94
16 Co-location of services 39   74
17 Joint local Performance targets/ indicators 21   40
18 Multi-agency homelessness team/ one stop shop 18   34
19 Staff placements in other agencies 15   28
20 Joint budgets 6   12
Mean 36
The  influence  of  the  second  information-based  tool,  inter-personal  contact  from 
government officials,  can  be  assessed by  comparing mean  collaboration  scores  for 
authorities  with  high  and  those  with  low  levels  of  contact  with  CLG,  the  central 
government department responsible for homelessness. A measure of ‘vertical contact’ was 
developed in the survey which asked respondents to indicate the degree of contact they 
had with a range of national level bodies, including with CLG, using the same 5 point 
likert scale as for horizontal contact.  In this analysis high contact with CLG is defined as 
scores of 3 or more while low contact is scores of less than 3110.  
Table  7.5 indicates that  those reporting  high levels of  contact with  CLG had 
higher  mean  collaboration  scores  on  both  measures  of  the  dependent  variable. 
Independent sample t-tests to compare means found that the differences were significant 
for both formal collaboration (t = 2.01, p = 0.001) and informal collaboration (t = 22.51, p 
= 0.000). 
Table 7.5 Relationship between vertical contact and local collaboration
Collaboration measure High Vertical Contact (≥3) 
(N=132)
Low vertical contact (< 3)
(N=56)
110 Mean scores for the five national bodies investigated are presented in appendix X (table) which reveals 
that of all the national level bodies, contact with CLG was highest.   
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Formal collaboration 
(mean score, s.d.)
143 (26.17) 120 (28.11)
Informal collaboration 
(mean score, s.d.)
10.06 (3.6) 8.05 (4.3)
The influence of incentive-based tools
As discussed in the previous chapter, key incentives include funds and schemes rewarding 
collaborative working such as the Innovation Fund and the Regional Champions Scheme. 
It is possible to ascertain the influence of these incentive-based tools by comparing mean 
collaboration scores for authorities in receipt of these awards and those which are not.   
The results are presented in table 7.6 below. It can be seen that the mean informal 
collaboration scores of Beacon/ Regional Champion authorities are significantly different 
from authorities without this  status (t=-18.8, p=0.005).  Similarly,  the mean informal 
collaboration score for authorities with Innovation Funding is greater than those without 
(t=-16.4 p=0.01).  There was also a statistically significant difference (t=-2.87, p=0.001) 
between the mean number of coordination tools adopted by authorities which received 
Innovation Funding (mean=12) and those who had not (mean=9).  There was a marginal 
difference between the mean coordination tool  scores of  ‘Beacon’ and ‘non-Beacon’ 
authorities,  although this  finding  was  not  statistically  significant  (t=-1.27, p=0.167). 
Overall, the results indicate that collaboration is greater in authorities that have been 
awarded Innovation Funding and Beacon or ‘Regional Champion’ status, suggesting that 
incentive based tools may have a positive impact on the level of local collaboration.  
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Table 7.6 Relationship between incentives and local collaboration
Collaboration measure Innovation Funding Regional Champion/
Beacon Award
Yes (N=22) No (N=169) Yes (N=20) No (N=171)
Formal collaboration 
mean score (s.d.)
12.00 
(3.04)
9.13 
(3.87)
10.60 
(4.89)
9.33 
(3.75)
Informal collaboration 
mean score (s.d.)
150.6 
(23.39)
134.2 
(28.49)
152.9 
(30.8)
134.1 
(27.5)
The influence of authority-based tools
One method of assessing the influence of authority-based tools on local collaboration is to 
examine mean interaction scores between the housing authority and other bodies with 
which collaboration is mandated under statute, and comparing these with non-mandated 
bodies.  As discussed in chapter six, there is a legal duty for social services departments 
and registered social landlords including LSVT organisations to cooperate with housing 
authorities to help them discharge their homelessness functions. There is also a legal duty 
for  housing  authorities  to  assist  other local  housing  authorities  when  requested. 
Consequently,  one might expect there to  be significant levels  of  interaction between 
housing authorities and these bodies in comparison to other agencies in the homelessness 
network.  Furthermore,  because of the requirement for social services departments to 
assist with the development of local authority homelessness strategies, one might predict 
a reasonably high level of ‘planning level’ contact with this agency in particular.  In 
addition, since the probation service and primary care trusts are required to be involved in 
strategic  Supporting  People  commissioning  bodies  at  local  level,  one  might  also 
anticipate high planning level interaction scores with these bodies.  
Table 7.7 provides the planning and case level contact scores for each of these 
‘mandated’ bodies as compared to the mean scores for all bodies in the homelessness 
network.  It  indicates that the three agencies for which we may have expected high 
planning level contact – social services departments, the probation service and primary 
care trusts - have either average or below average scores compared to all agencies in the 
network. Case level contact follows a similar pattern, with greatest contact gaps with 
primary care trusts,  followed by  social services departments and then  the  probation 
service.  These three bodies have the greatest gaps between ideal and actual levels of 
planning and case level contact of all mandated bodies, indicating scope for improvement 
in terms of contact levels.  However, of all mandated bodies, only primary care trusts and 
social services departments have higher ‘contact gaps’ than the network mean. For all 
other mandated bodies, interaction levels are either greater than or around average.  This 
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suggests that the government requirement to collaborate is more successful with some 
mandated bodies than others.  
Table 7.7 Mean contact scores for individual mandated agencies and all agencies
  Planning Level Contact       Case Level Contact
Agency  Actual          Ideal         Gap     Actual         Ideal          Gap
Other LHAs  3.3     3.7        0.4      3.1   3.5     0.4
Probation  2.9     3.7       0.8       3.2 3.7     0.5
Social Services 2.9    4.0       1.1       3.3   4.0     0.7
PCT  2.2    3.5        1.3       2.6   3.5     0.9
LSVTs  4.0    4.2         0.2       4.0   4.1     0.1
RSLSs  3.7    4.2         0.5       3.8   4.1     0.3
All agencies  2.9           3.8            0.9     3.1             3.7           0.6
in network
Table 7.8 below provides data on local housing authorities’ mean interaction scores with 
mandated bodies  as  a  whole in  comparison to  the  mean contact scores  of  all  non-
mandated local bodies in the homelessness network.  When all mandated bodies are taken 
together, it can be seen that there is greater interaction with these bodies than with non-
mandated bodies and a greater perceived gap between actual and ideal contact for non-
mandated than mandated bodies.  This suggests that legal mandates to collaborate with 
particular bodies are at least moderately successful.  
Table 7.8 Mean contact scores for mandated versus non-mandated bodies
Type of Body Planning Level Case Level
Actual Ideal Gap Actual Ideal Gap
Mandated* 3.25 3.87 0.62 3.33 3.80 0.47
Non-mandated 2.95 3.72 0.77 3.08 3.65 0.57
*  Mandated  bodies  include  the  Social  Services  Department,  Primary  Care  Trust,  Probation  Service, 
Registered Social Landlords, LSVT organisations and other Local Authorities.
Taking  all  ‘meta-governance’ tools  together,  the  analysis  suggests  that  attempts  to 
stimulate collaboration in local authorities may have a positive impact.  Although it is not 
possible to determine causality without constructing an experimental design, these results 
provide some evidence of  positive state influence of  local service delivery networks 
across English local authorities. They also indicate a  reasonable level of consistency 
between  central  and  local  conceptions  of  collaboration.   There  is  no  serious 
‘implementation gap’ between central policy prescriptions and local practice, although 
compliance is not perfect and there may be a tendency for local authorities to resist the 
most ambitious forms of collaboration.  Comparisons of interaction scores indicates fairly 
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good contact scores for mandated bodies as a whole compared to non-mandated bodies, 
although there are particular mandated bodies such as social services departments and 
primary care trusts with which there is perhaps less contact than would be desirable.    
It is not possible within the current research design to make direct comparisons 
between the relative impacts of these different tools  on collaboration because of the 
difficulty  of  isolating  the  effect  of  one  tool  from  another.   For  instance,  greater 
collaboration in authorities receiving incentives to collaborate may also be explained by 
the fact that such authorities have also received information or advice on collaboration, or 
because they have responded to government mandates.  Nevertheless it is possible to 
make some qualitative assessment of the relative strengths and weaknesses of different 
tools, a topic which is explored in chapter nine. 
7.2.2 Additional factors affecting collaboration: Introduction
Moving onto other potential explanatory variables, a range of antecedents of collaboration 
identified in previous literature were discussed in chapter one.  Recalling figure 1.1 from 
that chapter, contextual factors include both inter- and intra-organisational factors. Inter-
organisational factors refer to the environment between agencies or the wider context in 
which  networks  of  organisations  reside.   Inter-organisational  factors  aside  from 
government policies and meta-governance tools include the level  of inter-dependence 
between agencies, the geographical proximity of agencies and the degree of compatibility 
of organisational systems. Intra-organisational factors are internal to agencies and include 
the level of resources, the presence of collaborative leadership, organisational structure 
(e.g. number of tiers) and the level of staff training.  Interpretive factors refer to subjective 
factors relating to the attitudes of staff towards other organisations and their personnel, 
and  include  issues  such  as  domain  consensus,  trust,  goal  congruence and  mutual 
understanding.  
While it is outside the scope and aims of the present research to consider of all 
these factors, it is possible to assess a small number of variables from each category in 
order to identify which other factors or variables – other than government steering – 
appear to explain variation in collaboration across local authorities in the present setting. 
Since some of the factors identified above are difficult to measure quantitatively, it is 
necessary in some cases to use proxy measures for these variables.  
Contextual  intra-organisational  variables  investigated  include  organisational 
structure, level of training of staff, and level of resources.  Organisational structure is 
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considered in terms of the number of tiers in a local authority. Since previous research has 
indicated  that  collaboration  is  more  challenging  where  there  are  several  levels  of 
government involved, it might be expected that collaboration will be greater in single tier 
authorities than in two tier authorities.  Level of training is assessed in terms of survey 
respondents’  qualifications.  Previous  work  indicates  that  more  highly  trained  and 
qualified staff may be more likely to collaborate since they perceive collaboration to be 
less of a threat, and therefore where respondents are more highly qualified, collaboration 
is expected to be higher.  Level of resources is assessed in terms of number of staff. Since 
collaboration is  often hindered by lack of  resources, authorities  with  greater staffing 
levels may be expected to collaborate more.  
Contextual  inter-organisational  variables  assessed  include  the  degree  of 
interdependence, fragmentation and geographical proximity between agencies.  The level 
of single homelessness is used as a proxy for interdependence. It seems likely that where 
there is greater homelessness in local areas, agencies will also be more interdependent 
since tackling homelessness in the present system depends on agencies working together, 
as illustrated in chapter four.  Since interdependence is an antecedent of collaboration, we 
may expect areas  with  greater homelessness to  collaborate more.  Fragmentation is 
indicated  by  the  degree  of  externalisation  of  core  housing  services,  including 
homelessness, housing advice and local authority housing stock.  Previous literature also 
considers fragmentation  to  be  an  antecedent of  collaboration,  and  we may therefore 
expect local authorities with contracted out services to have higher collaboration scores. 
An authority’s geography, that is, whether it is urban or rural111, is used as a proxy for 
physical proximity since it is likely that agencies in urban authorities are more proximal 
than those in rural authorities.  As discussed above, geographical proximity is considered 
to facilitate collaboration.  We may therefore expect closer collaboration in urban than in 
rural authorities.
Interpretive variables are  much harder  to  assess  but  two  key  variables  may 
provide information on the influence of such factors. The length of time a respondent has 
been in post, or in their present authority, is potentially important and serves as a proxy 
measure for trust.  As discussed in chapter one, trust emerges as individuals engage in 
repeated interactions, and those who have been in post or in their current authority longer 
will have had a greater length of time to interact with other agencies in their network and 
therefore to establish trust.  Since trust is an antecedent of collaboration, length of time in 
post  or in current authority are predicted to be associated with greater collaboration. 
Secondly, previous experience of working in other types of agencies in the homelessness 
111 Authorities are classified as urban and rural according to the DEFRA Rural definition and classification 
of authorities dataset: www.defra.gov.uk/rural/ruralstats/rural-definition.htm
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network may indicate a greater understanding of other agencies, something which is also 
considered an antecedent of collaboration.  Consequently collaboration may be greater 
amongst individuals who have worked in other types of agencies in the homelessness 
network and less amongst those who have worked predominantly in one sector.
It should be noted that the two main dependent variables used hitherto measure 
organisational rather than individual collaboration. A separate question asked respondents 
to indicate what proportion of their own work time personally had been spent in contact 
with external bodies in relation to single homelessness.  When assessing individual level 
factors such as length of time in post, professional qualifications and previous experience 
of working in other agencies in the homelessness network, this measure is used a third 
dependent variable and cross-checked against the other two dependent variables.  
7.2.3 Intra-organisational factors
Number of organisational tiers, Level of resources and Professional qualifications
 
Of the contextual intra-organisational factors investigated, both organisational structure 
(i.e. number of tiers in an authority) and number of housing advice staff appear to be 
related  to  the  level  of  collaboration,  while  professional  qualifications  do  not  (see 
Appendix I, tables 1 and 4).  Independent sample t-tests reveal that mean collaboration 
scores are greater for single tier than two tier authorities.  Single tier authorities have 
higher  formal  collaboration scores than two tier authorities (11 vs 9 coordination tools 
employed) and the difference is statistically significant (t=2.14, p=0.034).  Single tier 
authorities also have higher informal collaboration scores (mean 146) compared to two 
tier authorities (mean 134) and the difference is again statistically significant (t=2.30, 
p=0.023).  
A bi-variate correlation analysis for level of staffing112 and formal collaboration 
score was performed, and the two variables were found to be weakly and positively 
associated  (r=0.252,  p=0.000).  Similarly,  informal  collaboration  was  weakly  and 
positively associated with the number of personnel (r=0.237, p=0.001).  T-tests, however, 
revealed no significant relationship between professional qualifications of respondents 
and level of collaboration, either organisational collaboration or individual collaboration 
(see Appendix I table 4)113.  
112 Measured as number of full time housing advice staff
113 Data on professional qualifications were not perfectly normal so the non-parametric equivalent to the t-
test (Mann-Whitney U test) was also run as a cross-check; this test confirmed that qualifications are not 
significantly related to the amount of time interacting with external agencies.
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7.2.4 Inter-organisational factors
Interdependence, Fragmentation and Geographical proximity
With regards to contextual inter-organisational factors, interdependence and geographical 
proximity are positively associated with collaboration, although fragmentation is not (see 
Appendix  I  tables  2a  and  4).   The  proxy  for  interdependence, the  level  of  single 
homelessness,  varies  across  local  authorities.   The  range  in  levels  of  single 
homelessness114 for 2005 in English local authorities was 0-1407 with a mean level of 103 
115.   The level of single homelessness was found to be weakly and positively correlated 
with collaboration.  In other words, the greater the level of homelessness, the greater is 
the  degree  of  collaboration.   This  finding  applied  to  both  informal  collaboration 
(Spearman’s  r  =0.211,  p=  0.003116)  and  formal  collaboration  (Spearman’s  r=0.289, 
p=0.000).   
As  noted  above,  the  degree  of  externalisation  serves  as  a  measure  of 
fragmentation,  with  greater  externalisation  predicted  to  be  associated  with  higher 
collaboration.  The survey asked respondents to indicate whether their housing advice 
service and homelessness service were contracted out to an external agency, and also 
whether their authority had undergone the Large Scale Voluntary Stock Transfer process 
to  transfer ownership of their  housing to an external housing provider117.   T-tests  to 
compare the mean collaboration scores for those authorities which  had contracted out 
these services and those which had not, revealed that none of these variables was related 
to the degree of collaboration (see Appendix I table 2a).
In  terms of  geography,  urban areas  were  found  to  have  greater  formal and 
informal collaboration scores than rural authorities, and the difference was statistically 
significant.  Urban authorities had mean formal collaboration scores of 10.18 compared to 
114 Single  homelessness  was  defined  as  the  number  of  homeless  people  accepted  by  English  local 
authorities for statutory assistance due to vulnerabilities such as old age, mental illness, physical disability 
or for ‘other’ special reasons, such as time spent in custody, in HM forces or in care (other than ‘young’ 
care leavers), and those fleeing home because of violence or the threat of violence (other than domestic 
violence). Official rough sleeping estimates were available for a limited number of authorities only and 
are therefore not included in the single homelessness statistic.   
115 Since the survey was conducted in the Summer of 2006, aggregate data for the four quarters of the 
previous year on the number of single homeless people is used to provide an indication of the level of 
single homelessness at local authority level. This data was obtained from Local Authority Annual Returns 
to Central Government for the year 2005 (P1E Data).  
116 Spearman’s r was used since the level of single homelessness was not normally distributed across 
authorities.
117 Data on LSVT status was cross-checked against official data ‘Completed LSVTs Dataset’. Updated 
16/08/06 www.communities.gov.uk/index.asp?id=1152563.
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rural authorities with scores of 8.84 (t=2.40, p=0.017). The mean informal collaboration 
score for urban authorities was 141 in  comparison to  rural authorities’ mean of 132 
(t=2.32, p=0.022).  Assuming that agencies in urban authorities are geographically closer 
than  in  rural  authorities,  this  provides support  for  the  hypothesis  that  geographical 
proximity is an antecedent of collaboration.
7.2.5 Interpretive factors: trust and mutual understanding 
Length of time in post or current authority
Moving  onto  interpretive factors, it  was  suggested above that  the  length  of  time a 
respondent had been in post or in their present authority, proxy measures for trust, may be 
related to collaboration, with collaboration greater amongst those who had spent longer in 
post or in their current authority.  The relationships between each of these variables and 
collaboration were assessed using correlation analysis.   Collaboration was considered 
both at an organisational level and an individual level (i.e. percentage of respondents’ 
time spent interacting with external bodies).  However, neither of these variables was 
found to be associated with level of collaboration either at an organisational or individual 
level (see Appendix I table 4).  
Experience working in other agencies
In relation to the second interpretive variable, respondents were first asked whether they 
had previously worked in  any other type of agency from the list of 25 provided in the 
survey.   Organisational collaboration scores for those who had previously worked in 
another type of agency were, perhaps unsurprisingly, no different to those who had not 
worked in another type of agency from the list provided.  However, as noted above, it was 
anticipated  that  experience  working  in  other  types  of  agencies  may  increase  an 
individual’s likelihood of collaborating with other agencies, since it may indicate greater 
mutual understanding.  Indeed, individual collaboration scores were greater for those who 
had worked in  another  type of  agency than those  who had not  (25% versus  17%), 
although this difference was not statistically significant (p=0.052). 
Those who had worked in another type of agency were asked to indicate what 
type of agency this was.  Analysis was conducted to ascertain whether there was any 
relationship  between  the  particular  type  of  agency  previously  worked  in  and  a 
respondent’s  individual  collaboration score.  Those who had worked in  non-housing 
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related agencies reported that they had spent more time over the past year in contact with 
external agencies than those who had not (25% versus 16%) and this difference was 
statistically  significant (t=2.61, p=0.011).  However,  previous  work in  a  non-housing 
agency was not associated with organisational collaboration scores.  
Respondents who indicated that they had worked in another type of agency were 
also asked whether this organisation had been within their current local authority. It was 
anticipated that collaboration scores may be greater amongst those who had worked in 
other agencies within their current authority than those who had not, since movement of 
staff between agencies is one way of building trust and understanding between agencies. 
However,  there was very little difference in mean collaboration scores for these two 
groups (see Appendix I table 3).
In a separate question respondents were asked to indicate how many years they 
had spent in the housing or homelessness sector.  Using correlation analysis, this variable 
was not found to be associated with organisational collaboration (see Appendix I table 4) 
but was negatively associated with individual collaboration (r=-0.175, p= 0.009).  In other 
words, those who had been in the housing or homelessness sector longer were less likely 
to spend their time collaborating with other agencies.  
A summary of the additional contextual and interpretive factors associated with 
collaboration is provided in table 7.9. 
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Table 7.9 Summary of additional factors associated with collaboration
Factors associated with collaboration Factors not associated with collaboration
No. of tiers in authority No. years in post/ trust
No. of housing staff/ level of resources No. years in authority/ trust
Geographical proximity Professional qualifications (degree or 
professional housing qualification)
Level of homelessness/ interdependence Externalisation of services/ fragmentation
Previous experience working in 
agencies other than housing agencies
Previous work in other agency (any type)
No. years in housing/ homelessness 
sector 
Previous work on other agency in existing 
local authority
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Chapter summary and discussion
This chapter has attempted to gauge the degree of collaboration in English local authority 
networks  with respect to  the problem of single homelessness and to  characterise the 
nature of this collaboration.  The results indicate moderate levels of formal and informal 
collaboration, although marginally greater levels of informal collaboration.  Within the 
formal variety of collaboration a mix of horizontal coordination tools is used, with group 
modes  and  impersonal  modes  most  common.   Overall,  the  tools  which  are  most 
commonly adopted are those which are less ambitious and do not involve a deep level of 
service integration.  This is perhaps a reflection of the cost and resource implications of 
these tools, however it may also testify to a propensity for agencies to resist forms of 
collaboration which  threaten organisational  autonomy.   This  concurs with  the  more 
pessimistic view of collaboration which suggests that agencies will  strive to maintain 
their organisational autonomy (for example Hudson, 1995). 
In terms of  informal  collaboration, that is, the day-to-day interactions between 
personnel across organisational boundaries, the survey highlighted strongest interactions 
between housing  authorities  and  accommodation providers  or  other  housing  related 
agencies.  This  may provide support for the ‘organisational  homogeneity’ hypothesis 
discussed in chapter one that organisations with similar remits and common ground find it 
easier to  collaborate.  Housing authority personnel have least contact with voluntary 
sector agencies and moderate contact levels with statutory sector agencies. 
In relation to the  organisational level at  which collaboration is  pursued, both 
informal and formal collaboration are stronger at operational level than at strategic level. 
This is evidenced by greater ‘case contact’ level scores overall as compared to ‘planning 
contact’ scores, and a larger gap between actual and ideal contact levels at strategic level 
than at operational level.  It is also backed up by the greater use of operational level 
horizontal coordination tools than strategic or planning level tools.  
A further aim of this chapter has been to investigate the relationship between 
central  government  steering,  the  main  independent  variable  of  interest,  and  local 
collaboration, the dependent variable.   It  appears that this key contextual variable  is 
positively related to local collaboration.  In particular, incentives to collaborate and direct 
contact between central and local government are associated with greater collaboration. 
The impact of authority-based tools is more difficult to assess since it is methodologically 
difficult  to detect variation in this tool. Nevertheless, the analysis does provide some 
indication of  the  influence of  authoritative exhortations  and mandates.  Analysis  of 
interaction scores for mandated bodies suggests that there is less contact with these bodies 
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than would be ideal according to the perceptions of street level bureaucrats themselves. 
However, the gap between ideal and actual contact is lower for mandated bodies overall 
than for non-mandated bodies, indicating at least partial effectiveness of authority-based 
tools.  Similarly, although local agencies are not perfectly compliant with government 
advice and exhortations on recommended forms of collaboration, there is greater used of 
horizontal collaboration tools specified in central guidance (‘top-down’ tools) than other 
tools  (‘bottom-up’  tools).   This  also  suggests  some  positive  state  influence  over 
collaboration.  Chapter nine examines perceptions of different vertical steering tools to 
provide  further  assessment of  local  actors’ responsiveness  government’s  attempts to 
encourage collaboration in local areas. 
While government steering appears to be associated with collaboration, other key 
factors, both contextual and interpretive, are also related to collaboration. This suggests 
that government steering may explain only part of the variation in collaboration across 
local authorities.  From the range of possible variables investigated, contextual variables 
associated with collaboration include institutional structure, geographical proximity and 
number of homelessness staff, while interpretive individual level factors include previous 
experience in non-housing agencies and length of time in the homelessness sector.   
The finding that collaboration is greater in single tier than in two tier authorities 
resonates with  interview data  discussed in  chapter  five.  Interviewees in  the two tier 
authority case study area generally found that this structural feature presented challenges 
for inter-agency collaboration. Difficulties associated with working across levels in two 
tier  authorities  were as  much related to  bureaucratic politics  as  to  physical distance 
between agencies.  The two tier system was characterised as creating tensions between 
District and County levels since Districts had to compete for County money for services 
such as social care and housing related support.  Therefore the vertical District-County 
relationship was an unequal one with greater power residing at the County level. The 
statistical finding on authority structure backs up these qualitative interview findings.
The greater levels of collaboration in urban areas than in rural areas reported in 
this  chapter  back up previous work which suggests that  geographical proximity may 
affect  collaboration.  Geographical proximity  was  also  highlighted  by  interviewees, 
although did not constitute a main theme.  Comments around geographical proximity 
related mainly to the physical barrier of working with agencies in other buildings.
The  additional  finding  that  collaboration is  greater  in  authorities  with  more 
housing staff  supports  previous  work which suggests that  adequate  resources are an 
antecedent of collaboration. It  indicates that human resources in terms of number of 
personnel may  be  an  important  element  of  the  resource  issue.   Resources were  a 
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continually emerging theme in the interview analysis of factors affecting collaboration, 
with lack of sufficient staff time a particular obstacle to collaboration.   
In relation to the interpretive factors highlighted, the finding that length of time in 
current post or authority has little bearing on collaboration scores is interesting.  This is 
surprising in view of the importance of repeated interactions to the development of trust 
and collaboration, and one might have expected longer serving staff to have developed 
trusting and collaborative relationships. However, it appears that those who are longer in 
post do not interact any more frequently than those who are new in post.  
The  type of agency in which an individual has worked appears to be a  more 
important determinant of their likelihood of collaborating than the local authority area in 
which they have worked.  The finding that collaboration is greater amongst those with 
experience of working  in  agencies  outside of  the field of  housing,  coupled with  the 
finding that collaboration is lower amongst those who have spent longer in the housing/ 
homelessness  sector,  may indicate that  individuals who remain  within  one sector or 
organisation become entrenched within the culture of that sector and less ‘outward facing’ 
than those who move across sectors.  
Importantly,  collaboration  also  appears  to  be  associated  with  the  level  of 
homelessness.  This may provide support for rationalistic explanations of collaboration, 
which assume that actors collaborate where the task environment dictates this.  Where 
there are significant levels of homelessness in an area, the need for collaboration is likely 
to be greater, and authority-level data indicate that this is reflected in authorities’ patterns 
of collaboration.  
While the analysis presented in this chapter provides a good indication of the 
relationship  of  different  variables  to  collaboration,  it  is  important  to  recognise  its 
limitations.  The analysis is based on bivariate analyses only, which makes it difficult to 
determine the  relative  importance of  different variables.   While  comparisons of  the 
strength of association and significance levels for different variables presented in the 
supporting appendix provide a reasonable guide to this, examination of the full range of 
factors within a single model using multivariate analysis techniques would generate more 
sensitive and powerful data to explain the contribution of different variables.  In such an 
analysis it would also be possible to include relevant statistical controls for other variables 
which may act as potential confounders, such as the level of homelessness, population 
size, the level of deprivation and the availability of affordable accommodation.  A more 
advanced statistical analysis of this nature would constitute a useful line of enquiry for 
future study. 
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Chapter 8: The contribution of horizontal tools to 
collaboration
Chapter overview
This chapter examines formal horizontal tools as mechanisms of collaboration.  While the 
previous  chapter highlighted the range of horizontal  coordination tools  used in  local 
authorities, the present chapter considers the dynamics of these tools.  Four key issues are 
considered. Section 8.1 offers an examination of the extent to which horizontal tools are 
viewed as mechanisms for attenuating the perceived externalities in the homelessness 
system which were documented in chapter five.  This has implications for the extent to 
which horizontal coordination tools can serve as effective mechanisms for overcoming 
externalities in fragmented systems generally.  
Section  8.2  analyses  actors’ motivations  for  developing  particular horizontal 
coordination tools, assessing the relative importance of rationalistic and ‘bureau-political’ 
considerations.  The discussion also assesses the influence of government steering on 
local  collaboration, in  particular whether tool  development is  primarily  voluntary  or 
pursued in response to government edict.
Section 8.3 outlines the main challenges associated with developing and managing 
tools including issues associated with bureaucratic politics.  Finally, section 8.4 discusses 
whether  horizontal  tools  themselves  offer  a  means  of  overcoming the  tensions  of 
collaborative working more generally.  Sections 8.3 and 8.4 together provide a means of 
assessing  whether  horizontal  tools  are  mechanisms  for  resolving  the  tensions  of 
bureaucratic politics, or simply the mechanisms through which bureaucratic politics are 
played out.  
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8.1 Do horizontal coordination tools attenuate externalities?
Chapter five outlined the perceived externalities created by the homelessness system. 
Collaboration is sometimes posited as a means of minimising externalities through better 
coordination, and the interview analysis sought to assess this claim.  The analysis uses 
data  from  interviewees’ general  descriptions  and  assessments of  the  strengths  and 
weaknesses of different coordination mechanisms.
To recap, the main client  level externalities  highlighted by  interviewees were 
confusion created by the complex system, difficulties accessing services, duplication of 
assessment and information collection by different agencies, disagreements over which 
agencies should be responsible for clients with multiple needs, and gaps in services.  The 
principal externalities relating to service provision or planning were duplication of the 
services provided,  challenges of  developing  services because of  fragmented funding 
streams and the precariousness of being dependent on other agencies to fulfil statutory 
responsibilities.  An additional theme raised in the literature, as discussed in chapter one, 
included forms of incoherence such as contradictory practices created by agencies’ lack of 
an  overview of  the  system  as  a  whole.   Several  of  these  themes were  raised  by 
interviewees in their accounts of the role of horizontal coordination tools, indicating that 
the tools do help in many resects to attenuate these externalities (see table 8.1 below).   
Duplications and gaps in services were addressed in group modes such as multi-
agency forums through discussions where agencies attempted to ‘iron out’ such issues 
(quote ID32 in table 8.1).  Duplication in service provision was also being addressed in 
one local authority which was considering co-location of frontline homelessness agencies, 
a  form of joint  service provision (see quote  ID14).  This  mode of coordination was 
viewed as likely to improve cost-effectiveness, obviating the need for each agency to have 
its own premises, equipment and personnel.  
Duplication  of  assessment and  information collection  was  something which 
interviewees suggested could be reduced through the use of joint assessment and referral 
forms,  joint  monitoring  databases and joint  service directories.  In  the case of  joint 
assessment forms, these could help prevent clients from having to repeat their details to 
several  agencies  (quote  ID19).   In  relation  to  joint  referral  forms,  interviewees 
commented that they often found themselves making several referrals for a single client in 
order to  maximise the chances of  securing accommodation  for this  person.  A single 
referral  form,  it  was suggested, would  reduce agencies’ duplication  of  effort.   Joint 
monitoring databases were also cited as a tool for preventing double-counting of client 
outcomes, something which was created by each agency operating its own monitoring 
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system.  Lastly,  joint  directories of services or available vacancies were described as 
reducing the need for each agency to produce their own lists of providers and services.
Improving accessibility of services was linked to forms of integrated provision 
such as co-location and multi-agency teams. These coordination tools were viewed as 
bringing services closer to people in the places they normally use the services (quote 
ID19).  For instance, it was suggested that homeless people with very chaotic lives would 
be more likely to use co-located ‘drop in’ services as compared to disparate appointment-
based services (quote ID40). Multi-agency outreach teams were considered to perform a 
particularly  important  role  for  street  homeless  people  who  had  limited  access  to 
mainstream services. Services such as housing advisors in GP surgeries could potentially 
reach groups who would be less inclined to seek help for housing or debt issues because 
of  the stigma attached or  for cultural  reasons. Linked to  the  accessibility  argument, 
integrated service provision was also considered to reduce confusion for clients (quote 
ID8).  As discussed in chapter five, the homeless service system was considered very 
complex and fragmented in the case study areas, forcing clients to  approach several 
different agencies. 
Joint protocols were considered a mechanism to address the problem of the lack of 
accountability for providing services to certain clients.  They had been used in a number 
of  cases  as  a  mechanism for  holding  agencies to  account for  their  responsibilities. 
Protocols were considered particularly important for issues where there was no statutory 
responsibility or duty of care on the part of the agency concerned.  In such cases, locally 
established joint protocols became the ‘stick’ to use to elicit agencies’ cooperation. One 
example involved the introduction of a protocol with Housing Associations to develop a 
shared responsibility for preventing homelessness.  This was in response to Housing 
Associations’ practice of evicting tenants and passing the responsibility over to the Local 
Authority, who held the statutory responsibility for homelessness.  This example also 
serves to illustrate how protocols may be a mechanism for agencies to use when they 
perceive themselves  overly-dependent on other agencies to  fulfil  their  own statutory 
responsibilities.  
There  were  several  tools  which  local  actors  viewed  as  helping  to  reduce 
incoherence.  For instance, formal coordinator posts – a personal coordination mode – 
were viewed in this light.  In areas where such posts had been established, interviewees 
commented that these coordinators had an overview of activities and developments in 
different organisations.   Consequently  they  were able  to  assist  with  the  creation of 
policies  and procedures on  a  cross-authority  basis  and to  help  ensure that  different 
organisations were not working at cross-purposes (see quotes ID29 and ID8).   Multi-
252
agency forums also helped to  improve  coherence.   Aside from identifying gaps  and 
duplications in services as discussed above, they were also used collectively to deal with 
problems that may otherwise remain unaddressed (quote ID3).  They also served an 
important information-sharing function  which improved agencies’ awareness of  local 
developments including service developments, something which could potentially reduce 
inconsistencies or contradictions in the practices of different agencies.
Lastly, joint directories of services were considered to improve coherence (quote 
ID21). Because agencies lacked an overview of the system as a whole, their knowledge of 
other agencies in the system was sometimes inaccurate or incomplete.  Joint directories 
were  viewed as  a  means of  distributing  accurate and  up-to-date  information  to  all 
agencies within the network and ultimately improving the quality  of decisions made 
around client referrals and other issues. 
These examples highlight several ways in which formal horizontal coordination 
tools do, or could, help to attenuate the externalities of the fragmented homelessness 
network.   Externalities  such  as  duplication,  incoherence,  poor  accountability  for 
determining responsibility and difficulties accessing services were perceived as issues 
which could be addressed or attenuated through horizontal coordination mechanisms. 
Their appraisal of the role of horizontal coordination tools does suggest that consideration 
of these issues did have some influence over their decisions to develop or consider using 
such tools.  Despite this,  some externalities identified by interviewees –  such as the 
challenge of developing services because of fragmented funding streams – were outside 
of  local  actors’  control,  with  local  horizontal  coordination  structures  unlikely  to 
ameliorate such difficulties.  
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Table 8.1 The contribution of horizontal coordination tools to the reduction of externalities
Theme Illustrative Quotes
Reducing duplication 
and addressing gaps 
in services
“There are all sorts of duplications that multi-agency meetings help to 
iron out. And I think at the moment that is a particular focus.” ID32, 
LA2 
“The crux of the matter came from the question ‘why are these 
agencies working independently, why don’t we share a photocopier or 
work under one roof or have one admin dept rather than six?’ ” ID14, 
LA2
“The next step is looking at things like assessments and information, 
so that clients that use 2 or 3 services don’t have to keep saying the 
same things over and over. Maybe they could just say it once and that 
file is held with the lead agency and with the person’s permission, 
shared appropriately with another service.” ID19, LA2
Enhancing coherence 
(e.g. through 
information sharing, 
collective problem 
solving, gaining 
overview of system)
“We look at trying to influence and get resources together where 
there’s funding streams available. We wouldn’t be able to do that if we 
didn’t have that County-Wide Homeless Managers group and the post 
who’s coordinated all that ‘cause they negotiated with the County SP 
team on a regional level rather than on a local level.” ID8, LA2
“I have an awareness of what other agencies are doing, and trying not 
to pull in the opposite direction to them. That’s my job as the 
coordinator, making sure that the two different teams are not doing 
opposite things to the same group… making sure that we’re all trying 
to work in the same direction, or at least not competing directions.” 
ID29, LA2
“A lot of agencies don’t know that other agencies exist, so it’s not a 
case of them not wanting to refer, it’s that they don’t know they are 
there. We’ve been discussing that lately in our group, whether we 
should put together a directory or something.” ID21, LA3
“The forum means that the services are better coordinated, & it means 
that everyone does occasionally say ‘we’ll all do something about this 
problem’.” ID3, LA3
Improving 
accessibility of 
services
“I support the day centre model of having a single site, of bringing the 
services closer to the people where they are.” ID19, LA2
Reducing confusion 
for clients
“Co-location would be ideal; it must be very confusing for clients 
’cause everything is in different place in the City.” ID8, LA2
Improving 
accountability for 
fulfilling 
responsibilities
(Discussing joint protocols) “I think that’s what you need sometimes 
is a document to go back to, to refer to when agencies maybe aren’t 
showing up and saying, ‘you do realise within this document that your 
director or CEO has signed, it says that you’re supposed to be doing 
this’… a point of reference.” ID16, LA2
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8.2 Motivations for adopting horizontal tools
The discussion on local support for collaboration in chapter five (section 5.2) alluded 
briefly to the reasons why interviewees considered collaboration to be important.  The 
two main reasons cited were firstly that homelessness was a multidimensional problem, 
and secondly that agencies therefore could not solve this alone and were interdependent. 
However,  in  order to  delve  more deeply  into their motivations for  collaborating,  an 
analysis of themes was undertaken surrounding interviewees’ comments on the role of 
specific collaborative mechanisms and tools.   By focusing on  specific examples and 
forms of collaboration, it was possible to move beyond rhetorical statements about the 
merits  of  collaboration to  a  more  meaningful  analysis  of  the  major  factors  which 
propelled agencies to collaborate.
While  local  actors  did  view  formal  horizontal  tools  as  helping  to  alleviate 
problems associated with the fragmented system, as discussed above, tools were adopted 
for a  variety of reasons.   Actors’ motivations for using horizontal coordination tools 
extended beyond a belief that they would help remedy negative externalities or provide 
more holistic approach to client needs.  Analysis of the reasons cited for using such tools 
indicates that concerns to protect the interests of the agencies themselves were fairly high 
on the agenda of street level bureaucrats (see table 8.2 below). 
In particular, horizontal coordination tools provided an opportunity for agencies to 
protect  their  own  position  in  a  difficult  financial  environment  and  also  to  protect 
themselves against risk in a sector which was characterised as having a strong ‘blame 
culture’.   In  terms of  the  financial environment, as  noted above,  one authority  was 
considering co-location of services.  While this was a means of reducing duplication, it 
was also part of a survival strategy for local agencies who knew they had to reduce costs 
in order to remain in operation (see quote ID17).  Pooling resources through co-location 
was one means of achieving this.  Co-location was also viewed as a cost effectiveness 
measure on  the  part  of  the  local  housing authority  which had its  own interests for 
reducing the costs of local voluntary sector homelessness services (quote ID8).  Across all 
authorities there was something of a consensus amongst agencies that the availability of 
funding  for  voluntary  sector  organisations  was  diminishing.   Joint  bidding,  another 
financial collaboration tool, was being employed in at least two authorities as a means of 
rationalising available funding and was viewed as a means of reducing local competition 
between agencies (quote ID21).
In a similar vein, case panels were used to lever in resources in the form of client 
referrals (quote ID5).  Linking back to an earlier point made in chapter five (table 5.9), 
agencies’ funding is generally dependent on sustaining a high throughput of clients or 
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high occupancy levels.  The desire to increase referrals therefore acted as a means of 
protecting the financial viability and wellbeing of agencies.
In relation to risk, collaboration through formal tools was used as a means for 
agencies to  manage and  protect  themselves against  this.  One  of  the  roles  of  joint 
protocols,  for  instance,  was  to  protect agencies  against  potentially  serious  incidents 
arising from a failure to coordinate and the repercussions of this.  Interviewees suggested 
that protocols were more likely to be adopted when agencies could see that it would help 
protect them in this respect.  For instance, one housing authority worker noted how she 
had been able to persuade the social services department to sign up to a protocol to 
prevent homelessness amongst families, since if they were found by the housing authority 
to be ‘intentionally’ homeless, the burden of responsibility and risk would fall onto the 
social services department (quote ID1).  Another  housing officer described how the 
housing authority and the hospital had agreed a hospital discharge protocol following a 
serious incident involving a homeless patient  discharged from hospital.  The housing 
officer suggested that the hospital had been happy to agree the protocol to work jointly 
with the housing authority because the protocol made it clear that the housing authority 
would ultimately accept responsibility for any negative consequences of decisions made 
(quote ID5).   
Information sharing protocols were also viewed as a means of protecting agencies 
against risk. These protocols typically incorporated client consent statements to enable 
information sharing  between specified agencies,  and having such protocols  in  place 
offered agencies protection against breaches of data protection law.  Information sharing 
protocols were also seen as a means of protecting staff from risky clients by ensuring that 
they had access to any information held by other agencies on dangerous behaviour (quote 
ID25). 
However,  horizontal coordination tools were also sometimes adopted for more 
altruistic reasons and in recognition of agencies’ interdependence. Multi-agency teams 
and case panels had been set up in many cases because staff viewed them as necessary for 
tackling homelessness  in  a  holistic way (quotes ID16 and ID1).  Temporary,  ad-hoc 
groups had also been established in case study areas to respond to the needs of homeless 
people as they arose. They were rationalistic in the sense of being developed as means of 
responding to service users’ needs, but the desire to tackle these was motivated by an 
altruistic concern to improve the lives of individuals affected by homelessness.  Examples 
of task-specific groups included a ‘move-on’ group set up out of a concern that people 
could not move from hostels to their own tenancies because of a lack of appropriate 
accommodation, and a complex needs group dealing with entrenched rough sleepers. 
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The  role  of  government  in  driving  the  development  of  formal  horizontal 
coordination  tools  was  highlighted  only  by  a  minority  of  interviewees.   These 
interviewees mentioned joint bidding in response to government funding streams which 
required multi-agency working as a pre-condition for receiving awards.  Two interviewees 
also noted how the Supporting People programme had stimulated the use of horizontal 
coordination  mechanisms (e.g.  quote  ID11).  This  programme  funding  required  the 
completion of standard paperwork, both in terms of client assessment and reporting forms 
through its Quality Assurance Framework.  In some cases this had helped to standardise 
the assessment forms and data collected by agencies.  Although local authorities did not 
have fully developed joint assessment and monitoring systems, those agencies funded 
through this programme were beginning to move in that direction, with their systems 
becoming increasingly harmonised. 
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Table 8.2 Motivations for adopting/ participating in formal horizontal tools
Theme Illustrative Quotes
Pooling resources 
to protect agencies/ 
achieve cost-
effectiveness in a 
difficult financial 
environment
“There is an argument for all the organisations using the same building 
and sharing some of their resources. You could save a lot of money, and 
that may help when the money is being clawed back. ’Cause there’s no 
question, not all the organisations are going to survive. Choice is good, 
but realistically it’s not going to happen.” ID17, LA2
“The co-location side of it would be much more attractive to us as a 
local authority than individual agencies asking us for funding for 
projects which includes a percentage for admin, monitoring & 
evaluation etc. I think having all these quite disparate organisations 
around the city all paying building rents is not really cost effective.” 
ID8, LA2
Coordination tools 
as mechanisms for 
levering resources
“The providers attend because they can get referrals, so there’s 
something in it for them, an incentive.” ID5, LA1
Rationalisation of 
available funding 
to reduce local 
competition
“We’ve been talking about this problem for ages, money keeps coming 
down, it’s a ridiculous amount they want us to fight over, but we’re not 
doing that anymore, so what we’ve decided to put together a consortium 
which will put in a bid for something like £300k.” ID21, LA3
Protecting agencies 
against risk
“We’ve got a protocol with social services. It was hard to get agreement 
on some things, but you can if you demonstrate how it benefits them. 
The obvious hook for them is they will have a children act duty towards 
that family if we find them intentionally homeless.” ID1, LA1
“We’ve had to introduce a protocol around discharge arrangements from 
the hospital because there is a potential for things to go wrong & I think 
both sides want to firm things up in terms of risk.” ID5, LA1
“I’m trying to get a ‘Client Alert’ going for people who have been 
excluded from hostels for carrying a weapon, because the police don’t 
always let us know although they should.” ID25, LA2
Belief in ability of 
coordination tools 
to meet needs of 
homeless people
“We are a multi-agency team and were deliberately formed that way to 
respond to needs of rough sleepers.” ID16, LA2
“I chair a multi-agency domestic violence panel, which from a 
homelessness point of view is very helpful ’cause it’s about making 
good, safe decisions with the right information, and domestic violence is 
a good example of where you really can’t do it on your own.” ID1, LA1
Government 
programmes/ 
funding streams
“They are trying to develop a common assessment form but I don’t think 
there’ll be the will to do it here. Though in some ways Supporting 
People fulfils that role – agencies have already had to adapt their 
assessment forms to meet SP requirements.” ID11, LA2
The testimonies of interviewees indicate mixed motivations for adopting formal 
collaborative tools.  ‘Bottom-up’ drivers, overall, appeared to be more dominant than 
‘top-down’ drivers.  The most significant bottom-up drivers were instrumental and were 
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associated  with  protecting  agencies,  although these motivations  themselves stemmed 
from the broader environment, which required agencies to  make savings and protect 
themselves against risk.  Altruistic means-ends motivations were slightly less dominant 
but nevertheless appeared to stimulate the use of formal mechanisms of collaboration in 
some cases.  Interestingly, top-down drivers such as government programmes and funding 
streams were mentioned only on a few occasions
8.3 The development and management of horizontal coordination tools
8.3.1 Horizontal tool development: an incremental process
While the section above provides an indication of why tools were developed, interviewees 
also commented on  how these tools were developed (see table 8.3).  Analysis of this 
process helps to determine the level at which coordination tools are developed, that is, 
centrally by government or locally by ‘self-organising’ networks. The process of tool 
development in  individual  authorities  was  gradual.   It  was  clear  that  certain  tools 
facilitated or led to the creation of others.  In particular, group coordination modes such as 
forums and joint training events were commonly used as a basis for working on the 
development of  impersonal  collaborative  mechanisms such as  joint  protocols.  Those 
multi-agency forums that  did  not  produce tangible operational multi-agency working 
arrangements  were  negatively  perceived  by  interviewees.   Indeed,  beyond  simple 
information sharing, the very purpose of multi-agency groups in some respects was to 
develop further joint working mechanisms.  In addition, specific issues raised at multi-
agency forums had led in many cases to the creation of further subgroups to work on 
these particular issues. 
In some instances new tools had been devised to help support delivery of the goals 
of other tools.  For instance, two examples were provided of joint structures established to 
help agencies operationalise agreed protocols.  First, a homelessness prevention protocol 
between the Housing Authority and Housing Associations in one authority had led to the 
creation of a multi-agency case panel to deal with individual cases related to the protocol. 
Second, a joint protocol between the housing authority and the Connexions service had 
resulted in co-location in the form of one of the Connexions workers based in the housing 
department’s advice centre (quote ID7 below).
Other examples of tools introduced to support existing tools included a  jointly 
funded post to help meet a joint local target on youth homelessness in LA2. In another 
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authority, a jointly funded post had led to the creation of three further posts to support this 
role and ultimately this had ‘mutated into’ a dispersed multi-agency team (ID5, LA1). 
Also in LA1 a housing association manager running a supported accommodation project 
described how she hoped that a service level agreement with the mental health trust 
would lead to the development of joint  training to assist her accommodation staff  in 
identifying mental health needs amongst their residents.  
Another  dynamic  of  tool  development was  the  way  in  which  formal  tools 
sometimes developed as a result of informal inter-agency working, or vice versa.  For 
instance, in one authority agencies were involved in a case panel on an informal and ad-
hoc basis when needed, but one of the panel chairs commented that there was a strong 
possibility  that  this  would  be  formalised with  the  panel  becoming a  multi-agency 
arrangement (quote ID1).  At the same time, in several cases formal group coordination 
modes such as forums and case panels had triggered additional informal meetings or 
ongoing  discussions  on  particular  issues.   These  group  modes of  coordination  also 
reinforced informal inter-agency relationships simply because the provided an arena for 
agencies to network and build linkages.  Interviewees noted that without tools such as 
multi-agency forums and training events, there would be little opportunity for staff to 
network and ‘catch up’ with each other in this way (quote ID2).   
The examples above serve to  illustrate the gradual and incremental  nature of 
horizontal tool development.  There was something of a cumulative effect, with certain 
tools and forms of collaboration leading to the development of others.  This reinforces the 
idea of tool development as a bottom-up process. 
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Table 8.3 Process of tool development
Theme Illustrative Quotes
Horizontal tool 
development as a 
cumulative and 
incremental process
“In setting up the joint protocol with Connexions, what we’ve been 
able to do now is get a worker from Connexions based in our office 
who will work alongside our Supported Housing team, in providing a 
service to our young people.” ID7, LA1 
Dynamic inter-
relation between 
formal tools and 
informal 
collaboration 
“The mental health panel isn’t multi-agency yet, but the police and 
probation have attended on a case by case basis and it may well end 
up being that.” ID1, LA1
“The forum is an excellent opportunity just to meet up with people 
you wouldn’t see on a daily basis. Just to catch up, you know, to 
network. That sounds a bit corny but I think it is important to do that.” 
ID2, LA1
8.3.2 The challenges of developing and managing horizontal tools
While  the section above indicates ways  in  which horizontal  coordination tools  were 
mutually reinforcing and cumulative, it was also clear that attempts to develop tools did 
not always follow this incremental and consolidating pattern.  In some cases agencies 
were unable to develop horizontal coordination tools successfully, and there were several 
reasons why this was so (see table 8.4).  
The first difficulty associated with tool development concerned disagreements over 
who should be driving these forward.  In a number of cases no single agency had assumed 
responsibility  for  developing  these.  Some  interviewees expressed frustration  that  the 
people they felt should be leading or co-leading the process were not doing so.  For 
instance, one housing association manager, describing why joint protocols had not been 
set  up  locally,  acknowledged that  while  he  had some responsibility  for  leading  the 
process, he needed someone from the other agency concerned to share this lead (quote 
ID39).  Similarly, a homelessness manager suggested that the Supporting People team 
was not leading on the development of integrated information systems, something she 
considered should be part of its role (quote ID8).  Another difficulty in this respect was 
resentment created when the responsibility for hosting events regularly fell on the same 
agencies.  For instance, some of the larger and more proactive agencies complained that 
the costs and responsibility for arranging and hosting meetings usually fell to them.  This 
theme links back to the issue described in chapter five of a lack of domain consensus, an 
important barrier to collaboration, where there is disagreement between agencies over the 
roles and responsibilities of those involved.  
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The second main obstacle to tool development was the difficulty of achieving 
standardisation and uniformity (see quotes ID19, ID13 and ID9).  This had arisen in 
relation to developing impersonal  tools such as common directories, joint  assessment 
forms and joint monitoring systems. In each of these areas, agencies’ information needs 
differed slightly, making it difficult to develop uniform systems. Group modes such as co-
located services were also hampered by this problem, since it was considered difficult to 
cater to the needs of diverse client groups in a single setting.  
Third, local contextual and council corporate priorities had militated against the 
development of tools in some cases. For instance, in one authority attempts had been 
made to develop a common inter-agency database, and a large government grant had been 
obtained to fund this.  However the attempt had failed due to a lack of support from the 
local council, the corporate priorities of which lay in other areas (ID3, LA3).  Contextual 
problems  associated  with  the  wider  environment  included  the  different  reporting 
requirements of funders.  For example, a housing manager in LA1 commented that the 
different priorities and reporting requirements of the Home Office and Supporting People 
programme had presented challenges for the development of  their  new multi-agency 
team. 
Fourth, certain tools were viewed as posing a potential threat to agencies.  For 
instance, co-location and multi-agency teams were viewed as potentially threatening to 
the autonomy and viability of the individual agencies involved (quote ID19).  Fifth, tool 
development was subject to  a  range of  practical challenges in  the case study areas, 
including  physical  and  technical  problems and  time  issues.  One  physical  difficulty 
involved arranging suitable premises for co-located services (quote ID19).  In another 
case, a prison officer outlined the physical challenge of co-location, in terms of arranging 
for agencies to carry out in-reach homelessness prevention work (quote ID31).  Another 
interviewee  commented  on  the  physical  difficulty  of  conducting  joint  assessments 
between geographically dispersed agencies and between agencies with different opening 
hours.  This  is  a  potentially  important barrier  in  fields  of  human services  such  as 
homelessness where services are provided around the clock.  Technical problems had 
inhibited  the  development  of  integrated  information  systems  in  some  authorities, 
including joint database construction.  
Lastly, tool development was described as an extremely time consuming process. 
In some cases the time was considered justified where the tools were seen as performing 
useful work, and case panels were singled out as an example of this. However, the time it 
took to develop certain tools made some interviewees question their worth.  For instance, 
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interviewees were dubious about the utility of joint protocols and multi-agency forums in 
this respect.
Table 8.4 Challenges of tool development
Theme Illustrative Quotes
Lack of clarity/ 
disagreements over 
who should lead 
process
“It’s something that, you know, I should be leading on, but I need 
somebody from the other side to lead on it with me… ’cause it’s a 
joint thing.” ID39, LA1
“Joint access & referral forms, because a lot of the people who sit 
on the homelessness forum are SP funded, I really feel that SP 
should be leading that process, & at the moment they just don’t 
appear to be doing it.” ID8, LA2
Difficulties around 
standardisation
“The needs assessment in agencies will be different.  It’s all very 
well sharing information but how much use is it to you?” ID19, LA2
“As long as I’ve been in this city people have been trying to work 
on a common referral and common needs assessment form. But 
people still want to use their own forms, which is fair enough. There 
might be one for homelessness, but if you have people in different 
categories, which forms do we use?” ID13, LA2
“I think one of the difficulties of trying to provide homelessness 
services to all in one place is that you can’t necessarily make that 
place look and feel the way it needs to for all groups.” ID9, LA2
Contextual 
difficulties, e.g. local 
political priorities
“There was an attempt to get a joint database so that everyone could 
register people in hostels on the same database. But it fell foul of 
procurement regulations & some internal politics of the council and 
it fell to pieces. It was at odds with the new customer service system 
we were engineering which was the council’s priority.” ID3, LA3
Perception that 
certain ambitious 
tools could pose a 
threat
“There’s degrees of collaboration. At one end of the extreme we 
could just jump into bed with each other and become one 
organisation that does everything for everybody … but this is quite 
threatening for people.” ID19, LA2
Practical challenges: 
physical, technical & 
time issues
“I don’t know whether [co-location] is physically possible because 
in town there’s all the building works going on, there’s not a lot of 
property available in the city centre, and everyone’s agreed it’s got 
to be somewhere accessible.” ID19, LA2
“We had a big technological problem with Notify which we have done 
a huge amount over the last year to overcome, and we are now 
uploading onto Notify.” ID1, LA1
Once tools had been established, there were further challenges associated with 
maintaining and managing these  (table 8.5). These themes have implications for the 
effectiveness of  horizontal  coordination  mechanisms as  tools  of  local  collaborative 
governance and also for the systemic level at which collaboration is pursued.  Several 
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interviewees noted  that  there was  a  need for  coordination  tools  to  be  supported or 
underpinned by other processes and it was clear that these processes were not always in 
place.  In one authority, for instance, a joint protocol had been developed to formalise 
homelessness agencies’ commitment to cooperative working, but with no actions to back 
it up.  Agencies had filed the protocol away and it had not been referred to or revisited for 
several years. Only  when a  new collaboration initiative had  been launched was the 
protocol unearthed, and even then only one of the agencies concerned could locate it. 
Similarly, there was a sense of frustration that some group coordination modes achieved 
few tangible operational outcomes.  Some interviewees commented that multi-agency 
forums  were  not  arenas  for  ‘getting  things  done’ and  were  mere  ‘talking  shops’, 
underscoring the need for such forums to be underpinned by further processes to ensure 
they achieved their aims.  
Another challenge involved establishing commitment to coordination tools from 
the  agencies  concerned.   Obtaining  the  required level  of  participation  had  proven 
problematic in relation to group coordination modes such as forums and meetings (quote 
ID29).  In addition, there was a view that protocols were not always adhered to.  One 
interviewee (quote ID8) suggested that a process for monitoring tools was essential to 
ensure that agencies did fulfil their commitments set out in joint protocols.  Related to 
this, there were disputes over which agency should shoulder the burden of holding multi-
agency events.  
Certain tools brought organisational clashes and disagreements to the fore.  Multi-
agency forums, for instance, were characterised as adversarial and competitive (quote 
ID13).   Forums  were  also  considered  arenas  where  organisational  cultural  clashes 
emerged (quote ID3).  For instance, differences in approach and philosophy as described 
in chapter five were manifested in these groups.  Group coordination modes could be 
dominated by certain agencies, allowing them unfair influence over the agenda.  The local 
authority  was  sometimes  the  dominant  body  (quote  ID5)  but  other  agencies  also 
dominated proceedings in some instances (quote ID19).
Other challenges were more practical in nature. Interviewees commented that at 
times there was inadequate participation from senior staff in formal collaboration attempts 
(quote ID8).  The costs and time involved in attending multi-agency forum meetings was 
considered problematic by some interviewees (quote ID13), a factor which may be related 
to the view held by some interviewees discussed in chapter five that there was some 
duplication of multi-agency meetings. Similarly case panels were described as extremely 
hard work, time consuming and challenging, and requiring significant follow-up work. 
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Lastly, interviewees highlighted the importance of an effective chairman or chairwoman 
(quotes ID14 and ID3). 
Table 8.5 Challenges of tool management
Theme Illustrative Quotes
Need for tools to be 
underpinned by 
further mechanisms 
and processes
“We had this joint protocol written up about 6 years ago and it was 
just put on a shelf. I mean it wasn’t really a working document 
anyway, it was just saying ‘you’ll do this, and we’ll do that, and 
we’ll all by nice and flowery’. But it didn’t follow up with any stuff 
like developing joint referral forms.” ID14, LA2
“The homelessness forum could do more in terms of setting things up 
cross-borough, operationally.” ID1, LA1
Enforcing agency 
commitment to 
coordination tools
“The number of times that social services don’t come to the multi-
agency meetings is just amazing.” ID29, LA2
“Unless someone is monitoring how the protocols are working and is 
it being adhered to, they sit on a shelf and people just fall back into 
their own practices, they’re not enforceable, they are just bits of 
paper.” ID8, LA2
Tools as arena for 
adversarial/ 
competitive relations 
and culture clashes
“The forums are not that useful, they’re adversarial.  One or two 
people get on their high horse then the meeting’s over.” ID13, LA2
“I think the organisational cultures really that clash at meetings, 
that’s one barrier.” ID3, LA 3
Dominance of 
certain agencies in 
process
“The forum is sometimes a bit council worker-heavy I feel … it should 
really be a forum for the voluntary sector.” ID5, LA1
“One agency had their own slot and a standing item and were able to 
take up a quarter of the time with their own concerns and issues.” 
ID19, LA2.
Need for staff at 
appropriate 
organisational levels
“I think the problem with some groups is there are no senior people 
to make decisions, and a lot of the issues that you are talking about 
trying to overcome you would need Directors there at a senior level 
to say right, I’m gonna send down this mandate and this is how we 
are going to work.” ID 8, LA2
Time/ resources 
involved
“If you count up the salaries around that table, it’s a really expensive 
meeting.” ID13, LA2
Importance of 
effective chair within 
group coordination 
modes
“It’s bringing agencies together on a regular basis where there isn’t a 
dominant chair who’s saying ‘we will follow this agenda’.” ID14, 
LA2
“My job as chair is to find some middle ground really, and to help 
people see everyone else’s point of view really.” ID3, LA3
Overall, the challenges of tool development and management broadly reflect the 
obstacles to collaborating as discussed in chapter five. Some of the difficulties of tool 
development – for instance those around differing priorities and no agency wanting to 
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shoulder the burden of leading on tool development - are consistent with a bureaucratic 
politics explanation of collaboration. However, others are more practical in nature and are 
there perhaps  more reflective of  a  rationalistic  perspective, such as  the difficulty  of 
developing standardised systems to suit the needs of all clients, and the physical challenge 
of developing jointly provided services.   Similarly, once tools are in operation, they 
continue  to  be  affected  by  tensions  associated  with  bureaucratic  politics  such  as 
competition between agencies and the dominance of powerful organisations. However, 
they are also beset with other process challenges such as ineffective chairing and lack of 
participation from staff at appropriate organisational levels. There are also problems of 
commitment  and  participation  which  may  be  related  to  lack  of  time  and  limited 
confidence in the utility of some coordination tools. 
8.4 Do horizontal coordination tools alleviate the obstacles to 
collaboration?
Although there were considerable challenges to managing horizontal coordination tools, 
there were also ways in which horizontal tools helped to alleviate some of the obstacles to 
collaboration, both interpretive and contextual (see table 8.6).  In terms of alleviating 
interpretive obstacles, certain tools were viewed as building mutual understanding, trust 
and domain consensus.  Mutual understanding and trust were facilitated by co-location. 
Since this mode of collaboration involves sharing premises, interviewees noted that it 
increased day-to-day contact between individuals from different agencies, and suggested 
that this led to improved understanding of one another’s roles and a general strengthening 
of inter-agency relationships (quote ID5 in table 8.6).   Despite the tensions sometimes 
present in  multi-agency forums as discussed above, they were also a mechanism for 
developing  mutual  understanding  and  trust  since  these  arenas  enabled  participating 
agencies to begin the process of breaking down barriers and misunderstandings (quote 
ID18).  Similarly tools such as staff placements and secondments, as well as multi-agency 
training events, were considered to generate ‘goodwill’ between agencies.  
Other tools had contributed to the development of domain consensus through the 
clarification of roles and responsibilities of different agencies. For instance, a series of 
homelessness forum meetings in one authority had been used to agree the respective roles 
of the police, frontline homelessness agencies and hospital accident and emergency wards 
in relation to a rough sleeping problem in the area.  In addition, impersonal modes such as 
joint protocols and agreements had helped to  clarify the roles and responsibilities of 
different agencies with respect to service provision. For instance, a joint agreement had 
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been introduced in one authority to define the role of two particular agencies with respect 
to care planning for service users (quote ID13). Such tools helped to manage expectations 
where agencies held unrealistic views of what other organisations could provide.
Two contextual obstacles to collaboration were attenuated though formal tools. As 
the discussion above indicates, the time it takes to develop, manage and participate in 
formal collaborative mechanisms was one obstacle to their development.  However, while 
participation could be time consuming, certain coordination tools helped to alleviate the 
time pressures associated with multi-agency working.  Group coordination modes such as 
case panels reduced the need for agencies to coordinate sequentially. Rather than having 
to  contact  several  agencies  separately  to  devise  care  packages,  agencies  meeting 
simultaneously could agree these together (quote ID9).  Individual coordinator posts were 
also seen as fulfilling a time saving role because they brought added capacity to the 
process and carried out some of the ‘legwork’ which agencies found challenging on top of 
their existing workloads (quote ID18). A second contextual obstacle to collaboration – 
physical distance - was potentially solved through co-location of services (quote ID8). 
Co-location was described as speeding up the information sharing and communication 
process. 
In summary, horizontal coordination tools have the potential to help overcome 
some of the challenges of collaborating, and can provide an efficient way of structuring 
and formalising  inter-agency relationships  to  enhance joint  approaches. However,  as 
section 8.3 illustrates, they are no panacea for achieving effective inter-agency relations 
and require active management and commitment if  they are to realise their  potential 
benefits. 
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Table 8.6 Horizontal coordination tools as mechanisms for addressing the obstacles to 
collaboration
Theme Illustrative Quotes
Role in addressing interpretive issues
Building trust/ 
mutual 
understanding
“A resettlement officer is going to specialise in working with the Youth 
Offending Team. She will spend one day a week at the YOT, attend 
their meetings, get their referrals, hopefully this will generate a bit of 
joint working, good will, joint understanding of each others’ roles, so 
that should be really positive.” ID5, LA1
“People through the forum are getting to know each other, building a 
bit of trust, and hearing each other talk and ‘oh she thinks that, oh, 
she’s not so bad, she thinks like I do’.” ID18, LA2
Enhancing domain 
consensus
“We have something called a three way agreement. If someone refers 
to us from say the mental health team, we would have an agreement 
with them, you do this bit, we do this bit, the client will do this bit. And 
it helps actually, because it defines everyone’s role.” ID13, LA2. 
Role in addressing contextual issues
Addressing time 
obstacle to 
collaboration
(Discussing a multi-agency case panel) “It’s much more simple doing it 
that way instead of us being the hub and having to phone half a dozen 
people, firstly to get all the information, then to find out what the other 
agencies are going to put it. It’s very time consuming and tiring and the 
pressure is then all on the one officer who’s trying to get all the 
information and all the commitments, whereas if we’re all sitting in a 
multi-agency meeting and everybody’s hearing the same information, it 
saves time and we can provide holistic support without agencies 
contradicting each other”. ID9, LA2
“You’ve got a paid coordinator who goes away and actually does the 
legwork to try and make it happen on the ground” ID8, LA2
Addressing physical 
challenge of 
collaborating
“It’s easier to sort things out when you’ve got a personal relationship 
with people & they’re in the same building. If I want to go and speak to 
environmental health about accommodation, they’re upstairs, you can 
just go and speak to them. I think that actually having people around in 
the same building and located in the same organisation does make 
partnership working easier”. ID8, LA2
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Chapter Summary and Discussion
Four core questions have been addressed in this chapter. First, do horizontal tools help to 
overcome externalities  associated with the fragmented homelessness system? Second, 
what are actors’ motivations for developing such tools? Third, how are tools developed 
and what are the challenges associated with their development and management? And 
fourth, are they a means of overcoming the challenges of collaboration generally?  
There  was  evidence  that  they  did help  to  alleviate  externalities  in  the 
homelessness service system, such as gaps, duplications and sources of incoherence.  For 
instance, multi-agency forums helped to iron out duplications, while protocols clarified 
roles in order to prevent agencies shifting responsibility onto others, and in so doing 
helped to improve accountability. Operational level tools such as case conferences, jointly 
delivered services, multi-agency drop in centres and outreach teams were regarded as 
leading to better coordinated and more holistic services for clients with multiple needs.  
Tools did also in some senses present mechanisms for addressing the tensions of 
and obstacles to collaboration, such as their role in developing mutual understanding and 
trust, and in establishing domain consensus (e.g. protocols).  Although developing and 
managing formal collaborative  mechanisms was described as  a  time consuming and 
resource intensive process, some tools did provide opportunities for efficiencies to be 
made, both in terms of time and money.     
However, without active management and continual nurturing, these benefits were 
unlikely to materialise.  Indeed, horizontal coordination mechanisms were arenas for the 
tensions  of  inter-agency relations  to  surface.   For  instance, cultural  differences  and 
competition  between agencies  were  two  problems  that  were  associated  with  group 
coordination modes.  There were clear difficulties around participation in coordination 
tools and adherence to joint agreements, highlighting a degree of ‘free-riding’ behaviour, 
an intrinsic risk in any form of collective action.  These issues highlight the importance of 
developing processes such as rules and sanctions to underpin joint arrangements.
 Tool development was a challenging process, and a number of obstacles to its 
realisation were highlighted. Some tools had proven elusive because of the difficulty of 
developing standardised responses to the range of clients involved with homelessness 
services and the differing needs, including informational needs, of agencies. This may 
partially  explain  the  relatively  low  use  of  some  impersonal  modes  such  as  joint 
assessment, monitoring systems and common directories of services highlighted in the 
previous chapter.  
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Although interviewees could see value in these tools, their desire to retain their own 
individual systems for assessing clients and recording data was one of the main reasons 
cited for agencies’ failure to adopt such systems.
Other tools were difficult to establish because no one agency or individual was 
prepared to lead on these or shoulder the costs of doing so.  In some cases there was a 
problem around establishing joint leadership for horizontal coordination tools.  This may 
indicate  a  potentially  important  role  for  coordinators,  perhaps  funded  through 
government, to act as facilitators of this process.  
The experience of some interviewees that their attempts to develop collaborative 
tools were at odds with the council’s corporate priorities highlights the fact that horizontal 
tool development takes place in a local political context which may sometimes undermine 
attempts to collaborate, in spite of central government’s promotion of this.  
Tool development itself was a gradual process, and it was clear that certain tools 
acted as catalysts for the development of others. There was something of a ‘snowball’ 
effect in this respect, with one tool leading to another.  This theme supports previous work 
which views collaboration as a sequential, gradual and phased process.  In terms of the 
public policy theories discussed in chapter three, it provides support for the argument that 
collaboration is  an  incremental and bottom-up affair,  taking time to  emerge,  and is 
therefore something which cannot simply be mandated.
Overall,  since  tool  development  was  perceived to  be  a  time  consuming and 
resource intensive process, agencies were most likely to develop horizontal tools when 
they could see that it was in their interests to do so.  There were strong instrumental 
motivations for developing  tools  such as  preserving agencies’ financial viability  and 
protecting against exposure to forms of risk.  Although altruistic motivations did also play 
a  part  in  decisions  to  develop  tools,  these  were  subordinate  to  the  instrumental 
motivations  raised.   However,  the  instrumental motivations  were  not  necessarily a 
reflection of selfish individualistic behaviour of the individuals concerned.  They were 
part of a desire to protect organisational interests and reputations in the context of a 
competitive  environment  and  a  blame  culture  in  which  there  was  a  potential  for 
vulnerable individuals to slip through the cracks’ between services - something which 
could have serious repercussions.   Further analysis  of  these issues in  relation to  the 
overarching theoretical framework of the research is provided in chapter ten.
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Chapter 9: The contribution of vertical meta-
governance tools to collaboration
Chapter overview
This final empirical chapter explores the dynamics and perceived effectiveness of vertical 
meta-governance tools through a  qualitative examination of the perspectives of street 
level bureaucrats who are the targets of these tools, and civil servants involved in their 
development.  In so doing the chapter provides evidence to  address one of the core 
questions raised at the outset of the thesis, namely the extent to which this approach to the 
governance of collaboration offers an effective response to coordination problems and 
other associated challenges affecting local public services in a fragmented polity.  
While chapter seven provided support for the view that government steering can 
make a difference to the degree of local collaboration, the qualitative evidence which 
follows helps to build a richer picture of the strengths, weaknesses and limitations of 
particular vertical meta-governance tools, as well as local actors’ responsiveness to these, 
and central actors’ views of their effectiveness.  This discussion helps to evaluate the 
persuasiveness of ‘top-down’ explanations of the implementation of collaboration, and 
illuminates the challenges associated with central state steering of local public service 
delivery networks. 
The chapter considers each of the main categories of meta-governance tool in 
turn, beginning with authority-based tools (section 9.1), moving onto information-based 
tools  (section 9.2)  and then incentive-based tools  (section 9.3).   The last  part  (9.4) 
examines the broader meta-governance structures in which the tools aimed specifically at 
homelessness are embedded.  The final discussion draws together the key findings and 
makes observations regarding the effectiveness of tools and their strengths and limitations 
as mechanisms for collaborative governance. 
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9.1 Perceptions of authority-based tools
Beginning  with  authority-based  tools,  three  examples  have  been  identified,  first 
mandatory collaboration in the form of legislation, second, ‘network constitution’, that is, 
mandatory  inclusion  of  certain  bodies  in  group  structures  created  to  facilitate 
collaboration,  and  third,  government  monitoring  and  regulation.  Each  of  these  is 
discussed in turn.
9.1.1 Legislation requiring cooperation
As noted in chapter six, the legislation requiring cooperation involves a statutory duty for 
certain agencies such as housing associations and social services departments to cooperate 
with the housing authority in order to help it achieve its homelessness functions.  In view 
of previous literature discussed in earlier chapters which casts doubt on the ability of 
governments  authoritatively  to  mandate  local  collaboration,  actors’ views  on  this 
legislation was of particular interest. 
When  questioned  about  these  statutory  duties,  interviewees  from  housing 
authorities  were  generally  in  favour  of  government  setting  out  a  requirement for 
cooperation at local level from agencies such as social services departments and housing 
associations, and felt it was legitimate for government to do so (see quotes ID10, ID11, 
ID16, table 9.1).  This view was partly a reflection of their own past difficulties in gaining 
cooperation from these bodies when requested, something which itself was attributed 
principally to their resource constraints and competing priorities.  Interviewees suggested 
that the statutory duty to cooperate could be used as a bargaining tool or a stick to wave at 
housing  associations  or  social  services  departments  to  back  up  their  requests  for 
cooperation,  or simply that it  was at  least a  commandment to get the right  agencies 
‘around the table’ (quotes ID1, ID8).
However,  the  vast  majority of  interviewees were  highly  sceptical  about  the 
enforceability of the statutory duty to cooperate (quotes ID3, ID8, ID19).  There was a 
general sense that this duty was ineffective and that agencies did not comply with their 
obligations to cooperate. Several interviewees felt that the duty was too vague to be 
meaningful,  and  suggested  that  the  legislation  should  specify  how agencies  should 
cooperate.  Many also questioned the legislation’s ability to hold agencies to account 
when they did not comply with the duty to co-operate, pointing out that the statutory duty 
was meaningless unless it penalised agencies that did not comply.  Interviewees therefore 
suggested  that  the  statutory  duty  to  cooperate alone was  not  a  sufficient  driver  of 
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collaboration, and should be backed up with penalties or financial incentives.  One local 
authority  homelessness manager (ID3) commented that  for Housing  Associations the 
incentives not to collaborate were greater than the incentives to collaborate.  Specifically, 
he  suggested that  housing  associations  were reluctant to  accommodate people made 
homeless because of rent arrears, and that the carrot or stick used to encourage this has to 
be stronger than the perceived negative impact of housing these people.       
Since the Housing Authority was the body with ultimate legal responsibility for 
assisting homeless people, housing officers felt that other bodies could simply ‘bat back’ 
the responsibility to the Authority.  Housing associations and social services departments 
were both  regarded as  problematic agencies in  this  respect.  In  relation to  housing 
associations,  interviewees considered it  unfortunate that  the  duty to  house  homeless 
people was not shared between the housing authority and housing associations, arguing 
that a shared legal responsibility would put greater weight behind the duty to cooperate 
and provide an incentive for housing associations to comply.  
With regards to social services departments, when dealing with people with dual 
social  care  and  housing  needs,  one  interviewee  (ID8)  noted  that  social  services 
departments could simply view the person’s homelessness as the priority problem and 
pass the responsibility onto the housing authority.  Such examples persisted in spite of the 
duty to cooperate.  The same interviewee commented that the housing authority could 
meet its own statutory duty to cooperate with social services departments by writing a 
letter to inform them when a family becomes ‘intentionally homeless’.  However,  she 
suggested that the social services department did not have an equal duty to  respond 
following receipt of that letter, leaving the homeless family with nothing.  
The difficulties of enforcing the duty to cooperate were backed up by additional 
comments made by interviewees relating to the challenges of mandating collaboration 
from the top-down (quote ID18).  Overall, despite support for the view that government 
should require cooperation  from certain agencies,  interviewees were  doubtful  about 
government’s  ability  to  enforce the statutory duty to  cooperate as  set  out  in  current 
legislation. Their comments suggest a need for further supportive legislation to back up 
the statutory duty, alternative meta-governance tools, or perhaps more radically, a shared 
legal responsibility for homelessness across the core agencies. 
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Table 9.1 Perceptions of the statutory duty to cooperate
Theme Illustrative Quotes
Doubts over 
enforceability of 
statutory duty to 
cooperate/ ability 
to mandate 
collaboration
“When it says ‘you have a duty to cooperate’, what does that mean? 
Cooperation could mean just returning your phone calls but 
persistently saying no to your request… that legislation is very woolly 
... rightly so, it shouldn’t be too prescriptive, but you end up with 
organisations wriggling out of a duty because the legislation is not 
specific enough. They should be more specific about how they should 
cooperate. And there should be some element of holding them to 
account and if they don’t cooperate they’ve got to be able to 
demonstrate why.” ID19, LA2
“They can require it; enforcing it is a whole different ballgame. Unless 
there is money tied to it or some other strong stick, it just doesn’t get 
on your agenda. If there was extra money in it or some penalty if you 
didn’t do it, I think that’s the way to enforce it really. It happens when 
it’s sensible and everyone can gain by it, but it’s quite difficult to 
enforce otherwise.” ID3, LA3
“Yeah, they have a duty to cooperate, but I just think it’s too vague. 
It’s meaningless to a certain extent and it’s a bit of a tick box 
exercise.” ID8, LA2
“I think government has got to encourage people to work together but 
you can’t mandate it from on high, you just can’t do it. Government 
can’t do anything really, they can just suggest things.” ID18, LA2
Support in 
principle for 
statutory duty
“They should do it. Sometimes you need to force agencies to take 
responsibility – they each have their own pressures.” ID11, LA2
“Well I think the government needs to take a greater interest in it.” 
(gives example of not getting input required from social services) 
ID10, LA2
“There does need to be some kind of higher driver. I know it’s difficult 
that whole issue of can you make people do this, but I think you need 
to try. If there’s no will at a national or a strategic level it’s never 
gonna filter down and I think maybe that is the problem with social 
services.” ID16, LA2
Viewed as a 
bargaining stick 
for gaining 
cooperation
“You can use it as a bargaining tool when you are trying to get what 
you want from housing associations, you say, ‘we remind you of your 
responsibilities under this Act’, but unless the Housing Corporation 
put down more prescriptive requirements and outcomes that they 
expect then it’s just a bit pointless really.” ID8, LA2
“We could wave around the guidance or the legislation… we did have 
some things where we had to say ‘no this is what the code of guidance 
says, this is your responsibility not ours’, so it can be useful.” ID1, 
LA1
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9.1.2 Monitoring and Regulation
Chapter six highlighted various mechanisms for monitoring and regulating collaboration. 
These included direct regulation through local authority housing inspections, and indirect 
monitoring through research, performance targets and self-assessment.  When asked if 
collaborative  working  was  something  which  government  monitored,  most  local 
interviewees were able to provide some examples of this (see table 9.2). Strong forms of 
monitoring such as  inspection were mentioned by some interviewees.  However,  the 
majority of examples provided were ‘softer’ forms of monitoring, for instance through 
CLG attendance at  local forums or meetings, or indirect monitoring  through general 
performance indicators.  
Several of the key performance indicators and associated targets in the sector, 
such as those on the prevention of homelessness, temporary accommodation and rough 
sleeping,  were believed indirectly to  encourage collaborative working, since meeting 
these targets was dependent on adopting multi-agency approaches.  This  was a view 
shared both by civil servants and street level bureaucrats alike (quotes ID9, ID36, ID37). 
Another  indirect form of  monitoring  occurred through  the  requirement for  statutory 
agencies  to  produce  local  strategies  which  were  monitored  by  central  government 
departments. One interviewee from the criminal justice sector commented that if there 
was no element if inter-agency working described in his local community safety strategy 
then ‘somebody would probably notice’ (ID29, LA2).  Interviewees also mentioned 
the  self-assessment  toolkit  produced  by  CLG  which  had  a  strong  emphasis  on 
collaboration (quote  ID37).   This  was  a  voluntary  exercise for  local  authorities  to 
complete  and  return  to  the  CLG  at  their  discretion.   The  three  local  authorities 
interviewed had  made  use  of  it,  and  their  housing  staff  had  found the  tool  fairly 
cumbersome, with one (ID8) noting that it was dispiriting because of the wide range of 
joint working practices suggested that were hard to deliver.
Some  interviewees  had  experience  of  collaboration  being  monitored  via 
inspections118.   Joint inspections had been held in one authority (LA1), involving the 
Commission  for  Social  Care  Inspection  and  the  Audit  Commission’s  Housing 
Inspectorate.  In this authority collaboration was something which had been highlighted 
for improvement within the inspection, particularly in relation to how the Supporting 
People team was working with other parts of the Local Authority.  From the perspective 
of the manager concerned (quote ID38) this has led to improvements in collaborative 
working,  through greater elected member involvement, a  significant increase in  the 
118 For instance the Audit Commission’s ‘Key Lines of Enquiry’ discussed in chapter six were mentioned.
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number  of  Commissioning  Body  meetings  and  better  engagement  generally of  the 
Probation Service and Primary Care Trust.  
Another authority (LA3) had undergone ‘special measures’119 for a particular part 
of their housing service. In this authority the experience of this form of regulation had 
been useful, with one interviewee (quote ID4) commenting on CLG’s supportive stance. 
In this authority a nominated advisor had been assigned who had enabled the authority to 
improve its practice and ‘get ahead of the game’ by providing advice on new national 
policy priorities. One such priority area discussed in this case was the Supporting People 
programme’s ‘Quality Assurance Framework’ which emphasised the use of collaborative 
tools such as common assessment forms.  
However,  a  number of interviewees, from both central and local government, 
commented on the challenges of monitoring collaboration directly.  For instance, it was 
noted that responses to checklists for local authorities in relation to collaboration would 
reveal very little about the quality or strength of relationships between agencies.  Others 
felt that there was little need to monitor collaboration, since this was only the process to 
achieve  desired  homelessness  outcomes.   Where  outcomes  were  being  met,  they 
suggested that it would have been likely that collaborative, multi-agency approaches were 
being used.  
119 A method for monitoring and improving performance in the lowest ranked authorities under the 
national performance system.  
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Table 9.2 Perceptions of government monitoring of collaboration
Theme Illustrative Quotes
Indirect forms of 
monitoring 
collaboration e.g. 
through performance 
targets, visits or self-
assessment
“I can’t think of any specific targets that would identify partnership 
working directly. However, where we are able to provide evidence 
that we are doing well against the BVPI around homelessness 
prevention… then we’re often able to point to partnership working 
as being the reason why.” ID9, LA2
“I’m not sure we monitor the success of joint working, but we do 
assess performance based on statistics… If you dig under a headline 
figure as to why an authority has reduced rough sleeping, that may 
be because it works well at a joint level.” ID36, CLG
“We’d be doing it when we went in to see Local Authorities.,, it’s 
more of a softer thing, a means to an end, so we’d be expecting 
there would be joint working to ensure that targets on numbers in 
Temporary Accommodation are reached.” ID37, CLG
“We produced a toolkit with a focus on joint working, but it’s self-
assessment, voluntary. If we had concerns we’d ask them to use it 
and point out to them, if your joint working is just people coming to 
meetings and not doing anything, that’s probably a reason why 
you’ve got detox services that no one can access.” ID37, CLG
Challenges of 
monitoring 
collaboration
“It’s very difficult. If you are making cars you can monitor that 
process fairly thoroughly and you can measure the output and how 
long it takes. With partnership working it’s far more difficult cause 
you are often not that clear at the beginning what it is you are trying 
to do.” ID10, LA2
“It’s tricky to monitor, it’s no good having set questions like ‘do you 
work jointly with X?’ You can tick ‘yes’, but the authority may well 
have put ‘yes, they are engaging with health’, cause they’ve got 
named representatives in health who occasionally turn up, or they 
could have put ‘no we’re not’, because they’re struggling to get the 
named representative to actually get involved. The way you answer 
that question wouldn’t really tell you very much.” ID33, LA
Potential of 
regulatory tools to 
enhance collaboration 
“We had a joint inspection … they asked about partnership working 
and it was something we fell down on, because SP was not 
embedded across the Council... I think that’s changed now, we do 
have member involvement; the PCT and Probation are much more 
engaged. It was a criticism that the Commissioning Body was 
meeting so irregularly… now they meet 6 times a year… so it’s 
much more joined up now than it was.” ID38, LA1
“We’ve been under special measures for Supporting People and the 
CLG were supportive, they really were, I mean it’s carrot and stick, 
but, you got the feeling they wanted you to succeed ultimately, they 
weren’t trying to trip you up.” ID4, LA3
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9.1.3 Network constitution
Interviewees were also asked for their views with  regards to  ‘network constitution’, 
another authority-based tool for promoting collaboration. As highlighted in chapter two, 
this  involves government mandating  networks or  in  some other  way authoritatively 
influencing or re-arranging relationships between agencies.  
As discussed in chapter six, network constitution is employed by government in 
relation to local homelessness networks in two principal ways. First, there are new multi-
agency  bodies  created  within  the  Supporting  People  programme,  in  particular 
Commissioning  Bodies  with  compulsory  involvement  of  specified  agencies.   The 
programme has also led to the creation of additional ‘provider forums’ in most areas, 
strategic bodies made up of provider representatives.  Secondly, the statutory requirement 
for  housing  authorities  to  produce homelessness strategies  in  partnership with  other 
agencies has, in the vast  majority of authorities, necessitated the creation of a multi-
agency steering group to facilitate the process.  Such bodies are similar to the horizontal 
group coordination modes discussed in the previous chapter, but are forms which are 
developed directly in  response to government edict,  rather than being generated in  a 
voluntarily ‘bottom-up’ sense.
There  were  mixed  views  amongst  interviewees  on  the  extent  to  which  these 
mandated structures facilitated collaboration (see table 9.3).   Interviewees considered 
them generally useful for promoting the interests of their respective client groups, for 
voicing collective concerns and challenging the local authority.  However, attaining the 
desired level of participation and commitment from key agencies in the homelessness 
strategy process had proven problematic, including those agencies required under law to 
cooperate (quote ID39).  
The process of allocating tasks and holding agencies to account for delivering these 
had been poorly managed in relation to the homelessness strategies in two out of the three 
local  authorities,  and interviewees stressed the  need for  assigning  responsibilities  to 
particular individuals and agencies and following these up (quote ID22).  In two of the 
three case study areas interviewees felt the strategy process has been hindered by a lack of 
resources.  Another common view was that the process had been divisive, with tensions 
between  agencies  having  surfaced.  Some  voluntary  sector  agencies  viewed  the 
homelessness  strategy simply as a  means of carving up council  money and felt  that 
strategy meetings were used as public relations exercise for voluntary sector agencies 
seeking the  approval of  the  local  authority,  rather  than  an  effective mechanism for 
devising strategy in partnership (quote ID19).  In two authorities there was resentment 
amongst voluntary sector agencies that the larger more powerful agencies in their sector 
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dominated the agenda.  Similar views were expressed in relation to the Supporting People 
Commissioning Bodies, with agencies becoming preoccupied with securing the interests 
of their own client groups, rather than taking a broader view of needs in the local area 
(quote ID1). 
These  themes  resonate  strongly  with  the  challenges  of  managing  horizontal 
coordination  tools  generally as  discussed  in  the  previous  chapter,  and  indicate that 
horizontal structures mandated by government are subject to similar problems to those 
generated locally.   The themes discussed above and  listed in  table 9.3 indicate that 
mandated  horizontal  structures,  as  was  the  case  with  locally-generated horizontal 
structures, are affected by the bureaucratic politics of relationships between local service 
providers.  
However, there is also a further dynamic at work in relation to mandated horizontal 
tools, namely the relationship between central government and local agencies.  There was 
evidence that horizontal tools mandated by government are more problematic because it 
is difficult to generate support for structures that are seen to be imposed compared to 
those which are locally devised.  For instance, some interviewees felt the homelessness 
strategies exercise had been driven in a top-down way, imposed by central government on 
local authorities that in turn treated the homelessness strategy as a ‘tick box’ exercise 
(quote ID18).  Comments were made on  the  need for  a  sense of  ownership of  the 
homelessness strategy amongst local agencies. Related to this was the view that multi-
agency and service user consultation had both been achieved in a tokenistic way, carried 
out simply to comply with government requirements (quote ID20).
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Table 9.3 Perceptions of authoritative network constitution
Main themes Illustrative quotes
Forum for promoting 
interests of client group/ 
voicing collective 
concerns/ challenging 
local authority
“They’ve got a lot of collective issues that they want to bring to 
us, so I think that maybe they’ve got a sense of that perhaps as 
well that sort of brings them together.” ID6, LA1
“They don’t hold back in challenging what it is that we’re 
proposing and making clear what their expectations are of SP as 
a programme, that’s been a really good thing.” ID39, LA1
Can become sectional & 
divisive with certain 
agendas dominating
“The danger with the Commissioning Board is that it can 
become a bit sectional – you know, I’m interested in what there 
is for my agency rather than recognising that the priority is an 
area that’s nothing to do with my agency” ID1, LA1
“There was a bit of being seen, turning up and showing 
yourselves, a bit of a PR exercise for some organisations, to let 
people know how fabulous everything is going.” ID19, LA2
Importance of sense of 
ownership/ commitment
“The people now involved in developing the strategy, people 
have an ownership, they have responsibility for pieces of work 
within that strategy, they’re involved in the service review 
process”. ID2, LA3
“I think when the last one was written they got some 
consultants in to write it, & it didn’t really seem to have much 
buy-in from many people so it was a bit of a waste of time.” 
ID3, LA3
Challenges around 
holding member agencies 
to account for actions/ 
establishing required 
level of participation
“It’s not always been an easy relationship and getting the three 
organisations to provide reps on the same day at the same time 
has not always been easy either.” ID39, LA1
“There was a homeless strategy done a couple of years ago and 
it was all lovely and glossy but there were no actions, there was 
nobody. It was all yeah, great than needs doing, but there was 
no one put down to do it, so it was no good.” ID22, LA3
Difficulty if imposed 
from top-down
“If I’m honest it (the homelessness strategy) feels to me like the 
Council views it as something that they’ve got to do and it’s a 
bloody nuisance and the government make them do it, and it’s 
the only way to get funding, so they’ve got to do it well and put 
a lot of time into it, but they’re too busy really to do it”. ID18, 
LA2
Multi-agency 
involvement in 
homelessness strategy 
process as tokenism
“Sometimes I think some of the meetings have been a bit 
almost tokenistic, ticking boxes about consultation, where 
it’s not really consultation it’s more like information giving”. 
ID20, LA3
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9.2 Perceptions of information-based tools 
9.2.1 Government guidance
A core tool used by government to promote collaboration is the production of written 
guidance for local agencies.  As noted in chapter six, several best practice guides have 
been produced on particular areas where collaboration is advised, including issues such as 
the  prevention  of  homelessness  amongst  ex-prisoners  and  patients  discharged  from 
hospital.  An official code of guidance also provides guidance on suggested forms of 
collaboration.  
When asked for their views of government guidance around collaboration (table 
9.4), only a minority of interviewees aware of this.  Those who had not read such material 
generally thought it could be a useful source of information (e.g. quote ID41).  There 
were mixed views on how useful it was amongst those who  had  read such guidance. 
Most of these people suggested that the guidance had to a certain extent been helpful and 
the guidance was viewed as credible (quote ID2), however, there was a feeling amongst 
some that the guidance produced had become repetitive (quote ID10). Others commented 
on the limited time they had available for reading the considerable amounts of guidance 
emanating from government.  
Interviewees felt  guidance was most  useful where it  highlighted examples of 
innovation and good practice in different local authorities and provided contact details for 
these authorities. They generally found it valuable to be linked up with such authorities to 
learn  from  their  experience (quotes  ID2  and  ID  1).   Civil  servants  demonstrated 
awareness of this issue, having received positive feedback on guidance which provided 
specific contacts in different local authorities.  This indicates a possibly valuable role for 
government guidance  in  terms  of  enhancing  collaboration  across  local  authorities. 
However,  the  transfer  of  good  practice  from  one  area  to  another  was  not  always 
straightforward.  Some local authority workers highlighted the challenge of persuading 
colleagues of the value of visiting and learning from other authorities, mainly because of 
views about the difficulty of applying lessons from other areas to a local context with 
different needs, resources and challenges.
Civil servants commented that it was important for guidance to demonstrate how 
collaboration could  benefit  local  agencies rather  than  merely expecting agencies to 
comply with exhortations to collaborate (quote ID33).  For instance,  guidance issued 
jointly  by the  Department  of  Health and DCLG to  encourage collaboration between 
hospitals and housing authorities had been designed to highlight how joint working with 
housing  authorities  could  help  hospitals  to  meet  their  own targets.  Specifically,  the 
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guidance stressed how working with housing authorities to link homeless people up with 
General Practitioners could assist accident and emergency wards to meet their targets to 
reduce waiting times by preventing inappropriate accident and emergency admissions for 
homeless people using this form of secondary acute care to fulfil  basic primary care 
needs.  This theme mirrors the view expressed by local actors, discussed in chapter eight, 
that  agencies are  more likely  to  adopt  formalised coordination  tools  when they are 
convinced of the organisational benefits of doing so.  
There was a view amongst central bureaucrats, however, that guidance should not 
be overly prescriptive (quotes ID33, ID34).  Some suggested that this was partly due to 
variation in different parts of the country, while others indicated that ideas had to come 
from a local level.  Civil servants recognised the limitations of information provision and 
were themselves unsure about how much use was made by local agencies of the guidance 
they produced. 
 Unsurprisingly, voluntary sector and RSL workers were much less likely to be 
recipients of government guidance, and tended to seek out information themselves when 
needed.  While some consulted government information sources, most sought information 
from other sources, particularly national voluntary sector bodies and housing bodies such 
as the Housing Corporation. Homeless Link was singled out by several interviewees as 
being a particularly valuable source of information.
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Table 9.4 Information-based tools: written guidance
Themes Illustrative Quotes
Perceived value of 
written guidance on 
collaboration
“Yes, we have. We have downloaded it, I think it’s good, it 
reinforces the messages that the advisor have put out across. And 
very often they are the same people that are involved in putting the 
information together.” ID2, LA3
“I think it would (be helpful), because joint working is difficult so if 
some research was done into best practice that would be a positive 
thing for me. We could formalise the whole thing then.” ID41, LA3
“It would be helpful to have government guidance on what makes 
partnership work, how do you keep it vibrant, how do you keep that 
focus, and how do you keep people informed between partnership 
type meetings and so on about what the issues are.” ID9, LA2
Guidance most 
useful when it 
contains contact 
details of 
innovative projects
“You’ve got a particular problem, so here’s a list of authorities, this 
is how they’ve dealt with it. If you contact X, Y& Z, you can talk it 
through with them; I think that’s really quite useful.” ID2, LA3
“Sometimes if you get something like that and it has… those sort of 
boxes that say ‘in this borough, this happens, and this is the contact’, 
that’s quite useful.” ID1, LA1
Repetitive nature of 
some government 
guidance
“There have been hundreds of reports written about homelessness 
over the last 5 years. But they say more or less the same thing. I’ve 
almost given up reading them. It shows frustration at national level 
with the problem, they keep saying the same things over and over in 
the hope that some people who aren’t listening will listen.” ID10, 
LA2
Guidance should 
demonstrate 
organisational 
benefits of 
collaborating
“It’s not just a case of sending out a document saying ‘you must do 
this’ or ‘you should do this’, and expecting people to pay attention to 
it… in the real world that doesn’t happen, some of them will, some 
of them won’t.” ID33, Department of Health
Guidance should 
not be overly 
prescriptive
“Government can put in place the framework within which people 
work… something that says ‘you have to bring together those 
people, but then it’s up to you to decide what your priorities are, how 
best to deliver it’. We back away from being too hands on and 
prescriptive… it’s all about finding local solutions to local issues.  I 
think we can do stuff to help facilitate, by helping with capacity 
building for example, but I don’t think we can prescribe too much.” 
ID34, CLG
“DH and CLG last year produced a piece of work providing 
guidance about producing protocols from people being discharged 
from hospital, but it’s not detailed, it can’t be, as it will vary 
enormously across the country.” ID33, DH
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9.2.2 Information provision and collection through central-local contact 
As  discussed  in  chapter  seven,  inter-personal  contact  between  central  and  local 
government can be classified as a  further information-based tool, since much of this 
contact involves government collecting and imparting information on collaboration to 
local authorities. Visits from ‘specialist advisors120’ were a key part of this contact and 
local authority interviewees were generally positive about advice that had been provided 
by CLG in this way (table 9.5), with most able to name particular specialist advisors with 
whom they held relationships.  Advisors were generally considered credible due to their 
past experience of working in local authorities and were viewed as having a reasonable 
understanding of the issues facing local areas.  
The positive experience of the majority of interviewees made them receptive to 
advice from CLG during their visits and ‘road-shows’, during which there had been some 
discussion of issues relating to inter-agency collaboration.  For instance, one civil servant 
described a visit which had been used to problem solve a dispute between particular local 
agencies  attempting  to  deal  with  a  rough  sleeping  problem.  Another  street  level 
bureaucrat described how CLG had enthusiastically accepted an invitation to help the 
housing  authority  with  difficulties  gaining  cooperation  from  a  young  person’s 
accommodation project in the local area.  In both these cases CLG performed both an 
advisory role and an arbitration role.   
However, a minority of interviewees considered the approach used by the CLG to 
be rather coercive (quotes ID10, ID11), although comments indicated that the approach 
had  altered  in  recent  years,  becoming  gradually  more  supportive  (quote  ID1). 
Unsurprisingly,  of  all  government departments, it  was  with  CLG that  local  housing 
authorities had most contact, suggesting this department has the greatest steering potential 
in relation to housing authorities. Contact with other government departments was mainly 
limited to consultation on particular cases where additional information was needed.  
As discussed above, while ‘effecting’ is one role of information based tools, they 
can also  be  used to  ‘detect’, that  is,  to  collect information from local  areas. While 
specialist advisors had provided generally valued advice to local authorities, advisors’ 
visits were perceived by street level bureaucrats to be largely a means of CLG dispensing 
advice (effecting) rather than listening to the views of local authorities (detecting).  When 
asked about their ability to get their views across to government about issues relating to 
collaboration,  and  to  influence  government  policy  in  this  respect,  the  majority  of 
interviewees were fairly sceptical (e.g. quotes ID3, ID8).  While some interviewees felt 
that they had an opportunity to express their views at conferences or events and through 
120 Civil servants with expertise in homelessness, usually with a background in local government.
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research, most of these people were unsure about whether this information was ever used 
to inform policy.  
One again, the national charity ‘Homeless Link’ was especially influential in the 
voluntary sector for imparting information, and was mentioned by numerous voluntary 
sector interviewees. It served as something of a filtering mechanism for selecting the most 
relevant government information and dispensing this to voluntary sector agencies.  This 
organisation also fulfilled a nodal position in relation to voluntary sector agencies (quote 
ID17), having an overview of numerous projects and serving as a joining up mechanism 
by facilitating the transfer of best practice between local voluntary sector agencies.  
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Table 9.5 Information-based tools: inter-personal information provision and collection
Themes Illustrative Quotes
Value of inter-personal 
contacts with CLG 
advisors
“The contact, monitoring & advice coming from CLG now are 
hugely different from 2 or 3 years ago and I think it’s really 
positive. It used to be forms going back and forth and very little 
contact…civil servants rather than anyone who particularly knew 
how a service was run. Having the specialist advisors is a big step 
forward.” ID1, LA1.
“Out of an informal discussion at a conference I had quite a 
positive response where I spoke to one of the CLG advisors about a 
problem with getting a local provider to accommodate homeless 
people. And she said ‘I’ll come down to see you, I’ll come & speak 
to the providers and sort them out”, which was really positive and 
really good, but that’s the only time that’s ever happened.” ID8, 
LA”
Preference for 
supportive rather than 
coercive/ controlling 
CLG stance
(Discussing the nature of contact with CLG) “It is helpful up to a 
point,  it  can be unhelpful  and it  can be de-motivating in certain 
circumstances, I question the tactics of some of the people they’ve 
used who’ve been involved in trying to persuade some authorities 
to up their game. I wouldn’t say it was totally business like.” ID10, 
LA2
“In my previous Local  Authority ODPM would come down and 
have control over what we were doing… that really annoyed me.” 
ID11, LA3
Difficulty of 
influencing central 
government
“I think we’ve got absolutely no chance to influence government 
whatsoever. Their drivers are very different to what drives the local 
authority.  I’m personally a bit cynical when people say ‘oh we 
should write to CLG about this’. What good is that going to do? No 
one has ever shown me any evidence that it would change 
anything.” ID3, LA3
“You kind of report and highlight. When the advisor was down 
doing his prevention road shows it was clear that lots of authorities 
were highlighting problems with individual housing associations 
not accepting homeless clients. But I don’t know how much follow-
up there was from that.” ID8, LA2
Importance of national 
charities for 
information provision 
to voluntary sector
“Homeless Link has been great for meeting other agencies. There’s 
no benchmarking in this business, that’s part of the problem, so you 
can’t test whether you are doing good work or bad work.  ‘Jan’ 
from Homeless Link goes round and visits lots of projects, she can 
bring lots of ideas back, lots of contacts.” ID17, LA2
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9.3 Perceptions of incentive-based tools 
As outlined in chapter six, incentive based tools adopted to promote collaboration in this 
sector  include  funding  streams  such  as  Supporting  People,  the  Hostels  Capital 
Improvement Grant and the Innovation Fund, as well as awards-based schemes such as 
the Regional Champions and Beacon Awards scheme.  Such tools reward collaboration by 
funding agencies that are able to demonstrate partnership working, and many do so by 
encouraging partnership bids. 
9.3.1 Funding streams and status awards: incentives for collaboration?
When asked if funding streams such as those described above led to greater collaboration 
(see table 9.6), street level  bureaucrats largely felt  that  they were a  strong lever for 
agencies to work together.  The majority were able to cite examples of bids they had been 
involved in which had required agencies to bid in partnership, and there was a general 
feeling that funding streams were moving in this direction (quote ID20, quote ID10). 
Interviewees mentioned all the above funding streams but singled out Supporting People 
funding as particularly geared towards partnership  working.  Some commented on a 
strengthening of local relationships during the process of putting together bids (quote 
ID6) and suggested that joint bidding was a means of reducing competition for funding at 
a local level.  The emphasis within the Supporting People programme on joint bidding 
had led in many areas to the creation of consortia.  
However, there was also some scepticism about the quality of partnership working 
generated through funding streams which rewarded partnership working, which were 
perceived by some to encourage collaboration purely in pursuit of money.  For instance 
one interviewee commented on the possibility of ‘lip-service’ in order to obtain funding 
(quote ID19). 
At  the  same time,  the  process of  joint  bidding  and consortium building  were 
considered high stakes activities. For instance, a CLG civil servant (ID34) described the 
process of consortium building as a ‘very long and sometimes painful process’ which 
could be perceived as having created much wasted time and effort should agencies fail to 
succeed.  Comments from local interviewees suggested that this had this scenario had 
arisen in some cases. For instance one voluntary sector project worker described the 
frustration of staff who had expended much time and effort building a local consortium 
only to be beaten by a single large provider from outside the local area (quote ID19). 
Consequently,  in  some  cases  failed  collaborative  bids  had  created  tensions 
between agencies. In others, successfully obtained money was perceived as having been 
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distributed  inequitably,  with  the  larger  statutory  agencies benefiting  most  from the 
funding obtained (ID21).  
There were also practical challenges associated with putting together collaborative 
bids because timescales were often prohibitively short. This was viewed as challenging in 
view of the time is took to get agencies together to develop bids (quote ID20), and one 
RSL manager (ID39) noted that  joint bidding was dependent on agencies having pre-
established networks with  other  local  providers.   Interviewees also  commented that 
jointly funded projects were often dependent on time-limited funding.  In a number of 
cases these projects had simply come to a halt when they money had run out.
With regards to award-based schemes such as Regional Champions and Beacon 
Councils, not all interviewees were aware of these. It was primarily local authorities who 
knew of their existence since the scheme is principally geared towards these bodies. It 
was not possible to ascertain from the interviews whether these schemes had acted as 
direct incentives for multi-agency collaboration within local areas, however, it was clear 
that they were a stimulus for collaboration between different local authorities. The view of 
such schemes in terms of cross-authority learning was positive, and many authorities had 
found it useful when Champions or Beacons in their area had visited either in a peer 
review or advisory capacity (quotes ID2, ID3).  Interviewees’ comments on these schemes 
indicated a general willingness to learn from other local areas, particularly those that were 
perceived as successful in attracting funding and publicity for their schemes.  
In  summary,  interviewees’ comments indicate  that  the  desire  for  funding  did 
encourage  agencies  to  collaborate,  again  indicating  instrumental  motivations  for 
collaborating. Government incentives were effective in stimulating greater use of joint 
bidding and consortium building.  In some cases interviewees perceived the process to 
have strengthened inter-agency relations and this may have helped to reduce competition 
in some ways. However, there were a number of problems associated with this, related to 
the  distribution  of  rewards and  the  type  of  partnership  working  generated by  joint 
bidding, as well as practical challenges of bidding in partnership and potentially negative 
effects of failed bids, something which could plausibly affect agencies’ enthusiasm for 
partnership working.  
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Table 9.6 Incentive-based tools: funding streams
Themes Illustrative Quotes
View that 
government funding 
streams incentivise 
collaboration
“Yes, I think so. We are developing something around meaningful 
occupation. It was made quite clear to us that money would be 
available from CLG but only because we are in partnership with 
the College and the City Council, and because it’s going to be a 
City-wide scheme which will benefit lots of agencies.” ID20, LA3.
“Yeah if there’s money to be had people’s heads are in the trough. 
We had it for the Hostel, everybody got together, decided what was 
needed, bunged in the bid and got the money. I think where the 
objectives are clear and people can see benefits on the different 
sides, they are up for it.” ID10, LA2
 
Strengthening of 
relationships
“The process of preparing the bid definitely strengthened 
relationships, it improved information sharing. Otherwise we 
wouldn’t get that kind of relationship with another provider. I think 
that’s happening more and more, people are doing joint bids, 
teaming up with organisations that have expertise with a particular 
client group, they’re joining together, I can’t see how that can be a 
bad thing.” ID6, LA3
Potential of schemes 
to enhance cross-
authority 
collaboration and 
information sharing
“Yes, we invited representatives from a number of those beacons in 
the area. It was really helpful, positive criticism, which was fine 
and now we’ve gone on a series of visits them”. ID2, LA3
“Yeah certainly I think Nottingham are regional champions & we 
see them as very useful. They get paid to host people and stuff, and 
similarly we went to Scarborough & that was very useful, so yes, I 
think it is very useful.” ID3, LA3
Problems created by 
failed collaborative 
bids/ potential for lip 
service
“The last SP contract I was involved with wanted coverage across 
the county, so we had no choice but to join consortia. That 
encouraged joint working, but whether the organisations that joined 
and didn’t get the bid are still talking to each other... it might just 
have been lip service to get the funding… We put an enormous 
amount of work into it but a single provider from out of area got 
the bid. So that pissed people off a bit”. ID19, LA2.
Practical challenges 
of bidding in 
partnership
“When they are looking for tenders, the timescales are often so 
tight that if you’re going to get something in, you can just about do 
it yourself but if you are trying to organise all the other people’s 
diaries it’s a bit of a nightmare... lengthening times would help”. 
ID20, LA3
289
9.3.2 Capacity Building Tools
As noted in chapter two, capacity building tools are a particular subset of incentive-based 
tools to promote collaboration, including support to alleviate the direct costs associated 
with partnership working, or targeted advice, training or technical assistance. When asked 
a  general  question  on  how government could  make  it  easier  for  local  agencies to 
collaborate, capacity building measures were raised by several local interviewees. 
For instance, it was felt that the costs associated with collaboration were high, and 
that some funding to cover staff time and the costs of holding multi-agency meetings or 
events would be helpful  (e.g. quotes ID19, ID9). Others voiced support for capacity 
building to train people in the skills required for partnership working (quote ID10).  One 
suggestion was for training in partnership bidding, and bidding more generally for small 
voluntary sector agencies, which were viewed as regularly losing out to larger agencies 
that  were better  resourced and more able  to  put  bids  together  (quote ID41).  Some 
interviewees suggested  that  government guidance  providing  advice  on  collaborative 
working would be helpful (quotes ID19, ID41), indicating either that they were unaware 
of existing best practice guidance on collaboration or that current forms of information 
provision may have been perceived as inadequate.  
Civil servants also acknowledged their own capacity-building role (quote ID34), 
and seemed to be generally aware of the difficulties facing local agencies in pursuing 
collaborative approaches and of ways in which they could support agencies in this regard. 
Some of the initiatives discussed above did attempt to contribute to capacity building on 
homelessness  collaboration,  such as  the regional champions scheme which sought to 
diffuse good practice across local authorities, and the information-based tools described 
above. 
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Table 9.7 Incentive-based tools: capacity building support from government
Theme Illustrative quotes
Perceived 
importance of 
earmarked money 
to resource 
collaborative 
endeavours
“Financially if government could provide money just for holding 
joint meetings, someone’s always got to carry the cost, whether it’s 
booking a room or whatever… just facilitating getting people 
together and talking honestly.” ID19, LA2.
“The resource to actually get people involved in a partnership takes 
time to organise, time away from the substantive day job. So we’ve 
got the agenda around partnership working, but I think the 
government have to recognise there’s a time element to that, which 
has to be properly resourced… you need adequate resources of staff 
time in particular.” ID9, LA2
Desire for 
guidance/ training 
on skills for 
partnership 
working
“It’s about capacity building, so, not everybody is skilled to do 
partnership work. It comes naturally to some people and not to 
others. So if you want that style of working I think they need to be 
shown how it works, rather than the old system where you know ‘I 
provide this, and you provide that, and that’s called joint working. So 
there’s an issue about capacity building.” ID10, LA2
“Joint working is difficult and so if some research was done into best 
practice that would be a positive thing for me. We could formalise the 
whole thing then.” ID41, LA3
“When funding comes available they’ve got to realise that some of 
the smaller agencies don’t have a full time researcher or someone to 
do bids all the time, so the way the funding is aimed, it always seems 
to go to the big people. It should be more accessible to smaller 
agencies. A lot of them don’t have the knowledge or expertise on 
bidding.” ID41, LA3
CLG recognition of 
government’s 
facilitative/ 
capacity building 
role
“Third sector providers are saying to us the amount of time it takes to 
build  consortia  and  the  amount  of  resource,  when  a  lot  of  these 
organisations  are  running on a shoestring… that  actually  is  a  real 
issue, so in terms of capacity building, that’s something that we’re 
really focusing on.” ID34, CLG
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9.4 Perceptions of Broader Local Meta-Governance Structures
As  discussed  in  chapter  six,  the  tools  of  meta-governance specifically  related  to 
encouraging collaboration between local  homelessness  agencies  are  embedded in  a 
broader set of local meta-governance structures. Although these were not the principal 
focus of the present research, it is pertinent briefly to acknowledge the contribution and 
potential role of such structures and processes which, although not directly related to 
homelessness,  provide  the context  in  which local service delivery networks operate. 
These structures are becoming an increasingly important feature of the local governance 
landscape in contemporary British public services and therefore structure attempts to 
foster collaboration  in specific policy sectors such as  homelessness and other cross-
cutting  areas.   This  last  section  briefly  considers their  role  as  tools  for  stimulating 
collaboration,  focusing  principally  on  Local  Area  Agreements,  arguably  the  most 
important new coordination structure affecting local authorities at the time of writing.
During the interview phase of the research Local Area Agreements were in the 
process  of  being  gradually  introduced  across  English  Local  Authorities.  This  was 
therefore very much an emerging agenda at the time, although one which local actors 
were keenly aware of. One of the local areas (LA2) was involved in the national pilot of 
Local Area Agreements.  
Most local level interviewees believed that the new Local Area Agreement (LAA) 
structure  would, in  theory,  strengthen  local  decision-making  and  simplify  current 
arrangements. However, there was concern that because of the need to reduce the number 
of priorities in each authority121,  it  would be important for agencies working with the 
homeless to  push the interests of socially  excluded groups to  ensure they prioritised 
within the local area.  Interviewees’ experience of Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs) did 
not bode well in this regard, and in two areas these were perceived as having prioritised 
other areas such as regeneration and economic development rather than issues of social 
exclusion. One interviewee in the authority which had been part of the national pilot was 
concerned that establishing the LAA had essentially been a fight about resources (quote 
ID29), and this interviewee suggested that the LAA had been unable to find ways of 
overcoming the differing priorities and agendas of the local services involved.  
These  issues  were  recognised  centrally,  and  one  CLG  civil  servant  (ID34) 
commented that the department was producing guidance for local authorities to advise 
them of  the need to  proactively engage with  the LAA process to  help  protect  their 
vulnerable client groups.
121 Local Area Agreements stipulate that Authorities select 35 priority areas for which associated local 
targets are set.
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Table 9.8 Broader meta-governance structures: Local Area Agreements (LAAs) and Local 
Strategic Partnerships (LSPs)
Theme Illustrative quotes
Perceived need to 
push interests of 
homeless people & 
other excluded 
groups into LAAs
“We are now trying to develop our networks around the LAAs 
because we think that’s where everything is going to go. And we need 
to be strong in that area because of the group we’re representing”. 
ID28, LA3
“We do need to guard against the possibility that SP in particular, 
’cause that’s my area of concern, that the money isn’t siphoned off to 
pay for services, that means that suddenly, single homeless people or 
whoever, suddenly don’t have any services. We need to safeguard 
against that, and that’s why it’s important to have enshrined within 
the LAA a commitment to the delivery of housing-related support” 
ID38, LA1
“I was quite proactive in saying we actually need to have some stuff 
in there on homelessness, because in my experience with the LPSA, 
if we don’t have these jointly owned targets then you don’t get the 
engagement and you also maybe don’t get the resources either” 
ID8, LA2
Doubt over extent 
to which LAAs/ 
LSPs help assist 
social excluded 
groups such as the 
homeless
“My personal perception has been that the LSP here has had very 
much an economic focus, more about the prosperity of the city. I’m 
not sure that there’s been an awful lot of the social inclusion agenda 
taken on board.” ID29, LA2
“The LSP has had no impact thus far on homelessness. I don’t think 
it’s yet on the priority list of the strategic housing partnership group. 
It is on the agenda but in the city there’s a big regeneration agenda as 
well, which tends to dominate.” ID3, LA3
LAA process 
dominated by 
competition & 
unable to resolve 
differing priorities 
of agencies
“One of the barriers to partnership working is that different agencies 
have different agendas, targets and priorities. And I haven’t seen yet 
how the LAA negotiates all those to come out with a set of agreed 
priorities. The experience so far has not been that the LAA is a good 
way of partnership working, it’s been much more about agency in-
fighting… up to now…. It all just became an argument about 
money.” ID 29, LA2
Additional meta-governance structures such as the National Value Improvement 
Programme and the Commissioning Framework for Health and Wellbeing discussed in 
chapter six were vertical tools aiming to build local capacity that were mentioned by civil 
servants, although not by local interviewees.  These measures did not relate directly to 
homelessness but were geared towards assisting with processes around local partnership 
working in a general sense. The former programme was viewed as way of helping local 
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agencies with the process of procurement and contracting, something where there was a 
perceived lack of expertise (ID34).  The latter was considered a mechanism for assisting 
local agencies with joint commissioning (ID37).  Although it was difficult to assess the 
influence of these particular meta-governance tools in local areas, these tools as well as 
LAAs can be viewed as attempts to unlock some of the barriers to the strategic level of 
collaboration in  local areas.  The early experience of LAAs in the case study areas 
indicates that, like other meta-governance tools, the process of managing and engaging 
with these structures entails competition between agencies with respect to promoting the 
interests of their own client groups and obtaining the resources to meet their needs.   
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Chapter Summary and Discussion
This chapter sought to investigate the influence of particular tools of meta-governance 
used to foster collaboration at local level.  It  also sought to assess their contribution 
generally in terms of alleviating externalities associated with fragmented service systems 
and to evaluate their contribution as mechanisms for gaining leverage and control in such 
an environment.  The analysis presented raises a number of points with respect to these 
questions.  
In relation to the different tools, the analysis indicates that some tools are more 
effective than others, although interviewees’ accounts highlight strengths and limitations 
of all tools.  Crucially, there are limitations of authority-based tools such as legislation 
which mandates collaboration between specified bodies. Although interviewees regarded 
it as legitimate for central government to mandate collaboration, they were more sceptical 
about government’s ability to enforce this.  The statutory duty to cooperate was viewed as 
rather vague and lacking in sufficient authority to generate compliance.  This finding 
underscores the need for meta-governance tools that aim to prescribe relations between 
agencies to be underpinned by additional tools or mechanisms which provide sanctions or 
rewards to generate compliance.  It also highlights the limitations of approaches which 
only vaguely define cooperation, and indicates perhaps greater need for legislation to 
specify ways in which agencies are expected to cooperate.
There were mixed views  regarding the  effectiveness of  authoritative network 
constitution  tools.  While  the  creation  of  multi-agency  structures  could  serve  as 
mechanisms for getting the right agencies around the table to discuss collective concerns 
and promote the interests of client groups, these processes needed careful management. 
In particular, when network structures were mandated by government it was regarded as 
important to develop a sense of ownership of these structures and to gain sufficient sign 
up  and  commitment  from  key  agencies.   There  were  problems  surrounding  the 
implementation of the compulsory homelessness strategies in local areas and this task was 
not always taken up especially enthusiastically, something which may have been related 
to the manner in which it was imposed on local agencies without any additional resources. 
In  relation  to  monitoring,  it  was  acknowledged  that  it  was  difficult  for 
government  to  monitor  collaboration  directly,  particularly  when  using  standard 
government monitoring techniques involving the collection of statistical data. Central and 
local interviewees shared this view, and suggested that quantitative data on collaboration 
would  be  difficult  to  interpret  without  some  additional  qualitative  or  explanatory 
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information on  the  dynamics of  the  relationships  involved.   However,  interviewees 
provided examples of other ways in which collaboration was indirectly monitored.  There 
was a clear view amongst civil  servants that key homelessness targets and indicators 
encouraged collaboration at a local level, and some local interviewees also acknowledged 
this.   However,  there was no evidence that other forms of monitoring led to greater 
collaboration.  
In authorities where regulatory mechanisms such as joint  inspections  and the 
‘special measures’ system had been used, these had helped local authorities to improve 
collaborative working arrangements.   This may be related to the fact that these were 
personal coordination modes.  As this chapter has illustrated, information and advice 
provided in person was generally valued by local interviewees. They found the advice 
they had received, either from government advisors directly or through peer reviews 
provided by local authorities and facilitated by government, to  be both credible and 
helpful.   The  general  support  for  inter-personal  information provision  from  CLG, 
alongside the finding from chapter seven that those with higher contact with this body 
had higher collaboration scores, indicates a potentially important role for this type of 
approach.  
However, while inter-personal information provision was valued by local actors, 
there  were  fairly  mixed views  on  the  utility  and  effectiveness  of  written  guidance 
produced and sent down by government.  Many local actors in statutory agencies did not 
read  such  guidance,  something  was  partly  explained  by  the  volume and  length  of 
guidance produced and its perceived repetitious nature. Guidance specifying case study 
examples and contact details was regarded as most helpful, again indicating a general 
willingness  for  horizontal  learning  across  local  authorities.  However,  there  was 
recognition amongst central bureaucrats of the difficulty of being overly prescriptive. 
This is in contrast to the finding reported above that legislative tools are not prescriptive 
enough,  and  highlights  the  challenge  of  striking  a  balance  between  being  overly 
prescriptive and too vague.  
Incentives were effective for encouraging agencies to build consortia and bid in 
partnership,  but  there  were several problems associated with  such tools,  principally 
related to the quality of partnership working generated, tensions generated by failed bids 
and disagreements over  the  allocation of  award money.   Incentives geared to  build 
collaborative capacity such as directed assistance to cover the costs of holding multi-
agency events may be more rewarding, by helping alleviate some of the general obstacles 
to  collaboration such as lack of time and resources. They may also serve to reduce 
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resentment which was created when the responsibility and costs of hosting such events 
routinely fall on the larger or more proactive agencies, as reported in chapter eight. 
Local area agreements as broader tools of meta-governance were considered a 
good idea in theory.  They were regarded as having potential for bringing decisions closer 
to the local level and for reducing bureaucratic reporting requirements by streamlining 
the performance indicators system. Local actors also suggested that they may help unlock 
some  of  the  challenges  to  collaborative  working,  particularly  at  a  strategic  level. 
Generally  local  actors  indicated  that  their  organisational  priorities  were  heavily 
influenced by targets and indicators that were mandated by government.   Since LAA 
targets focus on ‘cross-cutting’ issues, interviewees suggested that they could in theory 
help  to  elevate  the  priority  and  status  of  homelessness at  local  level.   However, 
interviewees were aware that only a limited number of areas could be included in their 
LAA and there was concern that homelessness, like other areas of social exclusion, may 
not be a high enough priority to warrant inclusion. 
A number of conclusions can also be drawn in relation to  the role  of meta-
governance tools in a more general sense. Meta-governance tools are often effective as a 
first stage in bringing local agencies together, but that beyond this stage the challenges of 
bureaucratic politics  can take hold.   For instance, incentives in  the form of funding 
streams rewarding collaboration do encourage joint bidding, but once jointly sourced 
funds are obtained, agencies sometimes begin to compete over the rewards and there is a 
perception amongst smaller agencies that the larger agencies are the greater beneficiaries 
in  this  process.   Moreover,  failed  partnership  bids  generate  disappointment,  partly 
because of the significant investment of time required to develop the networks of contacts 
to  put  together such bids.  Failed bids  may therefore dampen enthusiasm for  future 
collaborative endeavours and potentially harm relationships that have been established.  
Similarly, authoritative network constitution tools such as mandated multi-agency 
bodies  and inclusion  in  other  strategic  processes serve as  effective mechanisms for 
getting the relevant agencies around the table, and have other benefits such as the ability 
to raise collective concerns to the local authority.  However,  these structures are also 
considered divisive in some respects, and are viewed as mechanisms for distributing 
resources.  Where these forums are led by the local authority, local agencies sometimes 
feel under pressure to use these bodies as forums for winning its approval or favour.  In 
addition, as the example of the Supporting People Commissioning bodies illustrated, 
local actors are strategic in their approach to these bodies, pursuing the interests of their 
respective client groups, sometimes contrary to the needs of the local system as a whole.  
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It  is  clear  that  local  actors  are  more  responsive  to  some tools  than  others, 
suggesting that meta-governance tools, like the tools of government generally, have their 
own politics.  Unsurprisingly, interviewees responded well to advisory and supportive 
interactions with government departments and less well to coercive approaches.  The 
vertical dimension of the relationship between central and local actors is clearly affected 
by bureaucratic politics, with certain tools encouraging tokenistic or tick-box responses 
which create a veneer of compliance with collaboration or participation agendas.  This is 
somewhat in line with bottom-up conceptions of policy implementation in which street 
level bureaucrats distort policy generated in the higher realms of government, perhaps 
because the policies generated at  this level are unrealistic or incompatible with local 
concerns.     
The finding that all tools had limitations suggests that meta-governance strategies 
for stimulating local collaboration may be most effective when they combine tools.  This 
finding is  in  line  with  previous  work discussed in  chapter  two which suggests  that 
governments seeking to exercise leverage over networks of agencies are likely to require 
a combination of tools.
Lastly, the analysis provides support for the hypothesis presented at the outset of 
the thesis that command and control tools may have limited impact in the context of 
networks  of  service providers.  The limitations  of  government legislation mandating 
cooperation  discussed in this  chapter point to  a  need for additional tools  to  support 
authoritative techniques.
    Overall, this chapter  does  indicate potential  for meta-governance tools to help 
enhance collaboration.  However, these vertical tools do not themselves directly attenuate 
problems associated with fragmented service networks such as gaps, duplications and 
incoherence.  They  make  an  indirect  contribution  to  this  by  stimulating forms  of 
collaboration at  local  level  where these  problems  can  be  tackled.  These  forms of 
collaboration are themselves subject to considerable challenges stemming in large part 
from bureaucratic politics.  The implications of these findings are considered in next 
chapter. 
298
Chapter 10: Conclusion
Chapter introduction and overview
Contemporary public policy theory asserts that state control and coordination are more 
problematic, and that coherence is undermined, in the current era of ‘governance’.  This 
research has examined the potential of one type of strategy for re-asserting control and 
coordination, and enhancing coherence, in this environment. The strategy considered was 
the  stimulation, by  central  government,  of  collaboration  amongst  local  networks of 
service providers, a form of ‘meta-governance’.  The empirical setting of the research is 
the local public services used by those who are homeless, a client group for which the 
state has sought to encourage collaboration between local agencies. It is a salient example 
of the state attempting to exercise leverage over a fragmented service delivery network in 
order to deal with a ‘cross-cutting’ issue. 
This concluding chapter defends the thesis that meta-governance tools aiming to 
foster collaboration are partially effective, but that state capacity is limited by aspects of  
‘bureaucratic  politics’  and  the  ‘bottom-up’  nature  of  collaborative  processes. 
Bureaucratic politics is revealed through differing priorities of agencies which lead their 
personnel to pursue strategies which seek to maximise the interests of their respective 
organisations.  Furthermore there are power inequalities between the agencies concerned, 
which result in certain agencies dominating the agenda and undermine collaboration.  The 
argument that collaboration is ‘bottom-up’ is backed up by evidence of the incremental 
nature of the collaborative process, the importance of informal interactions and trust, and 
the key role played by particular individuals with boundary spanning abilities.  Horizontal 
coordination tools have the capacity to alleviate externalities associated with fragmented 
systems, leading to better and more accessible services for clients, but need strong local 
management and appropriate central facilitation.  Vertical coordination tools have some 
influence but also have limitations, and there is little evidence that purely ‘top-down’ 
strategies relying on authority-based tools  are likely to  secure the implementation of 
collaboration in local service delivery networks.
The case for these claims is made by returning to the research questions raised in 
the introduction to the thesis and addressing these in light of the empirical evidence 
presented in the intervening chapters.  The first section of this chapter (10.1) examines the 
descriptive questions of the research, namely the identification and classification of forms 
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of government steering of local collaboration, and the assessment of the extent and nature 
of local collaboration.  The second section (10.2) addresses the explanatory questions 
concerning why agencies collaborate, in particular whether collaborative decisions are 
better explained by rational-administrative or bureaucratic politics models of decision-
making, and top-down or bottom-up influences, including discussion of the role of the 
state in stimulating collaboration.  This section also revisits and assesses the rival models 
and hypotheses presented in chapter three underpinning the analytical framework.  The 
third section (10.3) addresses the evaluative questions concerning the effectiveness of 
both vertical and horizontal tools.  The penultimate section (10.4) situates the research 
within the existing body of knowledge and discusses its contribution and its limitations, 
and suggests avenues for future enquiry.  Section 10.5 provides concluding remarks. 
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10.1 The Pattern of Local Collaboration and Central Steering
Government  encourages  local  agencies  to  collaborate  using  a  range  of  vertical 
coordination tools. Together these tools constitute a form of ‘meta-governance’ and are 
aimed at influencing the relations between actors, in order to foster greater collaboration. 
The specific tools employed were discussed in chapter six and have been classified as 
authority-based, information-based and incentive-based.  Authority-based tools include 
legislation  mandating  cooperation  between  specified  local  agencies,  ‘network 
constitution’ which involves creating new structures in which local agencies are required 
to participate, and various methods of monitoring and regulation. Information-based tools 
include official exhortations and written guidance, as well as ‘detector/ effector’ tools to 
collect information from local areas and distribute this to a wider group of local areas. 
While  these  vertical  coordination  tools  relate  specifically  to  homelessness,  they  are 
situated  within  a  broader  range  of  meta-governance  strategies  used  to  enhance 
coordination between local public services more generally.  These include tools such as 
Local Area Agreements, Local Strategic Partnerships and joint commissioning processes, 
which are themselves forms of network constitution.
Chapter six also identified formal horizontal coordination tools and examples of 
informal collaboration employed at the level of central government.  These coordination 
efforts can be considered forms of vertical steering, since they are active attempts to join 
up government policy on homelessness in order to facilitate collaboration at the lowest 
policy implementation tier of public services.  A tri-partite framework of coordination 
modes was employed, incorporating group, personal and impersonal modes was used to 
classify the formal horizontal  tools.   Group modes used in  relation to  homelessness 
include  cross-Whitehall  groups  and  networks,  regular  inter-ministerial  meetings  and 
events designed to bring together governmental and non-governmental actors.  Personal 
modes include jointly funded posts, lead officers responsible for homelessness in different 
departments, and secondments.  Impersonal modes employed are cross-cutting budgets 
and joint work plans.  Informal collaboration across central government takes the form of 
ad-hoc contact where there are areas of overlap between departments, and appears to be a 
fairly important method of  coordination.   Overall the UK government’s  approach to 
stimulating local collaboration is characterised as a fairly strong one, and there is a clear 
policy agenda in this direction.    
Local collaboration also includes both formal and informal methods, as revealed 
by the survey evidence presented in chapter seven.  Formal collaboration occurs through a 
mix of horizontal coordination tools, but principally group and impersonal modes.  The 
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formal tools employed are the least ambitious ones, and tools that radically alter existing 
organisational structures and procedures are relatively uncommon.  The survey evidence 
also  indicates  that  there  is  greater  informal  than  formal  collaboration,  and  more 
collaboration at operational than at strategic level.  
Overall there are  moderate levels of both formal and informal collaboration in 
English  local  authorities  with  respect to  homelessness, and less  interaction between 
agencies than would be ideal, as perceived by local actors themselves.  The pattern of 
informal interactions indicates that personnel in  housing authorities spend more time 
collaborating  with  individuals  in  other  housing  related  bodies,  particularly 
accommodation providers, than those in non-housing agencies within the wider service 
network.  However, the survey also reveals variation in patterns of collaboration in local 
authorities, something which the research questions discussed in the next section helped 
to explain. 
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10.2 Explaining Collaboration
While the descriptive concerns of the research uncovered evidence on the level and nature 
of collaboration and of vertical coordination mechanisms to promote this, the explanatory 
questions sought to determine why actors collaborate, and why they sometimes do not. 
These questions were addressed through an analytical framework which focused attention 
on two key dimensions of explanation, as outlined in chapter three. The first dimension 
concerned decision-making, and two alternative perspectives were elaborated, rational-
administration and  bureaucratic politics,  each with  different views about  why actors 
collaborate.   The  second  dimension  concerned the  level at  which  decisions  about 
collaboration occur, and was examined through two branches of implementation theory, 
‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ perspectives.  As  discussed in  chapter  three, these rival 
theories were selected because they seem to capture some of the key debates in existing 
literature on collaboration whilst  also providing a framework for addressing the core 
research questions.  While the framework builds on this existing work, it highlights new 
issues which are revealed through a  critical assessment of the contrasting theoretical 
perspectives from political science.
Four alternative models combining the above dimensions were presented.  The 
models exhibit varying degrees of optimism about the ability of government to influence 
collaboration, and  about  the  likelihood of  agencies  collaborating  at  all.   They also 
represent differing viewpoints on the nature of decision-making within public policy. 
Table 10.1 below summarises the four models and recaps on the rival hypotheses which 
flow from each of these. In order to assess the persuasiveness of the models, the two main 
dimensions of the models are considered in turn, first, the nature of decision-making 
(rational administration or bureaucratic politics) and second, the level at which decision-
making occurs, in order to assess the influence of ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up factors’. 
These are presented in the next four subsections, each of which is accompanied by a brief 
table summarising the evidence to support each perspective.  Subsection 10.2.5 combines 
the key findings to make an assessment of the particular models.  
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Table 10.1 Rival models and hypotheses 
Model 1: The top-down rational administrative explanation*:
H1a Local agencies collaborate because government tells them to; government’s aims are 
unified and unambiguous; 
H1b The values  and objectives of collaboration policy are defined by government, and  neutral 
bureaucrats search for the most efficient means of delivering these objectives.  
Model 2 The bottom-up rational administrative explanation:
H2a Collaboration is locally defined and local agencies collaborate because they see this as the  
most  effective  mode  of  action  for  attaining their  aims and for  meeting clients’ needs;  local  
agencies’ aims are unified and unambiguous;
H2b The means pursued are the most administratively efficient to meet these aims.
Model 3 The top-down, bureaucratic politics explanation:
H3a Government or central  bureaucrats set  collaboration policy aims and means,  and local  
agencies are generally responsive to their parent government departments;
H3b Government policy is, however, not unified, with different departments pursuing their own 
interests and the outcome favouring the most powerful department.
Model 4* The bottom-up, bureaucratic politics explanation†: 
H4a Collaboration decisions (both means and ends) are generated from the bottom-up; however  
aims are not unified;
H4b Collaboration decisions are the outcome of strategic and instrumental moves between actors 
in the local arena, each promoting their own interests; the outcomes favour the most powerful  
local agencies.
*   Both bottom-up & top-down rational administrative models contain a ‘synoptically rational’  
     variant and a ‘boundedly rational' variant
†   Model 4 variant 1: ‘no collaboration’
     Model 4 variant 2: ‘collaboration through partisan mutual adjustment’
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10.2.1 Assessment of the rational administrative perspective
The rational administrative model holds three core assumptions.  First, that there is unity 
of aims; second, that aims are clearly specified and unambiguous and third, that decisions 
occur  in  a  rational  means-ends  fashion  where  the  means  selected  are  the  most 
administratively efficient to meet these ends.  Searching for alternative courses of action 
may occur in a synoptic or bounded sense.  
In terms of the aims or goals of actors involved in collaboration, a very clear 
theme in the present research has been a distinct lack of unity of goals, and this was one 
factor which impeded collaboration.  At the level of central government, the priorities of 
government departments differ, and homelessness is a major priority of one department 
but only a peripheral concern of others.  As chapter six illustrated, departments are highly 
focused on  their  own departmental priorities  and do  not  behave as  a  unified actor. 
Similarly at local level, the differing priorities of agencies came across clearly in chapter 
five which discussed the challenges of collaborating.  While homelessness was a concern 
for most agencies, it was  not the dominant common interest of all the agencies in the 
service delivery network.  Consequently collaboration itself was less important to some 
agencies than others, and agencies for which homelessness was not a primary concern had 
less motivation to collaborate.  These findings do not support a rational-administrative 
perspective.  
In terms of the goals themselves, these were not unambiguous.  As observed in 
chapter six, collaboration is a clear policy priority for government, and there is a fairly 
clear message in this regard. However, this message is sent only from one government 
department, CLG, to its local arm, the housing authority.  The message does not seem to 
have been effectively transmitted to the other agencies in the service delivery network 
outside  of  the  CLG’s  control,  with  voluntary  sector  agencies  and  accommodation 
providers far less aware of its collaborative agenda with respect to homelessness.  In 
addition,  there  was  only  limited  evidence that  other  government departments were 
sending this message to their own subordinate statutory agencies specifically in relation to 
homelessness, although they did transmit  a prioritisation of partnership agendas more 
generally.  Again, this evidence does not support the rational-administrative conception of 
decision-making.
The third feature of rational administration is that collaborative decision-making 
occurs on a means-ends basis.  The rational administrative ideal type presented in the 
current research is  an ‘altruistic-rational’ version, which some previous commentators 
have  argued  is  the  assumption  underpinning  many  government-led  collaboration 
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initiatives in areas of local public services.  This version of rational administration is 
inherently  optimistic  and  is  based  on  the  idea  that  agencies will  be  motivated to 
collaborate because they see this as a means of serving the interests of clients, and believe 
that they can achieve their aims more efficiently by working together than alone.  In this 
model,  the  particular  collaborative tools  selected by  actors  would  be  those that  are 
deemed most likely to reach these goals.  
There is a degree of evidence to support this aspect of the rational-administrative 
model, although this  evidence does not  conform entirely to  the ‘altruistic-rationality’ 
model. As noted in chapter five, collaboration was perceived by local bureaucrats to be 
appropriate in order to meet the multiple problems typically faced by homeless clients.  In 
addition, when discussing the role of formal collaborative tools (chapter eight), street 
level  bureaucrats  highlighted  various  ways  in  which  these  did  help  to  iron  out 
externalities in the homelessness system.  In this respect actors considered collaboration 
to be an effective means of attaining the altruistic dimensions of their goals, related to 
meeting  the  needs  of  homeless  people.   In  addition,  collaboration  was  sometimes 
considered inappropriate for reasons related to clients’ needs.  For instance, as discussed 
in chapter eight, the provision of services from a single site, or co-location, was thought 
to  be problematic because it  would be difficult  to  create the ‘right environment’ for 
different groups of clients in a single setting.  The incorporation of such considerations 
into decision-making around collaboration accords with the notion of ‘thin’ rationality, 
which denote the ‘selfless’ aspects of rational decision-making.  
However, it was clear that this altruistic rationality was only one component of 
street  level  bureaucrats’ decision-making.  Local  actors’ collaborative decisions  also 
exhibited  significant  instrumental rationality,  which  reflect  more  self-interested 
motivations.  In this case, it is organisational rather than individual self-interest, however, 
which  was  a  feature  of  decision-making. As  discussed in  chapters  five  and  eight, 
instrumental motivations  appeared,  on  balance,  to  be  more  dominant  than  altruistic 
motivations.  Actors’ instrumental motivations for collaborating are elaborated in section 
10.2.2 which assesses the evidence for the bureaucratic politics model.
A final aspect of the rational-administrative model which remains to be considered 
is  the  question  of  synoptic  versus  bounded  rationality.   Decision-making  was  not 
consistent  with  the  ‘pure’ synoptic variant of  the  rational-administrative  perspective. 
There was little evidence of actors selecting coordination tools as part of a systematic and 
comprehensive search for the most efficient and effective means to achieve their goals, 
either centrally or locally.  At a local level decisions regarding collaboration and the range 
of collaborative options considered were heavily bounded by constraints such as resource 
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and time limitations, practical difficulties and the challenges of devising joint systems for 
diverse agencies, as  discussed  in  chapters  five  and  eight.   At  the  level  of  central 
government,  as  chapter  six  illustrated,  the  issues  over  which  central  government 
departments collaborated were as much related to the political salience of the issues 
concerned as to any planned or systematic approach.  The lack of evidence for synoptic 
rationality is an unsurprising finding, however, and is arguably a reflection of the limited 
applicability  of  this  model  of  decision-making  within  public  policy  and  public 
administration generally.  The evidence relating to the rational-administrative model is 
summarised in table 10.2.
Table 10.2 Rational-administrative elements of collaborative decision-making
• Some evidence of rational-altruistic considerations in local actors’ collaborative 
decisions: i.e. needs of clients an underlying motivation for collaborating and are 
considered in decisions about adopting particular horizontal coordination tools; 
however, instrumental rationality was more dominant;
• Rational-administrative elements of decision-making were representative of 
bounded rationality rather than synoptic rationality.
10.2.2 Assessment of the bureaucratic politics perspective
Moving onto an assessment of the features of the bureaucratic politics models, three key 
elements span both top-down and bottom-up variants of this. First, interests, priorities and 
goals are disparate rather than unified. Second, actors’ purse their own priorities and 
interests goals through strategic and instrumental moves, often involving bargaining and 
negotiations, or ‘pulling and hauling’ (Allison and Halperin, 1972). Third, the outcomes 
of the negotiations favour the most powerful actors.  
It  has  already been  noted  that  goals  were  not  unified  because of  differing 
departmental and organisational priorities.  At central level, differing priorities inhibited 
departments’ willingness to assist with the agendas of other departments, and their own 
individual agendas took priority.  While central bureaucrats were highly attuned to the 
cross-cutting nature of  issues such as  homelessness and social exclusion, these were 
ultimately seen as ‘belonging’ to particular departments.  The move underway at the time 
of the research to agree a list of ‘priority priorities’ shared across departments can be 
viewed as an attempt to resolve this issue.  
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There were also differing priorities at local level. Chapter eight revealed that the 
different priorities and needs of local agencies actually inhibited the development of some 
formal  horizontal  coordination  tools  such  as  joint  information  systems  and  joint 
assessment systems.  This led agencies to continue with their individual systems, allowing 
them to obtain the information they felt necessary for their own organisational purposes. 
With  regards  to  the  second  dimension, there  was  evidence of  strategic  and 
instrumental moves amongst actors seeking to promote the interests of their respective 
organisations.  There was little evidence of bargaining as such, defined as the attempt to 
induce particular responses from others using conditional threats or promises (Lindblom 
1965).  However, agencies did use persuasion and negotiation to encourage other agencies 
to commit to collaborative projects and tools.  For instance, as reported in chapters eight 
and nine, both street level and central bureaucrats attempted to demonstrate to agencies 
the  organisational  benefits  they  could attain  by  collaborating,  in  order to  encourage 
participation in collaborative endeavours. 
As noted above, agencies had instrumental motivations for collaborating, and did 
so when they felt this could protect their organisational interests.  Chapters five and eight 
revealed three particular  examples.  First,  actors believed that they would be simply 
unable to  achieve their  organisational goals without  the input  of other agencies, and 
acknowledged their interdependence in this respect. Second, they viewed collaboration as 
necessary in order to lever in resources, including financial resources, human resources 
and client referrals (something which itself helped maintain financial stability). Third, 
they viewed collaboration as a means of protecting their agencies against various forms of 
risk. In particular,  they were concerned to avoid the risk of sharing data improperly, 
something which could lead to breaches of data protection law. Additionally, agencies 
viewed collaboration through the establishment of formal procedures and protocols as a 
method for avoiding accusations of letting vulnerable clients slip through the gaps in the 
service system in the blame culture in which they were situated.  
 There was  evidence to  suggest  that  agencies sought  to  maintain  their  own 
autonomy, which also indicates a desire to pursue organisational rather than  collective 
interests.   This  was  demonstrated by  the  survey  results  which  revealed  that  the 
coordination tools employed by agencies were the least ambitious ones which posed little 
threat to organisational independence.  Chapter eight confirmed the idea that agencies 
perceived certain tools to be more threatening than others and that this inhibited adoption 
of these tools.    
There was also a backdrop of competition which involved pulling and hauling 
between agencies.  As discussed in chapter five, voluntary sector agencies were in direct 
competition over clients and resources.  This led them to act in a possessive manner over 
their clients, to withhold information from other bodies and to project an image of success 
rather than to  share problems, actions which militated against  collaboration and had 
inhibited the development of specific horizontal coordination tools.  The competitive 
nature of inter-agency relations was alluded to by numerous interviewees. The suggestion 
by one interviewee’s that clients were ‘pawns’ caught up in a ‘game’ between agencies 
serves as a powerful metaphor for this. 
The third component of the bureaucratic politics models, that power is unevenly 
distributed and that the outcomes of negotiations favour the most powerful actor, was also 
largely borne out by the evidence.  Power inequalities were evident both at central and at 
local level. At the level of central government, the greater power of certain departments 
compelled other departments to assist with their agendas, suggesting that the powerful 
departments were the ‘winners’, with the Home Office/ CLG relationship serving as the 
most pertinent example.  The type of ‘collaboration’ which ensued was therefore highly 
asymmetrical.  As previous studies indicate, collaboration is less likely to occur where the 
actors involved perceive there to be a lack of reciprocity. In this case there was evidence 
that  failure  to  reciprocate  was  undermining  trust  between  bureaucrats  in  different 
government departments.  Thus while certain actors gained, there was a ‘net loss’ for the 
system as a whole.   
At local level, contrary to the view expressed in some previous network theory 
which posits  that  networks are morphologically ‘flat’, the homelessness network was 
uneven.  Although relationships were not formally hierarchical, power inequalities were 
manifested  in  agencies’  asymmetrical  access  to  resources.   Those  agencies  that 
commanded greater resources were viewed as most powerful, and personnel from smaller 
organisations  viewed these more powerful agencies as the ultimate winners in  many 
funding decisions.  These inequalities created tensions between agencies which fostered 
competition rather than collaboration.  
Overall, as discussed in chapter five, local authorities held greatest  bargaining 
power, as commissioners of services.  Their service commissioning role made the local 
authority primus inter pares within the local network and its greater power comparatively 
to other bodies was a major contributor to the tensions of bureaucratic politics which 
pervaded local service provider networks.  Power inequalities were also found within 
formal group collaboration modes such as forums and other multi-agency structures. It 
was often in these arenas that the tensions resulting from power inequalities were played 
out.  An example of this concerned multi-agency forums chaired by the local authority in 
one area, which had become a ‘public relations exercise’ for the other agencies attending, 
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who ‘went cap in hand’ to these meetings with the local authority rather than using the 
groups as a means of tackling problems such as externalities in the homelessness service 
system. 
Table 10.3 The bureaucratic politics of collaborative decision-making
• Differing priorities of government departments; homelessness a priority for one 
department; 
• Lack of consistency of message from different government departments;
• Powerful departments most likely to gain assistance from other departments with 
their agendas;
• Differing priorities of local agencies rather than collective dominant interest;
• Collaboration pursued by local agencies to protect their own agencies against risk;
• Collaboration pursued to lever in resources as part of an organisational survival 
strategy;
• Ambitious forms of collaboration avoided to protect organisational autonomy
• Collaboration, including formal horizontal tool development, inhibited by 
strategies used by agencies in a competitive environment to protect their position, 
including failure to share information, possessiveness over client ‘outcomes’ and 
projecting an image of success as opposed to sharing problems;
• Power inequalities at local level created tensions and competitiveness between 
agencies rather than collaboration;
• Issues of bureaucratic politics manifested as challenges of developing and 
managing formal horizontal coordination tools.
In summary, both rational-administration and bureaucratic politics models capture some 
elements of collaborative decision-making in the context of multi-organisational service 
provider networks. However,  the bureaucratic politics perspective is much more fully 
supported by the evidence.  Although decisions around collaboration are taken in a partly 
rational manner, the context in which agencies are located is a competitive and uneven 
one.  When actors do pursue collaboration, this is principally as a means of securing the 
interests of their own agencies.  However, because agencies pursue strategies to protect 
their own interests, this often results in implementation ‘failure’, manifested as a lack of 
collaboration. The uneven nature of power in the local arena allows certain agendas to 
dominate, and creates tensions when agencies attempt to work together.  Returning, then, 
to first explanatory question raised in the introduction, collaboration decisions amongst 
local  actors  to  collaborate are  driven more by  bureaucratic politics  than by  rational 
considerations. 
10.2.3 Assessment of the top-down perspective
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The second explanatory question sought to  determine the influence of top-down and 
bottom-up factors as explanations for collaboration patterns.  As discussed in chapter 
three, top-down perspectives of implementation theory assume that the central state is the 
sovereign actor, the legitimacy of which enables it to set policy and to transmit this down 
the line to those charged with policy implementation.  
In practice, a top-down approach by policy makers involves clear prescription of 
their aims and the use of measures to ensure that implementers comply with these, in 
ways which secure a tighter grip over bureaucracy. Top-down measures include tighter 
monitoring, greater clarity of mandates and reducing the number of links in the policy 
chain.  As discussed in chapter one, the approach pursued by New Labour administrations 
since 1997 to foster collaboration at  local level is generally considered to have been 
relatively top-down, at least during Labour’s first term in office.  
The present study has found considerable evidence of government attempting to 
set collaboration policy centrally, and using the tools at its disposal to encourage local 
agencies to  work together.   Some of these tools  do provide evidence of a  top-down 
approach.  For  instance,  the  government  exhortations  of  the  need  for  agencies  to 
collaborate within central policy strategies and guidance are evidence of an attempt to 
send out a clear message. The fact that personnel in local housing authorities were aware 
of government’s collaborative agenda with respect to homelessness indicates this message 
was effectively transmitted to housing authorities at least.   
Several of the measures used to encourage compliance with this agenda can be 
characterised as top-down. Authority-based approaches were part of the strategy,  and 
included the introduction of a new requirement under the 2002 Homelessness Act for 
social services departments to assist with local authority homelessness strategies.  This 
supplemented the existing statutory duties contained in  the 1996 Housing Act which 
require  cooperation  between  specified  agencies.   The  statutory  code  of  guidance 
accompanying the 2002 Act clarifies to local housing authorities the nature of statutory 
requirements to collaborate, and advocates a range of formal collaborative measures to 
local authorities. Centrally recommendations on forms of collaboration and particular 
collaborative  linkages are  also  provided in  best  practice  guidance. These  measures 
provide evidence of government attempting to increase the clarity of its policy aims.  
Monitoring and regulation were also used in  various  ways, including indirect 
forms such as research and self-assessment. The introduction of homelessness ‘key lines 
of enquiry’ to measure collaboration within Audit Commission inspections suggests that 
the regulation of collaboration is increasing.  Furthermore, the direct, hands-on approach 
of CLG with regards to homelessness, exhibited in its use of visits to local authorities and 
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road-shows, can be considered an attempt to reduce the number of links in the policy 
chain, another top-down method.
Therefore some of the vertical tools used to encourage collaboration do conform 
to the top-down model of policy implementation.  However,  a  top-down model also 
assumes that local actors are responsive to government mandate. This study has reported 
that local actors do believe that it is legitimate for government to mandate collaboration 
between certain agencies.  However, it has also revealed that vertical tools to enhance 
collaboration are only partly successful.  
The successful aspects of vertical tools were identified in chapter seven which 
demonstrated that local authorities interact more with agencies prioritised by government 
in  law than with other ‘non-mandated’ agencies.  The chapter also revealed that  the 
horizontal  coordination  tools  suggested  by  the  central  state  are  more  likely  to  be 
implemented  than  alternative  ‘bottom-up’  tools  decided  locally.   Furthermore, 
government incentives and information provision through direct contact are positively 
associated  with  collaboration.   Overall,  this  indicates  a  degree  of  implementation 
‘success’ in terms of government’s collaboration policy.  
However,  interview data revealed weaknesses with vertical coordination tools. 
For instance, interviewees suggested that  collaboration required in law is  difficult to 
enforce.  Local housing authority staff in particular regarded the law on collaboration as 
too vague, and they argued that this should specify how agencies should collaborate, and 
that there is a need for effective mechanisms to enforce the law.  In addition, information 
sources produced by government are not always read.  Incentives in the form of funding 
for multi-agency projects encourage agencies to come together to obtain funding, but 
there  interviewees expressed doubts  over  the  quality  of  partnership working which 
ensued.  There  were  participation  problems  with  centrally  mandated  horizontal 
coordination structures, such as homelessness groups and joint commissioning bodies. 
Centrally mandated horizontal coordination tools were subject to the same problems of 
bureaucratic politics  as locally devised coordination structures, perhaps even more so 
because of the way in which these were imposed and lacked local ownership.  There was 
also evidence that pressure to comply with top-down collaborative mandates could lead to 
tokenistic  compliance. As  noted  in  chapter nine,  street  level  bureaucrats sometimes 
responded to authoritative network constitution tools in a ‘tick-box’ manner.  This chimes 
with  Elmore’s  thesis  (1979)  that  hierarchical  controls  can  encourage  standardised 
approaches and restrict problem solving capacities.
Despite the use of some top-down policy tools, the approach pursued by central 
government is  not  entirely  top-down.  For  instance, CLG seems to  some extent  to 
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incorporate evidence collected from local areas to inform its collaborative policy.  This is 
demonstrated in its use of information ‘detecting’ instruments which collect information 
on  examples  good  and  bad  collaborative practice,  distil  these  lessons  and  provide 
guidance – either formal or informal – to local authorities.  This possibly indicates a 
dialogic rather than top-down approach to policy-making.  Furthermore, there was much 
inter-personal contact between central and local levels, with civil  servants stating that 
most authorities received a visit from them at least once a year.  
However, street level actors did not feel they had much ability to influence central 
policy. Some characterised central government as very far removed from the realities of 
practice.  Although there was a fairly high degree of contact between CLG and local 
authorities, local actors were unsure how much the department listened to and acted on 
their views. The purpose of meetings, they suggested, was for CLG to impart advice 
rather than receive feedback from local level.   
Therefore, while there is some interaction between central and local levels, this 
seems to be used principally as a form of monitoring and information provision than a 
device for receiving feedback. This  does not  conform to the optimistic  version of a 
‘recursive’ policy  style  put  forward by  Barrett  and  Fudge  (1981)  where  policy  is 
formulated in dialogue, but rather to their ‘compromising’ version in which policy action 
space is constrained.  
In summary, there are significant top-down components to central homelessness 
collaboration policy,  but these do not adequately explain local collaboration patterns. 
Local actors are only partially responsive to central strategies to promote collaboration, 
and it is far from clear that central government defines collaboration as practiced in local 
areas.  Furthermore, government steering is only one influence on local collaboration. As 
identified in chapter seven, there are additional factors, both interpretive and contextual, 
which  are  associated  with  this.  Additional  contextual  factors  which  influence 
collaboration  include  institutional  structure,  geographical proximity  and  number  of 
personnel. Interpretive or  individual level factors include  length of  time working on 
homelessness and prior experience working in non-housing agencies.  This indicates that 
government is  only  one  of  many influences on  local  actors’ collaborative decision-
making. 
Table 10.4 Top-down influences on collaboration
• Central attempts to stimulate collaboration through vertical tools; 
• Some use of authority-based tools;
• Evidence of ‘top-down’ approaches including attempts to strengthen regulation, 
increase clarity of mandates and reduce number of links in policy chain;
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• Degree of responsiveness to vertical tools; 
• Centrally mandated agencies and tools more likely to be ‘implemented’ than non-
mandated agencies or tools.
10.2.4 Assessment of the bottom-up perspective
Unlike  top-down  models  of  policy  implementation,  bottom-up  models  view  those 
involved in implementing policy as enjoying greater autonomy from the state.  Those who 
are conventionally thought of as the ‘implementers’ are perceived as possessing policy-
making or,  at  least, policy-shaping capacity.   In some models this  is  construed as a 
product of central policy makers’ inability to  prescribe policy because they lack the 
necessary information to  do  so.  In  others, particularly the  ‘street  level  bureaucracy’ 
accounts, local implementers are viewed as compelled to make policy decisions because it 
is at this level where policy is executed and only at this stage where it becomes fully 
formed. Many accounts view street level discretion as desirable in order to maximise 
creativity and discourage standardised responses and uniformity.  
In chapter three it  was hypothesised that  bottom-up models were likely to be 
appropriate for explaining collaboration. The evidence collected in this study provides 
considerable support for this hypothesis.  First, collaboration in the case study areas was 
an  incremental process.   As  outlined  in  chapter  eight,  the  development  of  formal 
horizontal  coordination  tools  was  gradual, occurring over time.  Once the process of 
horizontal coordination mechanism development in local authorities had begun, it often 
gained momentum, with one tool leading to the development of others.  This indicates 
that collaboration is a process, and as such is arguably not something which can simply be 
mandated by government.   
Second, collaboration was heavily dependent  on  informal relationships,  which 
were themselves based on trust.  Informal collaboration was important for a number of 
reasons. As noted above, the survey evidence suggested that informal interactions perhaps 
played a  more central role  than  formal  horizontal tools.   In  addition,  chapter eight 
indicated that the development of formal tools was facilitated by informal interactions. 
For instance, ad-hoc multi-agency meetings sometimes developed into more regular and 
formalised case panels.  There was also evidence that vertical meta-governance tools were 
more effective where there was a certain level of pre-established interaction within the 
network.  This applied particularly to funding streams which sought to encourage joint 
bidding. Where agencies were already networking amongst themselves, funding bids were 
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more easily put  together; where they were not, agencies found it  difficult  to respond 
quickly enough to bidding deadlines. 
Third,  local  collaboration  was  heavily  dependent  on  the  influence  of  key 
individuals who facilitated collaboration.  As discussed in chapter five, the commitment 
of senior managers was deemed particularly important in supporting collaborative efforts 
amongst practitioners and frontline managers.  Individuals with particular skills and even 
personality  characteristics  were  also  central  to  collaborative endeavours,  supporting 
previous work which highlights the importance of boundary spanners.  
When  asked  about  key  facilitators  of  collaboration,  many  interviewees 
commented on such individual level factors, and only a minority mentioned government 
programmes as a  driver of collaboration.  Indeed, government policy was frequently 
regarded as undermining collaboration because of the differing priorities of departments, 
inflexible funding regimes and bureaucratic reporting requirements which left little time 
for networking and partnership activities.  
These themes provide support for bottom-up models of collaboration.  However, 
the  notion  put  forward in  some  previous  literature  that  local  networks  coordinate 
themselves spontaneously from below is not supported by this evidence.  While actors did 
in many cases feel compelled to collaborate in order to achieve their aims and to draw in 
necessary resources, the challenges of collaborating were often greater than the reasons 
for doing so.  It was also clear that agencies sometimes failed to collaborate, despite 
government mandates or inducements to do so.  For instance, there is limited contact 
between local housing authorities  and many of  the agencies  with  which government 
suggests they should be cooperating.  Where such contact exists, the testimonies of street 
level actors suggest that there are tensions in these relationships, deriving from issues 
such as disagreements  over roles and responsibilities,  and differing priorities.  These 
themes indicate that although in many respects a bottom-up process, collaboration may be 
unlikely to occur without some form of central direction, as discussed further below.  
Returning to the second explanatory question raised in the introduction to the 
thesis, collaboration in the present empirical setting is subject to the influence of some 
top-down and some bottom-up factors.  On balance, however, bottom-up factors are most 
influential. 
Table 10.5 Bottom-up influences on collaboration 
• Certain tools (esp. authoritative) are difficult to enforce;
• Importance of local informal relationships to collaboration;
• Formal tools often arise from informal interactions;
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• Implementation of certain ‘vertical’ tools (eg govt funding of collaborative 
projects) dependent on pre-existing networks in local areas
• Tool development in local areas an incremental process
10.2.5 The rival models assessed
Based on the above discussion, it is possible to assess the rival models of collaboration. 
The first model, the top-down rational administrative explanation, made the following 
hypotheses:
H1a Local agencies collaborate because government tells them to; government’s aims are 
unified and unambiguous; 
H1b The values and objectives of collaboration policy are defined by government, and 
neutral bureaucrats search for the most efficient means of delivering these objectives.  
Hypothesis 1a is  rejected because government is  only one influence on local actors’ 
collaborative decision-making. Furthermore, local agencies do not comply perfectly with 
government  mandate.   Government’s  aims  are  not  unified  and  unambiguous.  As 
demonstrated above, although central and local actors believe that local collaboration is a 
priority for government, the message transmitted by different central departments to their 
respective local service providers is not a unified one.  Homelessness is a clear priority 
for  one  department,  but  other  government  departments’ priorities  lie  elsewhere. 
Hypothesis 1b is also  rejected  for the following reasons. While there is evidence that 
government does appear to set the direction for and values of government collaboration 
policy,  there  is  no  evidence  that  these  values  are  sovereign.   Local  actors’ own 
motivations for collaborating are at least as important as guiding influences, and they 
cannot be described as value neutral in their collaborative decision-making.  The clear 
separation of  government as  ‘value  setter’ and  bureaucrats as  neutral  implementers 
advocated in the ‘classical’ rational-administrative approach associated with Woodrow 
Wilson, is not borne out with this evidence.  Overall, there is little evidence to support the 
top-down rational administrative model.  
The second model, the bottom-up rational administrative explanation, presented the 
following hypotheses:
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H2a Collaboration is locally defined and local agencies collaborate because they see this  
as the most effective mode of action for attaining their aims and for meeting clients’ 
needs; local agencies’ aims are unified and unambiguous;
H2b The means pursued are the most administratively efficient to meet these aims.
Hypothesis 2a suggests that local agencies are sovereign, and that they set both the aims 
and means of collaboration policy.  Hypothesis 2b suggests that the means selected are 
rational, involving a weighing up of alternative courses of action.  The model suggests 
that motivations to collaborate are mainly client-centric, with collaboration pursued when 
it is likely to meet client needs.  The model as a whole is reflective of a bottom-up view of 
local action which places discretion with local professionals.  This model suggests unity 
of goals at horizontal level but a degree of vertical conflict between central and local 
actors, since non-compliance with government policy is likely. It accords with views of 
authors discussed in chapter three such as Elmore,  James Q. Wilson,  and Wood and 
Waterman, who argue that it is normatively preferable for those implementing policy to 
have discretion about how this is achieved.  Such accounts highlight ways in which those 
at local level are better able to make decisions and tailor government policy, perhaps even 
subverting it, but in ways which secure the public interest.
This model and the hypotheses within it are not well supported by the evidence 
and the model’s hypotheses are thus rejected.  While collaboration is to a considerable 
extent  locally  defined,  government  policy  on  collaboration  is  also  influential. 
Furthermore,  the  altruistic  model  of  collaboration  it  presents  does  not  capture  the 
complexity  of  motivations that local actors hold  for collaborating. As the discussion 
above  has  illustrated,  instrumental  motivations  are  important  and  may  even  take 
precedence over  altruistic  motivations.   Neither  are  local  agencies’ aims unified  or 
unambiguous,  and this  is  one of the reasons  why collaboration is  often problematic. 
Agencies also have differing motivations for collaborating, some of which are greater 
than others. 
The third model, the  top-down bureaucratic politics model, contained the following 
hypotheses:
H3a Government or central bureaucrats set collaboration policy aims and means, and 
local  agencies  are  generally  responsive  to  their  parent  government  departments;
H3b  Government policy is,  however,  not  unified, with different departments pursuing 
their own interests and the outcome favouring the most powerful department.
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The evidence provides partial support for this model.  In relation to hypothesis 3a, while 
local agencies are not totally compliant  with the agendas of their parent government 
departments, they are heavily influenced by these. Indeed, this is one reason why local 
agencies’ aims  are  often  in  conflict.  The  evidence  presented above  indicates  that 
government departments have differing aims (which supports hypothesis 3b). However, 
as  the  above  discussion of  bottom-up influences indicates, government does  not  set 
collaboration aims and means.  These are at least partly locally defined.
Hypothesis  3b  seems  to  capture  the  dynamics  of  collaboration  in  central 
government  more  accurately  than  the  corresponding  hypothesis  in  the  rational-
administrative model (Hypothesis 1a).  As the discussion of bureaucratic politics above 
indicates,  the  differing  priorities  of  government  departments  militate  against 
collaboration.  They are each compelled to  priorities their own issues and without a 
shared responsibility for homelessness, there is  little likelihood that this  will  change. 
There is also some evidence that power inequalities between government departments 
result in some departments assisting others’ with their collaborative agendas more than 
others.  Therefore, hypothesis 3a is rejected but 3b is accepted, providing partial support 
for the top-down bureaucratic politics model. 
The fourth model, the bottom-up bureaucratic politics model suggested that:
H4a Collaboration decisions (both means and ends) are generated from the bottom-up;  
however aims are not unified;
H4b  Collaboration  decisions  are  the  outcome of  strategic  and  instrumental  moves 
between actors in the local arena, each promoting their  own interests;  the outcomes 
favour the most powerful local agencies.
Hypothesis 4a is partly supported. As already discussed, collaboration policy setting is not 
entirely bottom-up, however, the assertion that aims are not unified is supported, and is 
more realistic than the idea of a dominant common purpose.  Hypothesis 4b is generally 
supported  by  the  evidence.  The  strategic  and  instrumental nature  of  collaborative 
decision-making  has  been  demonstrated,  including  tactics  such  as  withholding 
information and behaving possessively over client outcomes, in order to protect agencies’ 
positions.  In addition, there is some evidence that the powerful agencies dominate the 
local arena. While it is not necessarily the case that collaboration favours these agencies 
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more than others, it  is  certainly true that their  greater power creates tensions which 
militate against collaborative working.  
As noted in table 10.1 at the start of the chapter, there are two variants of model 
four, one of which has a ‘no collaboration’ outcome; the other with a ‘partisan mutual 
adjustment’ outcome (Lindblom 1965).  The latter is more optimistic than the former and 
indicates that coordination from below may be possible without a central coordinator. 
Certainly it is not the case that agencies did not collaborate at all, although there were 
times when the challenges involved, many of which were associated with bureaucratic 
politics, did prevent this from occurring.  There is some evidence to support the latter 
view which implies that partisans pursue their own interests through negotiation and 
persuasion.   However,  because  of  the  costs  associated  with  collaboration  and  the 
challenges of doing so,  it  is  unlikely that these bargaining and negotiating processes 
would be sufficient to compel local actors to collaborate without any central direction or 
facilitation whatsoever.  Of all four models, the bottom-up bureaucratic politics model 
most accurately depicts the nature and level of collaborative decision-making.  Although 
not a perfect description of collaboration, there is more evidence to fit this model than any 
other.  
The following diagram provides a visual representation of the preponderance of 
evidence supporting each of the rival models.  Each ‘X’ constitutes evidence to support 
the relevant model based on the conclusions reached in the above discussion.  While there 
are some findings to support each of the models, the weight of evidence falls behind 
model four,  the ‘bottom-up bureaucratic politics’ model.  Although the hypotheses of 
models one and two are ultimately rejected, there was a degree of evidence to fit the 
models, and this is reflected in the diagram. 
Fig 10.1 Preponderance of evidence to support each of the rival models
 View of bureaucratic decision-making behaviour
Rational-administrative         Bureaucratic Politics
Top-down
View of policy         X             X X X
Process
Bottom-Up      
Model 1
Model 2 Model 4
Model 3
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X
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10.3 The Effectiveness of Horizontal and Vertical Coordination Tools
The evaluative questions of the research examined the effectiveness of both horizontal 
and vertical coordination tools.  Effectiveness is considered in relation to the ability of 
these tools to help strengthen collaboration, and to alleviate externalities in the service 
delivery  network,  such  as  gaps  in  services,  duplications,  and  forms of  incoherence 
including accountability problems.     
This research suggests that horizontal coordination tools do in some ways help to 
iron out externalities associated with the fragmented homelessness  system.  A major 
externality in the homelessness system is the problem of no agency taking responsibility 
for clients with multiple needs who did not fit easily within a single service remit.  Joint 
protocols have the potential to help improve accountability in relation to such clients, by 
defining the responsibilities of specific bodies. This can help reduce the likelihood of 
agencies attempting to shift responsibility onto other agencies.  
A second major  problem of  the  multi-agency service  delivery  system is  its 
complexity, and it can seem impenetrable both to clients and to staff.  Various formal 
structures such as joint databases, service directories, and jointly funded coordinator posts 
help by reducing and making sense of this complexity. Such structures can also reduce 
duplication of information collection. Collective forms of data management such as joint 
directories of  services and common databases can also  be beneficial in  this  respect. 
Duplication is evident in relation to service provision, and co-located services and multi-
agency teams are a potential means of addressing this.  
Finally,  multi-agency forums and case panels are a  means of identifying and 
addressing problems of incoherence, gaps and duplications. The manifest nature of such 
structures, as compared to informal forms of collaboration, also provides an entry point 
for personnel wishing to work collaboratively.  This may be particularly important for 
new staff without pre-existing networks and contacts in the local system.  
However,  realising such benefits of horizontal coordination tools is contingent 
upon effective management of the processes involved.  This study highlights considerable 
challenges  of  developing  horizontal  coordination  tools  and  ensuring  they  operate 
effectively.  The challenges of tool development relate to the differing needs and priorities 
of the agencies concerned, lack of willingness to stand forward as the agency to lead on 
these, and other  local  contextual issues such as  the  corporate priorities  of  the  local 
authority.  Tool management itself was also difficult because coordination structures often 
brought tensions between agencies to the fore, providing arenas for disputes to surface. 
Lack of participation was a problem with respect to certain tools such as forums, and 
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there were difficulties enforcing joint agreements in some cases.    This does not imply 
that  such structures always result  in  these problems, merely that  they require  active 
management.  
It is important to note that well-managed horizontal coordination tools also served 
as mechanisms for addressing the problems and challenges of collaboration that are well-
documented in existing research. For instance, the problem of a lack of domain consensus 
was attenuated through joint protocols, while multi-agency forums and events helped to 
foster trust and mutual understanding.
With respect to vertical tools,  as discussed in  section 10.2.3 above, these are 
partially effective in  enhancing local  collaboration.  Tools  such  as  incentives  were 
effective amongst those local authorities that had been beneficiaries.  Similarly, vertical 
contact and information provision is generally valued by local actors and is associated 
with  greater collaboration.   The reasonably  good interaction  levels  between housing 
authorities and those with which collaboration was mandated indicates some success of 
authority-based tools.   Furthermore,  many of  the  centrally  recommended horizontal 
coordination tools are implemented locally.  While vertical coordination tools themselves 
may not  directly reduce externalities, they do assist with this  indirectly by encouraging 
adoption of local collaborative structures which have the capacity to do this.  
A key  finding  which  highlights  the  limitations  of  vertical  steering  of  local 
collaboration, however, is that legislation requiring cooperation is difficult  to enforce. 
The majority of interviewees thought that such laws were ineffective and suggested that 
greater specification was  needed of  the  nature of  collaborative working.   A further 
important finding is that agencies outside of the direct purview of CLG are far less likely 
to be influenced by its meta-governance strategies. In some cases interviewees in such 
agencies were  unaware of  the  government’s  collaboration  agenda,  and  received  no 
information from government. Consequently  many were uninformed of  collaborative 
funding streams to which they could have applied. 
Lastly, the evidence highlights that it is particularly important for local agencies to 
develop a sense of ownership of collaborative structures.  When these are viewed as 
imposed, tokenistic compliance may result.   Government-mandated coordination tools 
such as compulsory multi-agency homelessness strategies and joint commissioning bodies 
were vulnerable to  this.   In summary,  formal coordination tools, both horizontal and 
vertical, have both  strengths  and limitations.  Despite  the  challenges associated with 
developing and managing these, they do provide a means of increasing the likelihood of 
agencies working together.  
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10.4 Positioning the Research
Before proceeding to the closing remarks, some brief reflections are warranted to help 
position the research. This  final section considers the contribution of the research to 
existing knowledge, its limitations and suggests areas for further enquiry.
10.4.1 The Contribution of the Research
Empirical contribution
The  question  of  why  and  under  what  circumstances organisations  collaborate  has 
occupied scholars from a diverse range of disciplines.  Previous work, particularly within 
fields such as organisation theory, business and management, has focused predominantly 
on the  horizontal level of activity.   This  rich body of literature tells us much about 
collaboration and its antecedents, as well as offering practical insights for organisations 
seeking to develop forms of collaboration.  The literature is also theoretically diverse, and 
perspectives on collaborative advantage, managerial craftsmanship, resource dependence 
and exchange provide interesting and useful frameworks for analysis. 
However, in the context of the public sector it is essential to consider the role of 
the State in the collaborative process.  Unlike the market place, local public services do 
not exist  as  autonomous,  self-governing units  free from the hand of government and 
bureaucracy.  Their operating contexts are highly structured by the State.  Local statutory 
agencies are themselves the local arm of the State, and voluntary sector actors and quasi-
public bodies contracted to provide public services are increasingly subject to forms of 
control  conventionally  associated  with  the  public  sector.   This  research  makes  a 
contribution to the existing literature on collaboration by exploring the dynamics between 
local  collaboration  and  central  government.  To  borrow a  now  well-coined  phrase 
(Scharpf 1994), the research examines horizontal collaborative activity ‘in the shadow of 
hierarchy’.  
This research contributes to debates within the literature about the possibility of 
government-driven local collaboration, some of which critique the ‘top-down’ nature of 
collaborative agendas of recent British governments.  It adds a new empirical contribution 
to  this  literature by  investigating  the  relationship between central steering  and local 
collaboration in one policy sector.  The focus on ‘tools’, both horizontal and vertical, 
allows for an in-depth examination of range of alternative strategies which can be pursed 
at  a national and local level to structure and enhance collaboration.  This study also 
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contributes to wider debates in the contemporary public policy literature which questions 
state capacity in the era of ‘governance’.  It investigates the potential of a particular form 
of ‘meta-governance’ for enhancing control and coordination in this environment.  
The added value of the theoretical framework
The  theoretical  framework employed provides  a  lens  through  which  to  assess  the 
empirical questions of the research, and draws attention to issues which have been under-
explored in existing work. Studying collaboration from a political science perspective 
directs  attention  towards  power  relations  in  the  collaborative process.   Theories of 
bureaucratic politics are particularly relevant in this respect, and help to illuminate the 
tensions and dynamics of collaborative working in the challenging environment of local 
public services.  By employing a bureaucratic politics perspective it has been possible to 
highlight not only the differing priorities of actors in the system, but the way in which 
these actually affect the interactive behaviour of agencies and have implications for their 
capacity to collaborate.    
However, a bureaucratic politics perspective alone does not adequately explain 
collaboration. The inclusion  of  an  implementation  perspective  within  the  theoretical 
framework adds another layer of analysis which is important in view of the particular 
interest in the role of government.  As discussed in chapter three, the bureaucratic politics 
perspective has  been  criticised  for  neglecting  the  role  of  hierarchy.   Incorporating 
implementation  theory  into  the  analytical  framework has  helped  to  overcome this 
limitation. 
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10.4.2 Limitations and Avenues for Future Enquiry
This research has focused exclusively on the views of central and street level bureaucrats. 
While this focus is justified given the nature of the research questions, further research 
investigating on service users’ experiences would provide an alternative perspective on 
collaboration.  Measures of collaboration could be developed focusing on service users’ 
perceptions, such as the degree to which they view services to be ‘joined-up’, the number 
of services used and their ‘pathways’ through the homelessness service system.  Such 
approaches could be applied in a wide range of cross-cutting service areas where citizens 
straddle different systems of care or services.  Another potential angle for investigating 
service users’ experience would be to further investigate some of the issues raised in this 
research specifically around accountability deficits for those with multiple needs who fall 
between services. This group appear to be particularly vulnerable to problems caused by a 
lack of collaboration. 
Another fruitful direction for future research may be to further investigate the role 
of national non-governmental or quasi-governmental bodies in relation to steering local 
collaboration.  The present research has focused predominantly on the role of central 
government departments in the process, and could be complemented by further study of a 
wider range of national bodies including regulators, national voluntary sector bodies and 
other relevant representative organisations. In addition, the parts of the research which 
examined the  politics  of  inter-agency relationships  focused mainly  on  the  horizontal 
relations  between local  service providers.   In  future  work  the  bureaucratic politics 
framework could also be applied more specifically to the relationship between levels of 
government to identify how the politics of central - local government relations impacts on 
the centre’s ability to steer local collaboration. 
The question of the impact of collaboration on homeless outcomes was outside of 
the scope of the present study.  Instead the focus has been on how collaboration is, or can 
be, promoted by the central state, and the effectiveness of these attempts in terms of the 
level of  collaboration and their capacity to  alleviate problems in  fragmented service 
systems. The research is to some extent premised on the argument that collaboration per 
se is a good thing. Certainly all the indications in the literature suggest that multi-agency 
collaborative approaches are important for tackling homelessness.  However, the research 
has also highlighted the opportunity costs associated with collaborating.  Further research 
on  the  effectiveness  of  collaborative  endeavours on  service  outcomes would  assist 
practitioners to ascertain the circumstances under which pursuing collaboration is likely 
to be a worthwhile expenditure of effort. 
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Finally,  it  should  be  noted that  the  study  was carried out  in  a  single policy 
subsystem within the English context.  The context was a unitary state where there is 
fairly strong central direction, and where there is a mixed economy of service provision 
but  with  local  authorities  as  key delivery agents with statutory  responsibilities.  The 
research is therefore likely to bear most relevance to contexts which share some of these 
features. Homelessness has parallels with many other areas of human services and other 
cross-cutting  policy  issues,  and  is  an  example  of  an  issue  which  cuts  across  the 
boundaries of  different sectors of  service  provision.   The research therefore  may be 
relevant to similar policy fields where there is multi-agency involvement.
10.5 Concluding remarks
This research has investigated the influence and dynamics of both horizontal and vertical 
coordination  tools  in  English  homelessness  services.   The  particular  vertical  tools 
considered are those which are used to stimulate collaboration in local public service 
delivery  networks,  and  have  been  construed  as  tools  of  ‘meta-governance’.  The 
horizontal tools investigated are the formal collaborative structures employed at local 
level to ‘join up’ services.  
The results suggest that vertical coordination in the form of meta-governance does 
help to foster collaboration. However, strategies are only partially effective because of 
limitations to State capacity, such as the restricted ability of government departments to 
influence  actors  outside  their  direct  line  of  authority,  the  bottom-up  nature  of  the 
collaborative process, and problems associated with bureaucratic politics.  Government 
can help to facilitate and foster local collaboration, but this is only one part of the process. 
The governance of collaboration also requires effective local management of horizontal 
coordination tools and processes.  While horizontal coordination tools have the potential 
to  alleviate  externalities  associated  with  fragmented  systems  and  to  enhance 
collaboration, local agencies operate in competitive environment which encourages their 
personnel  to  protect  their  organisational  interests  rather  than  pursuing  a  common 
dominant interest.
The  meta-governance techniques  discussed  in  this  thesis  are  dependent  on 
government influencing collaboration via local statutory providers. The authority which 
central government holds over these bodies and their employees is what permits meta-
governance to take place.  Government has much weaker influence over local bodies 
outside  of  the  public  sector  such  as  voluntary  sector  agencies and  accommodation 
providers, which have less contact with and receive less information from government, 
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and are therefore much less attuned to government priorities.  It is therefore questionable 
the extent to which meta-governance as a technique for joining up local services would be 
possible in the context of further erosion of the public sector element of housing services. 
The research has found evidence of a weakened ability of local housing authorities to 
perform their statutory duties because of their increasing reliance on non-public or quasi-
public bodies over which they have little authority.    
Government can use its resources and powers to catalyse, stimulate and facilitate 
collaboration but is reliant on local housing authorities to take the collaborative process 
further at a local level. In an important sense local housing authorities are therefore the 
natural strategic leaders for fostering collaboration in local areas.  However, because of 
the service commissioning role of these authorities, they are not perceived by other actors 
in the local system to be impartial arbitrators of inter-agency relations.  This conflict is a 
salient challenge facing local authorities in the contemporary environment where there is 
a move to strengthen their local strategic capacity, while at the same time enhancing the 
service provision roles of voluntary and private sector agencies.   
This research relates to broader themes in contemporary public policy literature 
including issues such as the ‘self-organising’ nature of networks, and the loss of control 
and  accountability  inherent  within  network  forms  of  social  organisation  which  are 
associated with the ‘hollow state’.  The research finds that homelessness service networks 
do exhibit control and accountability deficits, as well as problems of incoherence.  
Previous literature indicates that weaker forms of collaboration such as  loose 
networks and voluntary linkages are based on principles such as reciprocity, trust and 
loyalty.  This study has illustrated that in the increasingly competitive environment of 
contemporary public  services  it  may  be  unrealistic  to  expect  collaboration  to  be 
maintained on the basis of such principles.  The analysis presented also questions the 
notion that agencies, in the absence of a central coordinator, will coordinate themselves 
purely on the basis of their interdependence and through negotiations and bargaining. 
Interdependencies and the need to  pool resources in  order to  maintain organisational 
survival may compel agencies to collaborate in  some cases.  However, on balance, the 
differing priorities of agencies and the environment in which they operate mean that 
collaboration remains problematic.  The research therefore indicates a need for central 
intervention and suggests that if agencies and networks are left to self-organise, such 
problems will remain and will ultimately restrict the ability of service providers to deliver 
the services needed to homeless people.  This thesis, through analysis of the strengths and 
limitations  of  the  tools  of  meta-governance, provides  ways forward for  the  type  of 
intervention which may be effective. 
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APPENDIX A
Contact: Alice Moseley
Department of Politics
Amory Building
University of Exeter
Rennes Drive
Exeter, Devon EX4 4RJ
E-mail: A.Moseley@exeter.ac.uk
Telephone: 01392 832205 or
07746 583669
Date
FAO: Name, Organisation
Dear Sir/ Madam,
We are writing from the University of Exeter to ask for your cooperation in helping us 
collect some brief information for a national research project on joint working in the 
homelessness sector. The research is funded by the Department for Communities and 
Local Government, the Economic and Social Research Council and Price Waterhouse 
Coopers. Although the research is  endorsed and supported by DCLG, it  is  being 
conducted independently by Exeter University.  Further details can be found on the 
information sheet provided.
We would be very grateful if you could arrange for the enclosed short questionnaire to 
be completed by the lead manager or principal officer dealing with homelessness 
within your local authority (e.g. the manager of homelessness strategy or advice), 
and returned in the pre-paid, addressed envelope.  Most answers are tick box and it 
should only take around 10 minutes to complete.  The results for each individual 
respondent  will  be  kept  strictly  confidential  and  will  be  anonymous so  that  no 
individual or authority will be identifiable.  We hope you can assist as the research is 
an opportunity for local authorities to provide feedback on this important issue.  Each 
questionnaire is important to us and we need a certain level of responses in order to be 
able to generate meaningful information.  
It would be much appreciated if the questionnaire could be completed and returned by 
Friday 21st July if possible.  If you have any queries about the research please do not 
hesitate to get in touch using the contact details above.  All participating authorities 
will receive a summary of the results on completion of the project.  Many thanks in 
anticipation for your help.
Yours Sincerely,
Dr Oliver James and Ms Alice Moseley
Department of Politics, University of Exeter 
329
APPENDIX B
Contact: Alice Moseley
Department of Politics
Amory Building
University of Exeter
Rennes Drive
Exeter, Devon EX4 4RJ
E-mail: A.Moseley@exeter.ac.uk
Telephone: 01392 832205 or
07746 583669
DATE
Dear Sir/ Madam,
Approximately six weeks ago we sent a questionnaire to your authority as part of a 
national research study of housing authorities. The purpose of the research is to obtain 
information on joint working arrangements and inter-agency contact in relation to 
single homeless clients.  The research is being carried out by Exeter University and is 
funded  by  the  Economic  and  Social  Research  Council,  the  Department  for 
Communities and Local Government and Price Waterhouse Coopers.  
We are writing this as a follow-up reminder, as it appears from our list that we have 
not yet received a response from your authority. Participation is entirely voluntary, 
and we are writing this in case the original questionnaire has been lost or misplaced. 
We have enclosed another copy of the questionnaire and would be most grateful if 
you could arrange for this to be completed by the lead manager or principal officer 
dealing  with  homelessness  within  your  local  authority (e.g.  the  manager  of 
homelessness strategy or advice) and returned in the prepaid addressed envelope.  It is 
important to us that this person is from within the authority rather than an external 
agency. We would be grateful to receive responses by 15th September if possible. 
This is an important study and your cooperation will be invaluable in ensuring a true 
picture is formed. All participants will receive a summary of the results. If you have 
any questions, please do not hesitate to get in touch using the contact details above. 
Please  be  assured that  all  the  information provided  will  be  treated  in  absolute 
confidence and used solely for the purposes of this research project. No individual 
respondents or authorities will be identified in our report.
Many thanks in advance for your help.  
Yours Sincerely,
Dr Oliver James
Ms Alice Moseley
Department of Politics, University of Exeter 
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APPENDIX C
Research Project Information Sheet
Project title: Implementing joint working in the English homelessness sector: a study of 
the extent of and factors affecting inter-agency working.  
Project team: Dr Oliver James and Ms Alice Moseley, Department of Politics, Exeter 
University. 
Funding details:  The research is funded under the Governance and Quality of Life Research 
Programme by the Department for Communities and Local Government (formerly the Office of 
the Deputy Prime Minister), the Economic and Social Research Council and Price Waterhouse 
Coopers (research award PTA-039-2004-00006). The research funding period is 1ST Nov 2004 – 
31ST October 2007. 
Background: The research is a study of joint working between organisations in the 
homelessness sector.  It involves a postal questionnaire of all housing authorities in 
England followed by in-depth case studies with relevant agencies in selected areas. 
Overall research aims:
To explore the extent of joint working and amount of contact between agencies in the 
homelessness sector in England in relation to single homeless people in the planning and 
delivery of services;
To identify the challenges and enablers of joint working;
To identify the mechanisms used to coordinate different agencies involved in 
homelessness provision;
To investigate views on central guidance and initiatives encouraging joint working. 
Additional information:
The information you provide will be kept strictly confidential and used for research 
purposes only. Third parties will not be allowed access to this information.
No names of individual persons involved in the postal survey will be revealed, and we 
will ensure that no individual or authority can be connected with answers given. 
Part of the research will be written up as a PhD thesis. The results may be published as 
journal articles or publications and presented to relevant conferences and groups.
Participants will receive a summary of the research results on completion of the project.  
Contact details:
For further information about the research, please contact: Alice Moseley, Department of 
Politics, Amory Building, Exeter University, Devon EX4 4RJ. Tel 01392 832 205/ 07746 
583669 a.moseley@exeter.ac.uk
The overall coordinator of the research is Dr. Oliver James, Department of Politics, 
Exeter University, o.james@exeter.ac.uk
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APPENDIX D
Questionnaire:
Joint working and inter-agency contact in the Homelessness Sector
The questionnaire aims to gather information and views on joint working 
between  your  housing  authority  and  other  organisations  involved  in 
providing accommodation and support services to homeless people or 
those at risk of homelessness. The group we are interested in is single 
homeless  adults,  both  statutory  (i.e.  ‘vulnerable’)  and  non-statutory 
cases, including but not exclusively rough sleepers.  The research does 
not include children and families, young people or care leavers, or those 
affected by domestic violence.  Please therefore answer all questions in 
relation to services for single homeless people.  
The questionnaire  should be completed by the lead manager or 
principal  officer  within  your  housing  authority  responsible  for 
homelessness, for instance in the housing advice/ homelessness 
service or the housing strategy section.  Even if the homelessness/ 
housing advice service is contracted out to an external agency, the 
questionnaire should be completed by someone within the housing 
authority. 
Please write in answers, circle or tick the boxes as appropriate.
Ref no.____ 
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Background information: Please provide the following background information to give 
us an idea of the breakdown of respondents and some brief organisational details. 
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12. To the best of your knowledge, which, if any, of the following formal joint 
working arrangements between organisations are in place in relation to single 
homelessness in your local authority (even if these involve only some agencies 
or are present only for specific categories of single homeless people)?
Please tick as appropriate, also indicating if the housing authority is directly involved 
in the arrangement. If applicable, add up to two additional joint working arrangements 
not listed.
 
Formal joint working arrangement in relation to 
SINGLE homeless people
Yes No Don’t
Know
If  YES,  is  the 
housing  authority 
directly involved?
Yes No
Operational level multi-agency group/ forum
Strategic level multi-agency group/ forum
Multi-agency staff training events/ workshops 
Staff placements in other agencies
Joint  client  monitoring  procedures/  multi-agency 
monitoring
Joint  case  conferences/  multi-agency  assessment 
panels
Joint client assessment forms
Outreach service involving more than one agency
A dedicated post for forging inter-agency links
Location  of  additional  specialist  services  within 
existing  agencies  e.g.  GP  or  benefits  advice  in 
hostel/ day centre
Service level agreements
Joint directory of information on local services
Common directory of accommodation providers 
Client  information  sharing protocols/  confidentiality 
protocols 
Other joint protocols (operational level)
Other joint protocols (strategic level)
Multi-agency  homelessness  team,  project  or
one stop shop
Jointly commissioned services
Joint budgets
Joint local performance targets/ indicators
Additional arrangements not listed (write in):
1.
2.
13.  How much contact (for example, by phone, e-mail, fax, or in person) does 
your  housing  authority  have  with  the  agencies  listed  in  relation  to  service 
planning and delivery  for  single  homeless  people?  Please  circle  the  number 
which represents the amount of contact for service planning (column A) AND client  
referrals/ casework (column B). If there is no such agency locally, circle 6 (N/A).
If needed, add up to 2 other bodies you think are important but are not listed. 
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Codes
1 = very little contact
2 = little contact
3 = a moderate amount of contact
4 = a lot of contact
5 = a very great deal of contact
6 = not applicable/ don’t know
A – Contact in relation to 
general service planning for 
clients 
B – Contact for client referrals/ 
casework
Very little      Very great 
deal
N
/
A
Very little          Very great 
deal
N
/
A
STATUTORY AGENCIES/ LOCAL AUTHORITY DEPARTMENTS:
Social Services 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
Primary Care Trust (GPs for column 
B)
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
NHS Trust (hospitals for column B) 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
Mental Health Service 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
Drug/ Alcohol Service 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
Supporting People Team 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
Police 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
Probation Service 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
Prison Service 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
Housing Benefits section in 
authority
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
Other local housing authorities 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
Local elected members 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
VOLUNTARY SECTOR AGENCIES:
Housing advice project(s) 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
Welfare rights service (eg CAB) 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
Meaningful occupation/ training/ 
employment project(s) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
Day/ drop-in centre(s) 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
Mental health project(s) 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
Drug/ alcohol project(s) 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
Tenancy support service(s) 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
Street outreach team/ project(s) 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
ACCOMMODATION PROVIDERS/ MANAGERS:
Homeless hostel(s) 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
Relevant registered social 
landlord(s)
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
Other relevant supported 
accommodation provider(s)
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
Private sector landlords 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
Large Scale Voluntary Transfer 
Organisation (if applicable)
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
OTHER BODIES NOT LISTED:
1. 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
2. 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
14.  Next,  we are  interested in  the  appropriate amount  of  contact.  How much 
contact would the housing authority ideally have with the agencies listed below 
to plan and deliver services for single homeless people, without hindering its 
ability to achieve its other organisational aims?  Circle as appropriate for service 
planning (column A)  and  client  referrals/  casework (column B).  If  there is  no such 
agency locally, circle 6 (N/A). If needed, add up to 2 other bodies not listed that you 
think are important. 
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Codes
1 = very little contact
2 = little contact
3 = a moderate amount of contact
4 = a lot of contact
5 = a very great deal of contact
6 = not applicable/ don’t know
A – Contact in relation to 
general service planning for 
clients 
B – Contact for client referrals/ 
casework
Very little      Very great 
deal
N
/
A
Very little          Very great 
deal
N
/
A
STATUTORY AGENCIES/ LOCAL AUTHORITY DEPARTMENTS:
Social Services 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
Primary Care Trust (GPs for column 
B)
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
NHS Trust (hospitals for column B) 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
Mental Health Service 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
Drug/ Alcohol Service 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
Supporting People Team 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
Police 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
Probation Service 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
Prison Service 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
Housing Benefits section in authority 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
Other local housing authorities 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
Local elected members 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
VOLUNTARY SECTOR AGENCIES:
Housing advice project(s) 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
Welfare rights service (eg CAB) 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
Meaningful occupation/ training/ 
employment project(s) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
Day/ drop-in centre(s) 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
Mental health project(s) 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
Drug/ alcohol project(s) 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
Tenancy support service(s) 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
Street outreach team/ project(s) 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
ACCOMMODATION PROVIDERS/ MANAGERS:
Homeless hostel(s) 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
Relevant registered social 
landlord(s)
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
Other relevant supported 
accommodation provider(s)
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
Private sector landlords 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
Large Scale Voluntary Transfer 
Organisation (if applicable)
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
OTHER BODIES NOT LISTED:
1. 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
2. 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
15. Have you previously worked in any of the types of organisations listed in 
questions 13/ 14 above?
Yes □ No □
If YES, Please write in up to 4 types of bodies from the list that you have previously  
worked in and tick if they were in the area in which you currently work:
List organisation(s) in which Tick this box if the organisation
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you previously worked was in your current local authority 
area
(i) __________________________ □
(ii) __________________________ □
(iii) __________________________ □
(iv) __________________________ □
16. We are also interested in the amount of contact from governmental and other 
regional and national bodies regarding single homelessness generally, both in 
terms of the amount of contact you think there is and the amount you think there 
should be.  
Circle one answer in  column A for each body to indicate  how much overall contact 
there is in relation to single homelessness.  Circle one answer in column B for each 
body to indicate how much overall contact there ideally should be in relation to single 
homelessness.
If  applicable,  please  add  up  to  two  other  regional/  national  bodies  you  think  are  
important which are not listed.
Codes
1 = very little contact
2 = little contact
3 = a moderate amount of contact
4 = a lot of contact
5 = a very great deal of contact
6 = not applicable/ don’t know
A – ACTUAL CONTACT B – IDEAL CONTACT
Very little       Very great 
deal
N
/
A
Very little          Very great 
deal
N
/
A
REGIONAL/ NATIONAL BODIES:
Department for Communities and 
Local Government (formerly ODPM)
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
Government Office for the Region 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
Housing Corporation 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
National Housing Federation 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
Regional Housing Board 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
Chartered Institute of Housing 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
OTHER REGIONAL/ NATIONAL BODIES NOT LISTED:
1. 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
2. 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
17(a) Finally, please estimate roughly what percentage of your work time over 
the  past  year  you  personally have  spent  in  contact  with  external  bodies 
regarding single homelessness.  
Please write in approximate percentage ________________
17(b)  Roughly  speaking,  how  was  this  contact  time  over  the  past  year 
distributed between the following types of agencies? (these should add up to 
100% in total):
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Body Percentage of 
contact time with 
this type of body
Other local statutory agencies/ local authority departments
___%
Local voluntary sector organisations
___%
Local accommodation providers/ managers
___%
Regional/ national bodies 
___%
  
                                                                                            T
otal
  
100%
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR TAKING THE TIME TO COMPLETE THIS 
QUESTIONNAIRE, 
YOUR INPUT IS MUCH APPRECIATED
PLEASE RETURN IN THE PREPAID ADDRESSED ENVELOPE BY SEPTEMBER 15TH 
2006 
Contact details: Alice Moseley, Department of Politics, University of Exeter,
Amory Building, Rennes Drive, Exeter EX4 4RJ, Devon
Tel: 01392 832205/ 07746 583669 
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APPENDIX E
Table 1 Profile of authority responses 
Respondents 
(%)
Population122 
(%)
LSVT authority Yes 48 48123
No 52 52
Total 100 100
Authority structure single tier 19 22
two tier 81 78
Total 100 100
Geography urban 45.5 50124
rural 54.5 50
Total 100 100
Region North East 6 7
Yorkshire & the Humber 6 6
East Mids 12 11
East 11 13.5
London Borough 7 9
South East 21 19
South West 12 13
West Mids 9 9.5
North West 15 12
Total 100 100
Table 2 Job titles of respondents 
Job title % N 
Head/ Director of Housing 6 13 
Housing Manager (Policy or Strategy) 8 16 
Housing Officer (Policy or Strategy) 6 13 
Housing Officer (Operational) 14 26
Housing Advice Service Manager/ Team Leader 44 83 
Homelessness Manager 15 28 
Homelessness Officer 5 10 
Missing 2 4
Total 100 193 
Table 3 Management position of respondents
Management Position of respondents % N 
Primarily strategic management 22 42
Primarily operational management 23 45
A mixture of strategic and operational management 51 98
‘Other’ 3 6
Missing 1 2
Total 100 193
122 Refers to population of English local authorities
123 DCLG. ‘Completed LSVTs Dataset’. Updated 16/08/06 
www.communities.gov.uk/index.asp?id=1152563
124 DEFRA Rural definition and classification of authorities dataset: 
www.defra.gov.uk/rural/ruralstats/rural-definition.htm
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Table 4 Unit or Section of Housing Authority125 
% N 
Housing Advice/ Options/ Needs Unit 43 82
Housing Dept, no unit specified 32 62
Housing Strategy Unit 10 19
Homelessness Unit 8 16
Not housing authority 6 11
Missing 1 3
Total 100 193
125 Almost all respondents (93%, n = 179) were from the local authority’s housing directorate, 
with the remainder in the legal, regeneration, community, planning, environment or technical 
services department (or missing responses).
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APPENDIX F
Interview schedule: local agencies
Introduction: 
• Explanation of research aims etc
• Background information on interviewee, e.g. length in post, nature of role
Section A: Local joint working
1. a) Which other agencies does your organisation spend most time working with?
   b) What are your main reasons for being in contact with them?
   c) Do you work much with agencies in other local authority areas? 
2. Do you feel that the way in which services and accommodation for homeless 
people are dispersed between a range of organisations poses any particular 
difficulties for clients? Examples?
3. How important, in your view, is joint working with other agencies in relation to 
     homelessness?
4. Overall, how well do you think agencies in the local area work together?
5. Are there any things which make joint working difficult?
6. What are the things which have helped facilitate joint working?
7. Would you say there is any one agency locally which acts as a sort of coordinator 
for bringing together different homelessness agencies?
(Extra qs for strategic council people only): 
- Do you feel housing associations are cooperative in terms of helping the council 
carry out its statutory homelessness duties?
- Has Social Services been cooperative in terms of assisting with the development 
of the Homelessness strategy? 
- Statutory health services?
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Section B:  Horizontal coordination mechanisms  
1. Show list of mechanisms from survey: 
- Aware of these? Involved in them now or in setting them up?
- How effective do you feel these mechanisms have been in terms of achieving a 
more integrated or coordinated approach
2. Homelessness Strategy
- Was your organisation involved in developing this? 
- How well do you feel the process of creating this worked? 
- Do you think the homelessness strategy has helped bring organisations closer 
together?
(For strategic people only): 
In relation to other local structures or processes such as local area agreements and 
local strategic partnerships:
- Do you feel these have led to better coordination of homeless services? More 
joint working? 
3.  Have you heard about the Regional Champions Scheme? If yes, has your 
organisation had any contact with any so-called ‘regional champions’?
Section C: Vertical coordination
1.  Do you feel joint working is something which is on the government’s agenda?
2. What do you think government can do to make it easier for local organisations to 
work jointly together?
3. Do you feel extra funding through programmes like SP, Innovation Fund, Ethnic 
Minorities Innovation Fund, Hostels Capital Improvement Grant, Change Up help 
to promote better joint working?
4. Have you come across any guidance on joint working either from the government 
or elsewhere? (prompts DVDs, information sent by DCLG or on their website, 
best practice guidance by DCLG or HA, joint commissioning framework)
- If YES, would you say this guidance helps to promote joint working?
- If NO, do you think this sort of thing would be helpful?
5.  Can you think of any ways in which government or other national bodies monitor 
joint working at the local level? 
6. Some areas of legislation set out a duty for agencies to cooperate. Do you think 
cooperation is something which government can require of local agencies?
7. Are there any government policies or programmes that impact on your ability to 
work jointly with other agencies?
8. Do you feel you have the opportunity to influence government in terms of 
homelessness policy generally?
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9. Are there other national bodies that you feel could or do play a role in helping 
facilitate local joint working?
(For strategic council people only): 
Are you aware of the Homelessness Strategies Health check? Contains a self-
assessment part relating to joint working. Did you find it useful?
(For strategic council people only): 
Do you feel the regional tier has much involvement in homelessness issues? (eg 
GORs, Regional Housing 
Section D: Perceptions of central joint working
1. Do you feel that central government itself works in a joined-up way in relation to 
homelessness? Eg different government departments?
End
• Anything else you would like to add?
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APPENDIX G
Interview schedule: civil servants
Introduction: 
• Introduce research/ start recording
• For  the  purposes  of  this  interview,  I  am interested firstly  in  your  views  on 
collaboration between local agencies;  secondly,  the  strategies  used by  central 
government  to  encourage  local  agencies  to  collaborate  and  any  challenges 
involved,  and  lastly,  cross-departmental working  at  central  level.  Therefore 
interview in three sections, covering each of these areas. 
Background information:
• Job title and nature of work you carry out. 
• Length of time in post?
• Length of time in this Department?
• Previously worked in other teams/ departments?
Section A: Joint working between organisations working at local level
1. First of all, how would you define ‘joint working’ in the context of homelessness? 
(prompt: sometimes referred to as collaboration)
2. What would you say are the main reasons for joint working at local level in 
relation to homelessness? Can you think of any particular examples of 
homelessness related issues where joint working is important?
3. Do you think that local service providers working with homeless people are 
committed to joint working?
4. In your view, what are the main difficulties facing local agencies trying to 
collaborate or work together?
5. There are a number of different ways that local organisations can work together. 
Are there any particular methods or approaches that have been successful in your 
view? (prompt - e.g. multi-agency forums, joint training, joint protocols, joint 
assessment, multi-agency monitoring).
Section B: Central/ local relationship
1.   Generally speaking, what can central government do to encourage local joint 
     working?
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2.   How much of a priority would you say it is for your department to get local 
homelessness agencies to work together? Would you say it is a priority for other 
government departments?
3. (a) How has your department attempted to encourage joint working between local 
agencies?  (ask if any joint targets for local agencies) 
(b) Are you aware of any other methods or strategies your department has 
considered? 
4. Which methods or approaches do you feel have been most effective in 
encouraging local agencies to colaborate? (prompt – Homelessness Strategies 
process? SP framework or other funding, legislation, best practice guidance, eg 
DVDs/ written guidance)
5. Overall, do you think that attempts by the centre to encourage multi-agency 
approaches have led to greater joint working on the ground? 
6. Have you encountered any difficulties encouraging local organisations to 
collaborate? 
7. Do you think central government currently does enough to encourage local joint 
working?
8. (a) Which local service providers or bodies do you see as the main targets for 
attempts to increase local joint working? 
(b) Are there any particular local agencies or sectors that are hard to influence? 
(c) While agencies do you see as best placed or best able to take a local lead on 
joint working?
(d) Are there any local agencies that seem reluctant to work together? Any that 
work well together?
9. As far as you are aware, does your department actively monitor or evaluate local 
joint working? (prompt: self assessment forms as part of Homelessness Strategies 
Health Check/ evaluation of Homelessness strategies process) 
10. (a) Does your department receive feedback from local bodies about their attempts 
at joint working?
(b) Do local authorities/ bodies contribute to framing central guidance or policy 
on joint working? Are there any formal mechanisms for doing this?
11. How do you see the role of other national bodies in promoting joint working 
between local service and accommodation providers? (prompt eg Housing Corp, 
GOR, RHB, CIH, NHF, Shelter, Crisis, Homeless Link)
Section C: Central level joint working
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1. How ‘joined up’ would you say different government departments are in relation 
to homelessness?
2. What are the main challenges of achieving joint working between departments?
3. Which departments do you tend to work most closely with? Which have been 
more difficult to work with? Why?
4. Are there examples where departments have worked successfuly together on 
homelessness policy?
5. Can you think of any examples where there have been conflicts or disagreements 
with other government departments? (prompt – Examples where different 
priorities have made it difficult to work together? Examples where policies of  
other departments have contradicted those in yours)
6. (a) Are there any formal arrangements or structures that you are aware of for 
enhancing joint working between departments (prompt - cross-cutting groups, 
joint budgets, joint targets? Movement of civil servants between departments)?
(b)How effective would you say these arrangements or structures are?
7. Which national bodies involved in homelessness other than government 
departments do you work most closely with? 
8. Do you encounter any difficulties working with these bodies?
9. Are there any things that have helped to enhance joint working with these other 
bodies?
End
• Anything else you would like to add that we have not covered?
• Any additional contacts you would suggest might be appropriate to interview?
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APPENDIX H
List of interviewee ID numbers, job titles and local authority
ID Job Title Local Authority
ID1 Local Authority Policy Officer LA1
ID2 Supported Housing Service Manager LA3
ID3 Local Authority Community Services Manager LA3
ID4 Supporting People Manager LA1
ID5 Resettlement Manager LA1
ID6 Supporting People Officer LA1
ID7 Local Authority Housing Manager (Operations) LA1
ID8 Local Authority Housing Manager (Strategy) LA2
ID9 Local Authority Housing Manager (Operations) LA2
ID10 Local Authority Housing Manager (Strategy) LA2
ID11 Voluntary Sector Accommodation Project Officer LA2
ID12 Supported Accommodation Provider LA3
ID13 Housing Association Supported Housing Area Manager LA2
ID14 Voluntary Sector Hostel Manager LA2
ID15 Housing Association Support Worker LA1
ID16 Voluntary Sector Homeless Outreach Project Manager LA2
ID17 Voluntary Sector Meaningful Occupation Project Manager LA2
ID18 Voluntary Sector Project Manager LA2
ID19 Voluntary Sector Project Worker LA2
ID20 Voluntary Sector Day Centre Manager LA3
ID21 Voluntary Sector Drugs Project Manager LA3
ID22 Voluntary Sector Project Manager LA3
ID23 Voluntary Sector Meaningful Occupation Project Manager LA3
ID24 Voluntary Sector Housing Advice Project LA1
ID25 Voluntary Sector Homeless Outreach Project Manager LA2
ID26 Police Officer LA3
ID27 Police Officer LA3
ID28 Probation Service Accommodation Manager LA3
ID29 Community Safety Manager LA2
ID30 Prison Resettlement Officer LA1
ID31 Prison Housing Officer LA1
ID32 Prison Accommodation Manager LA2
ID33 Department of Health Civil Servant N/A
ID34 CLG Civil Servant (Supporting People Directorate) N/A
ID35 CLG Civil Servant (Homelessness Directorate) N/A
ID36 CLG Civil Servant (Homelessness Directorate) N/A
ID37 CLG Civil Servant (Homelessness Directorate) N/A
ID38 Supporting People Manager LA1
ID39 Housing Association Area Manager LA1
ID40 Health Visitor (Homelessness) LA1
ID41 Nurse (Homelessness) LA3
ID42 Social Services Multi-Agency Outreach Team Manager LA3
ID43 Public Health Manager LA3
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APPENDIX I: Data Tables for Contextual and Interpretive Variables: T-tests
Table 1 Contextual intra-organisational factors: Authority structure & Professional Qualifications
Table 2a Contextual inter-organisational factors: Geographical proximity (Rurality) & Fragmentation (Externalisation of services)
Rurality Housing Stock126 Housing Advice Service Homelessness Service
Urban n=88 Rural n=103 External 
n=93
Internal 
n=157
External 
n=33
Internal 
n=157
External 
n=26
Internal 
n=162
Formal collaboration 
mean score (s.d.)
10.18
(3.77)
8.84
(3.89)
9.27
(3.74)
9.41
(3.98)
9.70
(3.56)
9.41
(3.94)
10.04
(3.62)
9.38
(4.04)
T-Test/ Sig Level t=2.40, p=0.017* t=0.66, p=0.51 t=-0.38, p=0.706 t=-0.80, p=0.423
Informal collaboration 
mean score (s.d.)
141.15
(25.02)
131.71 
(30.42)
134.28
(27.27)
136.23
(27.81)
134.95
(27.81)
136.23
(28.08)
129.07
(31.05)
137.75
(29.44)
T-Test/ Sig Level t=2.32, p=0.022* t=0.85, p=0.40 t=0.23, p=0.815 t=1.30, p=0.194
Table 2b: Contextual inter-organisational factors: Government steering
126 Indicated by whether an authority has undergone the Large Scale Voluntary Transfer process
Authority Structure Respondent Holds Degree Respondent Holds Professional Housing 
Qualification
1-Tier n=37 2-Tier n=154 Yes n=111 No n=41 Yes n=104 No n=60
Formal collaboration mean 
score (s.d.)
10.68
(3.65)
9.17
(3.90)
10.06
(4.04)
9.22
(3.21)
9.33
(4.04)
9.75
(3.43)
T-Test/ Sig Level t=2.14, p=0.034* t=1.204, p=0.230 t=-0.68, p=0.497
Informal collaboration mean 
score (s.d.)
145.59
(28.17)
133.77
(28.05)
139.22
(29.53)
132.02
(26.31)
136.34
(28.71)
136.03
(28.12)
T-Test/ Sig Level t=2.30, p=0.023* t=1.37, p=0.172 t=0.067, p=0.947
Individual collaboration mean 
score (s.d.)
N/A 17% 22% 19% 17%
T-Test/ Sig Level N/A t=-1.92, p=0.058 t=0.53, p=0.60
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Vertical contact from CLG Government Incentives to 
Collaborate: Regional 
Champions Scheme/ Beacons
Government Incentives to 
Collaborate: Innovation Fund
High Vertical 
Contact
Low Vertical 
Contact
Yes No Yes No
Formal collaboration 
mean score (s.d.)
10.06 (3.6) 8.05 (4.3) 10.60 
(4.89)
9.33 
(3.75)
12.00 
(3.04)
9.13 
(3.87)
T-Test/ Sig Level t = 2.01, p = 0.001* t=-1.27, p=0.167 t=-2.87, p=0.001*
Informal collaboration 
mean score (s.d.)
143 (26.17) 120 (28.11) 152.9 
(30.8)
134.1 
(27.5)
150.6 (23.39) 134.2
(28.49)
T-Test/ Sig Level t = 22.51, p = 0.000* t=-18.8, p=0.005* t=-16.4 p=0.01*
Table 3: Interpretive factors: Professional background
Previously worked in other 
agency from list
Previously worked in a non-
housing agency
Previously worked in other agency 
within current authority
Yes n=100 No n=89 Yes n=36 No n=64 Yes n=34 No n=64
Formal collaboration 
mean score (s.d.)
9.31
(4.04)
9.64
(3.77)
9.08
(3.99)
9.44
(4.10)
9.68
(4.15)
9.16
(4.02)
T-Test/ Sig Level t=-0.58, p=0.56 t=-0.42, p=0.676 t=0.60, p=0.548
Informal collaboration 
mean score (s.d.)
134.90
(27.98)
137.28
(29.23)
135.44
(24.15)
134.55
(30.10)
135.65
(27.02)
135.22
(28.71)
T-Test/ Sig Level t=-0.58, p=0.56 t=0.15, p=0.881 t=0.07, p=0.942
Individual collaboration 
mean score127 (s.d.)
24%
(16.10)
17%
(17.42)
25%
(18.26)
16%
(15.73)
20%
(17.21)
19%
(15.26)
T-Test/ Sig Level t=1.97, p=0.052 t=2.61., p=0.011* t=0.337., p=0.737
Data Tables for Contextual and Interpretive Variables: Correlation tests
127 Percentage of time individual respondent spent in contact with external agencies
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Table 4
Variables correlated Correlation (r) r² % of variation 
explained by 
variable
P value
Contextual variables
No. of Housing Advice Staff/ Formal Collaboration Score 0.252 0.064 6% 0.000*
No. of Housing Advice Staff/ Informal Collaboration Score 0.237 0.056 6% 0.001*
Level of Single Homelessness/ Formal Collaboration Score 0.289 0.084 8% 0.000*
Level of Single Homelessness/ Informal Collaboration Score 0.211 0.045 5% 0.003*
Interpretive variables
Years in post/ Formal Collaboration Score -0.037 0.001 0.1% 0.618
Years in post/ Informal Collaboration Score 0.119 0.014 1% 0.103
Years in post/ Individual Collaboration Score -0.069 0.005 0.5% 0.180
Years in authority/ Formal Collaboration Score 0.039 0.002 0.2% 0.594
Years in authority / Informal Collaboration Score 0.137 0.019 2% 0.103
Years in authority / Individual collaboration Score 0.038 0.001 0.1% 0.305
Years in homelessness sector/ Formal Collaboration Score 0.002 0.000 0 0.979
Years in homelessness sector/ Informal Collaboration Score 0.127 0.016 2% 0.083
Years in homelessness sector/ Individual Collaboration Score -0.175 0.031 3% 0.009*
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